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This PhD thesis intends to propose an efficient antitrust policy framework applicable to 
vertical agreements. The research focuses on a comparative analysis of the current vertical 
agreement’s legal framework in Brazil and the EU. By comparing the challenges of antitrust 
enforcement in two jurisdictions, this thesis opens new perspectives to analyse the evolution 
of both the rules and the institutional set-up of antitrust authorities concerning the complex 
assessment of vertical agreements. This Introduction will clarify the motivations, goals and 
research questions, in addition to presenting an outline of the following Chapters.  
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE: MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS 
1.1.1. The Complex Assessment of Vertical Agreements 
Vertical agreements represent a broad variety of supply and distribution contracts involving 
diverse market players, such as suppliers of diverse inputs, manufacturers, distributors and 
retailers.1 These agreements are signed among businesspeople on a daily basis, and therefore 
antitrust experts around the world are often asked to advise on whether those agreements 
have any negative impact on competition or whether they infringe antitrust law. The study of 
vertical agreements was always a complex subject and constitutes a lively dispute for antitrust 
enforcement. An explanation for this complexity is the fact that these commercial contracts 
have different motivations and they can enhance mixed impacts on markets, depending on 
the context in which they are implemented.  
Vertical agreements are considered “good” or “pro-competitive” when the 
contractual terms do not restrict competition and when the effects in the market increase 
consumer welfare. Vertical agreements are considered “bad” or “anti-competitive” when 
they provoke negative outcomes, such as collusive practices, that consequently reduce social 
welfare. There are other types of vertical agreements that do not necessarily fit into these two 
 
1 S. Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: A comparative Study of the EU and US Regimes, 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 1. 
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extreme categories, i.e. there are agreements that can reduce consumer welfare while also 
enhancing efficiency gains that outweigh the welfare losses. For this reason, the examination 
of the competitive effects of vertical agreements should be conducted taking into 
consideration the market conditions that firms face in each situation. These puzzling 
characteristics of vertical agreements justify the presence of conflicting positions when it 
comes to their regulation. This regulatory dilemma is one of the motivations for this PhD 
research. 
In terms of the scope of antitrust studies, it is intriguing to study how the legal rules 
and the decision-making process of antitrust enforcers have developed over the years. In the 
United States of America (hereinafter called “US”), for example, certain vertical agreements 
(for instance, those with resale price-fixing clauses) were for several decades considered as 
illegal practices. In the 1970s, the scenario has slowly changed, since economic oriented 
arguments were then recognized by US Courts that started analysing such agreements under 
the rule of reason. Important decisions to be mentioned are the Sylvania2 case about non-
price restraints, the Khan3 case decision regarding maximum resale price-fixing and, more 
recently, the Leegin4 case that is considered the most significant about minimum resale price-
fixing. The shift in the American antitrust case law can be justified by the spread of the 
Chicago school of thought that is counted among the important contributions of Robert Bork 
and Richard Posner.5 
Although there is some consensus on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the possible 
existence of efficient outcomes as a result of vertical contractual relations, new discussions 
have been raised. The rise of new technologies, the spread of the internet, the expansion of 
e-commerce, new applications of algorithms, big data and artificial intelligence have brought 
innovative queries to academics and policy-makers. It is uncertain whether the novel forms 
of vertical relations give rise to new forms of anti-competitive behaviour. Different examples 
of vertical restraints in the context of digitalization, such as the hub-and-spoke conspiracy 
involving price algorithms, put into question the legality of these contractual forms and, 
moreover, the enforcement challenges (the lack of legal tools) that arise from them. The 
 
2 Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc (1976) 433 US 36 and GTW Sylvania Inc v Continental TC Inc (1976) 
537 US 980. 
3 State Oil Co v Khan (1997) 522 US 3. 
4 Leegin Creative Leather Prods v PSKS Inc (2007) 127 US 2705. 
5 See, for example, R. Bork, ‘The rule of reason and the per se concept: price-fixing and market division’, Yale 
Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 5, 1965, pp. 775-847; R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself, 
New York,  Basic Books, 1978; R. Posner, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on 
the Sylvania Decision’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1977, pp. 1-20.  
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discussion of the antitrust enforcement of these contractual innovations is an additional 
motivation for this PhD research.  
Because of the complex assessment of vertical agreements, their legal framework 
must be analysed within the institutional set-up of each jurisdiction. The interpretation of the 
competition rules applicable to vertical agreements must be built beyond their technical 
aspects and it should also include the competitive market features and the characteristics of 
the institutional environment. In addition to the evaluation of the methodology of public 
policies related to vertical agreements, concern relies on the historical evolution of the law- 
and decision-making in Brazil and in the European Union (hereinafter called “EU”) because 
of the relevance of comparative studies in Law and Economics  
At the core of this PhD research, it is assumed that the primary goal of competition 
policies should be the promotion of economic welfare. As explained by Richard Posner, the 
economic welfare concept involves the understanding of the term “economic efficiency”: 
“Firms should be assumed to be rational profit maximisers, so that the 
issues in evaluating antitrust significance of a particular business practice 
should be whether it is a means by which a rational profit maximiser can 
increase its profits at the expense of efficiency, and that the design of 
antitrust rules should take into account the costs and benefits of 
individualized assessment if challenged practices relative to the costs and 
benefits of rule-of-thumb prohibitions”6   
1.1.2. The Recent Changes in the Brazilian Legal Framework 
The motivation to choose Brazil as a case study of this PhD research is not only due to 
personal background. The current challenges encountered by the Brazilian Antitrust 
Authority (in Portuguese, “Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica”, and hereinafter 
called “CADE”) regarding the enforcement of vertical agreements can be compared to those 
observed in other jurisdictions that face similar economic and institutional realities. This 
comparison is relevant in order to learn and share lessons for the future. Indeed, several 
countries around the globe have experienced deep economic and social transformations in 
the last decade that include the implementation of legislative and institutional frameworks 
 
6 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001, at ix (Preface).  
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for enforcing antitrust laws. Brazil is one example of an emerging economy that has put 
efforts in implementing a competition policy, and, as a result, it “has consolidated its position 
among the main antitrust jurisdictions around the world”.7 
A lot has been said and/or written about CADE’s achievements, and the impact of its 
decision in the Brazilian economy and the evolution of national competition policy. 
However, the existing studies often rely on the legal aspects of the decision- and law-making 
process. Less attention has been given to CADE’s historical institutional design and the 
challenges related to it.      
When it comes to regulating vertical agreements, CADE has changed its policy twice 
in the past 5 (five) years. In 2014, the authority defined clear parameters of notification of 
vertical agreements based on the firm’s turnover and market shares within the ex-ante merger 
control review. In 2017, CADE brought an end to the ex-ante notification of vertical 
agreements, favouring the ex-post control of vertical restraints. Nowadays, if a company is 
in doubt about the legality of a certain agreement, it cannot anymore notify the authority and 
wait for the “green sign”. The company has instead to self-assess the potential anti-
competitive effects of the commercial practice (mostly with the help of their legal advisors) 
and it has to bear the costs of legal uncertainty and/or potential future litigations.  
In this PhD research, it is to be wondered whether the sole ex-post control of vertical 
agreements is capable both of guaranteeing legal certainty to business people and of giving 
to them enough incentive to stop engaging in “bad” agreements and to start engaging in pro-
competitive ones. Brazil faces several challenges when it comes to antitrust enforcement, 
since the relevant parties are not well instructed to self-assess their vertical agreements. 
Moreover, the authority has limited experience and budget for the enforcement of restrictive 
practices outside the scope of cartels. Indeed, CADE has for years been considered as “one 
of the most under-staffed competition enforcement authorities”, having nowadays around 5 
people to handle all the antitrust cases that are not cartels or mergers.8 
Brazil is a continental country, the ninth largest world economy (in terms of nominal 
GDP),9 with thousands of business transactions being signed on a daily basis. An efficient 
monitoring of most of the industries and business transactions in this country of continental 
scope seems to be a difficult task. According to Paula Forgioni, because of this continental 
 
7 OECD, Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil, 2019, p. 15. 
8 OECD, 2019, supra note 7, p. 21.  
9 According to the World Bank, in 2018, Brazil had a GDP was equivalent to 1,9 trillion dollars.   
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dimension, vertical restraints imposed by companies with economic power are capable of 
truly causing short and long term “disasters” in Brazil.10 There are regions in Brazil in which 
the closing of distribution channels, including the supressing of traditional commerce, “may 
foster unemployment, reduce the economic activity and undermine development”.11 
According to the author, competition policies must consider the reality of the country and the 
magnitude of its territory to ensure that the benefits of this policy actually reach most of the 
population.  
The adequate regulation of vertical agreements gains importance in this context. It 
should be able to stimulate producers to improve the access to their retailers and to provide 
them with the most diversified products. It should also encourage retailers to distribute their 
products with fair prices and quality to the largest number of consumers in the country, not 
only in the big metropolitan areas but also in the most remote countryside locations. Taking 
into account the challenges to regulation, what attracts the attention is whether the policy 
options of the antitrust agency in recent years have taken into consideration the Brazilian 
economic reality and social needs.  
Another crucial point that motivated the study of antitrust policies in Brazil is the fact 
that in the past years, the country has faced a scenario of political turbulence, that weakened 
the institutional set-up and fostered a deep economic and political crisis in the country. In 
this scenario, the public interest was put into question in several fields of law and decision 
making. The antitrust study has been one of these spheres. According to Article 6 of the 
Brazilian Competition Law, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal, composed by the president of 
the authority and the Commissioners, are appointed by the President of the Brazilian 
Republic, following the Federal Senate approval. Their names are therefore subject to the 
influence of political pressure groups. 
1.1.3. The Experience from Europe and its upcoming challenges 
The European Union has always been, together with the US, the most influential antitrust 
regime in the world. The study of the evolution of competition policies oriented to vertical 
agreements in Europe is one of the drivers of interest in Comparative Law and Economics.  
 
10 P. A. Forgioni, Os fundamentos do antitruste, 9th ed., São Paulo, Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2016. 
11 Forgioni, 2016, p. 18. 
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Historically, Council Regulation No. 17/1962 created an enforcement system of 
vertical agreements based on an ex-ante authorization regime that was applied for almost 40 
years without significant changes. By that time, the European Commission had the monopoly 
in the assessment of the economic effects of vertical agreements and therefore in granting 
exemptions.  Forty years later, EU Regulation 1/2003 installed the ex-post control of vertical 
contracts putting an end to the centralized notification system among Member States. 
Nowadays, all 28 European Members States apply Regulation 1/2003 in parallel to their 
national competition law. In the EU, this change from an ex-ante to an ex-post control of 
vertical agreements happened after decades of having a notification system of agreements, 
and the reform was complemented by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and further 
Guidelines to help business people and law enforcers in self-assessing the potential anti-
competitive effects of such contracts. 
However, the new reality of a more globalized, technology driven, and digitalized 
competitive environment has challenged the European Commission´s approach to date. The 
next years will be dynamic in the discussion of online and offline vertical agreements, since 
more enforcement action is expected regarding sales restrictions and digital conducts. 
Moreover, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation is now under review,12 and the Geo-
Blocking Regulation No. 302/2018 is also applicable. The clear expansion of e-commerce in 
Europe, from 30 % of the population in 2007 to 55 % in 2016, is calling the attention of the 
European Commission.13 In 2017, as part of the “Digital Single Market Strategy”,14 the 
authority published the “E-commerce Sector Inquiry”, taking a look at the market tendencies, 
and the indication of market barriers to the growth of e-commerce.15  
This study devotes attention to relevant information regarding the dynamics of 
vertical agreements. Firstly, the majority of manufacturers reacted to e-commerce and have 
started selling their products directly to consumers, therefore, competing directly with their 
own independent distributors. Secondly, the amount of selective distribution contracts has 
risen considerably over the last decade, as manufacturers want more control of their 
 
12 The current Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (Commission Regulation No, 330/2010), will expire in 
2022. 
13 More data available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en [25/07/2019].  
14 The “Digital Single Market” is a strategy plan created by the European Commission to outline policy actions 
in orger to foster innovation and to stimulate a fair competition in the digital economy among the EU Member 
States. More information about the plan is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-
single-market_en [25/07/2019].  




distribution networks (both in terms of price and quality) within the scope of e-commerce. 
Finally, and most importantly, the development of online commerce encouraged the adoption 
of several other vertical restraints in Europe. Among them are highlight the reinforcement of 
price restrictions, exclusionary practices in respect to online distributors, platform bans, and 
so on. These restrictions are often justified by the fact that producers are afraid of losing the 
control of their distribution channels in this new digital reality.  
Figure 1.1 below identifies the most common commercial restrictions in vertical 
agreements that were identified by the Commission. 
Figure 1.1 – Proportion of retailers with contractual restrictions, per type of restrictions.  
 
Source: European Commission, Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, 2017, p. 9.  
The recent attempts in discussing the competitive outcomes of digital economies in Europe 
certainly broaden the views on the new forms of market power that can offer useful insights 
to other countries.  
Apart from the challenges of regulating vertical agreements in the digital markets, the 
European Union also faces challenges when it comes to the different levels of enforcement 
across the National Competition Authorities. About that, the main question at stake is 
whether, in the legal process related to vertical agreements, all Member States may be able 
both to acquire a similar level of knowledge and to guarantee adequate institutional set-ups 
for the enforcement. 
Reinforcing interest in Comparative Law and Economics, the European experience 
when it comes to regulate vertical agreements, opens new perspectives about normative 








Limitation to sell in marketplace
Limitation to sell cross-border
Limitation to sell on own website
Limitation to use price-comparison tools
Limitation to advertise online
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The first argument is that Brazil has historically followed the EU civil law legal traditions.16 
Secondly, when it comes to competition policy, both jurisdictions have an administrative 
model, and their legal systems passed through a change in policies oriented to vertical 
agreements: from an ex-ante notification of agreements to an ex-post control of anti-
competitive practices, although with some crucial differences. The European antitrust regime 
has inspired the Brazilian antitrust law. In truth, the analysis of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and Article 88 of Law 12.529/2011 in Brazil – the 
legal texts on anti-competitive agreements – shows that the inspiration of the European 
system was largely literal.17 Thirdly, the political and institutional reality in Brazil can be 
directly compared to some less developed EU countries, e.g., Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. This means that the challenges encountered by these jurisdictions, mainly 
related to a late development of market economies and late implementation of competition 
law – and the way they are overcoming them – can also be considered comparable to those 
encountered in the Brazilian reality.  
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The main objective of this PhD research is to identify, under different institutional 
frameworks, a policy framework of efficient antitrust enforcement applicable to vertical 
agreements. In this attempt, this research intends to explore the existing legal framework and 
institutional set-up in Brazil and in Europe with the aim of evaluating lessons to be learned 
from these jurisdictions, considering their promises and drawbacks. Taking into account this 
background, the research seeks to investigate the direct and indirect enforcement costs that 
antitrust authorities should consider and evaluate when designing an efficient regulation of 
vertical agreements. This PhD research intends to answer the following main research 
question:  
How should an antitrust policy be designed to efficiently deter anti-competitive 
vertical agreements and encourage pro-competitive ones? 
 
16 The law in Brazil law was mainly influenced by Roman law and the law of contemporary European countries, 
such as Portugal, France, Italy and Germany. G. Angelozzi, História do Direito no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 
Freitas Bastos Editora, 2009.  
17 See, for instance, work of Verissimo, in which he does the literal analysis of the text of the Brazilian and 
European competition provisions. M. P. Verissimo, ‘A “regra da razão” e o controle de condutas 
anticompetitivas pelo CADE’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, 
Editora Singular, 2018, p. 910. 
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In order to guide the reader, this research proposes other groups of sub-questions.   
The first group addresses economic-oriented questions: In which conditions should 
vertical agreements be considered efficiency enhancing? How can vertical agreements lead 
to anti-competitive outcomes? 
The second group refers to legal-oriented questions, such as: What are the possible 
legal treatments for vertical agreements? What are the promises and drawbacks of the legal 
treatment chosen by Brazil and by the EU? To what extent has the evolution of the Brazilian 
and European regulation been conditioned by the interests of private relevant actors? 
The third and most important group of sub-questions is related to the Law and 
Economics analysis. The following questions will guide us to the normative analysis: Does 
a change in antitrust policies from ex-ante to ex-post control of vertical agreements always 
enhance the efficiency of the enforcement of competition law? What are the direct and 
indirect enforcement costs in a notification system of vertical agreements and in an ex-post 
monitoring system? Which elements affect those different costs? 
To answer the proposed questions, this PhD research applies Comparative Law and 
Economics methodology. The research relies on comparative legal methods to provide an 
overview of the evolution and recent developments of antitrust policies applicable to vertical 
agreements in Brazil and in the European Union. The studies of these different jurisdictions 
open new perspectives of interpretation and transformation of public policies. Through a 
process of learning, new practices should be studied to enhance economic efficiency and 
social welfare in the markets. The PhD research also counts on the analysis of institutional 
factors of these jurisdictions that have affected the optimal enforcement of legal rules. In 
more detail, the research primarily connects the analysis of antitrust law in different 
jurisdictions to the economic theory of vertical agreements, in order to justify the need for an 
economic-oriented normative analysis. 
1.3. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS  
This PhD research is organized in six chapters.  
After Chapter 1, which introduces the goals, motivations and the research questions, 
Chapter 2 is centred on the economic analysis of vertical agreements. It summarizes the 
debate about the effects of these commercial contracts in terms of economic efficiency and 
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potential anti-competitive outcomes. This Chapter provides a literature review that discusses 
the complex assessment of vertical agreements and the difficulties in designing optimal 
antitrust policies. Considering different approaches to the economic analysis of vertical 
agreements, it highlights the main efficiency arguments, such as solving double mark-up 
problem, preventing free-riding in both upstream and downstream markets, and lowering 
transaction costs of the firms that are in the vertical structure. In addition, those efficiency 
arguments are analysed more particularly in cases where vertical restraints are implemented 
in online markets.  
Taking into account the anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements, Chapter 2 
presents a selected literature review which explains that vertical agreements may help 
maintaining horizontal cartels, exacerbating market imperfections and increasing the market 
power of incumbent firms.  The anti-competitive effects of the increase of collusion practices, 
the reduction of intra and inter-brand competition, and market foreclosure are understood as 
related processes. To enrich the discussion, some considerations about the anti-competitive 
outcomes in the context of online markets are presented. 
Chapter 3 discusses the regulation of vertical agreements and the enforcement 
activities in Brazil mainly from 1994 until 2019. The Chapter gives a brief historical 
perspective of the Brazilian Competition Law, including the discussion regarding the goals 
of the competition policy in the country.  It explores the evolution of policies applicable to 
vertical agreements, including the recent changes in legislation after 2016. Moreover, it 
focuses on the jurisprudence of vertical cases and on the institutional design that allows the 
ex-post enforcement of vertical agreements. The Chapter discusses the new legal framework 
in Brazil by analysing the law-making process (i.e. the public consultation) that resulted in 
the end of the ex-ante control of vertical agreements.  
Chapter 4 presents the evolution of policies oriented to vertical agreements in the 
European Union in the period starting from 1957 – when the internal market was established 
– until the late 2010s, as well as its current challenges. After briefly describing the origins of 
antitrust policy in Europe, the Council Regulation 17/1962, and the first sector exemptions 
for vertical agreements, the Chapter outlines the modernization of the competition policies 
in Europe under Regulation 1/2003 (also called 2004 Reform). Historically, Regulation 
1/2003 replaced the centralized ex-ante notification system of vertical agreements to a 
decentralized ex-post control of these business practices. Chapter 4 finally identifies the 
pillars that made the 2004 Reform possible and the challenges that jeopardize the optimal 
enforcement among the different Member States.  
11 
 
Chapter 5 develops a normative analysis of antitrust policies applicable to vertical 
agreements. For this analysis we consider the antitrust enforcement cost framework and a 
comparative analysis of the Brazilian and the European Union experiences. The Chapter 
looks at three main types of costs faced by the antitrust agency when enforcing vertical 
agreements.  First, it focuses on the information costs that are involved in the assessment of 
vertical agreements, that is to say, the costs of gathering relevant information for an antitrust 
assessment and the costs of assessing the complex effects of vertical agreement. Second, the 
Chapter describes the incentive costs which are related to the legal uncertainty of parties in 
a given framework. These costs are measured by analysing the level of fines of different 
jurisdictions, the probability of error, the role of private enforcement, and the general trust in 
institutions. Third, the administrative costs of enforcement practices are considered. To 
illustrate the cost analysis, there are comparative elements from Brazil and the EU that have 
been previously discussed. Following the cost analysis, the Chapter presents a normative 
discussion of efficient policies of vertical agreement taking into consideration different 
scenarios of enforcement costs. Chapter 5 also offers policy recommendations for Brazil and 
the EU. 





























2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION: THE REGULATORY DILEMMA OF 
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS  
This Chapter is centred on the economic analysis of vertical agreements. The aim is to 
summarize the debate regarding the effects of these commercial contracts, focusing on the 
efficiency theories and on the potential anti-competitive outcomes. The expression “vertical 
agreements” can be described as a commercial agreement between firms at distinct stages of 
the supply chain.1 Vertical agreements basically represent a broad variety of supply and 
distribution contracts involving diverse market players, such as suppliers of diverse inputs, 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers. Vertical agreements gain importance in a context in 
which technological advances are dynamic and are changing all the time. This is the case 
because they allow companies to form commercial alliances in order to strengthen 
themselves and to be able to compete in diverse markets. Added to the technological 
question, turbulence in the global economic scenario and uncertainties in the financial 
markets also give greater prominence to the issue. Vertical agreements are signed among 
businesspeople on a daily basis, and therefore antitrust experts around the world are often 
asked to advise on whether those agreements have any negative impact on competition or 
whether they infringe antitrust law.  
 
Herbert Hovenkamp highlights important conceptual differences between vertical and 
horizontal agreements for antitrust law enforcers: 
“The conceptual differences between a horizontal agreement and a vertical 
agreement are significant. For example, competitors meeting together to 
discuss market prices may provoke considerable suspicion. But a supplier 
 
1 S. Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: A comparative Study of the EU and US Regimes, 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 1. 
14 
 
and a dealer are necessarily parties to a buyer-seller agreement, and they 
presumably discuss prices all the time. As a result, in vertical cases the 
evidentiary focus tends to be the content of the agreement, while horizontal 
cases tend to focus on the fact of agreement.”2  
Indeed, vertical agreements can contain specific clauses that restrict competition on upstream 
and/or on downstream levels. Those restrictions are called hereinafter “vertical restraints”, 
and they can be categorized as: price and non-price restraints.  
The first ones are restrictions on the downstream markets (i.e. on distributor, retailers, 
and buyers) as to the price at which they may resell their products and/or services.  Resale 
price-fixing (also referred in the literature as resale price maintenance, or just RPM) is an 
example of it, since the retailer is obliged to not sell its products below a certain price 
threshold, fixed by the producer. The second type of vertical restraints, the non-price 
restraints, correspond to all the other categories of restrictions that are not related to price. 
As examples of non-price restraints we have geo-blocking clauses (also known in the 
literature as exclusive territory clauses) in which distributors are prohibited from selling in 
certain geographic regions; exclusive distribution and supply clauses, when the producer 
imposes a restriction on the distributor in order to be the only one contracting with it; selective 
distribution, when the producers require distributors to meet certain criteria before entering 
into the network and  franchising, in which a license is granted to trade under a brand, 
provided that the licensor’s standards for the business are maintained.3  
In the scope of contract law, the term freedom of contracts refers to a main legal 
principle. It means that parties should be free to decide upon the terms of any agreements.4 
It also means that parties are presumed to be equal when they decide upon the contractual 
terms. This important expression captures the volunteer aspect of the contract, and therefore, 
parties in the contract are “protected against coercion and fraud”.5 The principle of freedom 
of contracts is also applied to commercial contracts, such as vertical agreements. When 
companies opt to sign vertical agreements, it is expected that parties (e.g. producer and 
distributor) benefit from this transaction. Parties believe that the agreement itself would make 
them better-off.  
 
2 H. Hovenkamp, Principles of Antitrust, St. Paul, West Academic Publishing, 2017, p. 435. 
3 L.A. Sulivan, Antitrust, Minessota, West Publishing, 1976, p. 400. 
4 See P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford, Oxford, 1979.  
5 H. Collins, The Law of Contract, 2nd ed., London, Butterworths, 1993, p. 17. 
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However, this principle is not absolute.6 As we will discuss along this Chapter, parties 
may have different bargaining positions and might want to use these agreements to intensify 
their market power, increasing market imperfections, or to maintain an anti-competitive 
behaviour, exclude rivals from the markets, and/or deter entry. All these possible effects 
decrease the overall welfare in the specific market. 
In the scope of Competition Law, according to Patrick Rey and Francisco Caballero-
Sanz, who prepared an important policy-evaluation document about vertical restraints for the 
European Commission in 1996, there are different explanations for the existence of vertical 
agreements.7 The first one refers to the need to fix market failures and guarantee vertical 
coordination in the manufacturer-retailer relationship.  The authors claim that, because 
producers may have market power, distributors do not always keep all the benefits of their 
sales efforts, which is what drives them to maintain their sales effort at a sub-optimal social 
level. As an answer to these market imperfections between producers and retailers, vertical 
agreements are introduced so as to prevent the negative outcomes of that externality. The 
second explanation draws attention to the use of vertical agreements as a way to restrict 
competition. This is the case because these contracts can be used by firms as instruments to 
maintain collusive behaviour, and to increase their market power to the detriment of rivals, 
new entrants and consumers.8  
The study of vertical agreements was always a complex subject, constituting a lively 
discussion for antitrust enforcement. These commercial alliances among firms have different 
motivations and may cause different effects on markets, according to the context where they 
are used. On the one hand, they carry important economic efficiencies, and, on the other 
hand, they may generate anti-competitive concerns. As described by Sandra Colino, “these 
puzzling characteristics justify conflicting positions when it comes to their regulation”.9 
Other authors also have highlighted the complex issue when it comes to regulate vertical 
agreements. For Posner, the nature of restrictions in vertical agreements complicates the 
development of an ideal antitrust policy, in his words “how to enforce antitrust against 
practices that we are not prepared to treat (as we are in the case of price-fixing) as entirely 
 
6 See discussion in P. Logelain, Competition Law: Self-assessment of contracts –  Interaction of Eu Competition 
Law with Contract Law and Tort Law, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011, p. 18. 
7 P. Rey & F. Caballero-Sanz, ‘The Policy Implication of the Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints’, 
European Commission Economic Paper, No. 119, 1996, p. 5. 
8 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, p. 5-6. 
9 S. Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: A comparative Study of the EU and US Regimes, 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 1. 
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lacking in possible redeeming economic virtues”.10 This difficulty characterizes the 
regulatory dilemma that motivates this PhD research.  
This Chapter provides a literature review that discusses the complex assessment of 
vertical agreements and the difficulties to design optimal antitrust policies. Some related 
questions are highlighted: In which conditions should vertical agreements be considered 
efficiency enhancing? How can vertical agreements lead to anti-competitive outcomes?  
To answer these questions, the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents 
the main economic efficiency theories of vertical agreements. Among these theories, we 
highlight the double mark-up theory, the free-riding theory, and the transaction cost theory. 
Section 2.3 analyses the potential anti-competitive outcomes of these commercial structures. 
This Section generally discusses the collusion theory, the reduction of intra and inter-brand 
competition and the theories of market foreclosure and barriers to entry. Sequentially, Section 
2.4 discusses the double-side effects of vertical agreements illustrated by selective vertical 
restraints: retail price-fixing; geo-blocking and selective distribution. Section 2.5 briefly 
introduces a political economy discussion which shows that welfare-oriented arguments 
might not always be the motivation of policy makers. Finally, the Chapter ends with some 
conclusive remarks about the enduring debate on policy making. 
2.2. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCIES OF VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS 
The purpose of this Section is to present an overview of some relevant topics about vertical 
agreements that have been highlighted in economic theories. Economic efficiency, in the case 
of vertical agreements, can be mostly defined as allocative efficiency, the situation in which 
the total welfare of the market is guaranteed (optimal prices and greater levels of output in 
the market). Briefly speaking, in some situations where prices are persistently held above 
marginal cost and the output is reduced, vertical agreements can be used to guarantee that the 
market outcomes will go back to the efficient level.11  
 
10 R. Posner, ‘Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, 2005, p. 
241. 
11M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 303. 
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It is worth pointing out that every vertical structure faces a diverse range of decisions 
on its daily activities that goes from retail and wholesale prices, to locations for the 
distribution, quality demands for their distributors, sales efforts, and so on. Some decisions 
are only controlled by producers, while others are controlled by the distributors. In some 
cases, the decision over some variables affects the payoffs of each party involved, as well as 
the welfare outcomes.12 In other words, because the choices of one company (e.g. the 
producer) can directly influence the profit of other companies (e.g. the distributors), the 
outcome of the firm’s decision making may generate inefficiencies in markets, if not 
correctly assessed.13 Vertical restraints can be used as a way of repairing the externalities 
related to the coordination problem among the agents in the same vertical structure.  
Considering different approaches to the economic analysis of vertical agreements, 
three main efficiency arguments are highlighted. First, vertical restraints can solve the double 
mark-up problem. Secondly, vertical restraints can prevent free-riding in both upstream and 
downstream markets. Thirdly, vertical restraints can lower the transaction costs of the firms 
that are in the vertical structure. Lastly, we also point out the context of those efficiency 
arguments when vertical restraints are imposed in online markets.  
2.2.1. Solving the Double Mark-up Problem 
Over the years, economists have developed models to explain the outcomes of monopolies 
(higher prices, lower outputs), and also of successive monopolies (double marginalization). 
Double marginalization was first analysed by Spengler in the 1950s and corresponds to 
circumstances in which manufacturers and retailers have some market power.14 When this 
situation in observed, one company usually does not consider the effect of the price on the 
profit of the other company when setting its own price. Therefore, they set an additional 
mark-up to their costs that results in excessive prices to final consumers.  
In the light of increasing retail prices, for example, the distributor raises the profit 
margin to decrease the volume of sales, but while doing so, the distributor does not take into 
account that the reduction of the volume of sales has negative effects on the volume of profits 
 
12 Colino, 2010, supra note 9, p.11. 
13 Colino, 2010, supra note 9, p.12. 
14 J. Spengler, ‘Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1950, 
pp. 347-352.  
18 
 
of the producer. Such a principal-agent problem15 leads to a final price that is higher than the 
level that maximizes both the producer’s and distributor's total profits.  
If it is not possible for the firms to integrate vertically, different types of restraints 
can remove the market power of the retailers, putting an end to this negative externality.16 
Resale price-fixing appears to be a simple solution to the problem, since the producer can 
simply impose the resale price on the retailer, instead of waiting until the retailers define the 
price that maximize their profits. It is worth emphasizing that since the double mark-up 
generates excessively high prices, any vertical restrictions used solely to eliminate this 
problem lead in fact to lower prices, benefitting both companies and consumers. In these 
cases, vertical restraints guarantee lower prices, more outputs, increasing therefore total 
surplus and guaranteeing efficient outcomes in the markets.  
2.2.2. Preventing Free-Riding  
The first important consideration to note is that distributers typically offer a variety of 
services to consumers that directly affect the demand for the selling good.17 Among these 
services, the most relevant are: information and guidance on pre-sales to prospective clients, 
the size of showrooms, number of qualified sellers in the store, after-sales services, etc. In 
general terms, the fewer services that are provided by the retailers, the smaller is the demand 
for their products. 
There are diverse circumstances in which the behaviour of the retailer is unexpected 
and disadvantageous to the producer, for example, when retailers provide a sub-optimal level 
of services, which directly affect the number of sales. If retailers do not have the right 
incentives to appropriate the benefits of such services, they will not be motivated to invest in 
 
15 Briefly speaking, in Law & Economics, the term “principal-agent problem” addresses the difficulties that can 
arise in conditions of asymmetric and incomplete information. For instance, situations in which a Company A 
(principal) takes a certain decision regarding its business practive based on their own interest, not necessarly 
considering the interest of the other contract party (agent). J. Stiglitz, ‘Principal and agent’, The New Palgrave: 
A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 3, 1987, pp. 966–71. 
16 S. Bishop & M. Walker, Economics of E.C. Competition Law: concepts, application and measurement, 3rd 
ed., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2010, p. 198. 
17 From Microeconomic Theory, the demand curve of a product shows what happens to the quantity demanded 
of a good when its price varies, “holding constant all the other variables that influence buyers”. If any of the 
other variables apart from price and quantity changes, the demand curve shifts. Pre-sale services can be one 
factor that shifts the demand curve upwards, i.e. lead to a situation where the demand for such a product 
increases. See G. Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, 8th ed., Boston, Cengage Learning, 2018, p.71. 
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them, which will directly affect the producer’s profit.18 This is again another principle-agent 
problem that can somehow be fixed with vertical restraints.  
In the 1960s, Lester Telser was a pioneer scholar in discussing that vertical 
agreements can be used to increase total level of sales in the market and therefore increase 
total welfare.19 The author discusses that manufacturers can use contractual restrictions to 
prevent free-riding, and to induce retailers to invest in services. As suggested by Telser, some 
retailers might have good reasons for not investing in pre-sale treatments, since they do not 
bear the investment costs and therefore they can charge lower prices to consumers.20 The 
consumers, in this sense, can get the information of pre-sales services regarding a specific 
product from one retailer (i.e. the consumer would first visit the shop which offers additional 
services to take all the relevant information), and afterwards purchase the same product in 
another shop that has lower prices and does not invest in services.  
This situation illustrates the free-riding problem: some retailers “free-ride” on the 
investments made by other retailers. The expected outcome is that no retailer will have an 
incentive to invest in the pre-sale services, unless the producers give them incentives to do 
so. In this context, price restrictions show up as an option. Resale price-fixing guarantees a 
minimum gross mark-up for the retailers. They are therefore forced to find other forms of 
competitive strategies, such as the offer of special sales services, rather than relying only on 
price competition. One important point raised by Telser is that the nature of the product 
matters when applying this free-riding discussion. Branded products and new products that 
are unfamiliar to the mass of consumers are good “candidates” for resale price-fixing.21  
To sum up, Telser clarified that vertical price-fixing could benefit producers in the 
case where restraint is the only way to promote the sales services of distributers. Over the 
decades, his analysis was extended and complemented by several other scholars such as 
Robert Bork22 and Richard Posner23 who also discussed non-price restrictions. 
 
18 M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 314. 
19 L. Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade’, The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 3, (October) 
1960, pp. 86-105. 
20 Telser, 1960, p. 91. 
21 Telser, 1960, p. 95. 
22 See, for example, R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself, New York, Basic Books, 1978. 
23 See, for example, R. Posner, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1977, p. 4. 
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In the late 1960s, Bork wrote the first article directly addressing the economic 
analysis of vertical restraints, mainly indicating the efficiency argument.24 According to the 
author, the vertical restraints will lead to an efficient outcome only if both the producer of 
the goods and the consumer have their interests aligned.  In other words, a producer imposes 
restraints only when these restraints are profitable, meaning, only if these restraints are able 
to expand the sales of the goods. And this expansion in sales will depend on consumer 
preferences. If consumers understand that it is worth paying more for goods that have the 
additional value of supplementary services, they will buy more of these specific goods. 
According to Bork, even though these vertical restraints are anti-competitive in their nature, 
the effects might be pro-competitive, since the output has increased. In our example, 
consumers buy more goods with the increased level of services.  
Following the authors’ line of argumentation, every commercial restriction imposed 
by producers is pro-competitive, and therefore, efficiency-enhancing. Actually, Bork and 
Posner claim that, even when a firm has monopoly power, vertical restraints, such as resale 
price-fixing, can be pro-competitive. According to the authors, it is crucial to conduct the 
rule of reason25 analysis in such cases, which involves the balancing of potential economic 
efficiency and potential anti-competitive effects. Moreover, they present the argument that 
the increase of consumer welfare is not only due to lower prices and an increase in quality of 
products or services, but also the increase in consumer satisfaction. This is why the increase 
in pre- or post-sales services can increase overall consumer satisfaction, which will lead to 
greater outputs.  
The spread of the Chicago school of thought, which includes the contributions of 
Telser, Bork and Posner, started to influence US judges in the 1970s. Throughout many 
decades, vertical restraints in the US were considered illegal. This scenario started changing 
with the well-known Sylvania26 case, that was a crucial decision in the topic of vertical 
restraints, since it accepted the economic efficiency arguments and rule of reason approach. 
As the Court in Sylvania noted, restrictions are necessary because, in their absence, any dealer 
 
24 R. Bork, ‘The rule of reason and the per se concept: price-fixing and market division’, Yale Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5, 1965, pp. 775-847. 
25 In practical terms, the “rule of reason” term can be defined as the legal approach taken by law enforcers 
(antitrust agencies and courts) that considers the assessment both pro and the anti-competitive effect of a 
business practices in their decision making process. It means that it is the opposite legal approach taken in cases 
of per se illegal practices. The rule of reason is the main approach taken by US courts. See discussion of R. Van 
der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, p. 230-234. See 
also OECD, Glossary of industrial organisation economics and competition law, p. 77. 
26 Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc (1977) 433 US 36. 
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who offers presale services would be inviting competing dealers to provide no (or fewer) 
services and thereby under-price them. This "free-riding danger” would deter dealers from 
offering presale services, at least at the optimum amount.27 As decided by American courts: 
“Service and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and 
major household appliances. The availability and quality of such services 
affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. 
Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free rider" effect, 
these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive 
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all 
provided the services than if none did.”28 
Following this analysis, William Comanor raises the critical question of whether customers 
are served better by reduced prices and fewer services or greater prices and more services.29 
The author argues that the assessment of whether a particular restraint increases or decreases 
efficiency in a certain market largely depends on the relative preferences of different groups 
of consumers, i.e. it depends on how knowledgeable (or ignorant) they are in respect of a 
specific product. He argues that there are some consumers that do not perceive the value of 
additional services, meaning that they would prefer to pay less for the same product. Because 
of that, the economic efficiency argument elaborated by Bork would only make sense if the 
number of consumers that indeed value these services and are willing to pay more for the 
goods, is greater than the amount of consumers that is not willing to pay for these additional 
services.  
In Comanor’s words, “the profitability of imposing a vertical restraint depends on the 
demand-stimulating effects of the additional information for marginal consumers”.30 It 
means that vertical restraints, such as resale price-fixing, benefit “ignorant” marginal 
consumers but harm “knowledgeable” infra-marginal consumers that do not give the same 
value to the extra information. An interesting example discussed by Comanor is the case of 
new products. Whenever a new product is launched, more consumers are “ignorant” when it 
comes to the use of such products, as well as their characteristics, meaning that more 
consumers are willing to pay more to get the sales services. This is different from a product 
 
27 Posner,1977, supra note 23, p. 10.  
28 Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc (1977) 433 US 36, decision 23, June 1977, p. 2561.  
29 W. Comanor, ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy’, Harvard 
Law Review, Vol.  98, No. 5, 1985, p. 1001. 
30 W, Comanor & J. Kirkwood, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy’, Contemporary Economic 
Policy, Vol. 3, 1985, p. 14. 
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that has been launched for years, and the market, in general, has enough information about 
the product, and the producer has less to add to it. Consequently, retail price-fixing is more 
likely to increase efficiency contrary to the case of an incumbent firm.31 In a more qualitative 
analysis, Howard Marvel reaches similar conclusions.32 
 
In the context of the free-riding theory, it is worth highlighting three additional efficiencies 
of vertical restraints.  First, preventing free-riding among producers should also be 
considered as an efficiency gain.33 In this case, a producer may want to increase the effective 
distribution by making specific investments in the distribution channel (by training staff, 
investing in the shops, and so on).34 However, rival producers could free-ride by using the 
same outlets without contributing to the investments, or using the same trained staff. In this 
situation, the first retailer may lose its incentives to investment in a better distribution system 
and therefore consumers are worse-off, since it affects the amount of products available for 
them. This free-riding problem could be fixed by exclusive deals, or geo-blocking clauses. 
Second, there is the quality certification theory. Some retailers provide customers 
with a certification service that also involves some costs (rent of place in a good 
neighbourhood, hiring smart assistants, nice decoration) and therefore, other shops can 
benefit from these investments. This argument was developed by Marvel and Stephen 
McCafferty35 who justify restraints such as resale price-fixing and selective distribution to 
solve the free-riding problem. Considering the latter case, usually related to luxury goods, 
only a specific type of shop (being in a nice shopping street, having dedicated personnel, 
having particular amenities and so on) is entitled to sell the product. It is worth noting that 
not enabling a producer to safeguard the reputation of its goods is detrimental to the producer 
itself and also to the buyers who value the luxurious features of the goods.36 
 
Third, the hold-up theory is relevant for this discussion. Distributors sometimes must make 
specific investments in their retail shops which may decrease their value, when the 
relationship is ended. The use of long-term contracts is often the way to guarantee and 
 
31 Comanor & Kirkwood, 1985, p. 15. 
32 H. Marvel, ‘How Fair Is Fair Trade?’, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 3, 1985, pp. 23-35. 
33 Before, the analysis was more focused on the free-riding among distributors. 
34 G. Niels, H. Jenkins & J. Kavanagh J, Economics for Competition Lawyers, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 247. 
35 H. Marvel & S. McCafferty, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification’ RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1984, pp. 346-359. 
36 Motta, 2004, supra note 18, p. 334. 
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support these specific investments and avoid any type of opportunistic behaviour from the 
distributors.37 Franchising contracts is the classic example of the long-term commitments, 
but they are not the only ones. Exclusive arrangements, such as exclusive distribution or even 
selective distribution systems can guarantee an optimal level of investments and therefore 
effective level of sales. This specific efficiency is also discussed in the scope of the 
transaction cost theory and therefore, it gives us a link to the next subsection of this Chapter.  
2.2.3. Reducing Transaction Costs  
The third economic efficiency argument of vertical agreements is the reduction of transaction 
costs. Ronald Coase first created the Transaction Cost Theory in his 1937 contribution "The 
Nature of the Firm", and this publication formed the basis of the New Institutional 
Economics.38 The main point of this theory is that transaction costs affect the ways in which 
markets are organized, that is to say, the interaction among companies. Examples of 
transaction costs include contract negotiation costs, research costs, contract implementation 
and enforcement costs, among others. One of the ideas behind Coase’s theory is that, on the 
one hand, the higher  the transaction costs perceived by companies, for example, in their 
contractual negotiations with other companies, the greater the incentives to maintain various 
activities within the company. On the other hand, if these transaction costs are lower, 
organizations will have incentives to sign various contracts with other companies. 
In the 1970s, Oliver Williamson further developed the transaction cost theory in the 
scope of price theory.39 The author explains that the size of transaction costs directly 
influences the choice in favour of certain governance structures (for instance, whether to 
centralize or not the governance of a firm through integration).40 The work of Williamson 
has direct implications for antitrust discussions about vertical restraints and vertical 
integrations since he acknowledges that transaction costs should be considered in the analysis 
of antitrust cases.41 As this idea will be better developed, in order to reduce transaction costs, 
companies will engage in vertical alliances to a greater or lesser degree.  
 
37 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996, supra note 7, p. 16. 
38 R. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, Vol. 4, (November) 1937, pp. 386-405.  
39 R. Van der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, p. 62. 
40 See, for instance, O. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York, 
Free Press, 1975.  
41 See, for instance, O. Williamson, ‘Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transaction Cost Approach’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 4, 1979, pp. 953-993. 
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In his book “Markets and Hierarchies”, Williamson recognizes that the self-interest 
of agents (opportunism) and the bounded rationality are important factors of the transaction 
cost theory to be taken into consideration. They allow the firms to choose among different 
governance structures.42  Williamson refers to these features as the two human factors which 
might be a major source of risk and limitations on governance transactions. He indicates that 
the governance structure should be built in such a way as to minimize the bounded rationality 
of firms and consumers, and at the same time protect transactions against opportunism. In 
other words, the integrity of a distribution system should be protected against free-riders, and 
the quality of products should not be debased. If any of these features is observed in specific 
markets, vertical market restrictions may be necessary.43 
According to Williamson, in a first extreme case, market solutions provide the 
efficient outcome. A market is an institution in which a significant number of products are 
changed regularly, and where the rules and structures of these negotiations and transactions 
are standardized. In markets, the observed behaviour pattern is based on individual interests, 
and social interaction without restrictions. The market offers choices, flexibility and 
opportunities. Markets are poor learning mechanisms and the transfer of technological know-
how and information is freely available. Markets can be understood as situations where 
producers and distributors are free to contract, and no commercial restriction is imposed on 
any of them.44  
In the second extreme case, hierarchies are needed to achieve efficiency. A hierarchy 
is a network of relational contracts between individuals to efficiently organize the process of 
production. Hierarchies permit better specialization and decision-making, better controlling 
and coordination among agents (in his words “lower communication expenses”), less 
uncertainty related to unexpected costs or small-number of exchangers.45 Finally, according 
to Williamson, hierarchies narrow the information gap that exists between autonomous 
agents,46 since the transactions and the flow of resources that were previously conducted in 
the market are then internalized. Employees operate under the system of administrative 
procedures and play roles shaped by senior supervisors in the context of an authority system. 
Whereas the tasks are usually very specialized, internal activities are highly inter-dependent. 
 
42 Williamson, 1975, p. 21-22. 
43 Williamson, 1979, p. 958. 
44 See discussion of Chapter 2 in Williamson, 1975, supra note 40. 
45 Williamson, 1975, supra note 40, p. 49-54. 
46 Williamson, 1975, supra note 40, p. 49-54. 
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Hierarchies are constituted by vertically integrated firms, with their own routines, 
expectations and detailed knowledge. 
In 1985, Williamson included in his analysis a more profound attention to asset 
specificity. According to the author, the decision of firms in respect of their governance 
structures, are mostly dependent on the degree of asset specificity.47 In more detail, if the 
degree of asset specificity is low, firms depend less on these assets in order to keep their 
economic activity, and, when necessary, tend to sign short-term agreements with other 
companies. The degree of asset specificity does not bring excessive transaction costs to 
companies, and therefore market-based transactions are preferred. In these circumstances, 
the market itself, supported by contract law, should be able to provide effective protection 
mechanisms to the transacting parties. On the contrary, when the degree of asset specificity 
is large, companies are more dependent on this asset, and usually require large investments 
to have it. Therefore, the idea of engaging in long-term contracts with another company with 
more expertise, becomes attractive to the firm. It becomes more effective to keep the assets 
within the company, for instance, via vertical integration.  
An important contribution of Williamson that has direct relevance for this PhD 
research is the recognition of hybrid structures of governance.48 In between a pure market 
setting and a hierarchy, the author defines the hybrid forms of relationship derived from 
collaboration between agents. As stated previously, an increase in the degree of asset 
specificity most often creates a bilateral dependence between buyers and sellers, which 
promotes the formation of long-term contractual arrangements among parties. Therefore, the 
hybrid form is a “specialized governance structure to address a bilateral dependence without 
promoting integration”.49 The usual explanation for bilateral dependency invokes the 
existence of specific assets that create some "lock-in" among agents and simultaneously 
generate appropriate quasi-rents.50 The lock-in effect, therefore, provides an explanation 
regarding the long-term characteristics of vertical agreements. Practical examples of hybrid 
forms are franchising agreements, long term supply and distribution contracts with exclusive 
clauses, and so on. 
 
47 O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press, 1985. 
48O. Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1991, pp. 269-296. 
49 Williamson, 1991. 
50 The lock-in effect was discussed in B. Klein, R. Crawford & A. Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable 




Regarding coordination, hybrid forms generally require planning and management 
decisions, both within and between firms (otherwise the market would be sufficient). They 
develop specific features (contractual restrictions) to maintain long-term relationships 
between the parts of the arrangement, while ensuring efficient coordination and acceptable 
interests to generate income.51 As discussed in the previous subsection, vertical restraints can 
indeed guarantee better coordination between producers and distributers, generating market 
efficiencies. 
The mutual dependence, observed in hybrid forms of governance, is an important 
feature that explains the rationale of certain vertical agreements, and can be originated, for 
instance, by the existence of asset specificity. In this respect, Williamson defines asset 
specificity as the “degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value”.52 He classifies asset specificity in six 
kinds and concludes that especially in its first five forms (described below), asset specificity 
creates bilateral dependency, which justifies the existence of certain contractual designs:  
“(1) site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-
jowl relation to each other so as to economize on inventory and 
transportation expenses; 
(2) physical asset specificity, such as specialized dies that are required to 
produce a component; 
(3) human-asset specificity that arises in learning by doing; 
(4) brand name capital; 
(5) dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general purpose 
plant that are made at the behest of a particular customer; and 
(6) temporal specificity, which is akin to technological non-separability and 
can be thought of as a type of site specificity in which timely 
responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital.”53 (Emphasis added) 
Asset specificity can take a variety of forms, and in general, a condition of bilateral 
dependency (or the creation/need of vertical restraints) builds up as asset specificity develops. 
An important challenge for firms that engage in hybrid forms (or vertical agreement with 
commercial restraint) is to commit with their contractual obligations that naturally create 
 
51 C. Menard, ‘On clusters, hybrids, and other strange forms: the case of the French poultry industry’, Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152, No. 1, 1996, pp. 154-183. 
52 Williamson, 1991, supra note 48, p. 281. 
53 Williamson, 1991, supra note 48, p. 281. 
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mutual dependence, and at the same time, remaining independent when it comes to the firm’s 
decision-making process and protection of property rights.54   
A quick look at the model developed by Williamson in 1991 shows that markets (M), 
hierarchies (H) and hybrid forms (X) are functions of asset specificity (k) and Ө, a vector of 
shift parameters of governance costs.55 When there is no asset specificity of any kind, then 
markets are preferred to hierarchies. In this case, the costs related to the internal bureaucracy 
of an organization are bigger than the costs of market structures, since the latter is superior 
in adaptation respects.56  Expanding the analysis and considering also hybrid forms of 
governance: M(0) < X(0) < H(0).  When we look to the marginal value of those functions, 
we can state that M' > X' > H' > 0, and this is because the variation in governance costs in 
relation to asset specificity is lower in hierarchies than in hybrid forms and therefore higher 
in hybrid forms than in market structures, as illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 2.1 – Governance costs as a function of asset specificity 
 
Source: Williamson, 1991.  
In sum, in the view of the transaction cost theory, vertical agreements are developed 
when specific investments are needed, and at the same time, companies do not want to lose 
the advantages of making autonomous decisions. The dependency created by asset specificity 
within a vertical arrangement, especially in long-term relationships, explains contractual 
risks. Also, vertical agreements bring uncertainty to both parties. Uncertainties may explain 
 
54 C. Menard, ‘The Economics of Hybrid Organizations’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
Vol. 160, No. 3, 2004, p. 355. 
55 Williamson, 1991, supra note 48, p. 283-286. 
56 Actually, according to Williamson, "adaptation" is a key concept in the study of economic organizations, 
since it can be understood as the ability of a form of governance to handle disturbances which continually arise 
between agents that tend to transact over time. O. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 101-102. 
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the potential coordination problems discussed in previous sections. The combination of the 
risk of opportunism and the risk of coordination clarifies the existence of various forms of 
governance, including the decision of parties to have long-term contract-based solutions. 
Hence, risks must be balanced in such a way that the form of governance chosen by parties 
(markets, hybrids or hierarchies) is efficient and advantageous for the markets. 
2.2.4. Other efficiency arguments: considerations regarding online markets  
The topic of vertical restraints has been catching the specific attention of antitrust authorities 
around the world when related to cases involving digital markets. A literature review on e-
commerce highlights some features that may affect the traditional efficiency analysis of 
vertical restraints.57 First, in online markets, the search costs of consumers are relatively low, 
which means that they can more easily compare prices among competitors.58 Second, e-
commerce has expanded the geographic scope of business transactions, encouraging 
competition among producers and retailers that do not exist in the offline market.59 Third, the 
effect on distribution costs and the relationship of producers-distributors-consumers has 
changed considerably. Several producers started selling directly to consumers, sometimes 
with the help of price-comparison platforms. Some retailers are motivated to enter the 
markets because, in online shops, distribution costs (and stocks) are minimized in a way that 
retailers can offer a better variety of goods to consumers.60 Lastly, e-commerce has an impact 
upon consumer and producer information asymmetries. Buying on-line may create greater 
information asymmetry between producers, distributors and consumers, because consumers 
 
57 See E. Lieber & C. Syverson, ‘Online Vs. Offline Competition’, in M. Peitz & K. Waldfogel J (Ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.  
58 See, for instance, the study of Brown and Goolsbee about insurance markets. J. R. Brown & A. Goolsbee, 
‘Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry’, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3, 2002, pp. 481–507. 
59 It is worth noting, however, that some scholars show that internet users tend to buy online from sellers that 
are in the same geographic areas, i.e. they do not fully explore this limitless reach of the Internet. See, for 
instance, A. Hortaçsu, F. Martínez-Jerez & J. Douglas, ‘The Geography of Trade in Online Transactions: 
Evidence from eBay and Mercadolibre’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, 
pp. 53–74.  
60 According to Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith, there was an increase in consumer welfare by 7 to 10 times due 
to the expansion of on-line book retailers. Their research shows that, on average, an on-line book retailer, such 
as Amazon, trend to offer 57 times more book titles than a traditional large bookstore. See E. Brynjolfsson, Y. 
Hu & M. Smith, ‘Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety 
at Online Booksellers’, Management Science, Vol. 49, No. 11, 2003, pp. 1580–1596. 
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cannot try the goods out before purchasing them, making it harder for both producers and 
distributors to create a good reputation.61  
Taking this background into account, there are some considerations to be made 
regarding the efficiencies of vertical restraints in online markets. A first point to note is that 
the internet may increase the scope of the free-riding argument.62 Because price competition 
becomes more evident in digital markets, distributors might have no incentive to invest in 
pre- and post-sales services. Therefore, the magnitude of the free-riding effect may become 
bigger and retailers have even more reasons to focus their marketing strategies on 
guaranteeing lower prices to consumers. In this context, resale price-fixing, selective 
distribution systems, among other vertical restraints can also encourage online retailers to 
keep an optimal level of services. In a similar way, vertical restraints may also overcome the 
hold-up problem of online platforms, guaranteeing the return of their specific investments. 
Online platforms must bear high costs of software and design development, and exclusive 
arrangements can also counter-balance this negative externality. 
Cristina Caffarra and Kai-Uwe Kühn, in a study prepared for the OECD, analyse the 
problem of asymmetric information and incomplete contracting in multi-sided platforms.63 
They argue that producers cannot sign complete contracts with their retailer stipulating an 
optimal level of “sales effort/services” because the producer has asymmetric information on 
the amount and effectiveness of the retailer’s “sales effort” on its online platforms. According 
to the authors, the design of complete contracts becomes even more difficult within the scope 
of multi-sided platforms (such as price-comparison websites). This is because demand for 
goods is more elastic in platforms and the “service level” offered by the platform cannot 
usually be priced. Selective distribution can be a form of tackling the problem of incomplete 
contracting. 
 It is worth noting that the free-riding argument in the context of e-commerce can also 
be challenged. Lao, for instance, argues that consumers may free-ride in the opposite 
direction, i.e. consumers first compare the prices of certain goods online, and then go to the 
physical outlets to buy the goods.64 In this way, online retailers are harmed, but offline 
retailers may benefit from this positive externality. Because of these controversial effects that 
 
61 OECD, Vertical Restraints for online sales, 2013, p. 20. 
62 Van den Bergh, 2017, supra note 39, p. 252. 
63 OECD, The competition analysis of vertical restraints in multi-sided markets – Note by Cafarra and Kuhn, 
2017, p. 4-5. 
64 M. Lao, ‘Resale Price Mantenance: The Internet Phenomenon and “Free Rider” Issues’, Antitrust Bulletin, 
Vol. 55, No. 2, 2010, pp. 473-512. 
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are raised with digitalization, the author brings attention to the possible limitations of 
traditional efficiencies arguments in this new scenario. 
2.3. ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Market functioning is researched by the Industrial Organization field. Its focus is not only on 
analysing how companies exercise market power in imperfect competitive markets, but also 
on their interactions, welfare results and rationale for public measures. Vertical agreements 
can also be explained and explored considering theories of harm which put the emphasis on 
how companies can enhance their competitive performance by obtaining better market 
positions. Porter, for example, argues that “the relative position which firms occupy within 
their industry’s structure determines the generic strategies which are the most viable and 
profitable for them”.65 Vertical agreements can modify the general dynamics of a certain 
market, offering an advantage to the parties who are cooperating in strengthening their 
market positions. In fact, these contracts may allow companies to increase their market 
power, or in the worst case, to abuse that power.  
 
This Section aims at presenting the anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements. A selected 
literature review shows that vertical agreements may help in maintaining horizontal cartels, 
exacerbating market imperfections and increasing the market power of incumbent firms. This 
Section is organized in order to highlight the anti-competitive outcomes of the increase of 
collusion practices, the reduction of intra and inter-brand competition, and the foreclosure of 
markets.  In the same way as in the previous Section, and to enrich the discussion, some 
considerations about the anti-competitive outcomes in the context of online markets will be 
added. 
2.3.1. Increasing Collusion in Markets 
From Microeconomic theory, we know that a cartel (just like a monopoly) chooses a price 
that maximizes profits, and this price is higher than the prices in competitive markets. Unlike 
 




a monopoly, a cartel faces special difficulties related to the actual conflicting interests of its 
members. Insights from game theory explain the logic behind the cartel instability.66 Within 
a cartel, each member is interested in the others cooperating with the agreed terms. At the 
same time, each cartel member has their own incentives to break the agreement. For example, 
if all companies cooperate and charge the same (monopoly) price for a given product, they 
all make higher profits than the ones in a competitive market. In the same example, if a firm 
decides to break the terms of the collusive agreement, and charge less for the same product, 
the same firm will naturally capture a large number of consumers who would like to pay less 
for the same product. Then, the “cheating” firm increases its sales, reducing the profits of 
other cartel members. In this context, the cartel needs clear and easy-to-monitor rules to 
prevent members from escaping the deal. Resale price-fixing is a way of facilitating 
coordination between companies, as retail prices become easy to detect and it prevents the 
cheating behaviour.67 
 Indeed, firms can use vertical agreements to sustain cartels both in upstream 
(producers) as well as in downstream markets (retailers).68 With regard to upstream markets, 
retail price-fixing increases transparency and price observability,69 and it makes collusion 
more likely by eliminating the retail price variation. In the late 1990s, Frank Mathewson and 
Ralph Winter explored this argument: 
“With a competitive retail market and stable retail cost conditions, 
manufacturers could assume agreed-upon retail prices by fixing their 
wholesale prices appropriately. In reality, however, variation over time in 
the costs of retailing would lead to fluctuating retail prices. If wholesale 
prices are not easily observed by each cartel member, cartel stability would 
suffer because members would have difficulty distinguishing changes in 
retail prices that were caused by cost changes from cheating on the cartel. 
[Resale price-fixing] can enhance cartel stability by eliminating the retail 
price variation. The facilitating power of [Resale price-fixing] is in the 
increased cartel stability.” 70  
 
66 See, for instance, discussion of Chapter 12 and 13 of R. Pindyck & D. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 7th ed., 
Essex, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2009. 
67 Telser, 1960, supra note 19, p. 96. 
68 Telser, 1960, supra note 19; Posner, 1977, supra note 23. 
69 Motta, 2004, supra note 18, p. 359. 
70 F. Mathewson & R. Winter, ‘The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance’, Review of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 13, No. 1/2, 1998, pp. 57-84. 
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Bruno Jullien and Patrick Rey also formalized the same argument, stressing that resale price-
fixing contributes to the detection of price deviations in tacit collusion, since it makes it easier 
for producers to follow the same price. This is because, fixed retail prices are noticeably less 
responsive to demand shocks.71 
In the downstream market, vertical restraints, such as retail price-fixing, can lead to 
a decrease in competition because retailers cannot anymore compete in price. In the absence 
of resale price-fixing, final prices to consumers are more exposed to diverse shocks in retail 
markets, making it more difficult for producers to distinguish changes in retail prices that are 
caused by different retail conditions from cheating on cartels.72 Collusion in downstream 
markets is usually enforced by boycotting any producers who refuse to impose resale price-
fixing. Also non-price restraints may sustain the equilibrium of collusive practices among 
distributors since they “limit the scope for deviations from the collusive path.”73 
2.3.2. Reducing Intra- and/or Inter-brand Competition 
Briefly speaking, intra-brand competition is characterized by competition among retailers 
who sell products from different producers (i.e. the competition among the same brands that 
are sold in different shops) and inter-brand competition is defined by the competition among 
different branded products sold by each retailer.74 Let’s think about an example related to the 
beer manufacturers: Heineken and Budweiser sell their products in different supermarket 
chains, for instance, Walmart and Carrefour. In this case, intra-brand competition is 
characterized by the competition among retail shops, so it refers to the competition between 
Walmart and Carrefour. The inter-brand competition is defined among brands, so it is related 
to the competition among Heineken and Budweiser inside each retail shop. It goes without 
saying that the dynamic of the intra- and inter-brand competition depends on several 
variables, such as market power in the upstream and downstream levels, economies of scale, 
entry barriers, rivalry, buying power and so on. However, vertical agreements can also alter 
the dynamics of these markets in different ways. When vertical restraints diminish intra-
 
71 B. Jullien & P. Rey, ‘Resale price maintenance and collusion’, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, 
No. 4, 2007, pp. 983-1001. 
72 Motta, 2004, supra note 18, p. 359. 
73 OECD, 2013, supra note 61, p.14. 
74 Motta, 2004, supra note 18, p. 306 and p. 347. 
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brand and inter-brand competition, they also reduce total welfare in a given market, and 
therefore they are likely to be anti-competitive.  
Exclusive distribution, selective distribution, exclusive territory restrictions, and 
resale price-fixing are examples of restriction in vertical agreements that decrease the level 
of intra-brand competition. If a producer grants exclusive distribution to a single retailer, no 
other retailer will then be able to sell this specific product, and therefore intra-brand 
competition becomes non-existent. The important question to be raised is how these vertical 
restraints may affect the strategic interaction and the behaviour between producers, retailers 
and their rivals. In other words, what happens if this reduction in intra-brand competition 
also leads to a decrease in inter-brand competition? The answer to this question will depend 
on how imperfect is the market in the production (upstream) level, since the reduction of 
inter-brand competition exacerbates existing market imperfections.75 
If the market is concentrated in the upstream level (in our example, the markets for 
beers), contractual restrictions such as exclusive distribution lead to a reduction of intra-brand 
and consequently a reduction of inter-brand competition, since the options for consumers 
become very limited in most of the retail shops. However, if the upstream market is not 
concentrated (in our example, if there are many beer producers in certain geographic area), 
then the reduction of competition among retailers does not necessarily weaken inter-brand 
competition, since consumers, in this situation, still face several options of substitute goods 
in different retail shops.  
Exclusive territory restrictions can also reduce intra-brand competition in a certain 
marketplace (i.e. only one specific retailer is able to sell in a certain geographic market) and 
this scenario creates incentives for rival producers to undercut each other, reducing therefore 
the inter-brand competition in different geographic areas.76  
To sum up, the effects of vertical restraints on intra and inter-brand competition are 
hard to clearly assess, because each type of restraint can lead to different consequences in 
terms of encouraging or restricting competition. Indeed, in specific cases, these effects can 
be dubious and very hard to weigh. The US Supreme Court in the Sylvania case illustrated 
this concern: 
“Vertical restrictions reduce intra-brand competition by limiting the 
number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a 
 
75 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996, supra note 7, p. 17-18. 
76 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996, supra note 7, p. 16. 
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given group of buyers [...]. Vertical restrictions promote inter-brand 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in 
the distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in 
every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. 
Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can 
use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other 
manufacturers. For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers 
entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent 
and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and 
labour that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the 
consumers."77  
2.3.3. Market Foreclosure and Higher Barriers to Entry 
Vertical agreements can be used in an attempt to foreclose markets. This argument calls the 
attention of competition agencies around the world, especially in highly concentrated 
markets. Certain types of vertical restraints, such as exclusive distribution, exclusive supply 
and geo-blocking, might allow firms to enjoy a dominant position and deter the entry of 
competitors in the market, by making it harder or more costly for the entrant to acquire the 
necessary inputs.78  
Entry conditions may be affected at every level of the supply chain. In the upstream 
level, market foreclosure may be the result of exclusive arrangements that force potential 
new producers to set-up their own distribution systems. Some vertical restraints may 
discourage potential producers because these agreements would impose restrict access to 
retailers who would therefore have difficulty reaching prospective customers. Similarly, such 
restrictions can be implemented to exclude competitors from market by limiting the 
opportunities for distribution. If the distributors are generally subjected to large economies 
of scope or scale in a specific market, exclusive arrangements would also increase the costs 
of entry of potential competitors. Moreover, the practice of exclusive dealing may encourage 
potential rivals to distribute their products less efficiently and with higher costs.79 
 
77 Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc (1976) 433 US 36, p. 54-55. 
78 Motta, 2004, supra note 18, p. 362. 
79 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996,  supra note 7, p. 19. 
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The risk of an entry barrier is also observed in the downstream level. This is the case 
because entering in the distribution market can also be difficult and expensive. For instance, 
retailers might face a hard time in finding as good retail locations as its incumbent 
competitors. Again, holding the finest distributors or places in exclusive long-term 
agreements would raise the cost of distribution for potential entrants and could therefore ban 
potential competitors from entering the market. This challenge is more frequent where 
economies of scale are already considered natural entry barriers to a certain market.  
More generally, these examples are part of the so-called “raising rivals’ cost” 
strategy, developed by Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop in the late 1980s.80 
Considering the upstream and/or downstream market, such practices can be used against 
rivals to reduce their presence  in market or to decrease their market share significantly. They 
can also delay or prevent competitors from entering the market. The authors explain that 
retailers are not necessarily harmed by exclusive agreements. Even though they face limited 
lines of products to supply to their consumers, they may also be compensated by the 
producers, in case these firms decide to share the extra profits of deterring an entrant.81 
According to Krattenmaker and Salop: “By embedding a collusive agreement in a vertical 
contract that raises input prices by restraining sales to rivals, the firm reduces coordination 
costs, making it more efficient at preventing cheating and distributing the gains from 
collusion. Thus, these strategies involve creating additional horizontal market power through 
the mechanism of vertical contracts.”82  
Moreover, long-term exclusive dealing provisions or exclusive territory provisions 
proposed by producers generate a restrictive situation with distributors who even protect 
these brands against competing products. In these situations, producers and distributors are 
less willing to engage in a price war. It goes without saying that all these anti-competitive 
effects have socially negative outcomes.83 
 
80 T. Krattenmaker & S. Salop, ‘Anticompetitive exclusion: Raising Rivals’Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’, 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 2, 1986, pp. 209-293.  
81 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996,  supra note 7, p. 18-19. 
82 Krattenmaker & Salop, 1986, supra note 80, p. 224. 
83 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996,  supra note 7, p. 21. 
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2.3.4. Other Anti-competitive Effects: Considerations Regarding Online 
Markets  
Following on from the discussion brought by Section 2.2.4, the features of online markets 
may extend and/or reinforce the above-mentioned anti-competitive effects of vertical 
restraints. Because online markets reduce search costs for consumers and increase price 
transparency among retailers, it can be expected that these markets also facilitate tacit 
collusion among competitors.84 Vertical restraints may reinforce the magnitude of these 
effects. In the event of an explicit collusion scheme created by resale price-fixing 
mechanisms, they become even easier to monitor via the internet.   
Furthermore, to create a successful online retailer shop, it is necessary to build a 
strong reputation and network, which requires huge investments. Network effects increase 
barriers to entry in digital markets.85 It can be the case that a producer signs exclusive clauses 
with a specific online retail shop (established firm), and because of that, the producer cannot 
set better prices than the ones agreed with the established platform, not even with new 
entrants. These exclusive clauses among sellers and online retail platforms directly 
discourage new platforms and e-shops from entering the market, since they know they cannot 
compete in price in these specific goods. Most-Favoured Nation clauses are examples of that. 
In the next section, there is a brief introduce to this vertical restraint. 
Within the digital market scope, another frequent vertical restraint is the so-called 
“platform bans”. These bans are related to restrictions imposed on online distributors 
regarding sales conditions in their online shops. Platform bans can be understood as a special 
form of selective distribution system, and they have very peculiar and controversial 
characteristics. As we have seen in previous sections, a producer may want to place 
restrictions on its distribution network to make sure that the product has its image protected, 
especially in the case of luxury goods. However, these restrictions do not always match the 
online shops businesses, where consumers have no physical contact with the product, and 
much information, linked to the characteristics of the goods, is lost. In other words, some 
features of the internet and online shops directly conflict with the purpose and rationality of 
certain types of vertical agreements, mainly selective distribution systems. That was the 
 
84 See analysis of J. R. Brown & A. Goolsbee, ‘Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence 
from the Life Insurance Industry’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3, 2002, pp. 481–507. 
85 G. Werden, ‘Network Effects and Conditions Of Entry: Lessons From The Microsoft Case’, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2011, pp. 87-111. 
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conclusion reached by Paolo Buccirosi, who emphasises that “e-commerce tends to increase 
price competition and poses some problems of asymmetry of information that may 
exacerbate the difficulties that selective distribution is meant to overcome”.86 The Internet 
may therefore be an unsuitable marketplace for certain products, and this fact underlines the 
preference of certain producers to prevent internet sales altogether. 
Finally, new forms of hub-and-spoke conspiracies also arise in this context. Let us 
take as an example the market for pricing services. In the upstream market there is the creator/ 
developer of the pricing-algorithm (e.g. Bloomberg Commerce) and in the downstream 
market there are several industries that use this pricing-algorithm either to determine their 
market prices or to respond to market fluctuations.87 A sole vertical agreement that supplies 
price algorithm services to a specific industry is not necessarily anti-competitive. The 
problem comes when several of the same vertical agreements are signed among competitors 
in the same industry. Since rival firms end up using the same price suggestions, and therefore 
aligning their prices, the competition in this market is harmed. This situation is also referred 
to in the literature as hub-and-spoke cartels that are originated by vertical agreements in the 
digital markets.88  
2.4. THE DOUBLE-SIDED ASPECT OF SELECTED VERTICAL 
RESTRAINTS: AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCIES 
AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
This Section draws attention to selected vertical restraints considering both economic 
efficiencies and anti-competitive effects in our analysis. The nature of vertical restraints can 
be relatively complex, since restrictive clauses can affect different levels of the supply chain 
in diverse forms. Also, their effects in market-places are subjected to the behaviour of several 
players. To reflect upon these issues, the following subsections aim at taking a closer look to 
specific restraints, considering the theories discussed in the previous Sections. The cases of 
 
86 P. Buccirossi, ‘Vertical Restraints on e-commerce and selective distribution’, Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2015, pp. 747-773.  
87 See, for example, A. Ezrachi & M. Stucke, Virtual Competition: the promise and perils of the algorithm-
driven economy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2016.  
88 For a more extensive discussion on hub-and-spoke cospiracy within the digital markets, see: B. Klein, ‘The 
Apple E-books Case: when is a vertical contract a hub in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy?’, Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2017, pp. 423–474.  
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resale price-fixing, geo-blocking restrictions and selective distributions schemes will be 
considered in order to highlight the complexity of the market dynamics that need to be 
considered in an economic analysis of vertical agreements.  
2.4.1. Resale Price-Fixing  
Resale price-fixing is a restriction under which the producers determine the final price 
charged to consumers by distributors. There are several variants to this restriction, including 
price ceilings, price floors, and recommended prices. The contributions of Telser and others 
Chicago scholars have shed light on the pro-competitive effects of resale price-fixing.89  
First, resale price-fixing can be very useful to combat double mark-up problems. As 
we have seen in previous Sections, a producer that wants to protect its sales and avoid the 
reduction of quantity sold by retailers can control the profit of the distributors by fixing retail 
prices. Second, this price restraint can help producers and distributors to avoid free-riders of 
both levels of the supply chain. Third, still related to the second point, resale price-fixing, by 
preventing free-riding, is likely to improve pre-sales and post-sales services. Considering that 
the demand for goods is affected by the amount of services provided, it means that this 
restriction, in the end, can increase demand in specific markets and therefore increase total 
welfare. Fourth, resale price-fixing protects the image of certain branded (luxury) goods and 
quality standards, which would otherwise be less valued by consumers. Lastly, in the short-
run scenario, resale price-fixing can have a positive impact on inter and intra-brand 
competition. This happens because other producers might be attracted to enter the market if 
certain profitability is guaranteed. Also, it might raise the interest of other distributors that 
would hesitate to join a certain distribution network in other circumstances.   
However, in the absence of a free-riding problem, this specific vertical restraint does 
not truly enhance consumer and total welfare. As discussed before, if consumers are 
knowledgeable in respect of a specific product, the producer may take the risk of providing 
more information than is necessary, and therefore, charging higher prices. It means that 
vertical restraints, such as resale price-fixing, benefit “ignorant” marginal consumers but 
harm “knowledgeable” infra-marginal consumers that have to pay more for the goods. 
 
89 See discussion in Section 2.2.  
39 
 
Moreover, several other risks might be associated with price restrictions. They can 
facilitate collusion (explicit or tacit) between producers by enhancing price transparency. In 
the case of explicit collusion, resale price-fixing helps the maintenance of a cartel, making it 
harder for rivals to “cheat”. In the case of tacit collusion, however, producers can observe 
very easily the prices of competitors, which may directly affect the way they define their own 
prices. Resale price-fixing can also facilitate collusion between distributors, i.e. in the 
downstream market. This may happen because this vertical restraint eliminates price 
competition (intra-brand competition) among retailers, who lose part of their freedom in 
setting their own prices. It means that price restraints can soften competition between 
producers and distributors, thus increasing market imperfections. In less competitive 
markets, not only are prices higher and quantities offered lower, but at the distribution level, 
dynamism and innovation are also compromised. Finally, resale price-fixing can foreclose 
markets and deter entry in relation to the long-term, although this effect is clearer with non-
price restrictions. 
Table 2.1 aims at summarizing the potential multiple outcomes both regarding 
economic efficiencies and anti-competitive effects. It is worth noting that the Table does not 
give an answer to whether resale price-fixing is pro- or anti-competitive, since each possible 
effect has different sizes and the competition assessment is influenced by market conditions, 
and mainly, by the goals of competition law in the given jurisdiction. 
Table 2.1. The possible double-sided effects of Resale Price-Fixing 
Resale Price-Fixing 
Economic Efficiency Anti-competitive effects 
Fights double mark-up Encourages tacit collusion 
Prevents free-riding Reduces intra-brand competition 
 Reduces inter-brand competition 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
It is worth noting that when it comes to online markets, new forms of price-restrictions have 
been popping up. For instance, most favoured nation clauses (or MFN clauses) are vertical 
restraints between suppliers and distributors that generally consist of an offer by the supplier 
of a price or rate to a client no higher than the lowest offered to other clients. For instance, 
in the hotel online booking sector, an MFN clause obliges hotels to always give to the 
platform the best price for hotel online bookings, among other most favoured conditions.90 
 
90 See discussion of MFN clauses in Chapter 4. 
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Competition authorities are mainly concerned that such restrictions constitute a form of resale 
price-fixing that could limit price competition, and raise entry barriers among online travel 
agents, preventing their expansion.  
2.4.2. Geo-Blocking 
The territory designated to a certain distributor can be limited by geo-blocking provisions. 
When producers grant exclusive territory to certain distributors, the last ones are the only 
ones to serve customers in that geographic area. On the one hand, geo-blocking provisions 
can be efficiency enhancing. Most of the objective justifications are related to the free-riding 
theory. Geo-blocking clauses prevent free-riding on the production side. In case a producer 
makes specific investments on a certain distribution network (for instance, training of staff), 
they would not want other competitors (producers) to free-ride on these investments. 
Regarding the downstream level, geo-blocking clauses may be adopted to better coordinate 
retail services, since it aims at eliminating or at least reducing the scope of such externality. 
Even if free-riders are inexistent, a producer may target the allocation of exclusive territory 
clauses so that retail services are better monitored, especially the ones that attract marginal 
consumers.91 This is because this vertical restraint also assists in overcoming the hold-up 
problem of specific investments, and therefore reduces transaction costs related to economies 
of scale in logistics.92  
On the other hand, these provisions can provoke a negative impact in the competitive 
environment. First, geo-blocking restrictions may facilitate collusion in the short-run. 
Producers might agree on dividing territories to guarantee better profits in those locations. 
Client division is one type of cartel that is constantly on the radar of antitrust agencies and 
they can be reinforced by exclusive territory restrictions. Second, and most importantly, geo-
blocking clauses can foreclose markets and deter entry by raising a rival’s cost, mainly if 
parties have some degree of market power. It means that those smaller producers that do not 
belong to a specific distribution network, might not be able to reach their consumers. 
Similarly, smaller distributors might not have access to producers, and intra-brand 
competition is therefore harmed. 
 
91 Telser, 1960, supra note 19. 
92 A more descriptive analysis is carried out in Subsection 2.2.3. 
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It is worth noting that the magnitude of negative effects of territorial restrictions on 
intra-brand competition and market foreclosure depends on whether the producers give the 
distributors any freedom to set their own prices. In this case, the anti-competitive effects tend 
to be lower.93  Table 2.2 below presents a summary of the double-sided analysis.  
Table 2.2. The possible double-sided effects of Geo-blocking clauses94 
Geo-Blocking 
Economic Efficiency  Anti-competitive effects 
Prevents free-riding in the production side Facilitates collusion 
Prevents free-riding in case retail services are 
necessary 
Forecloses markets 
Reduces transaction costs Deters entry 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
2.4.3. Selective Distribution 
Selective distribution is a practice characterized by the engagement of a supplier with a 
restricted number of distributors. The EU Vertical Block Exemption Regulation defines that 
it is “a distribution system where the supplier undertakes to sell the contract goods or 
services, either directly or indirectly, only to distributors selected on the basis of specified 
criteria”.95 It means that within the selective distribution system, distributors must fulfil a 
number of specific features to be eligible to commercialize the manufactured products or 
services. The producers may request, for example, that the retail shop should be situated in a 
popular shopping street, or that it should have highly trained staff, or even a particular 
furnishing style. As discussed in previous sections, suppliers may engage in these restrictive 
agreements to preserve the image of their brands, in particular for luxury goods.96 Selective 
distribution systems may prevent free-riding problems in the downstream markets and, 
because of it, these vertical restrictions may help distributers to promote specific investments.  
 
93 Rey & Caballero-Sanz, 1996, supra note 7, p. 25. 
94 Like Table 1, Table 2 does not give an answer to whether geo-blocking is pro or anti-competitive, since each 
possible effect has different sizes and the competition assessment is influenced by market conditions, and 
mainly, by the goals of competition law in the given jurisdiction. As we will see in Chapter 4, the market 
integration goal of European Competition Policy outweighs the potential anti-competitive effects of geo-
blocking clauses. 
95 Article 1 of EU Regulation No. 330/2010. 
96 See discussion of Section 2.2. 
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Selective distribution may also increase economic efficiencies in cases of products that 
require pre-sale services or branded-products. In these cases, even if intra-brand competition 
is reduced by the contractual restraint, the inter-brand competition remains strong.  
This vertical restraint is however considered anti-competitive when producers use 
this vertical restriction to reduce significantly the number of outlets that sell their products. 
Considering a scenario where inter-brand competition is also weak, the selective distribution 
scheme will allow prices to rise above competition level.97 These distribution systems can 
also restrict intra-brand competition and, as a result of this, customers will cope with fewer 
alternatives available for certain brands/products. Besides, these selective systems can both 
generate entry barriers in some markets and promote market foreclosure. Finally, if producers 
and retailers have market power, the risk of double-marginalization may enhance higher 
prices for consumers.  
Recently, several cases of selective distribution in online platforms and online 
market-places have come to light around the world. The most prevalent limitation that 
producers impose on retailers aims to restrict the scope of their online products in selective 
distribution networks. There are some features of online sale restrictions, such as increased 
competition in prices and information asymmetry issues that “may conflict with the 
objectives of a selective distribution organization.”98 The Internet may therefore not be a 
suitable marketplace for some products, and this, in theory, can help explaining why a 
producer might want to totally avoid internet sales.99 The outcome of these cases has been 
dubious, since national authorities have been deciding differently upon this topic.100 Table 
2.3 highlights the main outcomes in terms of efficiency and anti-competitive effects that may 
be assessed in selective distribution cases. 
 
97 See, for instance, the paper of Rey and Stiglitz that demonstrates that within an exclusive distribution system 
(and to a certain extent selective distribution systems), a producer is less aggressive in setting their prices, which 
also influences the competitors to set higher prices as well. P. Rey & J. Stiglitz, ‘The role of Exclusive 
Territories in Producer’s Competition’, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, 1995, pp. 431-451.  
98 OECD, 2013, supra note 73, p. 25-26. 
99 P. Buccirossi, ‘Vertical Restraints on e-commerce and selective distribution’, Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2015, pp. 747-773. 
100 See on Chapter 4 the examples of the European Union. 
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Table 2.3. The possible double-sided effects of Selective Distribution101  
Selective Distribution 
Economic Efficiency  Anti-competitive effects 
Prevents free-riding Reduces intra-brand competition 
Ensures pre- and post- sale services Raises search costs for consumers 
Protects brands Forecloses markets 
Protects specific investments Deters entry 
 Encourages double mark-up 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
2.5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION POLICIES  
This Chapter is mostly focused on the economic analysis of vertical agreements, and on the 
need to think about policies of vertical agreements that guarantee an optimal level of welfare 
in society. This specific Section, however, briefly introduces the discussion that welfare-
oriented arguments – such as the ones presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 – might not always 
be the motivation of policy makers. Competition policies (and in this case, policies applicable 
to vertical agreements) can also be inspired by private interests such as the interest of the 
competition authorities, the interest of industries and their lobby groups, of legal 
representatives, among others. Given the complexity of the assessment of vertical 
agreements, the political economy discussion gains importance. 
Generally speaking, regulation is motivated and explained by public interest 
argumentation, meaning that the law and decision makers should operate to be able to ensure 
the promotion of economic efficiency. In theory, externalities, information asymmetry, 
market power and public goods are the market failures that give grounds for regulation. Even 
knowing that public interest grounds might vary among different societies, they are usually 
intended to tackle those conventional forms of market failures in those given contexts.102 
When studying competition law, monopolies are the classic examples of market failures, as 
they might lead to an abuse of market power. The previous Sections also showed that price 
and non-price restrictions that result from vertical agreements can also lead to collusion, 
 
101 This Table does not give an answer to whether selective distribution systems are pro- or anti-competitive, 
since each possible effect of these practices has different sizes, and the competition assessment is influenced by 
market conditions, and mainly, by the goals of competition law in the giving jurisdiction. 
102 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford, Hart publisher, 2004, p. 71. 
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reduction of competition and market foreclosures. Usually, competition policies are the main 
instruments for dealing with those issues.103 
However, in certain contexts, the law- and decision-making processes do not 
follow what is optimal for society, or they do not achieve the public interest goals. One 
explanation for that has been brought by public choice theory.104 The primary concept of the 
public choice theory is that an individual’s preferences is reflected in the law-making process 
and therefore affect the social welfare. George Stigler,105 Sam Peltzman,106 Richard Posner107 
and Gary Becker108 all pointed out, for instance, the fact that various interest groups compete 
when it comes to achieving political favours. A basic assumption of this private interest 
approach to regulation is that there is a demand and supply for regulation.109 With regard to 
the demand for regulation, interest groups (such as businesses, government authorities, 
industry associations, legal representatives) attempt to influence the law or decision-making 
process in order to pursue benefits for themselves.110 In other words, from a public choice 
point of view, the evolution of legislation also responds to the demands of private interests.111 
In this way, legislation can almost never be “allocative efficient” in the Pareto sense, since it 
will invariably impose losses on some individuals. William Schughart summarizes the theory 
by saying: 
“The model of public choice insists that the same rational, self-interest-
seeking movements that animate human action in ordinary markets be 
applied to decision making in the public sector as well. The assumption that 
all individuals, in or out of government, pursue their own self-interests is 
the fundamental tenet of public choice. Just as consumers want to 
 
103 See, for example, F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed., Chicago, 
Rand McNally, 1980.  
104 The proposition that private interest drive policy outcomes was articulated in its modern form by Stigler in 
G. Stigler, ‘The theory of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 
2, No. 1, 1971, pp. 3-21. 
105 See, for instance, Stigler, 1971. 
106 See, for instance, S. Peltzman, ‘Toward a more general theory of regulation’, Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, 1976, pp. 211–240. 
107 See, for instance, R. Posner, ‘Theories of economic regulation’, Bell J Econ Manag Sci, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1974, 
pp. 335–358; and R. Posner, ‘The social costs of monopoly and regulation’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
83, No. 4, 1975, pp. 807–827.  
108 See, for instance, G. Becker, ‘A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 98, No. 3, 1983, pp. 371–400. 
109 Stigler, 1971. 
110 G. Shen & N. Philipsen, ‘Regulation of the Inter-Provincial Establishment of Companies: Applying the 
Private Interest Approach to China’, in N. Philipsen, S. Weishaar, & G, Xu (Eds.), Market Integration: The EU 
experience and Implications for regulatory reform in China, London, Springer, 2016, p. 194. 
111 Ogus, 2004, supra note 102, p. 63. 
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maximize their utility and firms want to maximize their profits, public 
policy makers want to maximize their own welfare.”112 
Taking this perspective, public choice theorists argued that special-interest groups have a 
powerful influence not only over politicians but over the whole law-making process. This is 
the case because there are several different approaches in which those groups affect policy-
making. In the antitrust field, no different from economic regulation in general, the agencies, 
the judges and the antitrust bureaucrats113 are also assumed to operate in the public interest.  
Critical scholars of antitrust policy argue that the failures in implementing these 
policies are due to several reasons, for instance: the errors in the application of the law, the 
lack of knowledge of agencies, of courts and of lawyers in correctly applying the relevant 
economic theories, and/or the constant replacement of existing policies.114 However, 
historical records of unsuccessful legislations and bad antitrust decisions in different 
countries prove that the private interest of certain groups also has an influence on the levels 
of optimal enforcement. That is to say, while antitrust can be a way of promoting public 
interest goals, it can also be used to benefit some groups to the detriment of others. Armando 
Rodriguez and Ashok Menon when enumerating the limits of competition policies argue that 
the fundamental competition problem is the ability of domestic interest groups to easily 
influence government in their policy making process.115  The authors focus their analysis in 
developing countries and highlight that the governmental institution in those countries seem 
to be exceptionally vulnerable to pressure from interests groups compared to developed 
ones.116 
Robert Tollison was a pioneer scholar in discussing public choice theory to 
understand why competition law is often unsuccessful in achieving its goals oriented to 
consumer protection and protection against abuse of market power.117 After Tollison’s 
contribution, a whole new research agenda was created. An extensive literature, which 
included several empirical studies, started suggesting that antitrust enforcement was often 
 
112 W. F. Schughart II, ‘Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy’, in F. Mc Chesney & W. F. Schughart II, 
The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public choice perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1995, p. 9.  
113 Expression used by Tollison in R. Tollison, “Public Choice and Antitrust”, Cato Journal, Vol. 4, (Winter) 
1985, p. 905. 
114 F. Mc Chesney & W. F. Schughart II, The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public choice 
perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 2. 
115 A. Rodriguez & A. Menon, The limits of competition policy: The shortcomings of antitrust in developing 
and reforming countries. Biggleswade, Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 136. 
116 Rodriguez & Menon, 2010. 
117 Tollison, 1985.  
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working in favour of private interest groups and against consumers, by interfering with the 
allocation of resources within society.  For example, William Long, Richard Schramm and 
Tollison118 provided empirical evidence that the goals of competition law, such as consumer 
welfare, are not always observed in the allocation of antitrust cases.  
This political economy approach opens up a debate about the limitation of the 
welfare-oriented arguments as main drivers of antitrust regulation. It also appears to be 
important since it allows us to develop an alternative look at the Brazilian and European 
experiences when regulating vertical agreements. Regarding the Brazilian case, Chapter 3 
discusses the extent to which the self-interest of the relevant stakeholders explains the recent 
changes in regulation oriented to vertical agreements. Taking into account the European case, 
Chapter 4 introduces some ideas about the public choice perspective to the analysis of the 
policy options on vertical agreements adopted by the European Union in the early 2000s.  
2.6. THE COMPLEXITY OF VERTICAL AGREEMENTS AND THE 
ENDURING DEBATE ON POLICY MAKING 
This Chapter argues that vertical agreements have different effects in the marketplace. They 
can often increase economic efficiency and total welfare in certain markets, and in other cases 
generate anti-competitive outcomes, harm consumers and create welfare loses. Because 
vertical agreements are complex in their nature, this creates difficulties for policy makers to 
assess the overall effects in the markets. A vertical restraint can constitute a solution to a 
market failure, and at the same time encourage anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, 
different forms of vertical restraints have diverse outcomes in the markets, and therefore 
requires case-by-case assessments. For example, resale price-fixing and geo-blocking 
restrictions may combat free-riding, which is a pro-competitive effect. Resale price-fixing 
and geo-blocking clauses may also facilitate collusion and forecloses markets, which are anti-
competitive effects. However, resale price-fixing may also combat double marginalization 
problems, while territorial protection may increase those problems.  
 
118 W. Long, R. Schramm & R. Tollison, ‘The economic determinants of antitrust activity’, in F. Mc Chesney 
& W. F. Schughart II, The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public choice perspective, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 95. 
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Balancing pro and anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements also has limitations. 
First, incomplete information of parties harms the antitrust analysis. Second, the 
interrelations between producers and distributors, during a time period and the resulting 
outcomes, are not always the same (not even fully predictable). Indeed, the effects of these 
interrelations are sometimes contradictory. Moreover, the economic analysis of vertical 
agreements is largely dependent on the assessment of the features of specific markets (such 
as market concentrations, rivalry, entry conditions, buying power) that add complexity to the 
overall analysis. 
On behalf of the regulatory dilemma of vertical agreements, the enforcement of such 
practices turns out to be one of the most animated disputes in competition law nowadays. 
The exemplary literature review of the advantages and disadvantages of vertical agreements 
proves that there are many reasons to justify contradictory types of regulation. As shown in 
the next Chapters, some jurisdictions changed their policies over the years from prohibition 
of certain types of vertical agreements to a rule of reason approach, from notification system 
of agreements to legal exception regimes, or even from ex-ante notification systems to an ex-
post control of such contracts. The Chapter introduces the argument that contradictory 
regulations might be justified by private interest of different agents, rather than by welfare-
oriented arguments. 
The Chapter also briefly showed that what can be called the “regulatory dilemma” 
may be reinforced in the context of digital economies, e-commerce transactions, and 
marketplace platforms. This is the case because new forms of contractual arrangements, with 
innovative features, are now being spread and bring into question their legality when it comes 
to competition policy. The assessment of the competition implications of vertical restraints 
in digital markets seems inherently more complex on behalf of multiple interactions, network 
externalities and vertical relationships between the market-place platforms and consumers. 
This scenario potentially implies more difficult antitrust analysis with multiple foreclosure 
effects.  
This Chapter provides an opportunity to rethink and explore some foundations of 
competition law and its purposes. One can conclude, firstly, that the effects of vertical 
restraints are limited and less problematic when compared to the effects of horizontal 
restraints, so the policy options of the first restrictions should be carefully assessed. The 
complexity of vertical agreements also requires the conceptualization by the competition 
authorities of what is harmful to society, in order to guarantee that restrictions to competition 
do not take place. And whether a country will choose a lighter or stricter approach towards 
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vertical agreements will depend on the goals of competition policy in the jurisdiction, i.e., 
what policy makers believe competition policy should aim at protecting. As shown in the 
upcoming Chapters, the understanding of socio-political economic circumstances is a crucial 
feature to allow an optimal normative discussion. 
Considering this background, the following Chapters intend to discuss different 
applications of competition policies oriented to vertical agreements. As this PhD research 
enhances a comparison between the competition policies in Brazil (Chapter 3) and in the 
European Union (Chapter 4), the upcoming chapters will analyse the evolution of those 
competition policies and the attempts of the authorities to handle vertical restraints. One of 
the main policy features to be considered refers to the enforcement costs of the chosen 
policies because of the complexity of these commercial structures. Since the welfare 
outcomes of vertical restraints (in both online and offline markets) are not clear, a case-by-
case analysis appears to be a good policy option. However, case-by-case analysis raises 
significant enforcement costs. A critical evaluation of these enforcement costs will be 

















3. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OF VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS IN BRAZIL  
3.1. INTRODUCTION: THE CHOICE OF BRAZIL AS A CASE STUDY 
 
The previous Chapter discussed that vertical agreements face a regulatory dilemma and the 
enforcement of such practices turns out to be one of the most animated disputes in 
competition law. The exemplary literature review of the advantages and disadvantages of 
vertical agreements on competition proved that there are a lot of reasons to justify 
contradictory types of regulation. Following this discussion, this Chapter aims to discuss 
vertical agreements regulation and enforcement activities in Brazil. The selection of Brazil 
as a case study in this PhD research is not only because of the author’s background. The 
current challenges encountered by the Brazilian Authority in the enforcement of vertical 
agreements can be compared to the ones observed in other jurisdictions that face similar 
economic and institutional realities in order to learn and share lessons for the future. 
Briefly speaking, the recent change in Brazilian competition regulation put an end 
to the ex-ante notification of vertical agreements, favouring the ex-post control of vertical 
restraints. Nowadays, if a company is in doubt about the legality of a certain agreement, it 
cannot anymore notify the authority and wait for the “green sign”. The company has instead 
to self-assess the potential anti-competitive effect of the commercial practice (mostly with 
the help of their legal advisors) and still has to bear the costs of legal uncertainty and/or 
potential future litigations.  
In comparative terms, one cannot forget that this prioritization to an ex-post 
monitoring of commercial agreements also happened in the European Union (EU) in the 
2000s. However, two important differences should be highlighted here. Firstly, in the EU, 
the change from an ex-ante control of agreements to an ex-post monitoring system happened 
after forty years of implementation of a notification system of agreements. This learning 
period allowed firms, agencies and courts to create knowledge regarding what kind of 
agreements were anti-competitive or not. Secondly, the ex-post control policy was introduced 
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together with a revised Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, and guidelines for the self-
assessment of parties. This second issue is particularly important as these legal instruments 
helped to reduce uncertainty among business people.1  
This Chapter explores that in Brazil, the end of the ex-ante notification system 
happened in a different format and context. The country had only had a few years of a 
Regulation that clearly defined the notification system of vertical agreements before 
changing the rules to the ex-post control of these commercial contracts. There was not enough 
time and/or opportunity to create a consolidated antitrust jurisprudence regarding the legality 
of vertical agreements in the country as only a few of these cases were actually notified to 
CADE. Moreover, CADE did not publish any detailed guidelines to help business people to 
self-assess the potential anti-competitive effects of their contracts, or to help the agency staff 
to conduct an adequate effect-based analysis in its investigations.  
Several factors might explain this sub-optimal change in legislation, from an 
inadequate legal transplant, to budget reasons regarding the high administrative costs of 
analysing all notified contracts, the technical failure of law makers, or even the self-interest 
of the interacting groups of agents (antitrust authorities, lawyers, business people and their 
lobby groups). For these reasons, the following research question emerges in this Chapter: Is 
the new legal framework that favours ex-post control of vertical agreements aligned with the 
goal of competition law in Brazil and its institutional design? To what extent does the analysis 
of the interests of private relevant actors help explaining the recent changes in the Brazilian 
regulations? 
To answer these questions, the Chapter is organized into six Sections, including this 
introduction and the concluding remarks. Section two illustrates a brief historical perspective 
of the Competition Law in Brazil as well as the goals of competition policy in the country. 
The third Section explores the evolution of policies applicable to vertical agreements, 
including the recent changes in legislation. Section 4 focuses on the jurisprudence of vertical 
cases in Brazil and on the institutional design of law enforcers that allows the ex-post 
enforcement of these agreements. This Section explores CADE’s limited case law regarding 
resale price-fixing and geo-blocking practices. Lastly, the fifth Section discusses the context 
of the new legal framework in Brazil by looking at the self-interest of parties in the law-
making process. That Section describes the Public Consultation that resulted in Resolution 
 
1 Chapter 4 presents an extensive analysis of the European experience. 
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No. 17/2016 which terminated the ex-ante control of vertical agreements in Brazil. Finally, 
there is a summary of the findings and an outline of the prospects for the following Chapters. 
3.2. HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK OF THE BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 
3.2.1. The Origins of Competition Policy in Brazil: from 1934 to 2011 
In Brazil, the first time the protection of economic freedom was elevated to constitutional 
status was in the 1934 Federal Constitution that enhanced the organization of the “Economic 
Order” in accordance with the principles of justice and human dignity.2 Three years later, the 
1937 Constitution emphasized the relevance of economic and industrial development and 
gave to the State the possibility of implementing direct and indirect interventions in the 
economy when necessary to guarantee the public interest. Both the 1934 and the 1937 
Brazilian Constitutions defended the promotion of the “popular economy” and the consumer 
protection. 
As explained by Paula Forgioni: 
“The evolution of the [antitrust] discipline, in Brazil, did not happen as in 
countries with a certain antitrust tradition: antitrust was not born, in Brazil, 
as a link between economic liberalism and (maintenance of) economic 
freedom. It was born as a repression against the abuse of economic power, 
having the interest of the population and the consumer protected by the 
Constitution.”3  
In the period between 1934 and 1988 – year when the current Brazilian Federal Constitution 
entered into force– several norms started to give attention to competition issues. In 1938, the 
publication of Decree No. 869/1938 defined crimes against the “popular economy”. This 
Decree delineated provisions designed to sanction businesses for anti-competitive behaviour, 
such as: acquiring a dominate position in the market, engaging in predatory pricing, price-
 
2 Some authors discuss the origins of competition and economic freedom in Brazil long before the 20th Century, 
since the colonial period. See, for instance, R. Simonsen, História Econômica do Brasil, São Paulo, Companhia 
Editora Nacional, 1957. However, this PhD research will briefly introduce the historical period from 1934, 
when the economic freedon was elevated to constitutional status in the country.  
3 Free translation, P. A. Forgioni, Os fundamentos do antitruste. 9th ed., São Paulo, Editora Revista dos 
Tribunais, p. 102. 
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fixing, and entering into agreements to exclusively deal, and so on. While aiming to protect 
the “popular economy” and consumer welfare, the 1938 Decree can be regarded as the first 
compendium of antitrust rules in Brazil.4 
Years later, in 1945, a new regulation, Decree No. 7.666 entered into force. This 
Decree, also known as “Lei Malaia”, defined actions contrary to the moral and economic 
order. It established competition offenses, such as the formation of trusts, monopolies, and 
the concentration of power (via incorporation, merger, association or grouping of 
companies). “Lei Malaia” is considered to be the regulation which established the need for 
mandatory controls over market concentration and it established administrative proceedings 
and institutions to be used for reviews of anti-competitive practices.5  Due to the novel 
administrative characteristic of anti-competitive practices, “Lei Malaia” mandated the 
creation of an administrative agency to handle  cases, the Administrative Commission for 
Economic Defence, (in Portuguese, “Comissão Administrativa de Defesa Econômica”), 
precursor to the current competition agency in Brazil. Resistance to “Lei Malaia” quickly 
emerged from various sectors of the economy and this Decree was repealed after only three 
months in force. 
Some years later, in 1962, the first Competition Law (Law No. 4.137/1962) was 
enacted in Brazil. Law No. 4.137/1962 regulated abuses of market power and created CADE 
(the Brazilian Competition Authority, in Portuguese, “Conselho Administrativo de Defesa 
Econômica”) as the governmental body responsible for enforcement of the law. CADE’s 
powers included the power to open administrative proceedings, the power to investigate anti-
competitive practices, and the power to determine penalties and fines for violations. This 
legal mandate was inspired by the Constitution of 1946, which had foreseen (for the first 
time) the principles of protection against abuse of economic power in Brazil. The terms of 
the 1946 Constitution and Law No. 4.137/1962 resulted in an antitrust policy in Brazil which 
was no longer solely focused to the principle of protection of the “popular economy”, but 
also included protections against abuses of market power.6  However, Law No. 4.137/1962 
was not successfully implemented. The failure of Law No. 4.137/1962 was due to political 
and economic forces which controlled the priorities of the Brazilian government at the time. 
As observed by Roberto Pfeiffer, 
 
4 V. Bagnoli, Direito Econômico e Concorrencial, 7th ed., São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 2017, p. 317.  
5 See Forgioni, supra note 3, p. 107.  
6 I. Vaz, Direito Econômico da Concorrência, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Forense, 1993, p. 250.  
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“Law No. 4.137/1962 was known for its low effectiveness, in particular 
because: 1) there were other public policies to encourage business 
concentration (especially under the National Development Plans); 2) the 
high inflation that disrupted economic activity; 3) the instruments of price 
control implemented by the Federal governments that ended up 
encouraging uniform and concerted practices between companies.”7  
It was only in 1988, in a scenario of democratization, that the 1988 Brazilian Federal 
Constitution (or simply “CF/1988”) entered into force promoting several institutional 
changes and supporting the creation of a law to defend the constitutional principles of free 
competition. The Constitution of 1988 stated a change to market-oriented policies, which 
was followed by a sequence of economic reforms, such as the privatisation of state-owned 
companies, price liberalisation and deregulation.8 In this context, several independent 
regulatory agencies were created, such as the regulatory agency for the telecommunication 
sector (ANATEL), the agency for the electricity sector (ANEEL), for petroleum and natural 
gas (ANP), for transportation (ANTT) and for the air transport sector (ANAC).9 The 
democratic Constitution was published in a new political and economic context where there 
was a strong policy orientation toward economic liberalization and price stabilization.  
In this historical context, Law No. 8.884 of June 11, 1994 was the Brazilian law that 
successfully systematized the antitrust discipline in the country and improved the legislative 
treatment to the topic. This Law turned CADE as a self-contained independent federal body, 
linked to the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice.10 This Law also established 
the attributions of the Secretariat for Economic Law (“SDE” is its Portuguese acronym) – a 
body from the Ministry of Justice, and the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (“SEAE” is 
its Portuguese acronym). These three bodies together composed the Brazilian Competition 
Defence System (in Portuguese “Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência”, or SBDC). 
 
7 Free translation, R. A. C. Pfeiffer, Defesa da concorrência e bem-estar do consumidor, 2010. (PhD thesis 
filed at University of São Paulo, São Paulo), p. 120. 
8 OECD, Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil, 2019, p. 17. 
9 It is worth noting that the privatisation process did not affect all sectors in the Brazilian economy. The Brazilian 
government remained in control of the oil and gas sector, through Petrobras, in the electricity generation sector 
and, also, in the banking sector (for example, via Banco do Brasil). 
10 Even knowing that CADE was only treated as an independent agency in 1994, the Law No. 4137/1962 was 
the one that originally created the agency. However, by that time, CADE could not successfully implement its 
policies, and one of the reasons was the military coup of 1964: “The antitrust statute had been passed in 1962, 
but its implementation was left to the upcoming authoritarian regime. The statute proved to be largely 
ineffective”.  For more detailed information about the dictatorial period and its impact on competition policy, 
see F. Todorov & M. Torres Filho, ‘History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930-2010’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 
Vol. 57, No. 2, 2012, pp. 207-257. 
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Under this structure, CADE oversaw the administrative proceedings related to anti-
competitive conduct and the mergers subject to its review system. The proceedings were 
instructed by SDE and SEAE. These two bodies were responsible for issuing technical but 
non-binding opinions to CADE.11 
Having this structure, the Law No. 8.884/1994 foresaw two main regulatory activities 
against abuse of economic power: the repressive and the preventive control. The ex-post 
repressive control of anti-competitive conduct, including of cartels and anti-competitive 
agreements was based on Article 20 of Law No. 8.884/1994. The ex-post repressive control 
aimed at investigating the illegality of concrete commercial practices.12 The ex-ante 
preventive intended to take care of market concentration of commercial structures and certain 
types of cooperation among firms.13 It was based on Article 54 of Law No. 8.884/1994, and 
was mostly related to the notification system of mergers that were capable of harming 
competition in the Brazilian markets.14 Among many other reforms, this law consolidated a 
mandatory merger control system, established policies oriented to fight against cartels (as for 
instance, the introduction of a leniency procedure or even the growing interaction with the 
Federal Prosecutors), and initiated the control of unilateral behaviour, besides the promotion 
of competition advocacy, in order to increase the competition culture in the country.  
In 2011, the Brazilian antitrust policy passed through an important institutional 
reform. The Law No. 12.529/2011 – known as the new Brazilian Competition Law – altered 
important proceedings, such as the merger review system, and the structure of the antitrust 
agencies. As described above, before Law No. 12.529/2011 entered into force, the SBDC 
was composed of three agencies, CADE being the main one. With the advent of the new law, 
CADE took over the role of the other two agencies (SDE and SEAE), being unified as a 
solely investigatory and decision-making body dealing with antitrust matters. Nowadays, 
CADE’s structure is composed of (i) an Administrative Tribunal that comprises a President 
and six Commissioners; (ii) a Directorate-General for Competition (DG), the investigative 
body in matters related to anti-competitive practices; and (iii) an economics department.  
 
11 Information available at CADE’s official website: http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/about-us/our-history 
[07/12/2017]. 
12 C. Salomão Filho, Direito Concorrencial: as condutas, 1st. Ed., São Paulo, Editora Malheiros, 2007, p. 14. 
13 C. Salomão Filho, Direito Concorrencial: as estruturas, 3rd Ed., São Paulo, Editora Malheiros, 2007, p. 265. 
14 F. Abreu & J. Honda, ‘Associative agreements under the Brazilian Antitrust Law’, in C. Zarzur, L. Katona 
& M. Villela, Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2015, p. 138. 
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3.2.2. The Current Goals of Competition Law in Brazil 
In a democratic country such as Brazil, all power relations, including economic power, must 
be exercised in accordance with fundamental rights and other constitutional principles.15 
Each legal system has a set of principles and goals - directly linked to its historical, economic 
and social contexts - that underlines its regulatory and decision-making process. Those goals 
are essential to the better understanding of the local competition law and decision-making 
process.  
Over the decades, several schools of thought in the field of competition theory and 
competition law have tried to define and explain the goals of a competition policy. For 
instance, among those schools of thought are the Ordoliberal School, the Harvard School, 
and the Chicago School. Some scholars have discussed the different consequences of 
consumer welfare and total welfare as goals of competition policies. Others brought the 
different concepts of efficiency (allocative, productive and dynamic) as policy making 
orientation. In addition to the strict economic aims, different competition policy goals have 
already been attributed to different legal systems, such as market integration (as in the 
European Union), income redistribution, protection of small businesses, price control, control 
of corruption and fairness.16Although many jurisdictions have formally assigned certain 
goals to their competition policies, in practice, those goals are not observed in the regulatory 
or decision-making process; or even there are cases in which the goals of certain jurisdictions 
contradict one another. 
In Brazil, the discussion related to the foundations and principles of the economic 
order, and therefore on the competition policy goals, is directly linked to the analysis of 
Constitutional principles, and it has been extensively debated in the national antitrust 
literature. First, it is worth noting that every national legislation (including competition law) 
should bring with it the general principle that permeates all the Brazilian Federal Constitution 
from 1988 (“CF/1988”): the principle of human dignity and social justice, reinforced by 
Articles 1 and 3 of the Carta Magna.17  
 
15 A. Frazão, Direito da Concorrência: pressupostos e perspectivas. São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 2017, p. 46. 
16 See for instance the discussion on Chapter 3 in R. Van den Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and 
Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.  
17 Brazilian Federal Constitution, 1988: “Art 1 The Federative Republic of Brazil, formed by the indissoluble 
union of States and Municipalities, as well as the Federal District, is a Democratic State of Law founded upon: 
I. sovereignty; II. citizenship; III. human dignity; IV. social values of work and free initiative; V. political 
pluralism. […] The fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic of Brazil are: I. to build a free, just and 
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When considering the specific principles applied to the economic order, which 
includes competition policy, the 1988 Constitution highlights, among others, the free 
enterprise (Article 1 and 170 CF/1988), the principle of free competition (Article 170, IV, 
CF/1988) and the principle of consumer protection (Article 170, V, CF/1988). Historically, 
as indicated in the previous section, the principles of economic order were directly linked to 
the protection of popular economy. Nowadays, the Constitution established that the law 
should prevent the abuse of economic power that aim at the domination of markets, 
elimination of competition and arbitrarily increasing profits (Article 173 § 4, CF/1988).18  
With regards to the principle of free enterprise, Eros Grau explain how in Brazil this 
principle has “dual-caracteristics”. In addition to the attributes related to economic freedom 
(freedom of commerce and industry, freedom of economic initiative), the principle of free 
enterprise also reinforces the “social value of work” as one of the fundamental elements of 
the Federative Republic of Brazil (Article 1, IV, CF/1988). Moreover, Grau highlights how 
the principle of the “social value of the free enterprise” is always combined with the dignity 
of human work.19  
As to the principle of free competition, Grau explains that it derives from the principle 
of free enterprise. According to the author, the principle of free competition has as its premise 
market efficiency, and therefore a fair playing field among market competitors. It also has 
the “legal equality” as a main framework.20  The principle of free competition in Brazil also 
assumes the repression of the abuse of economic power, precisely to prevent market 
dominance. 
The current Brazilian Competition Law (Law No. 12.529/2011) acknowledges the 
principle of free competition in its Article 1: 
 
unified society; II. to guarantee national development; III. to eradicate poverty and substandard living 
conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities; IV. To promote the well-being of all, without prejudice 
as to origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of discrimination.”. (Emphasis added) 
18 Brazilian Federal Constitution, 1988: “Art 170 The economic order, founded on the appreciation of the value 
of human labor and free enterprise, is intended to assure everyone a dignified existence, according to the 
dictates of social justice, observing the following principles: I. national sovereignty; II. private property; III. 
social function of property; IV. free competition; V. consumer protection; […]Art 173 With the exception of 
the cases provided for in this Constitution, direct exploitation of an economic activity by the State shall only be 
permitted when necessary for the imperatives of national security or a relevant collective interest, as defined by 
law.[…] §4°. The law shall repress abuse of economic power seeking to dominate markets, to eliminate 
competition and to increase profits arbitrarily.”(Emphasis added) 
19 E. R. Grau, A Ordem Econômica na Constituição de 1988, 15th Ed., São Paulo, Malheiros Editores, 2012, p. 
203 
20 Grau, 2012, p. 206. 
57 
 
“Art. 1. This Law structures the Brazilian System for Protection of 
Competition - SBDC and sets forth preventive measures and sanctions for 
violations against the economic order, guided by the constitutional 
principles of free competition, freedom of initiative, social role of property, 
consumer protection and prevention of the abuse of economic power.”21 
(Emphasis added) 
Indeed, having as a background the Constitutional principles of economic order in Brazil, 
one can say that the evolution of the law- and decision-making regarding antitrust rules in 
Brazil should have observed wider goals than efficiency and the free market.22 In like 
manner, the Brazilian Supreme Court, as part of a decision upon an Action for Declaration 
of Unconstitutionality,23 indicated that the principle of free competition should be considered 
in a broad perspective than the one adopted by classic economic liberalism. In a broader 
perspective, free competition encompasses the “social values of free enterprise” that also 
refer to consumer protection and reduction of social inequalities.24  
According to Forgioni, the goal of the competition law in Brazil is to preserve, under 
the constitutional principles, an environment in which companies have effective incentives 
to compete, innovate and satisfy the demands of consumers; and to protect competition and 
prevent markets from being harmed by agents with a high degree of economic power.25  In 
complement to that, the author also describes that competition law is an instrument for the 
achievement of social justice and human dignity.26  
 
César Mattos, in his analysis of the goals of Brazilian Competition Law, highlighted the clear 
prevalence of consumer welfare: “Despite the fact that Law 12.529/2011 and the old Law 
8.884/1194 tried to approach economic efficiency goals in its text, the tone is clearly 
favouring consumer welfare”.27 This view is reinforced by the fact that, in practice, no case 
 
21 For the whole content of the Brazilian Competition Law, please access: 
http://www.cade.gov.br/assuntos/internacional/legislacao/law-no-12529-2011-english-version-from-18-05-
2012.pdf/view [25/01/2018].  
22 See Forgioni, supra note 3, p. 193. 
23 Case Reference: ADIn 319/4/DF. Relator Ministro Moreira Alves [03-03-1993].  
24 See Forgioni, supra note 3, p. 193. 
25 Forgioni, supra note 3, p. 194. 
26 Forgioni, supra note 3, p. 192. 
27 C. Mattos, ‘Um pouco da História da Lei 12.529/11’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste 
no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018, p. 45. 
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(mergers or anti-competitive conduct) has been decided on the sole basis of economic 
efficiency.  
Despite the obvious semantic connections between the wording of the Constitution 
and the wording of the current Brazilian Competition Law, the law- and decision-making 
processes in Brazil have not always being fully connected to the goals of the country. In 
2009, Luis Fernando Schuartz was one of the first authors to explicitly argue that antitrust 
decisions in Brazil are not always based on constitutional principles, including references to 
Article 1 of the national Competition Law. This phenomenon was named by the author as the 
"deconstitutionalization" of the Brazilian competition rules,28 as he argues that the 
implementation of competition policies in Brazil does not have as its main goal the national 
constitutional principles but rather the Chicago School´s assumptions.  
Schuartz describes that by the time the Law No. 8.884/1994 entered into force, the 
antitrust discussions were not yet developed in the country. For these reasons, the decisions, 
that were mostly transplanted from the most advanced American jurisprudence and 
sophisticated academic discussions, filled a theoretical and practical gap without significant 
resistance. While in the United States, the antitrust cases evolved with fissures and tensions 
– partially resulting from complex Law and Economics discussions –, in Brazil, the 
undisputed normative framework was created for immediate use without taking into 
consideration the main goals and constitutional principles of the country.29  
Indeed, even taking into consideration the constitutional principles, it is still unclear 
what are prevalent goals that, in practice, lead the law and decision-making process of 
Brazilian competition policies. Consequently, when the goals of a law are not fully clear or 
respected in a country, it creates a window of opportunity for relevant actors to behave in 
favour of their private interests, rather than in favour of the public interest.  
3.3. THE EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN COMPETITION LAW 
ORIENTED TO VERTICAL AGREEMENTS 
This Section offers an analytical description of the current state of art of the Brazilian 
competition policy related to vertical agreements and is divided in two subsections. The first 
 
28 L. F. Shuartz, ‘A desconstitucionalização do direito de defesa da concorrência’, Revista do IBRAC, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, 2009, p. 327. 
29 Schuartz, 2009, p. 334. 
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one (3.3.1) analyses the policies under the old Brazilian Competition Law from 1994, and 
the second subsection (3.3.2) analyses the most recent policies in the context of the new 
Competition Law.30 
3.3.1. Vertical Agreements under Law No. 8.884/1994: an Unclear Legal 
Framework  
According to the Law No. 8.884/1994, there was no explicit rule oriented to vertical 
agreements. Because certain vertical agreements can reduce consumer welfare,31 these 
practices were interpreted as anti-competitive conduct prosecuted under Articles 20 and 21 
of Law No. 8.884/1994. In addition to that, given the broad scope of the old merger system, 
vertical agreements were also somehow interpreted as within the notification threshold. 
In more detail, the scope of all anti-competitive practices, including the different types 
of vertical restraints, was analysed under the ex-post control of Article 20 and 21. Actually, 
these articles covered all types of antitrust conduct other than mergers that could “(i) limit, 
restrain or in any way injure open competition or free enterprise; (ii) control a relevant market 
of a certain product or service; (iii) increase profits on a discretionary basis; and (iv) abuse 
of market power”.32 While Article 20 had more generic language, Article 2133 brought an 
 
30 It is worth noting that commercial agreements have primarly to observe the rules of contract law (private 
law). In Brazil, the Brazilian Civil Code is the main legal instrument that sets the principles and rules for 
commercial contracts. However, the focus of this thesis is on the effects of these contracts in the markets and 
economic welfare, and therefore the antitrust legal framework is highlighted. The study of vertical agreements 
under contract law in Brazil can be found at: P. A. Forgioni, Contratos Empresariais: Teoria Geral e Aplicação, 
4ª ed., São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 2019 and P. A. Forgioni, Contratos de distribuição, São Paulo, Editora 
Revista dos Tribunais, 2005. 
31 See economic analysis of vertical agreements in Chapter 2. 
32 Article 20 Law No. 8884/94: “Notwithstanding malicious intent, any act in any way intended or otherwise 
able to produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be deemed a violation 
of the economic order: I - to limit, restrain or in any way injure open competition or free enterprise; II - to 
control a relevant market of a certain product or service; III - to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and 
IV - to abuse one's market control. Paragraph 1. Achievement of market control as a result of competitive 
efficiency does not entail an occurrence of the illicit act provided for in item II above. Paragraph 2. Market 
control occurs when a company or group of companies controls a substantial share of a relevant market as 
supplier, agent, purchaser or financier of a product, service or related technology. Paragraph 3. The dominant 
position mentioned in the preceding paragraph is presumed when a company or group of companies controls 
twenty percent (20%) of the relevant market; this percentage is subject to change by CADE for specific sectors 
of the economy”.  
33 Some items of Article 21 Law No. 8884/94 could be applied to vertical restraints, such as “Article 21. The 
acts spelled out below, among others, will be deemed a violation of the economic order, to the extent applicable 
under article 20 and items thereof: […]II - to obtain or otherwise procure the adoption of uniform or concerted 
business practices among competitors; III - to apportion markets for finished or semi-finished products or 
services, or for supply sources of raw materials or intermediary products; IV - to limit or restrain market access 
60 
 
exemplary list of practices, which included provisions of resale price-fixing and exclusive 
territory provisions. In contrast with other jurisdictions, the Brazilian Competition Law has 
never differentiated the provisions regarding anti-competitive agreements from the 
provisions of unilateral conduct. Indeed, they were all analysed under the same articles.34  
Actually, in 1999, CADE published Resolution No. 20/1999, to settle a framework 
for analysing anti-competitive conduct in Brazil, including vertical agreements. For instance, 
Annex I of Resolution No. 20/1999 introduced, for the first time, the idea of an effects-based 
analysis in the assessment of vertical restraints:  
“As in the case of horizontal restrictions, vertical restrictive practices 
presume, in general, the existence of market power in the relevant market 
of origin, as well as an effect on a substantial share of the market that is the 
target of such practices, typifying a risk of harming the competition. 
Although these restrictions are, in principle, limitations to free competition, 
they may also bring benefits (“economic efficiencies”), which must be 
weighed against the potential anti-competitive consequences, in 
accordance with the rule of reason.”35 
Following this general guideline, CADE had, in theory, to follow a three-step approach 
towards vertical restraints consistent with: (i) verifying the existence of a dominant position 
of the parties involved in the investigation; (ii) proving the anti-competitive effects of the 
vertical restraint, in particular the market foreclosure conditions and, (iii) balancing these 
potential anti-competitive effects with the potential economic efficiencies of the transaction. 
The terms of the Resolution were not necessarily clear and objective in order to guarantee 
that business people and the authority could prepare a good assessment of the investigated 
restraints. Although the Resolution No. 20/1999 introduced to the national competition 
policy an important tool for the analysis of vertical restraints, it left significant room for 
CADE to create more accurate criteria via its jurisprudence.36  
 
by new companies; […]VI - to bar access of competitors to input, raw material, equipment or technology 
sources, as well as to their distribution channels”.  
34 In Europe, for example, Article 101 TFEU deals with anti-competitive agreements while Article 102 deals 
with abuses of dominant position. More details about the European experience can be found on Chapter 4. 
35 Resolution No. 20/1999, Annex I, Item B. 
36 This criticism was also brought by D. Geradin & C. M. Pereira Neto, Restrições verticais adotadas por 
empresas dominantes: uma análise do Direito Concorrencial no Brasil e na União Europeia, Edição Bilingue, 
São Paulo, Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2013, p. 153. 
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In parallel with the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21, some companies opted to 
submit their vertical agreements (such as supply and distribution agreements) to the merger 
control system of Article 54 of Law No. 8.884/1994. This happened because, under Law No. 
8.884/1994, transactions subject to mandatory filing explicitly included not only “acts aiming 
at economic concentration” (Article 54, Paragraph 3), but also “any act, under any form, that 
has the potential to limit or restrain competition or result in market domination” (Article 54, 
caput). During the years of implementation of Law No. 8.884/1994, the lack of objective 
criteria/ thresholds regarding the notification of vertical agreements, and the vague 
boundaries of such broad notion of Article 54, encouraged CADE to publish important 
administrative decisions on the matter for further clarification.   
Indeed, CADE’s precedents under Law No. 8.884/1994 tried to create some objective 
criteria for the notification (or not) of commercial agreements.37 Following the jurisprudence, 
there were a few parameters that defined which agreements were not subjected to the 
notification system, based on market share, the existence of an exclusivity clause, the 
duration of the agreement, and so on. In more details, the agreements that were not subjected 
to the ex-ante merger control were the ones where (i) the volume of sales represented less 
than 20% of a specific relevant market; (ii) the duration lasted less than five years; (iii) they 
did not carry any type of exclusivity clause; and (iv) did not affect the independence of asset-
related decision making.38 Those parameters, however, did not cover several business 
practices and they remained mostly unknown to the business community.39  
This background reveals that the legal framework established by the Law No. 
8.884/1994 law was not necessarily favouring the enforcement of anti-competitive vertical 
agreements in the country. Even though one can conclude that both ex-ante notification of 
agreements and ex-post control of vertical restraints were somehow covered by the national 
legislation, the enforcement of such practices was far from being optimal. This can be 
explained because: (i) there were no clear parameters for the notifications of agreements and 
 
37 See, for example, CADE’s decision on the cases: Case No. 08012.005367/2010-72 involving Monsanto do 
Brasil Ltda. and Dow Agrosciences Industrial Ltda. and Case No. 08012.004571/2010-76 involving Basf S.A 
and Syngenta Crop Protection. 
38 Abreu and Honda describe in more detail the former parameters of Law 8.884/1994. See, F. Abreu & J. 
Honda, ‘Associative agreements under the Brazilian Antitrust Law’, in C. Zarzur, L. Katona & M. Villela, 
Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2015. 
39 The Brazilian competition law and case law have very rarely imposed specific sector-oriented rules, as it was 
observed in the European Union (see, for instance, in Chapter 4 the discussion on the first block exemptions). 
I highlight, for instance, that certain vertical agreements in the car industry are regulated by Law No. 6,729 of 
28 November 1979 (Law No. 6,729/79), also known as “Lei Ferrari”, which determines specific rules on 
territorial and customer restraints. See E.Grau & P. A. Forgioni, ‘Restrição à concorrência, autorização legal e 
seus limites, Lei 8.884, de 1994, e Lei 6.279/1979 (“Lei Ferrari”)’, Revista do IBRAC,Vol. 6, 1999, pp.5-27.   
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the antitrust jurisprudence regarding the need of notification did not cover many vertical 
agreements that could potentially have anti-competitive effects and; (ii) the level of ex-post 
enforcement was still very low and it relied on an instable pattern of jurisprudence. With 
regard to this last point, since this PhD research emphasizes the importance of having 
consolidated antitrust jurisprudence to guarantee better legal certainty to parties, a section of 
this Chapter will focus on the analysis of some relevant Brazilian case law.  
3.3.2. Vertical Agreements under Law No. 12.529/2011: Favouring Ex-Post 
Enforcement  
As discussed in the previous Section, the new Law No. 12.529/2011 did not introduce 
significant changes with regard to the substantive law. For instance, with regard to anti-
competitive practices (including vertical agreements), the substantive provisions of the new 
Competition Law were not considerably modified when compared to the previous law. In 
practical terms. Article 36 of the new Competition Law comprises a merger of Articles 20 
and 21 of Law No. 8.884/1994. This Article 36 establishes that a violation of competition 
law is observed when any act has the object, or is able, to produce anti-competitive effects in 
the Brazilian market, irrespective of its intention. Under this new institutional environment, 
CADE has not issued any Regulation that sets out criteria for the economic assessment of the 
positive and negative effects of such conduct. The Authority has based their decision-making 
process primarily on Resolution No. 20/1999, which is rather generic and outdated. 
With regard to merger control, the new Law introduces some procedural changes. 
Most importantly, it institutes a pre-merger regime40 and redefines the very hypothesis of 
transactions subject to mandatory filing. Law No. 12.529/2011 envisages, for instance, that 
associative agreements should be subjected to the merger control system.41 As the enactment 
of the new Brazilian Competition Law did not make clear the terms of Article 54 of Law No. 
8.884/1994 – i.e., what kind of agreements could be considered as associative – it 
 
40 According to the former competition law, the notification of a transaction to CADE was not suspensory and 
could be made up to 15 business-days after the execution of the first binding document between the parties (i.e., 
a post-merger notification regime). 
41 Law No. 12.539/2011: “Art. 90. For the purposes of Article 88 of this Law, a concentration act shall be 
carried out when: I - two (2) or more previously independent companies merge; II - one (1) or more companies 
acquire, directly or indirectly, by purchase or exchange of stocks, shares, bonds or securities convertible into 
stocks or assets, whether tangible or intangible, by contract or by any other means or way, the control or parts 
of one or more companies; III – one (1) or more companies incorporate one or more companies, or IV - two 
(2) or more companies enter into an associative contract, consortium or joint venture”. (Emphasis added) 
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immediately generated an immense debate regarding the meaning of the term “associative 
agreements”. Indeed, this kind of contract did not represent a typical category of commercial 
agreements. Moreover, the term had never been used before in Brazilian legislation and it 
had not been considered an historical reference in antitrust practice. 
For these reasons, the first attempt to clarify the notification requirements for 
horizontal and vertical agreements was Resolution No. 10/2014. Pursuant to Article 2 of 
Resolution No. 10/2014, horizontal and vertical agreements had to be filed under the pre-
merger review system if they lasted for two years or more and the following additional 
conditions were met: 
 “(i) the agreement gives rise to a horizontal overlap between the 
contracting parties or their respective groups, and their combined market 
share is equal to or in excess of 20%; or (ii) the agreement gives rise to a 
vertical link between the contracting parties or their respective groups, and 
one of them has a market share of at least 30% in one of the markets 
affected by the agreement, provided that (a) the agreement contains a 
profit/loss sharing provision; or (b) the agreement contains exclusivity 
obligations.”42  
Whenever the contractual transaction fell within any of the above-mentioned cases, the 
contracting parties had to assess whether the turnover thresholds for mandatory filing set 
forth in the Brazilian antitrust law were also met.43 In the case where such thresholds were 
met, the parties had to submit the agreement to CADE′s pre-merger control before taking any 
measure to implement it. For example, a two-year exclusive distribution agreement with 
effects in Brazil was considered an associative contract whenever the manufacturer of the 
product to be distributed held a market share equal to or in excess of 30% in the market at 
issue. So, even though one can understand that notification of vertical agreements was 
covered in the national legislation since 1994, it was only 20 years later, in 2014 that an 
explicit provision entered into force. 
 
42 Free translation from Article 2, CADE Resolution No. 10/2014. 
43 According to the Brazilian Antitrust Law, an agreement is subject to CADE′s pre-merger control if it has 
effects in Brazil. Secondly, if at least one of the groups involved in the transaction has gross revenues in Brazil 
of BRL750 million or more (equivalent in May 2019 to around EUR165 million) in the fiscal year immediately 
prior to the execution of the agreement; and if at least one other group involved in the transaction has gross 




It should be noted that some of the wording of Resolution No. 10/2014 remained 
unclear to the business community, such as “sharing of risks”, “sharing of profits and losses”, 
“inter-dependence relationship”, and “exclusivity relationship”, also because no guideline 
was provided to parties to understand these concepts. Indeed, the first difficulty arising from 
the wording of Resolution No. 10/2014 was the lack of clarity about the essential elements 
of the definition of associative agreement, established in Article 2 (“horizontal or vertical 
cooperation or sharing of risk resulting in an interdependence relationship”).  
 Moreover, because Resolution No. 10/2014 was too broad in scope, companies 
started not complying with the law. This fact meant that they preferred rather taking the risk 
of being caught by the authority than to bear the costs of undergoing the whole notification 
system. Indeed, the terms of Resolution No. 10/2014 lead to high costs both to companies 
that were obliged to bear the non-negligible costs of communicating such agreements to 
CADE, and to the Authority itself, which had to assess these transactions.44 Curiously, the 
number of associative agreements notified to CADE since Resolution No. 10/2014 entered 
into force was much smaller than expected. From January 2015 to November 2016 (when 
Resolution No. 10/2014 was revoked), only 50 associative agreements among horizontals 
and verticals were filed in the period (less than 5% of total merger transactions filed in the 
same period), out of which 15 were considered non-mandatory notifications.45 All other filed 
agreements were approved without restriction.  
It is possible to speculate on the reasons for such a small number of agreements 
communicated to CADE. Maybe the rule itself was not totally comprehended by the 
companies – which is evidenced by the high percentage of cases where the agreement notified 
was not considered mandatory by the Authority (30%). Notwithstanding that the reduced 
number is not realistic, mainly if we take into consideration the size of the Brazilian economy 
and the amount of commercial transactions that are held in the country on daily basis. It is 
unlikely that in almost two years there have been more mergers than, for example, supply 
and distribution agreements that contained exclusivity clauses. In other words, it would be 
 
44 An extensive cost analysis of different enforcement costs will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
45 Under Resolution No. 10/2014, 15 (fifteen) notified agreements were considered by CADE as non-mandatory 
notification, which reflects the vague/imprecise terms of the law (i.e. The parties thought they had to notify and 
in the end, CADE decided that those agreements were not in the scope of the notification system). Among the 
reasons for these decisions, CADE claimed: (i) the non-existence of a horizontal or vertical relation; (ii) the 
non-fulfilment of the market share thresholds, and/or (iii) the non-existence of exclusivity clauses or sharing of 
revenues and losses. 
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erroneous to assume that there was significant compliance with the obligation to file vertical 
agreements under Resolution No. 10/2014. 
In 2016, CADE decided to change the rules once again. The agency published 
Resolution No. 17/2016 that brought new conditions for the notification of commercial 
agreements, therefore revoking Resolution No. 10/2014. The new Resolution establishes the 
basis for significant changes in the rules for mandatory filing of both vertical agreements and 
horizontal collaborations. The great innovation introduced by Resolution No. 17/2016 is that 
vertical agreements are no longer subjected to the ex-ante notification system, meaning that 
they were excluded from the preventive provisions. The rule brought by the new Resolution 
is clear in the sense that only horizontal agreements, meaning, only agreements performed 
by firms that compete in the same relevant market should be subjected to a merger review. 
Besides the conditions related to horizontal overlap, Article 2 of Resolution No. 17/2016, the 
agreement must cumulatively fulfil some other criteria for the antitrust filing: (i) the contract 
should have 2 (two) years term or longer; (ii) parties should set up a common undertaking 
for the exploitation of a business activity;46 and (iii) parties should share risks and results in 
the business activity under the agreement.  
Actually, although Resolution No. 17/2016 tries to overcome the uncertainties from 
previous regulation, it still leaves some discussions open. It is worth remembering that, since 
2014, Brazil has been passing through a deep political and economic crisis and, therefore, 
strategic alliances among competitors tend to occur more often as an important strategy of 
cost reduction and market expansion. Sectors such as food/beverage, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, among others, where players typically engage in various types of distribution 
and supply relationships and partnerships, have to carefully assess in order to check how 
these constant changes in regulation affect their business in Brazil.  
The first case in which CADE applied the rules set forth in Resolution No. 17/2016 
was the Case No. 08700.008484/2016-25 (decided by CADE on January 16, 2017). The 
contract was between the pharmaceutical companies Medley Farmacêutica Ltda. (“Medley”) 
and Aurobindo Pharma Limited (“Aurobindo”). Because they were direct competitors in the 
pharmaceutical market, they decided to notify their contract. However, the agreement 
referred to a distribution, license and supply of three generic medical products (not covered 
by patent rights), i.e., it referred to a vertical agreement celebrated by direct competitors. In 
 
46 Resolution No. 17/2016 defines "business activity" as the "acquisition or offer of goods or services in the 




this case, CADE concluded that the agreement was not subject to mandatory review. In 
practice, the contract would result in an additional distributor for Aurobindo’s products, 
without exclusivity. With this decision, CADE confirmed the understanding that typical 
vertical agreements are no longer subject to mandatory filing, even if between competitors, 
since they do not establish a common undertaking to perform an economic activity. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that in 2015 CADE issued Resolution No. 12-2015 about its 
Consultation Procedure. Within the scope of this Consultation Procedure, parties can directly 
contact CADE regarding the interpretation of legislation, or even regarding the legality of 
acts, contracts and commercial practices that have (or have not) been initiated by economic 
agents. Therefore, if parties have doubts regarding the legality of their vertical agreements, 
they can consult the authority. This procedure, however, appears to have been underused, 
looking at the available statistics. Since 2015, 25 (twenty-five) consultations were judged by 
the authority, being only three of them related to the legality of vertical clauses.47  From these 
three cases, two of them (Case No. 08700.001930/2019-13 and Case No. 
08700.009476/2014-34) were inconclusive because of the lack of information provided by 
the parties. In the Case No. 08700.004594/2018-80, however, Continental do Brasil Produtos 
Automotivos Ltda asked CADE whether its resale price policy in the auto parts aftermarket 
was in accordance with the law. The Reporting Commissioner Paulo Burnier da Silveira 
concluded that the practice was legal since the company did not have market power in this 
market, and moreover, there was no discrimination between resellers affected by the 
minimum price policy. 
When discussing vertical agreements in Brazil it is possible to conclude that the legal 
framework has changed in 2016 in a way that turned out to prioritize the ex-post enforcement 
of these practices. This PhD research puts into question whether the legal framework that 
excluded vertical agreements from the notification system and, therefore, prioritized ex-post 
enforcement of vertical restraints, is an optimal policy. One way of answering this query is 
through the analysis of some of CADE case law that refers to ex-post control. This discussion 
could be fruitful for predicting whether the precedents of the Authority’s behaviour are able 
to guarantee greater legal certainty to firms. The other way involves a discussion about 
whether the legal reform was duly justified considering the public interest and the goals of 
the Brazilian Competition Law. Both discussions are described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
47 Data available at: <http://cadenumeros.cade.gov.br/> [24/06/2019] 
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3.4. THE EX-POST ENFORCEMENT IN BRAZIL: RELEVANT 
JURISPRUDENCE AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 
Nowadays, the main rule applicable to anti-competitive vertical agreements is Article 36 of 
Law No. 12.529/2011, which corresponds to the ex-post control of these practices. In Article 
36 (3), one can find a non- exhaustive list of business practices that may be deemed to be 
infringements of antitrust law if they have as their object, or effect, distorting competition. 
Law No. 12.529/2011, however, does not define vertical restraints. Over the years, CADE 
has investigated only a few cases related to vertical restraints, among them, resale price-
fixing cases and exclusive agreements. Table 3.1 below presents the data of (i) opened cases 
of vertical agreements and (ii) total decisions taken by CADE’s Tribunal from 2013 until 
2017.48 
Table 3.1: Enforcement of vertical agreements in Brazil, 2013-2017. 
Vertical 
Agreements 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Matters 
Opened 
3 3 9 5 4 
Total 
decisions 
5 0 0 0 0 
 Source: CADE’s General Superintendence and OECD, 2019. Compiled by the author. 
From Table 1, one can conclude that from 2013-2017 CADE has decided very few cases 
involving vertical agreements. This can be explained by the fact that vertical restraints are 
not prioritized by the Authority, and/or that most of the cases (if not the totality of them) are 
solved by settlement agreements.  
Indeed, to resolve its investigations, CADE depends heavily on settlements.49 
Actually, in recent years, the authority has changed its settlement procedures with the aim of 
increasing cooperation among business people, and this has proven to be very effective. The 
increase in the number of settlements is impressive, from 5 agreements signed in 2012, when 
the new law entered into force, to 75 signed in 2017.50 In the year 2018, the amount of fines 
 
48 This is the most recent data available, in which vertical agreement cases are disaggregated from other anti-
competitive practices.  
49 The amount of settlement agreements signed by CADE in the last years was pointed out by OECD as an issue 
to be overcome by the authority in Brazil. OECD, 2019, supra note 8. 
50 Most recent data, see OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 104-108. 
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resulted from settlement decisions amounted to BRL 530 million (equivalent to around EUR 
120 million). This is ten times more than the value of fines resulted from CADE’s decision 
on administrative proceedings, that totalled BRL 50 million (equivalent to around EUR 12 
million) in the same year.51   
This substantial use of settlements by CADE has its drawbacks, mainly because it can 
give wrong incentives to parties. This is particularly the case when the discounts proposed 
by the settlements are substantial. Settlements can actually reduce legal certainty in the 
marketplace and slow the development of the jurisprudence in Brazil. With settlement 
agreements, no decisions are published by CADE and the cases are not reviewed by national 
courts. If, for instance, very few cases reach CADE´s Tribunal in respect of vertical 
agreements, and the members of the Tribunal disagree among themselves, the clear view on 
the legality of verticals becomes a challenging issue.52 As there are almost no recent cases in 
which CADE has conducted a full assessment of vertical restraints, this Section will mostly 
rely on the older case law.  
According to Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, in order to investigate whether vertical 
restraints are anti-competitive, CADE jurisprudence has usually followed three main 
criteria.53 First, the analysis of market share and dominant position in both upstream and 
downstream markets. For instance, a franchising agreement of a medium-sized fast food 
chain that usually has several vertical restraints (such as geo-blocking clauses and resale 
price-fixing) cannot be considered an antitrust offense. The second criterion, according to 
Azevedo, is identifying the actual or potential negative outcomes in the market. For this 
second condition, CADE would observe whether the effect of the vertical restraint in market 
structure, rivalry between competitors and entry barriers is sustainable enough in order to 
foreclose markets. Once verified the potential anti-competitive effects of a particular vertical 
restraint, CADE would go to the third and last step, which consists of verifying the relevant 
economic efficiencies. Azevedo shows (through case studies) that the three-step analysis is 
a pattern among CADE decisions. However, the intention of conducting this approach does 
not say much about how the full assessment of vertical restraints is conducted, in terms of its 
complexity.  
 
51 Data available at: <http://cadenumeros.cade.gov.br/> [24/06/2019] 
52 This concern was also raised by OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 104-108. 
53 P. F. Azevedo, ‘Restrições verticais e Defesa da Concorrência: A experiência Brasileira’, Textos para 
Discussão FGV-EESP, No. 264, 2010, p. 9-11.  
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By the time the new Brazilian Competition Law entered into force in 2012, Damien 
Geradin and Caio Mario Pereira Neto conducted a study about vertical restraints in Brazil, 
looking mainly at CADE’s decisions on exclusive dealing, conditional rebates, tying and 
bundling cases.  The authors concluded that the effect-based approach conducted by CADE 
over the years relied on “qualitative criteria and intuitive reasoning, rather than a rigorous 
and structured assessment, including quantitative elements, hence leading to inconsistency 
and uncertainty”.54 The authors had a closer look at CADE jurisprudence, showing 
significant discrepancies among the qualitative analysis of the authority: 
“This variation generates inconsistency, especially when it comes to a 
definition of standards of proof in the context of the rule of reason analysis. 
Indeed, the relatively clear general framework for the effects-based 
analysis has not been capable of developing more detailed tests and 
standards to define when the net effects of a particular vertical restraint 
would be deemed negative to characterize conduct as illegal under the 
[Brazilian Competition Law]. In particular, Brazilian Competition Law 
System’s initial analysis of effects has been relatively weak as it has not 
focused on demonstrating actual foreclosure effects or on developing a 
rigorous analysis of potential effects. Such assessments require a detailed, 
fact-based, analysis relying on objective economic criteria, such as, for 
instance, the “equally efficient” competitor test in the case of rebates. 
However, the approach used by Brazilian authorities has not gone that far, 
sometimes limiting itself to observing hypothetical foreclosure to declare 
certain conduct anti-competitive.”55  
It should be highlighted that ex-post enforcement in Brazil can also be accomplished 
by private actions. The Competition Law in Brazil foresees the possibility of damage claim 
actions against anti-competitive conduct, such as certain vertical restraints. Article 47 of the 
Brazilian Competition Law indicates that harmed parties “may take legal action in defence 
of their individual interests or individual homogeneous interests, so that the practices 
constituting violations to the economic order cease, and compensation for the losses and 
 
54 D. Geradin & C. M. Pereira Neto, Restrições verticais adotadas por empresas dominantes: uma análise do 
Direito Concorrencial no Brasil e na União Europeia, Edição Bilingue, São Paulo, Editora Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2013. 
55 Geradin & Pereira Neto, 2013, supra note 54, p. 162. 
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damages suffered be received, regardless of the investigation or administrative procedure, 
which will not be suspended due to filing of court action”.  
However, there is no significant culture in Brazil when it comes to proposing damage 
claims.56 In practice, filing private claims is not an easy task in Brazil, especially without 
having a corresponding CADE proceeding, since parties are required to demonstrate the harm 
of the alleged anti-competitive practice, as well as the duration of it. Just as in other 
jurisdictions, the need for complex economic analysis, evaluation of risk and the calculation 
of damages are natural barriers to these claims. In addition to these challenges, civil 
procedures can be very lengthy since parties should expect a minimum of 5 years for a final 
decision of the Superior Court of Justice.57 Taking into account this scenario, the upcoming 
ex-post enforcement analysis will focus exclusively on CADE’s public enforcement and 
jurisprudence. 
3.4.1. Resale Price-Fixing: SKF Case 
Traditionally, CADE adopted the rule of reason in resale price-fixing cases. Actually, for 
several years CADE seemed to prioritize the American approach regarding resale price-
fixing.58 The first and most relevant jurisprudence under Law No. 8.884/1994 was the Kibon 
case (or Ice cream price list case), adjudicated in 1997 by CADE.59 In the Kibon case, the 
investigation started with a complaint by the Bakery Association of the State of São Paulo, 
that indicated that Kibon (ice cream producer) set a price list for its resellers which directly 
affected their autonomy to define their prices in the markets. CADE dismissed the case and 
decided that the so-called price list referred only to the so-called “recommended prices”, 
since the ice-cream producer had not pressured at any time its resellers to follow the 
 
56 For more details, see submission of Brazil to OECD, Relationship between Public and Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Brazil, 2015. 
57 Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público (SBDP), Revisão Judicial das Decisões do Conselho Administrativo 
de Defesa Econômica (CADE): Pesquisa empírica e aplicada sobre os casos julgados pelos Tribunais 
Regionais Federais (TRFs), Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Belo 
Horizonte, Editora Fórum, 2010. 
58 In the US, certain vertical agreements (for instance, with resale price-fixing clauses) were considered as per 
se illegal for several years. Since the 1970s, the US Courts have used the rule of reason to assess the cases 
involving vertical agreements. The highlight here is the famous Sylvania case (Continental TV Inc v GTE 
Sylvania Inc, 1976, 433 US 36) about non-price vertical restraints. After the Sylvania case, the Khan case (State 
Oil Co v Khan,1997, 522 US 3) judgment for maximum resale price maintenance and the Leegin case in 2007 
(Leegin Creative Leather Prods v PSKS Inc, 2007, 127 US 2705) accepted the efficiency arguments to allow 
minimum resale price maintenance.  
59 Kibon vs. Bakery Association of the State of São Paulo, Case No. 148/99. 
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suggested prices. Not only that, CADE also pointed out that there were no sanctions to 
resellers that opted to offer prices below the suggested lists. Also, there were no threats from 
Kibon’s side to stop supplying to such resellers. This position was confirmed by several other 
cases during the 1990s and the 2000s,60 for instance, in cases involving price lists set by car 
manufacturers,61 and even in 2011 in cases involving vertical price-fixing for book 
publishers.62  
Actually, until 2013, CADE had never condemned a company for resale price-fixing. 
Most of the above-mentioned cases were dismissed by lack of evidence of effective 
monitoring from the producers’ side, i.e. a lack of monitoring mechanisms and punishment 
for the dealer that did not follow the fixed resale prices.63 Other cases were dismissed because 
of the lack of market power of the economic agents. According to Amorim, the fact that 
CADE, until 2013, did not condemn any company on the basis of resale price-fixing and the 
existing jurisprudence supported agents to carry out the practice without apparent risks, 
ultimately encouraged this conduct in the country.64 
However, this position was changed in January 2013 in the judgment of SKF.65 In 
2013, CADE published an infringement decision against SKF do Brasil Ltda, an auto parts 
manufacturer, subsidiary of the Swedish SKF group, for fixing minimum the resale price for 
automotive bearings. In this decision, resale price-fixing was considered illegal since 
defendants were not able to prove efficiencies. Despite the duration of the practice and 
whether the distributors followed or not the fixed resale prices, the case was presumed to be 
illegal by the authority.  
The SKF judgment was the first decision regarding resale price-fixing that was 
condemned by CADE. In detail, the investigated practice consisted of pre-definition of 
minimum mark-ups in the resale of SKF products (automotive bearings) by its exclusive 
distributors in Brazil. SKF created a document called “Preventive Measures” (in Portuguese 
“Medidas Preventivas”) in which they would fix resale prices. According to this document, 
 
60 See for example: Kinder Ovo Case No. 08000.0062701997-88; Gomas de Mascar Case No. 14/96; Brahma 
Case No. 08000.000146/96-55; AmBev I Case No. 08012.004363/2000-89; Ambev 2 Case No. 
08012.001626/2008-71; CAA/DF Case No. 08012.012420/99-6. 
61 See, for example, Volkswagen Case No. 89/92, and FIAT Case No. 08000.017766/95-33, judged in 1999 
62 Among others, Ática Case No. 08000.0018299/96-86. 
63 M. M. Sampaio Ferraz, ‘Fixação de preço de revenda no e-commerce: uma análise à luz da jurisprudência 
nacional e internacional’, Revista do IBRAC, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2017, p. 453. 
64 F. Amorim, Fixação de preços de revenda no Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: análise do 
direito sancionador antitruste à luz do princípio da segurança jurídica, 2017 (Master thesis filed at University 
of São Paulo, São Paulo).  
65 SKF vs. Procon-SP, Case No. 08012.001271 / 01-447. 
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SKF would punish the distributors that did not follow their resale price, for example, by 
cancelling the distribution contracts and/or any authorization to distribute SKF products. In 
practice, SKF did not terminate any contract, but applied warnings to distributors that did not 
respect the fixed-price.  
During the investigation, SKF argued that (i) its commercial policy generated 
economic efficiencies to the market, and (ii) that in practice the company did not set penalties 
for distributors who did not follow their fixed mark-ups, meaning that distributors were free 
to set their own prices. The company also argued that the fixed mark-up was a request from 
the distributors themselves as a way of avoiding the free-riding problem as part of the "price 
war" in the downstream market. The anti-competitive practice lasted seven months between 
2000 and 2001.  
In 2005, the SDE (the former investigation body) concluded the investigation in 
favour of SKF, arguing that there was not enough indication that SKF was dominant in the 
specific market or engaged in anti-competitive practice. When the case was forwarded to 
CADE, the Reporting Commissioner César Mattos, after years of further investigation, voted 
for dismissing the case, following the SDE suggestion, since there was no indication of 
coordination in the upstream or downstream markets, and not enough evidence that SFK had 
market power.  
Nevertheless, the Commissioner Vinícius Marques de Carvalho (who afterwards was 
appointed president of CADE), requested a revision of the case and voted to condemn the 
company on the basis of the presence of a resale price-fixing policy combined with the threat 
of a punishment. According to him, that would be enough to create a "coercion" regarding 
the commercial policy, even if the company, in fact, did not monitor the prices nor apply 
specific penalties. Carvalho pointed out that the low market share of SKF as well as the 
efficiency defence presented by the defendant in the case files were not sufficient to 
characterize the legality of the practice. It is worth noting that the voting among CADE´s 
Commissioners was not unanimous.66 Four other Commissioners followed Carvalho’s vote, 
while only one Commissioner voted for dismissal of the case following the Reporting 
 
66 In Brazil, every case of infringement of the economic order is voted by CADE’s six Commissioners and 
President (Article 91, CADE’s Internal Regulation). For every case, there is a Reporting Commissioner who is 
responsible to make a decision, and the other Commissioners can choose to follow it or not. If the votes are 
diverging (unusual to happen), CADE’s President can nominate a Commissioner who will prepare a casting 




Commissioner. CADE imposed on SKF a fine equivalent of BRL 2.7 million (equivalent to 
EUR 500.000). 
SKF challenged CADE's decision in the judiciary, seeking its annulment. At the end 
of May 2015, the company obtained a favourable first instance decision from the Federal 
Court of Brasília. The decision shows that CADE had abruptly changed its position (by 
applying a different analysis to resale price-fixing), and therefore harmed the legal certainty 
of business people. The first instance decision, however, was based on formalistic arguments 
and did not analyse the scope of the practice and the effects in the market. In June 2015, 
CADE appealed to the Federal Regional Court, seeking to restore the terms of its 2013 
decision, but the case is still under discussion.  
The relevance of the SKF decision stems from the fact that CADE has gradually 
became more conservative in assessing the legality of vertical restraints. CADE’s recent case 
law has returned the burden of proof to the companies, treating resale price-fixing as a sort 
of per se violation. Since this decision, companies that want to fix resale price must also be 
able to prove economic efficiency gains, i.e. prove that the positive effects generated by such 
restraint will be passed on to consumers.67 The central point of the problem is this reversal 
of the burden of proof that directly alters the dynamics of the ex-post enforcement of vertical 
restraints. On the one hand, if the burden of proof is on the side of the antitrust authority, it 
is more unlikely that the economic agent will be condemned by setting resale prices. On the 
other hand, if the burden of proof regarding the absence of adverse effects on competition 
rests with the company, it is very likely that it will be condemned by the authority, even 
though it can bring efficiencies to the markets.68  
This means that the change in the burden of proof in cases of resale price-fixing, may 
ultimately lead the authority to take wrong decisions. Efficiency enhancing agreements may 
be condemned because proofing efficiencies is not an easy task. Still in the scope of the SKF 
case, CADE’s Commissioner Olavo Chinaglia – one of the two Commissioners that voted in 
favour of dismissal of the case – stresses how difficult it can be for the firms to prove pro-
competitive outcomes: 
 
67 Amorim explains that this inversion in the burden of proof to the companies should not be confused with the 
rule per se, which considers an anti-competitive practice illegal by its very essence (as in the case of hard-core 
price-fixing cartels. The author concluded that resale price-fixing, despite the reversal in the burden of proof is 
still under the "rule of reason," stipulated in Article 36 of Law 12.529/2011. Amorim, 2017, supra note 64, p. 
95. 
68 It should be noted that the mere suggestion of resale price remains a lawful practice, when not accompanied 
by any price monitoring mechanism and/or retaliation of retailers that do not follow the price suggestions. 
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“In this context, if the only way to decide upon the legality of the practice 
would be proving that economic efficiencies are greater than the damages, 
than the Defendant has almost no possibility of defence. In a case in which 
the documents are unable to conclude precisely that the investigated 
practice altered the functioning of the market and, consequently, are unable 
of proving any negative antitrust effect, the Defendant’s necessity of 
proving economic efficiencies creates a very similar situation to what 
procedural theory has called as diabolical proof.”69 
According to Pedro Cristofaro, CADE failed to present any constitutional or legal 
justification to adopt this reversal in the burden of proof for resale price-fixing.70 The author 
explains that only few exceptions in the whole Brazilian legal system accept the reversal in 
the burden of proof, and therefore the SFK decision could have failed to respect constitutional 
principles.71 
After the SKF case, two other main cases involving resale price-fixing were judged 
by CADE. The first one, Bematech,72 involving resale price-fixing in the market for a specific 
type of printer, resulted in settlement.  
The second case involves resale price-fixing by Raízen Combustíveis, formerly Shell 
Brasil, a fuel distributor. In the Raízen case,73 the company was accused of fixing resale 
prices (and mark-up margins) of fuels, imposing the standardization of accounting systems, 
prices and profit margins to distributors during the period of 1999 and 2003. Just as in the 
SKF case, CADE’s Tribunal was again divided on how to assess those vertical restraints, and 
whether to consider the presumption of illegality. The Reporting Commissioner Alessandro 
Octaviani Luis voted for the condemnation of the company and presumed the vertical price-
fixing to be illegal, since the company was uncapable of proving the economic efficiencies 
of their business practice. In this sense, Octaviani Luis presented his arguments in a more 
formalistic approach and chose not to define any objective rule to be applied in resale price-
fixing cases. The Commissioner Marcio de Oliveira Junior also voted for the condemnation 
of Raízen but based his arguments in the rule of reason approach. His vote described a balance 
 
69  Free translation from Olavo Chinaglia’s Vote on Case SKF vs. Procon-SP, Case No. 08012.001271/2001-
447, from 31 August 2011, case file p. 939. 
70 P. Cristofaro, ‘A categorização dos ilícitos concorrenciais e o direito concorrencial brasileiro’, in C. 
Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
71 Cristofaro, 2018.  
72 CADE vs Bematech S/A, Case No. 08700.002692/2014-59. 
73 CADE vs Raízen Combustíveis S/A (former Shell Brasil Ltda), Case No. 08012.011042/2005-61. 
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of the pro and anti-competitive effects of the practice, taking into consideration the 
information that was available in the case files. In his words: 
“There were no economic efficiencies generated by the practice: (i) it was 
not a mere suggestion of resale conditions to the distributor Shell, but 
instead the imposition of prices and operational conditions; (ii) the coercive 
mechanisms for the imposition of resale prices have eliminated the possible 
efficiencies of the practice; and (iii) the control over the services offered 
by distributors could have been made via other means rather than price-
fixing, eg, via fuel quality inspections.”74 
Some recent literature criticized CADE’s position with regard to resale price-fixing cases, 
others recognize that the problems arise from a lack of cases being analysed by CADE. 
Priscila Brolio Gonçalves, for instance, explains that the lack of administrative precedents 
regarding resale price-fixing is partly related to government control exercised until the 1990s, 
and more recently, to the priority set by CADE in relation to horizontal conduct such as 
cartels.75 The author stresses that the modest amount of administrative decisions on this 
matter does not stem from the absence of such conduct in the Brazilian territory, or from the 
fact that the conduct does not harm competition and/or consumers.76  
Nowadays, unfortunately, there is no clear rule or clear jurisprudence regarding resale 
price-fixing, and there are divergent views in the Tribunal regarding the topic. This fact 
increases legal uncertainties and weakens the function of the Tribunal in guiding competition 
policy and enforcement. It is worth noting that in their decisions, none of the Commissioners 
mentioned the goals of competition law in Brazil as a way to clarify the choice for their line 
of argumentation.  From previous Sections, it has been shown that the among goals of the 
competition policy in Brazil is economic efficiency and free-competition, i.e., the 
preservation of an environment in which companies have effective incentives to compete, 
innovate and satisfy the demands of consumers.  
The use of presumption of illegality in resale price-fixing cases does not necessarily 
respect this goal, because resale price-fixing can bring economic efficiencies to markets, such 
as solving the double mark-up problem, preventing free-riding, or reducing transaction 
 
74 See Vote of Commissioner Oliveira Junior on the Case No. 08012.011042/2005-61, p.135 (case file p. 1495). 
75 P. A. Gonçalves, Fixação e Sugestão de Preços de Revenda em Contrato de Distribuição, 2nd ed., São Paulo, 
Editora Singular, 2016, p. 330. 
76 Gonçalves, 2016, p. 307-308. 
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costs.77 These economic efficiencies can help to create a level playing field among 
competitors that is intrinsically expressed in the constitutional principles, and therefore they 
should not be ignored by the Brazilian Authority in any analysis of vertical cases, even when 
they involve price restrictions.  
3.4.2. Geo-Blocking: Iguatemi Cases 
With regard to the jurisprudence of exclusive territory or geo-blocking agreements, CADE 
evaluated this problem in a few cases concerning leasing agreements in shopping malls. In 
the investigation and assessment of the authority, it was concluded that the negative outcomes 
of the restrictive agreements outweighed the potential benefits of it.  
Iguatemi Shopping ("Iguatemi") was involved in two cases concerning the use of 
vertical restraints (exclusive territory), having been condemned in both. Iguatemi is a 
luxurious shopping mall located in the wealthy southern region of São Paulo. The first case 
(also called the Iguatemi I case78), judged in 2003, concerned leasing contracts79 with 
exclusive territory clauses, in which Iguatemi prohibited the shop owners of luxury brands 
from opening other stores in malls that directly compete with Iguatemi. The second case (also 
called Iguatemi II case80), judged in 2007, involved another type of exclusive territory clause, 
defining that the same shop owners could not have other shops within a certain radius of its 
mall (hereinafter called “radius clause”). In the next paragraphs, the focus is on the analysis 
of the second case.81 
In Iguatemi II, SDE (the former investigatory body) concluded that the exclusive 
territory clause was lawful, and therefore recommended the dismissal of the case. SDE 
argued that these clauses are common in lease agreements in shopping malls and in 
franchising contracts because it brings economic efficiency to markets, such as elimination 
of the free-riding problem. CADE´s Tribunal disagreed with SDE. The Authority 
 
77 See the economic analysis of resale price-fixing in Chapter 2. 
78 Participações Morro Vermelho Ltda. vs Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi e Shopping Centers Reunidos 
do Brasil Ltda, Case No. 08012.009991/98-82. 
79 Any store-brand that wants to have a shop in this Iguatemi mall, has to sign a lease agreement with it. 
80 CADE vs. Condomínio do Shopping Center Iguatemi/SP, Case No. 08012.006636/97-43. 
81 For the detail analysis of Iguatemi I case, see for instance, P. F. Azevedo, ‘Contratos de Exclusividade em 
Shopping Centers’, in E. Pereira, E. Lagroteria & J. P. Lea, Concorrência e Regulação: Estudos e Pareceres 
Econômicos, 1st ed., São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2004, pp. 163-186; R. Santacruz, ‘Exclusividade e 
competição no mercado de shopping centers’, in C. Mattos (org.), A revolução do antitruste no Brasil 2, São 
Paulo, Editora Singular, 2008. 
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acknowledged the existence of efficiency gains from this vertical restraint but considered 
them to be insufficient and disproportionate to the restriction. 
In detail, Iguatemi’s lease agreements generally used a standard radius clause, which 
prevented shop owners from installing another facility within a radius of 2.5 kilometres away 
from its mall. Paulo Furquim Azevedo explains that, on the one hand, the radius clause 
restricts competition since it transfers to a single company (the shopping mall) the rights of 
other entrepreneurs to open a shop in a certain area.82 Since the mix of stores is an important 
attribute of competition among shopping malls,83 the radius clause limits the access of 
competing shopping malls to certain brands/shops and therefore weakens competition in the 
area under protection. In other words, intra-brand competition is harmed.84 On the other hand, 
the radius clause discourages opportunistic behaviour of shop owners. In the absence of the 
radius clause, a shop owner could appropriate the collective benefits of the shopping mall 
(for instance, the amount of consumers that visit that specific area) and set another shop just 
outside Iguatemi and profit from it without having to pay the high renting costs of the 
shopping mall and/or the royalties related to the volume of sales.85  
In the first step of CADE’s analysis, the Authority suggested that Iguatemi is a mall 
with a clear dominant position in the marketplace because of its capacity to charge 
substantially higher prices for the leased space than similar malls in the city. Because of that, 
CADE had to assess as a second step whether there was the intention of Iguatemi to foreclose 
markets. In the case files there was strong evidence of other shopping malls being threatened 
not to enter into this luxurious shopping mall segment. In addition, there was also evidence 
of existing shopping malls (e.g. Eldorado Shopping mall) that failed to expand their activities 
to other segments because it was in the 2.5 kilometre radius.  
Because of the market foreclosure evidence, CADE had (as a third step) to find a way 
to balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of this vertical restraint. According to 
Azevedo,86 the weighting in the Iguatemi II case could be done by means of radius dimension 
 
82 Azevedo, 2010, supra note 53, p. 27. 
83 Commercial contracts with Shopping Malls are named in the literature as “mix-tenant” contracts, since it is 
the mix of stores that guarantees enough incentives for shop owners to establish a store in these locations. For 
the analysis of such clauses in the Brazilian context, see R. Barcellos, O Contrato de Shopping Center e os 
Contratos Atípicos Interempresariais, São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 2009. 
84 M. Possas & J. Pondé, ‘A análise de eficiência em práticas restritivas verticais: custos de transação e cláusulas 
de raio no mercado de shopping center’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São 
Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018, pp. 1012-1056. 
85 In a lease agreement, shopping malls usually charge the shop owner a fixed component related to the renting 
of the place and a variable component related to the volume of sales (royalties). 
86 Azevedo, 2010, supra note 53, p. 27. 
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analysis. That is to say, if the radius was too small, the damage to competition would be 
proportionately smaller, and the benefits of keeping shop owners from installing a store next 
to the shopping mall would be proportionately larger than the damages in a way to conclude 
that the conduct was lawful. If the radius was too large, the damage to competition would 
increase as the protected area grew, while the benefits would remain the same since the gain 
in consumption deviation was fixed.  
Considering that it was virtually impossible to accurately determine this borderline, 
in the present case, CADE concluded that the 2.5 kilometre radius was disproportional, and 
therefore the vertical agreement was illicit. This is because the area protected by the "just 2.5 
kilometres radius" actually corresponded to almost 20 thousand kilometres square in the 
wealthiest area of São Paulo, which is the largest metropolis in South America.87 This area 
would also cover almost the total of the consumers that would be willing to buy from those 
luxury shops. This area, according to CADE, is one of the world's most densely populated 
areas as well, and therefore, the efficiency arguments presented by Iguatemi were not enough 
to balance the anti-competitive effects of such practice. 
Even though CADE did not assess too many cases involving geo-blocking clauses, 
the existing jurisprudence respects somehow the effect-based analysis suggested by the 
Brazilian Law. Unlike the case of resale price-fixing, the few cases involving geo-blocking 
clauses are still analysed under the rule of reasoned approach. However, this does not mean 
that by signing geo-blocking agreements, firms are covered by legal certainty. And this can 
be explained by the fact that these decisions are rather outdated and not confirmed over the 
years as a way of creating a consolidated antitrust jurisprudence in the topic.  
An important point that seems to be overlooked by CADE is the fact that the 
consideration of the geographical restraints should gain greater relevance in continental 
countries, such as Brazil. According to Forgioni, because of this continental dimension, 
vertical restraints imposed by companies with economic power are capable of truly causing 
short and long term “disasters” in Brazil.88 There are regions in Brazil in which the closing 
of distribution channels, including the supressing of traditional commerce, “may foster 
unemployment, reduce the economic activity and undermine development”.89 According to 
the author, competition policies must consider the reality of the country and the magnitude 
of its territory to ensure that the benefits of these policies actually reach most of the 
 
87 See analysis of Azevedo, 2010, supra note 53. 
88 Forgioni, 2016, supra note 3. 
89 Forgioni, 2016, supra note 3, p. 18. 
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population, not only in the big metropolitan areas but also in the most remote countryside 
locations. Therefore, one wonders whether the current enforcements efforts made by CADE 
in the last decades have taken into consideration this reality.  
It is worth finally noting that with the ascension of digital economies and e-
commerce, more cases discussing geo-blocking clauses could be in the radar of CADE. The 
growth of e-commerce may encourage producers to the adoption of market-place restrictions, 
since they might be afraid of losing control of their distribution channels in this new digital 
reality. However, so far, no case of geo-blocking in the digital context has been assessed by 
the Brazilian authority. 
3.4.3. Cases Involving Digital Businesses 
CADE has not investigated many cases related to digital businesses.90 Regarding vertical 
restraints, the Authority has opened only one investigation of “most favoured nation clauses” 
(or MFN clauses) related to the market for online hotel booking. It is worth noting that the 
debate about MFN causes is not recent, but it has already been under analysis by competition 
agencies in other countries.91 MFN clauses that appear in vertical agreements between 
suppliers and distributors generally consist of an offer by the supplier of a price or rate to a 
client no higher than the lowest offered to other clients. For instance, in the hotel online 
booking sector, an MFN clause obligates the hotels to always give to the platform the best 
price for hotel online bookings, among other most favoured conditions.  
In 2016, CADE started an investigation based on a representation filed by the Brazil 
Forum of Hotel Operators (Fórum de Operadores Hoteleiros do Brasil or FOHB).92 In the 
representation, FOHB argued that the companies Booking.com, Decolar.com and Expedia 
were applying in their contracts hotel price parity clauses to ensure that they would have 
better prices/ advantageous conditions to consumers when compared to competing platforms 
(including compared to the website of the hotels themselves). According to FOHB, these 
 
90 According to a Report prepared by CADE in 2019, the authority has assessed over the years only few cases 
involving digital markets: five mergers, six cartels and five cases of unilateral conduct. For more information 
on the cases, see report “BRICS in the digital economy: competition policy in practive”, available at 
<http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/publicacoes-institucionais/brics_report.pdf>, [01-10-2019].  
91 See, for instance, Chapter 4 the discussion about similar investigations in Europe. 
92 Fórum de Operadores Hoteleiros do Brasil vs Expedia do Brasil Agência de Viagens e Turismo Ltda., 




clauses infringed Brazilian Competition Law, particularly Article 36 of Law No. 
12.529/2011. CADE, in practice, did not prepare an assessment of this case since the three 
companies decided to sign a settlement agreement with the Authority before its final decision. 
The settlement specified that the use of price parity provisions in relation to offline sales 
channels and competing platforms should be terminated for the three firms. 
It is worth noting that, in Brazil, digital businesses have grown significantly in the 
past years. For instance, e-commerce in Brazil presented an average growth of 13.2% in the 
past 5 years (2013-2018) and a turnover, in 2018, of more than BRL 50 billion (approx. EUR 
12 billion), reaching the number of 58 million consumers.93 It means that CADE, by signing 
the settlement agreements, once more missed the opportunity to start developing an antitrust 
jurisprudence in Brazil regarding digital business.  
3.4.4. Challenges to Ex-Post Enforcement 
3.4.4.1. CADE’s Institutional Design  
From the last Sections, we can highlight that CADE needs to overcome the challenge of lack 
of more objective parameters in assessing vertical restraints. Indeed, the existing antitrust 
jurisprudence is not all clear, consistent, or vast enough to be able to conclude CADE’s 
positions with regard to certain vertical practices. Moreover, the Authority has been 
favouring the settlement of agreements in a way that does not contribute to the creation of a 
trustworthy legal framework. In addition to these challenges, it would be useful to look at 
another specific challenge that may jeopardize any possibility of reaching optimal level of 
antitrust enforcement in Brazil: the institutional design of the Brazilian Competition 
Authority. 
When the new Brazilian Competition Law entered into force, one important feature 
of the reform was the need for additional staff. This is because the lack of staff, added to the 
high employee turnover, led to an overload situation. Actually, according to OECD Peer 
Review, CADE has for years been considered as “one of the most understaffed competition 
enforcement regimes in the world”.94 To change this scenario, Law No. 12.529/2011 foresaw 
the creation of 200 new positions, that would more than double the previous SDE, SEAE and 
 
93 Data available in 39th Edition of the research Webshoppers, by E-bit.  
94  This is considering technical staff per unit of GDP or population. See, OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 21. 
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CADE combined staff. However, the hiring of the new staff did not happen because of 
government budget cuts.95  
Nowadays, CADE´s General Superintendence is organized in nine main units. Five 
of these units work on cases related to mergers and unilateral conduct, and four units focus 
on cartel cases, one of them being specifically related to cartel screening activities.96 This 
means that cases involving vertical agreements are handled together with the overload merger 
cases. Therefore, one can predict that there are significantly fewer resources allocated to 
investigations of unilateral conduct, including vertical restraints, and more devoted to merger 
review given the amount of filed notifications added to the statutory deadlines.97  
CADE consisted of 385 employees in 2018, of which 137 are non-administrative staff 
working on competition enforcement, being 40% lawyers, 25% economists, and the last 28% 
graduated in other areas.98 OCDE Peer Review also highlights that from all the non-
administrative staff, only 5 (five) are dedicated to antitrust conduct apart from mergers and 
cartels,99 which includes the analysis of vertical restraints.  
With regard to CADE Commissioners, they often have a background in economics 
and law because the Competition Law foresees in its Article 6 that such decision-making 
positions should be filled by lawyers or economists.100 However, recent appointments have 
not necessarily respected this procedural requirement. The current President, Alexandre 
Barreto de Souza, has a background in management and public administration.101 This fact 
raises questions regarding the latent political influences behind the process of making 
appointments. It should be noted that in Brazil, the members of CADE’s Administrative 
 
95 OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 21. 
96 CADE, Annual Report 2018. 
97 Law No. 12.529/2011 stipulates specific deadlines form the authority to conclude merger cases. The 
maximum deadline is 240 days that can be extended by CADE’s Tribunal in 90 extra days in very complex 
cases. 
98 CADE, Annual Report 2018, p. 41. 
99 OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 33. 
100 Article 6 of Law No. 12.529/2011: “Art. 6. The Administrative Tribunal, an adjudicatory body, is comprised 
of a President and six Commissioners chosen among citizens over thirty (30) years old, who are well reputed 
for their knowledge of law or economics and who possess a reputation for moral integrity, appointed by the 
President of the Republic, after being approved by the Federal Senate.” 





Tribunal – the President and the six Commissioners – do not apply themselves for open 
positions but are rather appointed by the Brazilian President and the Senate.102  
To sum up, while considering the state of the art of ex-post enforcement of vertical 
restraints in Brazil, we have identified some of the Authority´s main challenges and threats.  
On behalf of the limited jurisprudence, we can conclude that CADE fails in defining 
objective parameters for assessing vertical agreements (including the definition of whether 
some practices are per se illegal or not). This unpredictable behaviour of the Brazilian 
enhances a high degree of obscurity, complexity and subjectivity in its decisions. Moreover, 
when it comes to the institutional design, CADE does not have much staff to carry out its 
work. This means that the Authority may have been favouring ex-post enforcement of 
vertical agreements in a context where the lack of resources and skilled staff has been the 
rule.  
3.4.4.2. The Judiciary System  
The Brazilian judiciary is responsible for two main activities involving antitrust law. 
The first one is related to damages claims. The second one is related to the judicial review of 
CADE´s administrative decisions. In fact, it is impossible to talk about antitrust enforcement 
without discussing the possibility of judicial review. The Brazilian Competition Law, the 
Federal Constitution, and the Brazilian Civil Code provide together the understanding that 
all decisions taken by the antitrust authority are subject to judicial review. 
In Brazil, the evolution of judicial review involving antitrust cases has been quite 
interesting. Firstly, with the Law 8.884/1994, CADE became an independent agency, and, 
naturally, there has been a growing number of administrative decisions in that matter. The 
increase in the number of administrative decisions was followed, to some extent, by the 
increase in the number of requests for judicial review. During this period, CADE's procedures 
were still quite incipient, and the decisions were contradictory. This scenario gave to the 
companies the opportunity to submit requests for review. While in 1994 there were 7 requests 
 
102 While the Executive Power of the Brazilian government can control CADE by indicating and approving (or 
disapproving) the mandates of Commissioners and the President of the Authority, the Legislative Power 
exercises its control by approving the national annual budget, which includes CADE’s annual budget. See a 
more extensive analysis on accountability in A. C. Gomes & M. E. A Camargo e Gomes, ‘Ouvidoria do CADE: 
contribuições para o equilíbrio entre autonomia e accountability, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do 
antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
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for judicial review filed in courts, this number increased to 161 in 2000, and 480 in 2007.103 
Actually, 2007 was the year with the largest number of judicial review requests involving 
CADE´s decisions throughout the national territory. 
Until the mid-2000s, CADE's decisions were not so effective, since most of them 
were suspended by the judiciary. From 1994 on, when the old Competition Law entered into 
force, until 2005, only 18% of CADE’s infringement decisions were essentially confirmed 
by courts.104 Between the years 2002 and 2004, for instance, less than 4% of the fines 
imposed by the Brazilian Authority were actually paid by parties. This scenario started to 
slowly change after 2008.105  
The fall in lawsuits involving CADE´s decisions from 2008 onwards can be explained 
by several reasons. Firstly, the Superior Court of Justice started to demand from companies 
a judicial deposit, that amounted to the fine imposed by CADE, in order to proceed with the 
judicial review. This fact, naturally, discouraged many companies from filing review 
requests. Secondly, there was an improvement in the performance and cooperation of the 
CADE Attorney's Office with the Judiciary as a whole. A third important change was the 
increase in the number of negotiations and settlements signed between the companies and 
the competition authority.106 Lastly, the agency's success rate in court disputes started to 
increase over the following years (which also reflects the quality of CADE Attorney's 
Office). In a study conducted by the Brazilian Society of Public Law (in Portuguese 
‘Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público’, or just SBDP) in 2011, it was pointed out that 
almost 50% of CADE’s decisions about administrative proceedings regarding anti-
competitive conduct were confirmed by national courts.107 Another data set presented by 
CADE in 2013 indicates that almost 80% of CADE's decisions have been upheld by the 
judiciary.108 
Despite this significant evolution of the judiciary's performance in matters related to 
competition law, there are still challenges to be overcome. The first one refers to the length 
 
103 CADE, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 2013, p. 130. 
104 CADE, 2013, p. 132. 
105 In 2008, there were 343 new cases for judicial review; in 2009, 150 new cases; in 2010, 62 new cases; and 
in 2011, 58. CADE, 2013, supra note 103, p. 131. 
106 CADE, 2013, supra note 103, p. 132. 
107  Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público (SBDP), Revisão Judicial das Decisões do Conselho Administrativo 
de Defesa Econômica (CADE): Pesquisa empírica e aplicada sobre os casos julgados pelos Tribunais 
Regionais Federais (TRFs), Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Belo 
Horizonte, Editora Fórum, 2010.  
108 CADE, 2013, supra note 103, p. 136. 
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of the judiciary proceedings. The research carried out by SBDP indicates that it takes, on 
average, more than five years for the case to be decided in court, and more than two years to 
have a ruling at first instance.109 Moreover, Brazilian magistrates still refrain from applying 
economic concepts in court decisions either due to lack of knowledge or reluctance. Indeed, 
judges tend to focus more on the formal issues of the administrative proceedings. However, 
as we have been addressing throughout this PhD research, in cases of vertical agreements, 
economic analysis is fundamental to balance economic efficiencies with the potential anti-
competitive effects of restrictive agreements in the marketplace. In the SKF Case involving 
resale price-fixing, exposed in the previous Section 3.3.1, the parties were able to reverse 
CADE's position in the first instance in 2013 (i.e. the court decision interpreted that resale 
price-fixing should not be considered illegal), but the case is still being discussed in higher 
instances. 
3.5. THE CONTEXT OF ANTITRUST POLICY IN BRAZIL: THE 
INTERACTING GROUP OF AGENTS 
This Section presents one possible explanation of the above-mentioned legal reform. It aims 
to analyse whether the latent interests of private relevant actors (antitrust authorities, lawyers, 
business people and their lobby groups) help to explain the recent changes in the Brazilian 
regulation. As discussed in Chapter 2, regulation is often motivated by public interests. 
Externalities, information asymmetry, market power are often the market failures that give 
grounds to regulation. However, in certain contexts, the law and decision-making processes 
do not advance in the path of what is optimal for society, and therefore they are not able to 
achieve the public interest goals.  
Historically, the democratic legitimacy in Brazilian public policies has been put in 
question because only a few interest groups of agents have indeed access to the law and 
decision-making processes regarding different kinds of public policies.110 As for antitrust 
policies, CADE has foreseen some mechanisms of public participation, such as Public 
Consultations that allow different individuals or interested groups – affected by the new 
regulatory context – to give their opinion on the content of the new regulation.  
 
109 SBDP, 2010. 
110 P. Mattos, ‘Regulação econômica e social e participação pública no Brasil’, IX Congreso Internacional del 
CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Madrid, Spain, 2004, p. 3. 
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From 2012, when the new Competition Law entered into force, until 2018, 17 
(seventeen) Public Consultations were launched in different topics. In practical terms, 
whenever CADE launches a public consultation, the authority first makes available on its 
website a first draft of the new proposed regulation (“first draft”). Then the agency opens the 
Public Consultation to the public for a couple of weeks or months. After this period of open 
consultation, CADE publishes the final version of the new regulation (“final version”) 
together with a Technical Note which contains a brief summary of the contributions and gives 
some explanation regarding this final result. Taking this background into consideration, the 
aim of this Section is analysing the interest-groups participation in the recent changes in 
antitrust policies oriented to vertical agreements.  
3.5.1. Behind Resolution No. 17/2016: Identifying Interest Groups of 
Agents  
From all the Public Consultations issued by CADE in the past years, two of them were 
devoted to the discussions of vertical agreements: Public Consultation No. 03/2014 and 
Public Consultation No. 02/2016 (respectively regarding Resolution No. 10/2014 and the 
Resolution No. 17/2016).111 The discussions of Public Consultations No. 03/2014 were 
focused on the definition of agreements and the thresholds for the notification system. 
For this first Public Consultation No. 03/2014, CADE received 23 (twenty-three) 
contributions: 13 (thirteen) from Law firms/ Bar Association;112 7 (seven) from Industry 
Associations and 3 (three) from companies that opted to send an individual contribution. 
There was no specific group of consumers that actively participated in this public 
consultation. Considering the group of lawyers, it is worth noting that, in this scenario, they 
were not representing any specific client, but simply presenting an individual contribution. 
In general terms, the main concern brought by those lawyers was the need to clarify concepts 
and objective criteria for the notification system of contracts since the first draft was 
considerably broad. In principle, they were all in favour of the notification system both to 
horizontal and vertical agreements, once an objective criterion was better defined.  
 
111 As explained in previous sections, the first regulation that attempted to bring clear rules in respect to the 
notification of vertical and horizontal agreements was Resolution No. 10/2014. While Resolution No. 17/2016 
excluded vertical agreements from the notification system. 
112 It is worth noting that the first group identified, i.e. the group of lawyers, involve mostly big law firms, bar 
association, groups and institutions that are represented by the law firms. 
86 
 
Regarding the industry associations and the companies which have contributed to this 
Public Consultation on their own, they were mostly related to regulated sectors. Apart from 
requesting more objective criteria to the notification system, the business community argued 
that some of those associative agreements that they engaged in, are contracts which are 
controlled by their own regulatory agency. Therefore, according to them, an extra control 
from the antitrust agency would not be necessary. It was the case, for example, of network 
sharing agreements among telecom companies that are tightly controlled by the National 
Agency of Telecommunication and that would fall into the scope of CADE, bringing 
additional high costs to those companies.  
As a result of this first Public Consultation, Resolution No. 10/2014 indeed reflected 
some of the concerns presented by parties, especially in relation to narrowing down the scope 
of the notification system (e.g. a market share threshold for horizontal and vertical 
agreements was added in this regulation). However, as showed in Section 3.3, the final legal 
text was not enough to guarantee a legal and safe framework for business people. 
The brief description of this first Public Consultation is important in order to 
apprehend the role of relevant actors that were interested in this issue since the beginning of 
the regulatory discussions. The content of this first Consultation, however, is not the focus 
of this Section. Indeed, for the objectives of this Section, the second round of Public 
Consultations turned out to be much more relevant, since it resulted in the exclusion of 
vertical agreements from the ex-ante notification system. 
Before entering into further detail, it is important to highlight that the first draft of the 
second Public Consultation No. 02/2016 still considered both horizontal and vertical 
agreements as part of the pre-merger control policy. This draft aimed at clarifying the 
notification criteria for commercial contracts. This means that the first idea of CADE was 
not to exclude vertical agreements but merely to define clearer parameters. Table 1 describes 
the changes in legislation proposed by the first draft: 
Table 3.2: Public Consultation No. 02/2016: Main changes proposed by the ‘first draft’  
Resolution No. 10/2014 
 
Public Consultation No. 02/2016 
(first draft) 
General criteria for notification of commercial agreements 
1. A duration equal to, or longer than, 2 years, 
or the 2-year period is reached or exceeded 
through renewals provided for in agreements; 
and  
1. Duration equal to, or longer than, 2 years, 
or, in case of shorter than 2 years or open-
ended periods, a notification must be made 
when such period is reached;* and 
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Resolution No. 10/2014 
 
Public Consultation No. 02/2016 
(first draft) 
2. Involve "horizontal or vertical cooperation 
or sharing of risks entailing inter-
dependence". 
2. Whenever the agreement results in 
horizontal and/or vertical cooperation and the 
corresponding risks and results are shared.  
 
Criteria for notification of horizontal agreements 
The share of the parties to the agreement in 
the relevant affected market is equal to or 
higher than, 20%. 
The share of the parties to the agreement in 
the relevant affected market is equal to or 
higher than, 20%. 
 
Criteria for notification of vertical agreements 
At least one of the parties holds 30% or more 
of the relevant markets affected by the 
agreement, provided that the following 
conditions are met: 
a) The agreement provides for the sharing of 
revenue or losses between the parties; and  
b) An exclusivity relationship derives from 
the agreement. 
There is an obligation that sets forth or may 
result in exclusivity and at least two parties 
to the agreement hold market shares equal 
to, or higher than, twenty percent (20%) in 
the potentially affected relevant markets.*   
Note:*emphasis added 
Source: Compiled by the Demarest Advogados, based on Resolution No. 10/2014 and first draft of 
Public Consultation No. 02/2016. 
 
In this second round of Public Consultation, CADE received – in the period of 20 (twenty) 
days – 14 (fourteen) contributions, being 9 (nine) from Law firms/ Law Bar Association; 2 
(two) from Industry Associations and 3 (three) from companies that opted to send an 
individual contribution (see Annex I). For this Consultation, there was again no specific 
group of consumers that actively participated in it.  
Considering this context, the analysis to be carried out in the coming subsection will 
consider three main groups of relevant actors: (i) the antitrust authority (CADE), (ii) the law 
firms that provide advocacy services to companies, and (iii) the business enterprises and their 
lobby groups (i.e. including their associations). The choice of these three main groups reflects 
not only their participation in the Public Consultation No. 02/2016, but also the methodology 
used by previous studies that tried to identify the interest groups who influence antitrust law 
making processes in other jurisdictions, such as in Europe (Oliver Budzinski and Andt 
Christiansen; Angela Wigger) and in  China (Weng Ng).113 
 
113 O. Budzinski & A. Christiansen, ‘Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an 
Interest-Driven Process’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005, pp. 313-337; A. Wigger, ‘Revising 
the European Competition Reform: The toll of Private Self-Enforcement’, Working Papers Political Science of 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, No. 07, 2004; Wendy Ng, The Political Economy of Competition Law in China, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
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Although our attempt involves complex relations, the proposed outline is still far from 
exhaustive, as consumer groups and the academic interactions are omitted. One can speculate 
that consumers (including consumer’s representatives) did not contribute to this Public 
Consultations because they were not well informed about the existence of the Consultation 
itself. Indeed, the Public Consultation was not spread in the main channels of national media 
and CADE opened the discussion for only 20 (twenty) days, which is clearly not enough time 
for the news to be well spread in a country with the dimensions of Brazil, and/or for 
specialists to do a full assessment of the first draft.   
3.5.2. Main Assumptions about the Behaviour of Relevant Actors  
This subsection starts addressing the relevance of the basic premise that public interest goals 
are not enough to explain certain antitrust policies and therefore that private interests also 
play a role in the law-making process. This premise will be further analysed taking into 
consideration the identified set of relevant actors: the business enterprises that are directly 
affected by the competition rules, the lawyers that represent their firms, and the antitrust 
authority (in this case, CADE). 
Taking into account the business community and their lobby groups, we assume that 
their self-interest is related to the minimization of compliance costs that include the costs 
associated with the lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings (and therefore high costs 
with lawyers), the notification requirements, and indirect costs of having erratic decisions. 
Therefore, they would consistently argue in favour of clear rules and simplified notification 
systems, so that they could count on the legal certainty and predictability of an ex-ante control 
and with the green flag from the authority that would protect them from future litigation 
costs. This means that business enterprises, when contributing to the Public Consultation, 
would argue in favour of a limited scope of the notification system both for horizontal and 
vertical agreements, including the possible exemption system for certain agreements 
(following the EU model of Block Exemptions), in order to minimize their compliance costs. 
As for the law firms (and Bar Associations), it could be assumed that they would 
follow a similar pattern as the business community. This is because the analysis of the content 
of Public Consultations usually requires a degree of expertise that many clients ( illustrated 
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here by the business community) do not have.114 This means that the lawyers, in theory, 
participate in those Public Consultations to represent their clients who do not have the 
expertise in the field. They would therefore contribute to the Consultation in favour of a 
limited scope for a notification system both to horizontal and vertical agreements, and also 
because this notification system guarantees to those law firms a great amount of legal services 
to be provided. However, the exact behaviour of law firms is not always easy to predict. 
There is some literature that suggests, for example, that lawyers have an interest in keeping 
the law complex, so that they may benefit from the increased demand of legal services.115 If 
we take this into account, law firms, in this case, would not contribute to make the law clearer 
but would rather leave it with legal gaps. 
Finally, as for the antitrust authority, it is supposed that CADE would firstly observe 
the goals of the country and specific constitutional principles when drafting specific rules. 
Meaning that the law-making process carried out by CADE would respect the constitutional 
principles of human dignity and social justice, by proposing new rules that preserve an 
environment in which companies have effective incentives to compete, innovate and satisfy 
the demands of consumers; protect competition and prevent markets from being harmed by 
agents with a high degree of economic power.116 Secondly, CADE would seek to minimize 
the enforcement costs of the agency. In this case, the enforcement costs would be the 
administrative costs of the notification system (i.e. having enough staff to prepare 
competition assessments for all notified contracts), and/or the investigation costs of potential 
administrative procedures. Thirdly, antitrust agencies would give high importance to their 
reputation and credibility in their policy and decision-making process. It is likely that CADE 
would want to guarantee the delivery of good policy making with good policy results, in 
order to guarantee its reputation as a serious and capable antitrust agency. The perception of 
the competition agency’s quality directly influences not only the judicial or legislative 
decisions but also the willingness of companies to comply with the law.117 The international 
recognition of the competition agency also plays a major role in their reputation. Actually, 
 
114 R. Van den Bergh, ‘Towards Efficient Self-Regulation in Markets for Professional Services’, in C. D. 
Ehlermann & A. Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004. 
115 See for example, A. Ogus, ‘The economic basis of legal culture: networks and monopolization’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2002, pp. 419–443. 
116 Forgioni, 2016, supra note 3. 
117 W. Kovacic, H. Hollman & P. Grant, ‘How does your competition agency measure up?’, European 
Competition Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, p. 28. 
90 
 
William Kovacic argues that agencies’ reputations can be compared to brands since having 
a well-respected brand is an extremely valuable asset.118 
In practical terms, the observation of the goals of the country, the willingness to 
minimize enforcement costs and to maintain a good reputation could be achieved by CADE 
by drafting clear rules, and limiting the scope of the notification system for both horizontal 
and vertical agreements, without leaving apart situations that might lead to abuse of market 
power. It is also supposed that in the law-making process, the formulation of the content of 
regulation would indeed consider the arguments and justifications presented by the 
contributions of interested actors. And more than that, the agency would present the 
reasoning of its decisions, by justifying why the final version of the norm was done in one 
way and not the other.119  
The figure below summarizes the main assumptions about the behaviour of main 
actors: 
Figure 3.1:  The context of Public Consultation No. 02/2016: main assumptions about 
different actors  
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
118 W. Kovacic, ‘Rating the Competition Agencies: what constitutes good performance?’, Geo. Mason. L. 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, p. 905. 
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3.5.3. Qualitative Analysis of the Context of Public Consultation No. 
02/2016 
From a qualitative analysis of Public Consultation No. 02/2016, it is possible to confirm some 
of the above-mentioned assumptions, mainly in relation to the interests of the business 
community. The group named as “business enterprises and their lobby groups” was 
represented by 5 (five) contributions. These manifestations were made by companies or 
associations of highly regulated markets, such as telecom (three contributions) and the oil 
and chemical industry (two contributions). As assumed, all these contributions aimed at 
requesting a better limitation on the scope of the notification system of horizontal and vertical 
agreements. Moreover, some of them suggested the introduction of exemption systems for 
specific agreements that are already controlled by sector regulators. For example, 
SindiTelebrasil, the association that represents all telecom companies in Brazil, asked for 
exemption from the interconnection networks agreements: 
“Attention must be given to the General Interconnection Regulation, 
approved by ANATEL120 (Resolution No. 410, of July 11, 2005), which 
establishes the basic rules for the mandatory interconnection networks 
among telecommunications services. According to this sector regulation, 
telecommunications operators are obliged to engage in different 
agreements with each other, in accordance with parameters defined by 
ANATEL. It should be clear that those contracts foster competition as they 
enable different companies to have access to a greater amount of 
infrastructure necessary to provide their services (infrastructure which 
would be too costly to maintain alone).[..] Thus, to settle the discussion, 
SindiTelebrasil suggests the inclusion of a legal provision clarifying that 
regulated contracts should not be subject to CADE’s notification system. 
This, of course, wouldn’t prevent the authorities (both CADE and 
ANATEL) to open an investigation in cases of abuses of market power.”121   
In contrast with what was initially supposed, the contributions from law firms and the final 
version of the regulation prepared by CADE indicated some interesting results that require 
further analysis. Starting from the contributions of law firms, it was possible to identify that 
the majority of other law firms are big and international ones and argued, among other issues, 
 
120 ANATEL is the Brazilian National Telecommunications Agency. 
121 SindiTelebrasil contribution on Public Consultation No. 02/2016, at 4. Free translation.  
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in favour of the strict exclusion of vertical agreements from the notification system.  
If we carefully assess the reasons that underlined those contributions, we can 
conclude that no party brought economic oriented arguments to the discussion. For instance, 
most of the submissions justified the exclusion of vertical agreements by observing the “best 
international practices”, such as the policies in the US and the EU.122 However, they have 
not considered the different institutional realities and experience when treating competition 
law and cases related to vertical agreements (as seen in previous sections, they are very 
limited in Brazil). Considering the international landscape, national competition agencies 
design their policies based on similar grounds, for instance, the promotion of market 
efficiency. This does not mean that antitrust rules will be the same in all jurisdictions, or even 
that the enforcement of competition law in different countries is free of tensions.123 Countries 
are at different stages of implementation of antitrust policies and different policies are 
required for each of those stages. The pure legal transplant (meaning, the copy of a foreign 
legislation), without any understanding of local social, political and cultural reality, should 
not be the main a motivation or explanation to a change in the law.  
Taking one step further in the analysis of these legal contributions, the suggestion 
regarding the exclusion of vertical agreements makes sense when analysing it under the 
public choice theory. As explained in Chapter 2, the main idea of the public choice theory is 
that an individual’s preferences are reflected in the law-making process and therefore affect 
the social welfare. For the purpose of this Section it is important to note that the big law firms 
(including the Bar Associations and other legal institutions run by those firms) represented 
around 65% of the total number of contributions and they were the only group to suggest the 
exclusion of vertical agreements from the ex-ante notification system. In this case, big law 
firms may earn more profits from lengthy litigations/ investigations raised in the ex-post 
enforcement than the simple preparation of filings to the notification system. This can be a 
reason that explains their unjustified submissions to the Public Consultation.  
Several Law and Economics scholars have pointed out that the private interest of 
lawyers might seek to shape laws in ways that follow their own interests rather than the public 
interest.124 For instance, Roger Van den Bergh pointed out the serious information 
asymmetries in the market for professional services, such as legal services.125 The author 
 
122 See Annex I (end of the Chapter) with the brief description of the contributions. 
123 A. Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, (April) 2017, pp. 49–75. 
124 See for instance, F. Cross, ‘The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution’, Emory Law 
Journal, Vol. 45, 1996, pp. 523-527. 
125 Van den Bergh, 2004, supra note 114.  
93 
 
explains that, in these markets, there is a high risk of principal-agent problem occurring (in 
this case, the big law firms instead of representing the interest of clients, might indicate their 
own interest), therefore affecting an optimal regulation. Wigger, when analysing the change 
for ex-post control of agreements in the EU, has also indicated that the ones to profit from 
the new regime and long-run increased litigations are law companies providing advocacy 
services to companies.126  
Taking these manifestations into account, some peculiarities should be highlighted 
with respect to the final version of the Regulation and the Technical Note prepared by CADE 
as a result of the Public Consultation. Even knowing that the first draft of the Regulation kept 
the mandatory notification system for vertical agreements, the final version adopted the 
suggestions from the lawyers’ group, excluding vertical agreements from the ex-ante control. 
Please find below the summary of the new rules, when compared to the previous Resolution. 
Table 3.3: Resolution No. 17/2016: Main changes proposed by the ‘final draft’  
Public Consultation No. 02/2016 
(first draft) 
Resolution No. 17/2016 
(final draft) 
General criteria for notification of commercial agreements 
1. Duration equal to, or longer than, 2 years, 
or, in case of shorter than 2 years or open-
ended periods, a notification must be made 
when such period is reached; and 
2. Whenever the agreement results in 
horizontal and/or vertical cooperation and the 
corresponding risks and results are shared.  
 
1. The duration of the agreement must be of 
two years or more or, if they are valid for less 
than two years or for an indefinite term, 
CADE must be notified before their renewal, 
and the continued effectiveness of the 
agreement for two (2) or more years will 
depend on CADE's prior approval;* and 
2. The agreement must involve horizontal 
cooperation (between competitors) as well as 
the sharing of risks and results. 
Criteria for notification of horizontal agreements 
The share of the parties to the agreement in 
the relevant affected market is equal to or 
higher than, 20%. 
The market share criterion was excluded. 
Only the general criteria will apply. 
 
126 Wigger, 2004, supra note 113, p. 18. 
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Public Consultation No. 02/2016 
(first draft) 
Resolution No. 17/2016 
(final draft) 
Criteria for notification of vertical agreements 
There is an obligation that set forth or may 
result in exclusivity and at least two parties to 
the agreement hold market shares equal to, or 
higher than, twenty percent (20%) in the 
potentially affected relevant markets.*   
The criterion of notification to CADE based 
on vertical relations between the parties was 
also excluded.*   
Note: * emphasis added 
Source: Compiled by Demarest Advogados, based on Public Consultation No. 02/2016 and 
Resolution No. 17/2016.  
 
The choice for the exclusion of vertical agreements, however, was not justified by the 
Authority, either in terms of economic arguments, or in terms of the goals and constitutional 
principles of the country. The only general explanation given by CADE, was the following: 
“After analysing all the contributions and with the aim of improving legal 
provisions, a final version of the Resolution is found annexed. This final 
version: […] (iii) defined as associative contracts only the ones signed 
among competitors, withdrawing the vertical contracts, again privileging 
the best legal provision taking into consideration the goals of the Law.”127 
(Emphasis added) 
The expressions “the aim of improving legal provisions” or the choice of the “best legal 
provision taking into consideration the goals of the Law” are rather too general as the main 
justification for the change in legislation. Moreover, it did not present the main reasoning or 
rationale adopted in its law-making process.128 In contrast to what was supposed, CADE did 
not present the reasons of its decisions in order to justify why the final formulation was in 
favour of the exclusion of vertical agreements the notification system of agreements. 
Moreover, there was no explicit reference to welfare-oriented arguments, and there was no 
explanation of how the new policy trends followed the goals of the Law. 
The above-mentioned discussion brought by Wigger also identified that the ex-post 
control of agreements increases the duties of business people in carefully complying with the 
competition rules.129 The author emphasises that under the ex-post rule, undertakings must 
 
127 Free Translation from Technical Note No. 1/2016/SGA1/SG/CADE, at 4. Public Consultation No 02/2016. 
128 Kochan explains what is expected from agencies to be accountable during public consultations. See D. 
Kochan, ‘The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability through Public Participation Public Participation’, 
Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 601-622.  
129 Wigger, 2004, supra note 113, p. 17. 
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pay special attention to self-assessing their agreements before their consummation, while 
competition authorities are free from this task.130 This means that, under the public choice 
theory, one possible explanation is that the agency aimed at simplifying the legislation in the 
most convenient way, by simply excluding vertical agreements, as suggested by the big law 
firms, instead of putting more effort into analysing the most efficient regulation. The 
exclusion of vertical agreements from the notification system positively impacts the 
administrative costs to be borne by the Authority and therefore justifies even more the change 
in legislation.   
The decision concerning an ex-post control of vertical agreements is also somehow 
justified by the need to guarantee good reputation. Usually, the performance of a good agency 
is evaluated by its substantive results and processes.131 These results and processes are 
closely linked to the initiation and judgment of high-profile cases. It means that a case-related 
activity pattern is the main index that designates the value of an agency. For instance, the 
Global Competition Review published an annual ranking of the most recognized antitrust 
agencies around the world, named as Rating Enforcement.132 Its criteria are very much related 
to the number of new mergers and cartel cases. Cases related to abuse of dominance, or 
vertical restraints, are not often taken into account in those rankings. This fact can possibly 
explain CADE’s decision to leave out the vertical agreements from the notification system, 
as they lead to high administrative costs and do not contribute to the reputation of the 
agency.133  
Some literature confirms the conclusion that CADE has as its priority the fight against 
cartels, especially after the advent of leniency policies.134 This highlights here the work of 
Salomão Filho who criticizes the way CADE has been defining its enforcement priorities that 
are “focused exclusively or primarily on the fight against cartels, forgetting that the 
enforcement should also be focused on fighting against other abuses of economic power”.135 
The author even mentions that the priority given to leniency policies might have negative 
effects in the long run, since the information given by business people might not always be 
 
130 Wigger, 2004, supra note 113, p. 17. 
131 Kovacic, 2012, supra note 118, p. 905. 
132 For more information, see globalcompetitionreview.com/series/rating-enforcement [20-02-2018].   
133 Moreover, according to the OECD, 2019, supra note 8, p. 38: “CADE has the autonomy to open 
investigations into any sector or markets that might potentially harm competition. That said, cartel enforcement, 
and bid rigging in particular, has been a clear priority since the enactment of the new Law.” 
134 See, for example, Gonçalves, 2016, supra note 75, p. 307. 
135 C. Salomão Filho, ´Evolução ou Involução do direito antitruste?´ in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução 





It is worth noting that case-driven measures ignore other non-litigation activities 
(such as advocacy, quality control mechanisms, transparency, accountability) that should 
also be taken into account when examining the quality of enforcement and stages of 
implementation of antitrust law and reputation. However, this is not the focus of this Chapter.  
The proposed analysis suggests that the choice of favouring ex-post control of vertical 
agreements may be explained by interest-driven arguments, since CADE did not appear to 
have carefully observed the policy goals of the country.  
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From an economic point of view, vertical agreements should be assessed case-by-case. The 
legal framework of vertical agreements should not be seen as fixed and immutable, since 
markets are in constant development, and the economic assessment of these business 
practices depends to a large extent on the dynamics of a given market. Therefore, it cannot 
be accepted that the rules in Brazil are simply transplanted from other jurisdictions, 
disregarding the economic and institutional conditions of the country, as well as its goals and 
constitutional principles. This is the case because, the level of development and maturity of 
markets such as in the US or in many EU countries are very diverse from the level of the 
Brazilian one. Consequently, the tolerance of vertical agreements in Brazil should be the 
object of further reflection. 
Chapter 2 showed that vertical agreements can bring to markets one of the most 
harmful effects of business practices: market foreclosure. It is therefore necessary to discuss 
the position of CADE with regard to these practices, considering that the authority has been 
concentrating its resources almost exclusively for the co-existence of the cartels. The sub-
optimal enforcement of vertical agreements in Brazil, may encourage in the short and/or in 
the long-run deleterious effects on social welfare. 
This Chapter argued that the legal framework in Brazil that excluded vertical 
agreements from the notification system and favoured the ex-post control, presents several 
limitations. This Chapter demonstrated that these limitations can be observed in different 
ways. They are expressed through (but not exclusively): (i) CADE’s non-consolidated 
antitrust jurisprudence, in which the Authority does not have clear parameters for an effect-
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based assessment of vertical agreements; (ii) CADE’s institutional design and its 
enforcement priorities; (iii) the neglected way in which the goals of the Competition Law in 
Brazil are being considered in the decision and law-making process; and (iv) the incomplete 
regulatory impact assessment of the current policies.  
In more detail, when analysing case law under CADE´s ex-post enforcement, the 
antitrust jurisprudence is not consolidated enough to guarantee greater levels of legal 
certainty to parties when assessing their vertical agreements. For instance, it highlighted the 
case of resale price-fixing, where there is no clear rule or clear jurisprudence regarding the 
topic. Besides, CADE’s Tribunal is also not completely sure of whether to define such 
practice as a per se illegality.  
Previous Sections showed that one of the goals of competition policies in Brazil is to 
protect competition and prevent markets from being harmed by agents with a high degree of 
economic power, by preserving an environment where companies have effective incentives 
to compete, innovate and attend to consumers’ demands. The use of the presumption of 
illegality in resale price-fixing cases does not necessarily respect these goals, and this 
happens to be because resale price-fixing can bring economic efficiencies to markets, such 
as solving the double mark-up problem, preventing free-riding, or reducing transaction costs. 
These economic efficiencies can help to create a level playing field among competitors that 
is intrinsically expressed in the constitutional principles, and therefore they should not be 
ignored by the Brazilian Authority in the analysis of any vertical cases, even when it involves 
price restrictions.  
Moreover, CADE relies heavily on settlements. The downsides of settlement 
agreements are also the reduction of legal certainty in the marketplace and the slow 
development of the jurisprudence in Brazil towards the economic assessment of vertical 
agreements. With the settlements, there is no effect-based assessment and/or decision 
published by CADE and legal cases are not reviewed by national courts.  
CADE not only fails in defining objective parameters for assessing vertical 
agreements (including the definition of whether some practices are per se illegal or not), but 
also has not enough staff to do such work (the Authority counts only 5 people to assess all 
the antitrust cases other than cartels and mergers). This means that CADE have favoured ex-
post enforcement with a lack of skilled staff to do so. Actually, nowadays, the trust in 
CADE’s precedents has become a real problem for business people. In this sense, the 
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enactment of guidelines could be a good example of measures aimed at stabilizing and 
improving this legal environment.  
This discussion leads us to another important topic of this Chapter: the identification 
of the self-interest of relevant actors as a possible explanation to the enactment of Resolution 
No. 17/2016. As CADE did not include in its policy assessment document any reference to 
the goals of the country, nor did it give clear reasoning to the choice of this specific 
regulation, one could hypothesise that the exclusion of vertical agreements from the 
notification system has been based on private interests of relevant agents. Moreover, 
Schuartz’s theory of "deconstitutionalization" of the Brazilian competition rules is somehow 
confirmed. This is because the application of rule of reason in vertical cases seems to be 
neglected and the law-making process and the implementation of competition law have not 
been observing the constitutional principles of the country.   
All these issues embrace two main problems to be overcome in the country. The first 
one is related to the unstable learning process of the enforcer and business community with 
regard to the assessment of vertical restraints that leads to great legal uncertainty. The second 
one is the prevalence of private-interest grounds in the law-making process. Both problems 
lead to sub-optimal regulations and lower levels of antitrust enforcement.136 
For these reasons, a comparative law and economics analysis makes sense. We started 
this Chapter indicating that both Brazil and Europe passed through a similar change in policy 
applicable to vertical restraints: from an ex-ante notification system of agreements to an ex-
post control of restrictive practices, although with some crucial differences. The comparison 
between the two legal systems, specifically on policies applicable to vertical restraints, is one 
of the contributions of this PhD research.  
Therefore, the following Chapter 4 will describe in further detail the European Union 
policies. Afterwards, Chapter 5 will identify the enforcement costs for each legal system. The 
comparative law and economics analysis of information, incentive and administrative costs 
will allow a deeper understanding about policy design and enforcement among countries with 
different institutional realities and stages of implementation of antitrust law. 
 
136 I briefly highlight here the current discussion on the Federal Senate’s decision of the new Commissioners to 
take over CADE’s Tribunal. From June to October 2019 CADE’s activities were suspended because of the 
uncertainty of the nominations, which resulted in more than 80 (eight) transactions paralysed, including 
mergers, and other joint ventures. According to information released by the press, the late nominations of 
CADE’s Commissioners were due to friction between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. For more 
information, see J. Basile, ‘Vagas no Cade viram moeda de troca’, Jornal Valor Econômico, 6 August 2019. 
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ANNEX I – Public Consultation No. 2/ 2016 
 
Name Type of Industry 










Main argument and/or 
suggestion 
Sinditelebrasil Telecom Industry 
Association 
Yes Yes Need of exemptions for 
certain commercial 
contracts 
ABIQUIM Chemical Industry 
Association 
Yes Yes Need of clearer rules 
OAB - SP Law Bar 
Association 
Yes No Exclusion of market share 
thresholds 
Suggestion to follow best 
international practices  
Trench Rossi 
Watanabe 




Law Firm  Yes Yes Need of clear rules 
Exclusion of market share 
thresholds 
OAB - DF Law Bar 
Association 
Yes No Exclusion of market share 
thresholds 
Limit to contracts of 4 
years or more 
Petrobras S.A Oil Industry Yes Yes Need of clear rules 
Claro S.A Telecom Industry Yes Yes Need of clear rules 
ABA Law Bar 
Association 
Yes No Need of clear concepts 
Suggestion to follow best 
international practices 
TIM S.A Telecom Industry Yes Yes Need of exemptions for 
certain contracts 
IBRAC Research Institute  Yes Yes Need of clear rules 
MC Millan + 
ICN 
Law Firm   Yes  No Suggestion to follow best 
international practices 
VPBG Law Firm   Yes No Suggestion to follow best 
international practices 
CESA Law Study Group 
(controlled by 
Law Firms) 










4. VERTICAL AGREEMENT POLICY AND 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
4.1. INTRODUCTION: THE CHOICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 
THE COMPARATIVE RESEARCH  
This PhD research aims at identifying an optimal mix of antitrust policies oriented to vertical 
agreements. The previous chapters explained that the regulation of vertical agreements 
constitutes one of the most animated disputes in competition law. This is because vertical 
agreements can bring efficiencies to markets (in the form of cost savings to companies) but 
can also excite anti-competitive practices (e.g. market foreclosure). Because of this 
regulatory dilemma, countries have different approaches towards this topic. In this research, 
a comparative law and economics analysis of antitrust policies in Brazil and Europe was 
conducted. This specific Chapter aims at analysing the evolution of the European Union (EU) 
competition law related to vertical agreements, as well as its current challenges.  
Several reasons encouraged this choice of the EU policies as a framework in this 
comparative law and economics research. Firstly and more generally, Brazil has historically 
followed the EU civil law legal traditions.1 Secondly, and now referring specifically to 
competition law, both legal systems passed through a change in policies oriented to vertical 
agreements: from an ex-ante notification of agreements to an ex-post control of anti-
competitive practices, although with some crucial differences. Briefly speaking, Chapter 3 
discussed the change in the Brazilian Competition Law oriented to vertical agreements.  It 
showed that the recent Resolution No. 17/2016 removed vertical agreements from the 
notification system, leaving the enforcement of vertical restraints in Brazil solely dependent 
on ex-post control. Fourteen years before, EU Regulation 1/2003 installed the ex-post control 
of vertical contracts putting an end to the centralized notification system among EU Member 
States. As it will be explained in this Chapter, in contrast with Brazil, in the EU, the change 
 
1 The law in Brazil law was mainly influenced by Roman law and the law of contemporary European countries, 
such as Portugal, France, Italy and Germany. G. Angelozzi, História do Direito no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 
Freitas Bastos Editora, 2009.  
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from an ex-ante to an ex-post control happened after forty years of having a notification 
system of agreements, and the reform was complemented by Block Exemption Regulations 
and Guidelines to help business people self-assessing the potential anti-competitive effects 
of their contracts.  
Thirdly, the political, social and economic reality in Brazil can be directly compared 
to some less developed EU countries, e.g., Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
This means that the challenges encountered by these jurisdictions, mainly related to late 
development of market economies and late implementation of competition law – and the way 
they are overcoming them – can also be considered comparable to the Brazilian reality.  
Lastly, a lot of new facts and discussions have been happening in Europe in relation 
to vertical agreements and it is worth having a closer look. The new realities of a more 
globalized, technology driven, and digitalized competitive environment may suggest that the 
current rules adopted by the European Commission are outdated and require adjustment.  The 
next years will be dynamic in the discussion of online and offline vertical agreements, since 
more enforcement action is expected regarding sales restrictions and digital conduct. 
Moreover, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation is now under review,2 and the Geo-
Blocking Regulation No. 302/2018 is also applicable. The recent attempts of the Commission 
in discussing the competitive outcomes of digital economies, as part of the “Digital Single 
Market Strategy”, certainly broaden the views on the new forms of market power that can be 
transferred to other countries, such as Brazil.3 
The Chapter is organized in four main Sections, apart from this introduction and the 
concluding remarks. Section 4.2 presents the evolution of policies oriented to vertical 
agreements/ vertical restraints in the EU in the period of 1957 – when the internal market 
was established – until the late 1990s. The Section briefly describes the origins of antitrust 
policy in Europe, the Council Regulation 17/1962 that introduced the centralized notification 
system of agreements, and the first sector exemptions for vertical agreements. Subsequently, 
Section 4.3 describes the modernization of the EU competition policies introduced by 
Regulation 1/2003. Section 4.4 identifies the main components (pillars) that made this legal 
reform possible. Then, section 4.5 focuses on the current challenges of EU competition law 
and policies to enforce anti-competitive vertical agreements. Two main challenges are 
identified: a substantive one related to the uncertainties on the outcomes/effects of digital 
 
2 The current Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (Commission Regulation No. 330/2010), will expire in 
2022. 
3 European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, 2015.  
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economies in vertical relations and, an institutional one, linked to the different levels of 
enforcement and institutional designs among the Member States.  
4.2.  HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
The legal framework of competition policies in Europe is based on the Treaties which have 
further developed over the years, as a result of legal amendments and successive 
negotiations.4 The evolution of competition policies oriented to vertical agreements in 
Europe allows us to make some interesting reflections. History has a great impact on the 
outcomes of the EU competition policies, and its deep understanding might help us to have 
a “solid view on the future”,5 by predicting and proposing adequate normative discussions.  
If we look to the origins of competition law in the EU, it is possible to say that the 
initial movements started before the 1957 Rome Treaty, meaning before the growth of the 
European Economic Community (EEC).6 Over the decades, several main events have 
influenced the fundamentals and basis of the EU antitrust policies. First, one can highlight 
the earlier national rules throughout Europe that were frequently intended to promote orderly 
competition and often pre-dated the Second World War.7 Second, influenced by the 
emergence of the post-war economic order of Germany, the German Ordoliberal school 
which promoted the principle of free competition.8 Third, the development of antitrust laws 
in other jurisdictions, such as the Sherman Act in the United States (US). Forth, after the 
Second World War, the evolution of national sources, such as the 1957 German Act against 
restraints of competition (Gesätz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen). Finally, one can 
highlight other sources that formed part of efforts of market integration in Europe, notably 
the fight against cartels and the regulation on merger control in the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty), also called the Paris Agreement, in 1951.9 
 
4 W. Souter, Coherence in EU Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 31. 
5 W. Schreuders, ‘Welcome in Brussels on the Rhine: A positive perspective on the EU’, in M. Faure, W. 
Schreuders & L. Visscher, Don’t Take it Seriously: Essays in Law and Economics in honours of Roger Van den 
Bergh, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018.  
6 The Treaty of Rome was signed on 25 March 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and West Germany and corresponds to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
7 Souter, 2016, supra note 4, p. 34. 
8 See R. Van der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, p. 
105. 
9 Souter, 2016, supra note 4, p. 34. 
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Considering these influences, the competition regime in Europe was introduced to 
eliminate trade restriction in the internal market. The challenge for law enforcement at that 
time was massive since the Commission had to start from scratch, a policy in a continental 
scale that aimed at integrating different domestic economies into a single economic area and 
developing competition as the major driver of the economic order.10  
Because this research is focused on policies oriented to vertical agreements, this 
Section will present a closer look to the application and implementation of Council 
Regulation 17/1962, as well as to its consequences for the competition within markets. 
Actually, the Council Regulation 17/1962 was the first Regulation that oriented and brought 
specific antitrust norms to the Members States in relation to commercial agreements, both 
the horizontal and vertical ones. It was also the first regulation to address the centralised 
enforcement powers on the EU level. Regulation 17/1962 was created to prevent restrictive 
arrangements between producers and distributors from harming the process of market 
integration and/or even promote the exclusion of new rivals that might both enhance 
competition and generate pressure to reduce prices.11 This Regulation created an enforcement 
system that the Commission has applied for almost 40 years without significant changes.  
Regulation 17/1962 gave the monopoly to the European Commission in assessment 
of the potential anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements and therefore the monopoly 
in granting exemptions. According to Articles 85 and 87 of the EEC Treaty, the exemption 
of agreements was granted solely by the European Commission, based on a system of prior 
notification.12 Actually, Article 85(1) (current Article 101 TFEU) provided for  a prohibition 
on trade-related agreements that may have the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition. This kind of agreements could be exempted by Article 85(3) 
whenever they generated pro-competitive outcomes, such as efficiency gains.  
Consten-Grundig13 was the first case of vertical restraints under the application of 
Article 85. Briefly speaking, the case discussed the validity of Grundig's system of absolute 
 
10 European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty , 1999. 
11 European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 1997, p. 2. 
12 One interesting fact is that recent historical research holds that the text of the old Article 85 reflected both 
French and German thinking: the French thinking in respect to the decentralization and their views on legal 
exceptions; and the German on regarding the exemption system and centralization in the hands of the 
Commission. For example, see Souter, 2016, supra note 4; S. Pérez & S. Scheur, ‘The evolution of the law on 
Article 85 and 86 EEC: Ordoliberalism and its Keynesian challenge’, in  K. K. Patel & H. Schweitzer (Eds.), 
The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
13 Joined cases 56 and 58/ 64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig Verkaufs- GmbH v Commission 
(1966) ECR 429.  
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territorial protection in the market for electronic goods, that used to bar all Grundig 
purchasers, German and foreign, from exporting or re-exporting its products.14 The Court of 
Justice decided that: 
“[…] an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to 
restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be such 
as to frustrate the most fundamental objections of the Community. The Treaty, 
whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the barriers between States, 
and which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude with regard 
to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct such 
barriers. Article 85(1) [now Article 101(1) TFEU] is designed to pursue this 
aim, even in the case of agreements between undertakings placed at different 
levels in the economic process.”15 
The Grundig case guided the decisions and position of the European Commission in the 
following decades in this topic. In fact, this worry related to keeping uniform and equilibrated 
conditions in the internal market led the Commission to over-enforce vertical restraints. This 
extreme concern in fighting against vertical restraints was not always in line with their 
potential harmful nature in a more objective economic sense,16 but it could be explained by 
the influence of the Ordoliberal school of thought.17  
Moreover, several historical, institutional and cultural reasons justified the choice of 
a centralized notification system of agreements. By the time Regulation 17/1962 entered into 
force, the Commission was in the best position (i) to access anti-competitive conducts; (ii) to 
ensure the comprehensive interpretation of Article 85; (iii) to ensure the necessary 
information for National Competition Authorities (NCAs), and (iv) to guarantee legal 
certainty to undertakings.  
Actually, in the 1960s, only six countries were part of the Community (Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) and therefore the 
Commission could easily guarantee the correct implementation of the existing Regulation. 
 
14 A detailed history and analysis of the case can be found at L. Ebb, ‘The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: 
Judicial Harmonization Of National Law And Treaty Law In The Common Market’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 6, 1967, pp 855-889.    
15 Consten- Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 429, p. 340. 
16 See discussion on the economic analysis of vertical agreements in Chapter 2. 
17 Souter, 2016, supra note 4, p. 38. 
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In the 70s and 80s, countries such as Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom,18 Greece,19 
Portugal and Spain,20 and later in the 90s Austria, Finland and Sweden also joined the 
Community,21 some of which had a background of dictatorial periods, with no experience 
whatsoever in enforcing competition law. Because most of these countries had limited or 
even no experience in applying competition policies, the centralised authorization system 
showed itself to be essential and effective in setting up a “culture of competition”.22  
However, as an unintended side-effect of the centralized authorization and 
notification system, the eventual result was the submission of thousands of agreements for 
consideration by the Commission services. As a result of that, from the 1960s until the 1980s, 
several measures were taken by the Commission to reduce notifications and/or speed up the 
assessments: starting from comfort letters, then de minimis notice, and the creation of sectoral 
block exemptions. In more detail, the Commission first started giving comfort letters to 
companies. However, the undertakings were still not completely covered by legal certainty 
as they did not give a formal “green flag” to the proposed agreements.  With regard to the de 
minimis notice, in the Völk v Vervaecke case,23 the Commission declared that, in the scope 
of Article 85, a threshold of five per cent market share (and a turnover threshold of 20 million 
accounting units) should be used to determine the scope for agreements of minor importance. 
It means that companies that had such a market share did not have to notify their agreements 
to the Commission anymore. 
Another important measure to decrease the amount of notifications was the creation 
of block exemptions. The core idea was that if an agreement fulfilled all the conditions in a 
particular block exemption, it was automatically cleared, and therefore did not have to be 
notified. These block exemptions were issued for standard types of agreements, notably (i) 
vertical agreements, such as exclusive distribution agreements or exclusive purchasing 
agreements,24 respectively licensing and franchising;25 (ii) sectoral agreements, e.g., motor 
 
18 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1972) 
19 Treaty of Accession of Greece (1979) 
20 Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal (1985) 
21 Treaty concerning the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union of Accession (1994). 
22 European Commission (1999), supra note 10, paragraph 4. 
23 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] Case No. 5-69 
24 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/ 83 of 22 June 1983 concerning exclusive distribution agreements, 
OJ 1983, L173/ 1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/ 83 of 22 June 1983 concerning exclusive 
purchasing agreements, OJ 1983, L173/ 55. 
25 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2349/ 84 of 23 July 1984 concerning patent licensing agreements, OJ 
1984, L219/ 15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/ 88 of 30 November 1988 concerning franchising 
agreements, OJ 1988, L359/ 46; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 556/ 89 of 30 November 1988 concerning 
know- how licensing agreements, OJ 1989, L61/ 1 
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vehicle distribution,26 and insurance;27 as well as (iii) horizontal arrangements, e.g., 
specialization agreements and research and development agreements.28 It is worth noting that 
some of these exemptions have been the subject of intensive industry lobbying.29 The various 
block exemptions, however, were originally highly specific. Undertakings were forced to 
choose a particular business model (specific contract) and stick to that in order to obtain an 
exemption under the competition rules, even if for commercial reasons a mixed form or even 
a wholly new format would have been preferred.  
By the late 1990s, fifteen Member States were part of the Community, which meant 
eleven different languages and more than 350 million people having to respect those 
Treaties.30 Indeed, the Community grew significantly and the role of the Commission in 
guaranteeing uniform conditions in the internal market also changed. Moreover, the world 
became globalized, speeding up the internationalization of the European economy and 
therefore all the transactions (including the number of commercial contracts). This reality 
brought into question the procedural rules from the 1960s.  
4.3. THE MODERNIZATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
Several decades of notification system proved to be somehow effective to create a “culture 
of competition” among the Member States, especially considering the different historical and 
political backgrounds among them. However, several reasons encouraged the revision of 
Regulation 17/1962, and new rules started to come up as an option.31 In the late 90s, there 
were two main initiatives from the Commission in respect of evaluating competition policies. 
The first one was the 1997 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU Competition Policy32 
(hereinafter called the “Green Paper”) and the second one was the 1999 White Paper on 
 
26 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/ 85 of 12 December 1984 concerning motor vehicle distribution and 
servicing agreements, OJ 1985, L15/ 16. 
27 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1534/ 91 of 31 May 1991 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector, OJ 1991, L143/ 1. 
28 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 417/ 85 concerning specialization agreements, OJ 1985, L53/ 1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/ 85 of 19 December 1984 concerning research and development 
agreements, OJ 1985, L53/ 5. 
29 See, for instance, discussion of Chapter 7 in C. R. Swaak, European Community Law and the Automobile 
Industry, Deventer, Wolters Kluwer, 1999. 
30 Information given by the European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 5. 
31 In the late 1990s, several scholars started to point out the need of a reform of policies oriented to vertical 
restraints. I highlight the work of B. Hawk, ‘System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law’, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 32, No.4, 1995, pp.937-989. 
32 European Commission, 1999, supra note 11. 
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Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (hereinafter 
called the “White Paper”).33  
The first one focused exclusively on policies oriented to vertical agreements, while 
the second one focused on the modernization of competition policy in Europe, including the 
need to revise the notification system of agreements and the monopoly of the Commission in 
analysing antitrust cases. Moreover, the documents also showed alternative policies to 
guarantee the enforcement of vertical restraints that – although not applied in Europe - could 
be implemented in other countries. The next subsections intend to show the view of the 
European Commission in deciding on new policies for vertical agreements, taking into 
consideration the goals of the Community, and the self-interest of parties. The analysis and 
the outcome of these policy-evaluation documents is very rich in terms of setting the grounds 
of this comparative PhD research and later normative conclusions. 
4.3.1. The Green Paper and the White Paper  
The Green Paper firstly identified the progress that had been made in Europe during the 80s 
and 90s in respect of de minimis notice and other block exemptions. The Green Paper 
acknowledges the advantages of the notification system, such as: the guarantee of full 
economic assessment of those agreements, the better promotion of market integration, the 
consistency among the decisions, and the legal certainty offered to business people.34  The 
economic assessment of vertical agreements was also included in the document. The Green 
Paper recognized that some legal and procedural changes needed to be considered, not only 
because of the growth of the Community and the rise in administrative burdens, but also to 
enable the Commission to concentrate on more severe antitrust cases.  
The Green Paper mentions that the process of globalization and market expansion 
changes the dynamics of markets,35 making contracts among business more complex in a 
scenario where technology starts playing a new role in the market dynamics that before was 
even ignored.36 The document also identifies several pitfalls in the former policy applicable 
to verticals. It identifies, for instance, that the existing block exemptions did not contain any 
market share limits to address the market power of undertakings and they were rather too 
 
33 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10. 
34 European Commission, 1997, supra note 11, Chapter III. 
35 European Commission, 1997, supra note 11, paragraph 244-247. 
36 European Commission, 1997, supra note 11, paragraph 223-225. 
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strict, as a high percentage of vertical agreements that could not bring any anti-competitive 
concerns to market were outside their scope.37  
As alternative policies brought by the Green Paper, one can highlight the adoption of 
wider block exemptions (wider interpretations), or even more focused block exemptions 
(covering other types of contracts), in order to lower the number of notifications to be 
assessed by the Commission.38  The market share limits in block exemptions and other 
objective parameters for the application of Article 85(1) were also presented as alternative 
policies. In this context, a couple of years later, not only Regulation 2790/9939 – the 1999 
Vertical Block  Exemption Regulation (1999 VBER) – but also the White Paper were 
published, incorporating somehow the concerns brought by the Green Paper and also adding 
some new insights to the reform that was about to happen. 
With regard to the White Paper, succinctly, the document presents three main 
justifications for the legal reform. Firstly, as anticipated before, the growth of the Community 
and the globalization of the market economies. According to the Commission, within the 
decades of implementation of Regulation 17/1962, the national competition authorities had 
also slowly acquired better knowledge, and more than that, they developed some 
infrastructure and human and legal resources in order to be able to take action in their 
territories. The 1999 White Paper describes that by 1998, there were more than a thousand 
agents working for the national authorities of all Member States, as opposed to around 150 
officials in the Commission.40  
Secondly, the Commission also identified that there was a need to prioritize cartels 
and abuse of dominant position. According to the White Paper, the enlargement of the 
European Union led to an increase in restrictive practices and in the abuse of dominant 
positions that needed to be tackled, especially considering those cartels in concentrated 
markets and in markets that were about to be liberalised.41 Even knowing that the notification 
system was necessary to acquire the knowledge required to assess anti-competitive practices, 
the Commission ended up shifting its attention from other important cases. For example, 
from 1988-1998, only 13 % of the cases were ex-officio investigations and about 6% of the 
 
37 F. Wijckmans & F. Tuytschaever, Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law (3rd ed.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2018, p.17. 
38 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, see Chapter VIII. 
39 The Commission adopted the block exemption on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices on 22 
December 1999. The Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2000, and the new block exemption conferred 
by it applies with effect from 1 June 2000. 
40 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 44. 
41 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 45. 
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cases were actually closed,42 since most of the staff was focused on handling the large number 
of notifications. 
Thirdly, the high administrative burden was also highlighted by the Commission. The 
notification and authorization system – the way it was proposed by Regulation 17/1962 – 
created over the years a burden both to the Commission, and to business people and their 
legal advisors. This burden was reflected for instance, in the drafting and preparation of 
notifications, the collection of information requested in the forms, and the analysis itself of 
all those cases by the Commission.43  
Having this background, the White Paper’s main suggestion was that the Commission 
should face a reform based on the decentralisation of competition rules, and the termination 
of the notification system of agreements. Under a legal exemption system, vertical restraints 
are valid under certain conditions defined by law. There were, of course, other alternative 
policies presented by the White Paper, such as: (i) changing the interpretation of Article 85 
to a rule of reason approach; (ii) decentralizing the application of Article 85 to national 
authorities (but keeping the notification) – and, in this case, it wouldn’t reduce the total 
number of notifications but rather redistribute them among the national authorities; (iii) 
broadening the waiver of the notifications; (iv) simplifying procedures by, for example, 
abolishing the requirement to translate into all the languages, among others.44 These 
alternative policies would undoubtedly have attacked some of the issues identified by the 
Commission; however, other difficulties would have remained in place, such as the lack of 
resources of the Commission and the non-focus on dealing with the most serious restriction 
cases. For these reasons, the reform brought by Regulation 1/2003 kept the main suggestions 
of the White Paper, that is, the end of the notification system for vertical agreements and the 
decentralization of competition law. 
In May 2004, Regulation 1/2003 came into effect in all Member States (and therefore 
is hereinafter called “2004 Reform”). It replaced the old centralized ex-ante authorization 
system of commercial agreements (including vertical agreements) to a decentralized ex-post 
control.45 It means that companies do not have to notify their agreements and wait for the 
approval from the Commission but have to self-assess their arrangements instead. The 
 
42 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 44. 
43 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 76. 
44 For more details on the alternative policies, see European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraphs 56 
to 68. 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
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Reform also changed the allocation of responsibilities, and the Commission somehow lost its 
monopoly in applying former Article 85 and in granting exemptions to the agreements. 
Actually, Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 lays down the responsibilities to the national 
authorities to apply Article 101 and 102 (formerly Articles 81, 82 and, before that, Article 85 
and 86) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) alongside their 
national rules.46  It means that the decentralization not only needed a coherent 
implementation of competition rules among Member States and their national authorities, but 
also close cooperation among them. It should be noted that 1 May 2004 also marked a shift 
in the European Union's history since ten new Member States entered the Community on that 
occasion: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Consequently, Regulation 1/2003 turned out to be a requirement for 
these countries' accession to the EU.47 
4.3.2. The Context of the EU Modernization of Competition Law: A Public 
Choice Perspective 
As discussed in Chapter 2, political economy discussions allow us to have an alternative look 
at the European experience when regulating vertical agreements. This Section aims at 
reviewing some literature that explains the context in which the 2004 Reform of EU 
Competition Law happened. It questions, for instance, the main argument of the White Paper 
regarding the workload of the Commission with the notifications of agreements. It discusses 
 
46 Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 TEC). 1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (a) directly 
or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, 
markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts. 2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: - any agreement or 
category of agreements between undertakings, - any decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings, - any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers 
a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility 
of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
47 B. M. Chiritoiu, ‘Convergence within the European Competition Network: Legislative Harmonization and 
Enforcement Priorities’, in A. Almășan & P. Whelan (Eds), The Consistent Application of EU Competition 
Law: Substantive and Procedural Challenges, Springer International Publisher, 2017, p. 5. 
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the possibility that private interests also may have justified part of the reform.48 For instance, 
it shows that, contrary to appearances, the Commission has benefited from the 
decentralization and has not lost its central position in the development and implementation 
of European competition policies. This is not necessarily the case for other stakeholders, such 
as National Competition Authorities. 
As we have discussed in the previous subsection, the Commission’s justification for 
the 2004 Reform was a combination of overload of the notification system and a need for 
simplification to adapt to the enlargement of the EU. From the viewpoint of the Commission, 
the notification system was also ineffective in identifying anti-competitive conduct since 
anti-competitive agreements were not being notified anyway, but instead left as secret.49 
Indeed, one of the main arguments of the White Paper was that the Commission’s resources 
could be better spent in more severe antitrust cases. This is the case because the Commission 
was overloaded with the notifications of agreements and the end of such a policy – together 
with the decentralization – permitted the European authority to focus its resources on cartels 
and other more severe antitrust cases. The recital 3 of Regulation 1/2003 indicated that the 
notification of agreements “hampers application of the Community competition rules by the 
courts and competition authorities of the Member States, and the system of notification it 
involves prevents the Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the most 
serious infringements”.  
However, some statistics show that the number of notifications of agreements, by the 
time Regulation 1/2003 entered into force, was not that significant. Alan Riley suggests that 
the notification was already an “irrelevant procedure with marginal impact on the 
enforcement of EU competition law” and therefore there was almost no cost to the 
Commission in abandoning this policy.50 Indeed, even though in the late 1960s the 
Commission was receiving more than 30.000 notifications a year, this amount was 
substantially reduced by the introduction of comfort letters, block exemptions (mainly the 
 
48 In Chapter 3 there is a more extensive discussion (both on literature review and analysis) of public choice 
and antitrust, in which Brazil is taken as a case study.  
49 P. Nicolaides, ‘Development of a system for decentralised enforcement of EC competition policy’, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002, p. 42-44. See also J. Venit, ‘Brave new world: the modernization and 
decentralization of enforcement under article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 
40, No. 3, 2003, pp. 545-80.  
50 A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! Part One: 
Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003a, p. 604. 
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1999 Block Exemption Regulation), and notices. For instance, only 71 agreements were 
actually notified in 2003, before the new Regulation entered into force.51  
Actually, Phedon Nicolaides suggested that if the work-overload was indeed the main 
problem for an effective enforcement of competition policies in the EU, then “an increase in 
the Commission’s resources would have been the first-best solution”.52 Damien Neven, 
argued that the change in systems was not necessary, but, instead, the Commission should 
have decided to use its resources more efficiently in its internal working process, since the 
number of individual exemption notifications was naturally going to be reduced with the 
changes to the substantive law (block exemption regulations for vertical restraints).53 Neven 
also stressed that the Commission´s notification system was also very costly due to the time 
spend in several informal lengthy, such as unnecessary pre-notification discussions with 
firms.54  
Riley also supported the argument that the end of notification system of agreements 
was not necessary, and suggested that dealing with 100 or so notifications a year would be 
less burdensome to the Commission than dealing with the cooperation and supervision of 
Regulation 1/2003.55 Indeed, the decentralization unsurprisingly created huge transaction 
costs related to the coordination of responsibilities, an item that was not considered in the 
official policy evaluation documents.56 This argument is particularly important considering 
that Regulation 1/2003 is equally applied to countries with different economic and political 
backgrounds, different experience in applying competition law, different levels of 
resources,57 and cultural diversities, which inevitably raises such coordination costs.   
 
51 According to the XXXIII REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2003, 216 agreements were notified in 1998, 
followed by 162 in 1999, 101 in 2000, 94 in 2001 and 101 in 2002. 
52 Nicolaides, 2002, supra note 49, p. 44. 
53  D. Neven, ‘Removing the Notification of Agreements: Some consequences of ex-post monitoring’, in A. 
Bogdandy, P. Mavroidis & Y. Meny (Eds), European Integration and International Cooperation: Studies in 
International Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2002. In this paper, Neven also argued that the merger task force was doing a good job, while the staff 
combatting anti-competitive behaviour have been frustrated in carrying out their tasks. He also mentioned in 
his paper that the German Federal Cartel Office have used a system of prior notification for more thn 40 years 
without having management problems. 
54 According to Neven, almost 70% of all notifications passed through a pre-notification discussion with the 
authority. See D. Neven, P. Papandropoulos, & P. Seabright, Trawling for Minnows: European Competition 
Policy and Agreements between firms, London, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), 1998, p. 
112. 
55 Riley, 2003a, supra note 50, p. 615. 
56 For instance, no cost-benefit analysis was published by the Commission as policy evaluation documents. 
57 Riley’s analysis provides an insight into the inadequacy resources, knowledge and independence of many of 
the NCAs and the associated courts. See Riley, 2003a, supra note 50.    
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This political economy reading on the 2004 Reform suggests that the Commission 
had the interest of ending the notification system of agreements so that the officials could 
focus on the more high-profile cases (and therefore save the administrative costs of the 
notification).  
As part of this interest driven discussion, other authors demonstrate how the 
Commission has benefited from the 2004 Reform. According to David Gerber, the agenda of 
the Competition Directorate (DG Comp) was a central point in the modernization analysis, 
since it had developed the proposals and lead the implementation of it.58 Some commentators 
indicate that (because of self-interests) the Commission did not lose its central role in the 
enforcement of EU competition law, and that the “decentralization” can somehow be 
questioned. Indicated here are some of the relevant supporters of this view. Oliver Budzinski 
and Arndt Christiansen argued that the competence allocation in the EU competition policy 
brought by Regulation 1/2003 was not clear or welfare-enhancing since self-interested actors 
had an important role in shaping the policy reform.59 Their point was that when the 
competence allocation is not clear in a multilevel system of competition policies, there is 
more space for the self-interest of agents to prevail. The authors argued that the vagueness 
and lack of clarity of the delimitation of competences between the European and national 
levels was mainly ignored by the reform and therefore “brought a rather complicated mixture 
of explicit decentralization (of enforcement) and more implicit centralization (of substantial 
rules)”.60  
They identify, for instance, that not only the Commission, but also the European 
Courts (Court of First Instance and Court of Justice) historically have enjoyed this role in the 
law and decision-making process, and that competition law has provided them with status 
and power.61 Therefore, the vagueness of the 2004 Reform in relation to the competence 
allocation could be seen as an opportunity to not change this scenario or take this centralized 
power from them.62  
 
58 D. Gerber, ‘Modernizing Competition Law: a developmental perspective’, European Competition Law 
Review, Vol. 4, 2001, p. 125. 
59 O. Budzinski & A. Christiansen, ‘Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-
Driven Process’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005, pp. 313-337. 
60 Budzinski & Christiansen, 2005, p. 318-319. 
61 This argument is also brought by Gerber, 2001, supra note 58, p. 126. 
62 Budzinski also explain that the ECJ historically has explicitly affirmed the priority of European Competition 
rules over the national ones in cases of conflict, for example in the Walt Wilhemen judgment of 1969 (Case 14-
68), Delimitis case regarding beer supply agreements in 1991 (Case C-234/89), Materfoods case in 2000 (Case 
C-344/98), among others. See the author’s explanation in O. Budzinski, The Governance of Global 
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The Commission, however, was not the only stakeholder that benefited from the 
change in policy in Europe. According to Angela Wigger, law firms providing antitrust 
advocacy to the undertakings also profited from the decentralized ex-post control of 
Regulation 1/2003.63 Indeed, with the 2004 Reform, companies have to privately self-assess 
their agreements (to minimize antitrust risks and to know better how to deal with competitors) 
and private damage actions were also facilitated.64 It means that law companies became 
extremely important in this context, since they are the ones who will measure the antitrust 
risks of potential restrictive agreements.65 It is worth remembering that with the end of the 
notification system of agreements, parties lost part of their legal certainty, and therefore have 
additional responsibilities in this process. 
When it comes to the National Authorities in Europe, the effects of the 2004 Reform 
were not all positive, since they now face greater responsibilities (and therefore costs) and, 
at the same time, too little freedom when it comes to defying their rules and legal proceedings. 
In this context, Stephen indicates that instead of “decentralizing” the EU competition policy, 
Regulation 1/2003 “Europeanized” the national antitrust regimes, and extended the powers 
of the Commission. The author presented four main arguments that support his claim.66 
Firstly, Article 3’s provision marginalizes national law by saying that all the national 
authorities should apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, whatever their current legal 
framework.67 Secondly, Regulation 1/2003 provided a system of close monitoring, in which 
the Commission, at any time, can replace the cases of national authorities by its own 
proceedings. In third place, the ECN is somehow controlled by the Commission, and 
therefore the competence allocation is controlled by the Commission as well. Lastly, 
 
Competition: Competence Allocation in International Competition Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008, p. 126.  
63 A. Wigger, ‘Revising the European Competition Reform: The toll of Private Self-Enforcement’, Working 
Papers Political Science of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, No. 07, 2004. 
64 Wigger, 2004, supra note 63, at 14-15. 
65 For instance, Chapter 3 shows that in Brazil, law companies are the agents that participate more in Public 
Consultations and therefore have an impact in the law-making process. 
66Wilks, 2005, supra note 70. 
67 About this specific point, Roger Van den Bergh questions whether, in the case of Germany, the rules of 
Regulation 1/2003, mainly in respect to vertical restraints, reflected indeed a better approach than the ones that 
were already in force in the country. According to the author, the old German Competition Law (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, or GWB) used to differentiate the rules applicable for vertical agreements from 
the ones applicable to horizontal ones, which was a good rule, since vertical agreements require a more 
economics-based approach than the horizontal ones. See discussion in R. Van den Bergh & P. Camesasca, 
European Competition Law and Economics: a Comparative Perspective, 2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006, p. 227-229. 
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Regulation 1/2003 extends the Commission’s powers of investigation, the size of the fines, 
and even its abilities to negotiate biddings settlements with the parties.68   
In addition, Budzinski explains that larger Member States – such as Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom – were against the decentralization since their national laws were 
in this context further marginalized,69 and their national authorities were corralled.70 Also, in 
later works, the same author suggests that the European Competition Network (ECN) was 
unequivocally implemented “to heal” some of the deficits of the competence allocation 
discussions, and to a certain extent to guarantee that the Commission’s rule-interpretation is 
not affected by the decentralization.71 The author also discusses political economy aspects of 
the EU merger control policies, although he recognizes that in the case of merger control, the 
delimitation of competences is much more specified than in the case of cartel policies (or 
vertical restraints).72 
Riley used the expression “political masterstroke” to characterize the 2004 Reform, 
as the Commission gave the impression of radical reform, when it actually had not lost its 
central role in the development and implementation of European competition.73 By setting 
the outline of Regulation 1/2003, the author argued, for instance, that the Commission’s 
powers of decision and investigation  were actually extended with Regulation 1/2003 (e.g. 
power to obtain information; to take statements; to start their own procedure; among others). 
Finally, the author concluded that the Commission was the “sole beneficiary” of the new 
regulation, since undertakings did not benefit greatly from the removal of the notification 
system (legal uncertainty increased) and the NCAs also did not benefit since they had to incur 
extra costs of adjusting their legislation to the EU context.74   
 
68 Wilks, 2005, supra note 70, p. 439. 
69 Budzinski, 2008, supra note 62, p. 320. 
70 See also S. Wilks, ‘Agency Escape: Descentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the 
Mofernization of Competition Law?’, Governance:  An Institutional Journal of Policy, Administration and 
Institutions, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2005, pp. 431-452. 
71 Budzinsky, 2008, supra note 62. 
72 See, for instance, O. Budzinski, ‘Towards an international governance of transborder mergers? Competition 
networks and institutions between centralism and decentralism’, NYU Journal of Internation Law and Politics, 
Vol.36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-52. Also, O. Budzinski, ‘An economic perspective on the jurisdictional reform of 
the European merger control system’, European Competition Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006, pp. 119-40. 
73 Riley, 2003a, supra note 50, p. 604. 
74 A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you ! Part Two: Between 
the Idea and the Reality: Decentralization under Regulation’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 12, 
2003b, p. 671. 
117 
 
Apart from the above-mentioned literature, several other authors – such as Suzanne 
Kingston,75 Jeremy Lever,76 Ian Forrester,77 John Fingleton,78 and René Smits79 – also 
explored the political economy perspective to the 2004 Reform, among other points, the 
discussion regarding the implicit centralization of the Commission on the institutional side 
and/or the fear that, within this policy design, the NCAs (even the traditional ones, such as 
the German authority) became “automaton satellites” of the Commission.  
4.4. THE 2004 REFORM: THE THREE ENFORCEMENT 
COMPONENTS 
Despite of the political economy discussion brought by Section 4.3, there are still very 
important lessons to be drawn from the evolution of antitrust policy in Europe and the 2004 
Reform. These lessons are mainly related to the instruments that are still used by the NCAs 
to guarantee the enforcement of vertical agreements, in the ex-post control scenario. Three 
of these instruments, also called “pillars”, that made this massive reform possible, can be 
identified. The identification of these pillars is one of the main contributions of this Chapter.80 
Firstly, the consolidated antitrust jurisprudence. After almost four decades of a 
notification system, the jurisprudence of restrictive agreements was clear enough to allow a 
decent degree of legal certainty to parties and to guide national authorities to decide upon 
restrictive practices. Secondly, the cooperation among National Authorities. Regulation 
1/2003 created the ECN to guarantee cooperation among authorities and a coherence and 
uniform application of Article 101 TFEU. Thirdly, the intensification of ex-post control. 
Since parties no longer have to notify their potential restrictive practices, the strengthening 
 
75 S. Kingstone S, ‘A “new division of responsibilities” in the proposed regulation to modernize the rules 
implementing Article 81 and 82 EC? A warning call’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 8, 2001, 
pp. 340-348. 
76 J. Lever, ‘The German Monopolies Commission’s report of the problems consequent upon the reform of the 
European cartel procedures’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 7, 2002, pp. 321-325. 
77 I. Forester, ‘Modernization: an extension of the powers of the Commission?, in D. Geradin (Ed), 
Modernization and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC Competition Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004. 
78 J. Fingleton, ‘The distribution and attribution of cases among the members of the network: the perspective of 
the Commission/ NCAs’, in C. Ehlermann & I. Atanasuy (Eds.), Constructing the EU Network of Competition 
Authorities, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005. 
79 R. Smits, ‘The European competition network: selected aspects’, Legal Issues of European Integration, Vol 
32, No. 6, 2005, pp. 175-92. 
80 Chapter 5 will take a closer look into these three pillars from a Law and Economics perspective, and the 
theories of enforcement. For this specific Chapter, the intention is to merely describe them as important factors 
that permitted the enforcement of vertical restraints in Europe, after Regulation 1/2003. 
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of ex-post control via both public and private enforcement was necessary.  The next 
subsections describe in detail these three pillars.  
4.4.1. The Consolidated Antitrust Jurisprudence, the VBER and the 
Guidelines 
Over the years, the decisions and notices established by the Commission, and also the role of 
the Court of Justice in sometimes upholding or annulling decisions, were fundamental to the 
understanding of existing rules (including the complex assessment of Article 101 TFEU) and 
the goals of the Community. After almost 40 years of enforcement of Resolution 17/1962, 
the rules on vertical agreements became more predictable for undertakings. In other words, 
several decades of a notification system contributed to a good knowledge acquaintance on 
how to assess the potential anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements taking into 
consideration the particularities of the Community, the entire legal system and its policy 
priorities.81 We can mention for example, the Metro SB- GroBmarkete GmbH v 
Commission82 for selective distribution cases, and the Yamada83 case for resale prince 
maintenance, among others.84 
The Commission itself indicated that the choice for alternative policies oriented to 
vertical agreements was only possible due to the legal certainty carried out by decades of 
antitrust jurisprudence and the decision-making process, and more recently by the block 
exemption regulation, notices and guidelines.85 The White Paper highlighted:  
“In a directly applicable exception system, the legislative framework is of 
primary importance. The application of the rules must be sufficiently 
 
81 Souter, 2016, supra note 4.  
82 Metro SB- GroBmarkete GmbH and Co KG  v Commission, Case No. 26/76 
83 Yamaha Corporation Japan, Yamaha Europa GmbH, Yamaha Musica Italia, s.p.a., Yamaha Musique France 
S.A. and Yamaha Scandinavia AB vs Commission, Case No. IP/03/1028 
84 The Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints brings several other examples of consolidated 
jurisprudence related to vertical restraints. 
85 According to the White Paper, paragraph 70.`While there were legitimate doubts in 1960 as to the scope of 
the conditions for exemption under Article 85, the Commission's decision-making practice, the case-law of the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance and the various block exemption regulations and general notices 
have made the conditions governing exemption much clearer.  Furthermore, the national authorities and courts, 
undertakings and their legal advisers have progressively gained a better knowledge of Community competition 
law. These changes now make it possible to overcome obstacles which, at the time when Regulation No 17 was 
adopted, prevented the establishment of a system of ex post control and stemmed essentially from uncertainties 
as to the precise scope of the exemption conditions provided for in Article 85(3)`. See European Commission, 
1999, supra note 10. 
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reliable and consistent to allow businesses to assess whether their 
restrictive practices are lawful. The Commission would keep the sole right 
to propose legislative texts, in whatever form - regulations, notices, 
guidelines etc. - and would act whenever necessary in order to ensure 
consistency and uniformity in the application of the competition rules.”86 
(Emphasis added) 
Indeed, the 1999 Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (Regulation 2790/99, or 1999 
VBER), and later on notices and guidelines, gained strength and importance.87 In the absence 
of a notification system, those hard and soft law instruments became fundamental tools to 
business people to self-assess their contractual relations, and also to national authorities when 
investigating anti-competitive practices. Actually, as highlighted by Alison Jones and Brenda 
Sufrin, most of these notices and guidelines were “crucial to complete an overall picture of a 
particular competition rule and in practice they influence the way in which firms conduct 
business”.88 The authors also mention that although the notices and guidelines are soft law 
instruments, and do not have a legislative force, the EU decision makers are constantly 
referring their decisions to it. 
Regulation 2790/99 addressed some innovative aspects when compared to the 
previous group of (sector) block exemptions, such as (i) the introduction of an umbrella block 
exemption applied to a broad variety of supply and distribution contracts; (ii) the 
implementation of market share thresholds for producers and distributors, for instance, in the 
case of exclusive supply; and (iii) the adoption of a blacklist approach, that included, inter 
alia, bans on vertical price-fixing and on geo-blocking provisions.89 The 1999 VBER was 
also accompanied by explanatory Guidelines to help enforcers and mainly business people 
to better understand the types of agreements and/or clauses they could or could not be 
engaged in.90 Actually, in view of the fact that Regulation 1/2003 abolished the notification 
system, the rationale for the exemption system changed. Instead of being used as a policy 
tool to reduce the number of notifications, the VBER has proved to be the most relevant tool 
 
86 European Commission, 1999, supra note 10, paragraph 84.  
87 It is worth noting that in the EU law, Treaties are known as primary law, and all the body of law that comes 
from the principles and objectives of the treaties is known as secondary law. This includes Regulations (such 
as Regulation 1/2003 and the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation), directives, decisions, recommendations 
and opinions. 
88 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th ed.), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p. 118. 
89 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, supra note 37, p. 18. 
90 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 (updated version). 
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for businesses and lawyers to carry out the self-assessment demanded by Article 101 (3) 
TFEU.91  
It is worth noting that the new version of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 
entered into force in June 2010.92 Regulation 330/2010 (or 2010 VBER) brought two main 
developments to the policies applicable to vertical restraints when compared to Regulation 
2790/99: (i) a double market share limit and (ii) a brief assessment over internet sales. In the 
current system, an agreement benefits from the legal exemptions in a situation where the 
market share held by both the supplier and the buyer does not exceed 30%, and if the contract 
does not include a number of blacklisted clauses (hard-core restrictions). As blacklist clauses, 
Regulation 330/2010 highlights for instance, in its Article 4, resale price-fixing clauses, 
territorial and consumer restrictions (including selective distribution systems).  
The consolidated antitrust jurisprudence, the VBER and the Guidelines, are therefore 
the first pillars that permitted the change from a notification system of vertical agreements to 
a system of legal exception in Europe without parties encountering too much legal 
uncertainty. The next section analyses the role of the ECN in guaranteeing cooperation and 
consistency in the enforcement of article 101 TFEU among the Member States. 
4.4.2. The European Competition Network: Cooperation among EU 
Member States  
The European Competition Network was established in 2004 as a forum for discussion on 
the application of EU competition policies, mainly Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In detail, 
Article 11 and Article 14 of Regulation 1/2003, and the ECN Cooperation Notice establish 
the principle of close cooperation between national authorities and the Commission.93 The 
network is supported by the allocation of cases94 and information exchange,95 including the 
exchange and use, across ECN members, of confidential information. This network was 
created to help national authorities to enhance cooperation and the coherence, consistency 
and uniform application of the competition rules, given the diverse experience among the 
 
91 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, supra note 37, p. 16. 
92 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
93 European Commission, Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
2004.  
94 European Commission, 2004, paragraphs 5-15. 
95 European Commission, 2004, paragraphs 16-19. 
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NCAs in applying competition law.96 It means that the national authorities and courts 
themselves had (and still have) an active role in supporting one another to apply competition 
rules to restrictive practices, and therefore this close cooperation is identified as the second 
pillar that sustains the 2004 Reform. Indeed, one of the main differences of Regulation 
1/2003 and Regulation 17/1962 was the cooperative provisions.  
Given the complexity of assessing antitrust cases (as in vertical agreements cases) 
and the deficiencies of the competence allocation of EU competition policies bought by 
Regulation 1/2003, the ECN showed up as an important pillar for the national authorities. 
Also, the ECN has developed guidance for the more effective distribution of competences.97 
In this respect, the ECN has been capable of overcoming certain weaknesses and conflicts of 
the current system, by establishing additional and more informal internal procedures. 
According to Budzinski and Christiansen and “In the absence of a mutual consent on a clear-
cut delimitation of competences, however, this only represents a makeshift/emergency 
solution”.98  
It should be noted that in the hierarchical structure of the ECN, the European 
Commission functions as a manager to ensure that EU regulations are applied uniformly.99 
In other words, the ECN offers cooperative support for NCAs, so they can consistently apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and also commit to the creation and establishment of a prevalent 
competition culture across Europe.100 The idea of having the support of the Commission and 
of more experienced competition authorities, mainly for the new Member States with no 
tradition whatsoever in implementing competition rules, certainly characterizes the second 
pillar of the reform. 
4.4.3. Intensification of Ex-Post Control 
Finally, a crucial item of the reform was the intensification of enforcement and monitoring 
by the Commission, NCAs and national courts to ensure that restrictive practices (including 
anticompetitive vertical agreements) were not taking place and competition rules were 
 
96 K. Cseres, ‘Comparing laws in the enforcement of EU and national competition laws’, European Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010a, pp.7-44. 
97 Budzinski, 2008, supra note 44, p. 132-133. 
98 Budzinski & Christiansen, 2005 supra note 59, p. 322. 
99 Cseres, 2010a, supra note 96, p. 19. 
100 F. Cengiz, ‘Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network’, European 
Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, p. 662. 
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respected among all the Member States. Because the law became more predictable to 
undertakings over the years of the notification system, the ex-post control of vertical 
agreements turned out to be the alternative policy to simplify the administration of these 
practices. Actually, the Commission acknowledges that – without the mandatory system of 
notifications – the better level of enforcement of anti-competitive agreements could only be 
accomplished when the ex-post enforcement has been guaranteed.101In this context, it is 
important to differentiate between the two instruments of ex-post control to be considered in 
this analysis: the public and the private enforcement.  
Regarding the public enforcement, the strengthening in the ex-post control means 
guaranteeing a larger power to the Commission (but also to national enforcers) to start their 
own cases (ex-officio) and a larger power of enquiry (e.g. power to seal premises, request for 
information, ask questions during investigations). Within the new legal framework, both the 
Commission and the national authorities could start their own investigation on vertical 
infringement founded on external complaints. In this context, one can say that private parties 
are also protagonists in the enforcement of competition law, since any interested individual 
or any firm may be able to file a legitimate complaint against restrictive contracts.102  
Law and Economics theory discusses that the increase in ex-post control, not only 
through the increase of fines, but also thought more focused and powerful investigatory 
powers, would ultimately lead to an increase in the costs of businesses to engage in restrictive 
practices. For example, Gary Becker explains that the offenders eventually stop committing 
crimes (or lower the amount of crimes), according to the severity of the enforcement (e.g. 
probability of detention, size of fines).103 The increase in the level of fines is indeed a basic 
enforcement tool in order to tackle anti-competitive practices. In 2006, new Guidelines104 
with specific methodologies to set fines for antitrust infringements were adopted by the 
European Commission. These Guidelines increased the deterrent effect of fines by 
determining, for instance, (i) that fines may be based on up to 30% of the company’s annual 
sales to which the infringement relates, multiplied by the duration, in years, of the 
infringement; (ii) that an “entry fee” may be applicable regardless of the length of the 
 
101 European Commission, 1999, paragraph 108. 
102 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, supra note 37, p. 21. 
103 G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, 
1968, pp. 169-217.. Although the author focused his analysis on criminal law, most of the insights can be 
applied to other law infringements, such as anti-competitive conducts. A more extensive law and economic 
analysis of ex-post enforcement instruments will be carried out in Chapter 5. 
104 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, 2006. 
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infringement; (iii) that fines for undertakings that continue to repeat the infringement may be 
increased by up to 100%, and so on.  
Some current developments in EU law have also contributed to the strengthening of 
the ex-post control in the field of private enforcement, meaning the application of EU 
antitrust legislation in conflicts between private parties before the judiciary. Frank 
Wijckmans and Filip Tuytschaever discuss the importance of considering private actions also 
(and mainly) in vertical cases: “more than cartels, vertical restraints give rise to autonomous 
private litigation before national courts because vertical practices are more a contractual 
matter and also because there is simply less public enforcement activity in the field of 
verticals”.105 Over the years, the Commission actively promoted some actions with the aim  
of harmonizing and promoting the relevant national rules on damages actions. Towards the 
end of 2014, the EU Private Damages Directive entered into force,106 containing rules which 
assist any individual who has been harmed – including harm originated by vertical restraints 
– to exercise a right to claim full compensation. Some of the obstacles to effective 
compensation were removed by the new Directive, guaranteeing therefore better protection 
for citizens and businesses. 
Without these three main pillars – that is to say, the consolidated jurisprudence, the 
ECN cooperation and the intensified ex-post control – the optimal enforcement of restrictive 
commercial practices in Europe, mainly related to vertical agreements, would have been 
impaired. The understanding of these three enforcement pillars is fundamental to the next 
step of this Chapter that aims at identifying the current challenges of the EU policies 
applicable to vertical restraints and to formulating lessons for other jurisdictions. Among the 
current challenges, it is believed that two of them can be seen as a threat to the optimal 
enforcement of vertical restraints among the Member States. The first challenge is the new 
interpretation of the current regulation when applied to vertical restrictions in online markets. 
Because these new cases are not completely covered by the existing regulation and case law, 
enforcers and firms are encountering greater levels of legal uncertainties in this matter. The 
second challenge is related to the different procedural and institutional realities among 
Member States, which affect greater levels of enforcement. These challenges are better 
explained in the following Section.  
 
105 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, supra note 37, p. 27. 
106 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance. 
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4.5. THE CHALLENGES OF THE CURRENT EU ENFORCEMENT OF 
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS 
The contribution of this Chapter is not only to identify the evolution of EU competition 
policies oriented to vertical agreements but also to categorize the main challenges faced by 
the Commission and the EU Member States. Highlighted here are some authors who have 
discussed specific challenges of EU competition law in terms of the optimal enforcement of 
vertical restraints.  
Firstly, and more generally, Damien Gerard identifies some paradoxes which resulted 
from the modernization process, and the effects-based approach of Article 101TFEU.107 He 
identifies, for instance, a drop-in enforcement level, beyond cartels. He argues that after 
Regulation 1/2003, vertical agreements have “disappeared from the EU antitrust enforcement 
radar” and, apart from Germany and France, this anti-competitive conduct is hardly 
prosecuted at national level either. He also says that after Regulation 1/2003, enforcement 
and justification costs rose, instead of dropping. This is because parties now have to 
encounter extra costs of self-assessing their contracts under this effects-based approach to 
avoid future litigation. Gerard lastly criticizes the paradox of having, on the one hand, Article 
101 TFEU that requires the competitive analysis to be tailored to the specific case and 
markets, and on the other hand a reliance on abstract guidance found in the Block Exemption 
Regulation and Guidelines.  
Also, Roger Van den Bergh argues that the policies oriented to vertical agreements 
in Europe are characterized by a high degree of regulatory intervention and the excessive role 
of technical legal distinctions.108 The author recognized that designing an optimal legal 
system for vertical agreements is not an easy process due to their uncertain effects in the 
markets. However, he stresses that EU competition law – different from US antitrust law – 
does not allow a full efficiency economic assessment of the positive and negative outcomes 
of vertical restraints. His main criticism is that: (i) market share thresholds of the VBER are 
not always a best proxy for market power and therefore they are not good indicators for 
identifying anti-competitive practices, (ii) the guidelines on vertical restraints do not pay 
 
107 D. Gerard, ‘The effects-based approach under Article 101 TFEU and its paradoxes: modernization at war 
itself?’, J. Bourgeois & D. Waelbroeck (Eds), Ten Years of Effects-Based Approach in EU Competition Law 
Enforcement, Brussels, Bruylant, 2012. 
108 R. Van den Bergh, ‘Vertical Restraints: The European Part of the Policy Failure’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 
Vol. 61, No. 1, 2016, pp. 167-185. 
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sufficient attention to the particularities of buying power and (iii) the guidelines do not 
consider the dynamic efficiencies that might arise mainly in e-commerce transactions.109 
Miguel De la Mano and Jones, similarly, emphasise that the antitrust analysis of 
vertical restraints has not evolved towards a more “effects-based” approach, as was 
expected.110 Firstly, they argued that the economic rationale of vertical agreements is still not 
properly reflected in the current legal framework, since it continues to strongly depend on 
broad presumptions of illegality that are not necessarily sustained by economic theory or 
evidence. Secondly, they criticized the shortage of decided cases – mainly related to digital 
markets – which indicated the lack of transparency for assessing and judging the pro and 
anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements. According to the authors, these factors 
increase the uncertainty and turn out to instigate disparities in the approaches to enforcement 
emerging at the national level.111  
Paul Dobson discusses that the end of the notification system of vertical agreements 
placed a severe regulatory burden on companies, since they mainly rely on the self-
assessment of potential restrictive practices.112 Wolfgang Kerber and Simonetta Vezzoso, on 
their terms, reinforced that the general features of EU competition policy on vertical restraints 
mainly rely on neoclassical  concepts on market competition, while neglecting the relevance 
of innovation.113 The authors propose the development of an analysis based on a  dynamic or 
evolutionary framework for vertical agreements’ assessment where they use theories of 
evolutionary economics, dynamic competition and innovation economics. However, they 
acknowledged that the implementation of the rule of reason methodology in Europe looks 
deeply troublesome, since it assumes the existence of a specific knowledge and expertise that 
companies and competition authorities often do not have. In particular, the lack of staff that 
are able to conduct a full economic analysis of restrictive agreements is a problem often faced 
by national authorities with lower experience regarding the enforcement of competition law. 
 
109 Van den Bergh, 2016, p. 172-175. 
110 M. de la Mano & A. Jones, ‘Vertical Agreements Under EU Competition Law: Proposals for Pushing Article 
101 Analysis, and the Modernization Process, to a Logical Conclusion’, King's College London Law School 
Research Paper, No. 23, 2017.  
111 de la Mano & A. Jones, 2017, supra note 110, p. 26-27. 
112 P. Dobson, ‘Vertical Restraints Policy Reform in the European Union and United Kingdom’, Loughborough 
University Business School Research Series, No. 2, 2005.  
113 W. Kerber & S. Vezzoso, ‘EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation: An Analysis from 
an Evolutionary Perspective’, paper presented at 10th International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society Conference 
(ISS), Milan, 9-12 June 2004. 
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In addition to what has been discussed in the literature, this Section proposed to take 
a closer look at two important challenges for improving the European enforcement: one that 
invokes a debate of concepts and another one related to institutional matters. These identified 
challenges directly put into question the three main pillars that were discussed in Section 4.4: 
consolidated jurisprudence, networks among authorities and an intensified ex-post control.  
The first challenge refers to the controversies among the different Member States on 
the application of Regulations and soft law instruments to cases involving the digital 
economy. Briefly speaking, some examples show that national competition authorities, as in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, are taking different approaches towards vertical 
restraints. This means that the classic European case law that has been uniform and 
consolidated in the last decades, does not necessarily cover new forms of abuse of market 
power – mainly due to the new transactions coming from the digital economy. Vertical 
restraints, such as exclusive distribution, selective distribution, and resale price-fixing, are 
now intrinsic to digital platforms, e-commerce, and online marketplaces, and the current legal 
instruments in Europe do not always bring a clear answer on how to tackle the outcome of 
these practices. In other words, there are some substantive gaps relating to the interpretation 
of Article 101 TFEU.114 The objective of a careful look at these cases has a normative 
importance, since the Block Exemption Regulation is about to expire in 2022 and this is an 
opportunity to reflect upon this topic. 
The second challenge is related to different levels of enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU among the EU Member States. This is explained by a diversity of historical 
perspectives, different institutional backgrounds, different stages of implementation of 
antitrust policies and a very diverse access to information for business people and law 
enforcers. The legal diversity of national laws and procedures, and moreover, the diversity 
of institutional designs remain a challenge when it comes to the capacity of establishing 
adequate ex-post enforcement systems and to achieve consistency in the implementation of 
competition policies across the Member States.     
4.5.1. Challenge #1: Uncertainties of the Digital Economy 
The first challenge to be discussed refers to the limits of the current jurisprudence and the 
silence of the VBER and Guidelines with regard to most vertical restraints involving digital 
 
114 P.I. Colomo, The Shaping of EU Competition Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 281. 
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markets. Over the last decade, the NCAs have been essentially entrusted with the scrutiny of 
vertical agreements. In the absence of uniform guidance, the NCAs have dealt with some of 
the numerous challenges that emerged from digital markets and their decisions led to the 
adoption of heterogeneous approaches towards vertical restraints across the EU. It has been 
seen that in the EU, a number of vertical restraints have also been categorised as hard-core 
restraints, which include resale price-fixing, geo-blocking clauses, bans on online selling and 
certain selective distribution systems. However, there is still the debate whether some other 
new restraints (especially certain online practices) also fall within this category.115 The 
revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation will face some of these open questions. 
Competition authorities across the EU have received various complaints about online 
sales restrictions set by brand manufacturers. As we will see in the next paragraphs, the 
decisions by the national competition authorities so far do not make it clear whether the EU 
competition law is moving towards a more or less strict approach to restrictions on online 
sales. As the Commission has not adopted consistent infringement decisions with regard to 
the different vertical restraints in online markets, national enforcers, and businesses have to 
rely on jurisprudence which is relatively sparse (and old) for such guidance.  
There might be reasons to justify diverge decision among the different member States, 
since countries encounter different market dynamics and therefore different assessments 
might occur. However, such considerable disparities among NCAs add uncertainty to the 
already complicated debate about vertical restraints on e-commerce. In this context, the 
publication of the E-commerce Sector Inquiry116 indicated the Commission’s desire to 
provide coherence and legal certainty in order to prevent market fragmentation that might 
hinder the achievement of one of the main the goals of the EU competition law, that is, the 
internal market.117 Even though the Sector Inquiry suggested that the updated Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation (to enter into force in 2022) does not have to be adjusted with regard 
to abuses of e-commerce restrictions, an extensive research was conducted to better assess 
the agreements that result in online markets.   
This Chapter aims at illustrating, via case studies, the need for better consistency in 
applying Article 101 TFEU across the EU. It must be acknowledged that the following 
subsections present a non-exhaustive list of cases.  
 
115 de la Mano & Jones, 2017, supra note 110, p. 25. 
116 European Commission, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, 2017. 
117 M. B. S. Cardenal, ‘Vertical Restraints on E-Commerce in the Context of the Single Digital Market Initiative 
of the European Commission’, Stanford-Vienna European Union Law Working Paper, No. 23, 2017. 
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4.5.1.1. Selective Distribution in online marketplaces 
A first example emphasises the different positions among authorities with regard to 
restrictions to advertising or selling on third-party platforms can be considered. As a general 
rule, suppliers may require certain quality standards of their distributors in order to resell 
their products online, and they may impose quality standards on products intended to be sold 
offline.118 It has been a common practice among suppliers operating selective distribution 
systems to impose quality criteria on the conditions or the types of online platforms on which 
they can advertise and/or sell the suppliers’ products. Paragraph 54 of the Vertical Restraints 
Guidelines explicitly allow such restrictions:  
“[A] supplier may require that its distributors use third party platforms to 
distribute the contract products only in accordance with the standards and 
conditions agreed between the supplier and its distributors for the 
distributors’ use of the internet. For instance, where the distributor’s 
website is hosted by a third-party platform, the supplier may require that 
customers do not visit the distributor’s website through a site carrying the 
name or logo of the third-party platform.”  
This excerpt has two main messages. Firstly, that a supplier is indeed entitled to impose 
quality standards in respect of distributors that use online market-places such as Amazon or 
E-bay. Secondly, it concerns a ban on buyers’ sales via online marketplaces, for instance by 
requiring that the website on which the supplier’s products are sold must be operated by the 
buyer. By the time the guidelines were enacted, there was no consideration that, in the future, 
a consumer would not even know that he/she was on a third-party platform.119   
The Commission does not take the online marketplace ban into consideration as a 
hard-core restriction when it concerns a marketplace which is visible to the customer.120 The 
Commission has noted in its E-commerce Sector Inquiry121 that bans on sales on 
marketplaces do not constitute hard-core restrictions per se, as in principle their object is not 
to prevent, restrict, or distort competition: 
 
118 OCDE, Vertical restraints for online sales, 2013. 
119 Wijckmans & Tuytschaever, 2018, supra note 37, p. 329. 
120 Z. Georgieva, ‘Competition soft law in French and German courts: A challenge for online sales bans only?’, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2017, p. 179. 
121 European Commission, 2017, supra note 116.   
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“Such an approach is in line with the Vertical Guidelines which 
specify that market-place restrictions requiring the retailer to use third party 
platforms (e.g. marketplaces) only in accordance with the quality criteria 
agreed between the manufacturer and its retailers for the retailer's use of 
the internet are not considered a hard-core restriction. They concern the 
question of how the distributor can sell the products over the internet and 
do not have the object to restrict where or to whom distributors can sell the 
products.” 122 
 
However, the Commission has admitted that these platform bans might not always comply 
with the existing rules. For instance, they might amount to hard-core restrictions when the 
suppliers and distributors exceed the market share threshold in Article 3 VBER.123 For 
instance, the position of the German and the French NCAs in relation to restrictions 
originating from online platforms, such restrictions to sell on certain websites, have not 
always been clear. In some cases, their approaches were shown to be different even from 
those rooted in the EU competition law. 
For example, in 2013, the French Competition Authority (FCA) opened 
administrative proceedings against Adidas,124 while the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO, 
or, in German, Bundeskartellamt) opened administrative proceedings against several sports 
clothing and running shoes manufacturers, including Adidas and ASICS, on account of their 
distribution policies.125 The FCO adopted an infringement decision in August 2015, 
concluding that the conditions imposed by ASICS on its authorized retailers could lead to a 
restriction of intra-brand competition. In the ASICS case, the company was limiting the use 
of its trademark in price-comparison websites. The FCO also found that this specific 
restriction could be predominantly harmful to medium and small -sized distributors.126  
In the view of the FCO, ASICS’ distribution system contained provisions that 
qualified as restrictions of competition by object pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU. Those 
 
122 European Commission, 2017, supra note 116, paragraph 509 
123 Article 3 VBER: “1. The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall apply on condition that the market share 
held by the supplier does not exceed 30 % of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or services 
and the market share held by the buyer does not exceed 30 % of the relevant market on which it purchases the 
contract goods or services.” 
124 Judgment of 2 February 2016 in case no 15/01542, the Paris Court of Appeal. 
125 Decision of the German FCO, ASICS no B2-98/11, 26 August 2015. Decision of the German Competiton 
Authority, Adidas, no B3-137/12, June 2014.  
126 See Cardenal, supra note 117, for a full assessment of this case. 
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provisions were non-exemptible under Article 2 VBER, as they were deemed hard-core 
restrictions within the meaning of Article 4(c) VBER.127 Likewise, in the Adidas case, the 
FCA confirmed the Pierre Fabre128 doctrine and concluded that manufacturers can organize 
their distribution networks freely, as long as they do not unjustifiably restrain competition.  
In contrast with what has been decided by German and French enforcers, by the end 
of 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided that no antitrust violation has been 
verified in a selective distribution case against the luxury cosmetics company Coty Germany 
GmbH (“Coty”). This case started with a complaint from the distributor Parfümerie Akzente 
GmbH, a authorized distributor, who was banned from selling Coty’s products in online 
platforms such as Amazon or E-bay.129 The ECJ, based on Article 101 (1) TFEU, assessed 
whether there were indeed any restrictions to competition imposed by Coty and moreover, 
whether Metro-criteria applied to selective distribution systems were verified.130 In practice, 
commercial restrictions initiated by companies with less than 30% of market shares are 
exempted by Article 3 of the VBER. In this case, the Court clarified that marketplace bans 
such as the ones observed in the Coty case do not constitute hard-core restrictions under 
Article 4(b) or 4(c) VBER.131 
4.5.1.2. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses and price parity arrangements 
The MFN clauses that appear in vertical agreements between suppliers and distributors 
generally consist of an offer by the supplier of a price or rate to a client no higher than the 
lowest offered to other clients. For instance, in the hotel online booking sector, an MFN 
clause obligates the hotels to always give to the platform the best price for hotel online 
bookings, among other most favoured conditions. Indeed, because of the nature of these 
clauses, and because parity clauses are not addressed in the current Vertical Guidelines, the 
 
127 Article 4 (c) VBER “The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements which, 
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hotel online booking sector has attracted significant interest throughout the EU competition 
enforcers.  
In 2012, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)132 opened a formal investigation against 
the online travel agents Booking.com, Expedia, and InterContinental Hotels Group (or 
simply IHG). The case examined whether certain arrangements between hotels and online 
travel agents infringed British Law and Article 101TFEU. The OFT sustained that 
Booking.com and Expedia had “each entered into separate agreements with IHG that 
restricted the OTAs’ ability to discount the headline rate at which room-only hotel 
accommodation bookings were offered to consumers”.133 The OFT also held these 
commercial restrictions constituted a form of RPM that could limit price competition and 
also increase entry barriers and prevent the growth of established online agencies. 
The British authority, in early 2014, accepted formal commitments from IHG, 
Booking.com, and Expedia. The parties agreed, among other things, to allow OTAs to offer 
discounts of room rates, but these discounts could be exclusively offered to certain groups of 
consumers that were members of the OTA in question and who had previously booked a 
room on that platform. Irrespective of the removal of all the discounting restrictions, the OFT 
recognized that enabling hotels to have certain control over the headline rate for their rooms 
generated efficiencies. In September 2014, the British Competition Appeal Tribunal upheld 
the appeal presented by Skyscanner, a price comparison website, against the OFT’s decision 
of January 2014. Skyscanner claimed that the OFT had failed to assess the impact of the 
decision on inter-brand competition, and the company questioned the accepted 
commitments.134 The Tribunal sent the case back to CMA (OFT’s successor), in order to 
reconsider the matter. In the light of the new judgment, in September 2015, the CMA closed 
its investigations alleging “administrative priority grounds”. The OFT’s approach in this 
online booking case – meaning the acceptance of certain types of narrow MFN clauses –, 
was in line with the approach developed by the French, Swedish, and Italian NCAs. However, 
this approach was quite different from the one taken by the FCO in Germany, who had 
adopted a stricter position towards the topic.  
In 2012, the FCO initiated an action against Hotel Reservation Service (HRS), a hotel 
online booking platform, alleging that HRS’s MFN clauses restricted competition between 
 
132 In April 2014, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) was established and combined many of the 
functions of the OFT and the Competition Commission in the UK.   
133  OFT Case CE/9320/10. 
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hotel online booking platforms and foreclosed the market.135 In December 2013, the FCO 
prohibited HRS from enforcing MFN clauses and ordered the company to delete them from 
its contracts with hotel partners, since such clauses remove the hotel portals’ incentives to 
offer lower prices on other OTAs.136 Moreover, the FCO argued that the market entry 
conditions of new hotel online booking platforms or the expansion of the number of smaller 
competitors were considerably more difficult since MFN provisions prohibit hotels from 
providing reduced prices for their accommodation.  
The FCO decided that not only should booking’s MFN clause be removed from its 
website by January 31, 2016, but also that such a clause could not be replaced by a “narrow 
MFN” clause, since limiting the scope of the MFN clause was “insufficient to allay 
competition concerns”.137 In January 2015, the FCO’s decision against HRS was upheld on 
appeal by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court that reached a decision on June 2019. 
Different from the FCO, the German Court found that “narrow MFN clauses” are compatible 
with competition law, since they are proportional commercial practices to guarantee a fair 
service exchange between the hotels and the online platforms.138 
In short, it seems like there is a unanimous acceptance that wide MFN clauses are 
hard-core restrictions of competition pursuant to the VBER and, therefore, they fall under 
the prohibition set by Article 101 (1) TFEU. However, over the last years, there was no 
consensus with regard to narrow MFN clauses. There is also a lack of economic literature 
that tries to assess and/or estimate the effects of such clauses.139 Some authors have 
emphasized that MFN clauses generates serious anticompetitive effects simply because it 
makes low-price entry less likely, because parties (in this case hotels) that have engaged in 
contracts with such price parity clauses would not allow this lower-price setting.140 
 
135 See Cardenal, supra note 117, for a full assessment of this case. 
136 Bundeskartellamt Case B 9 - 66/10. 
137 The Bundeskartellamt's prohibition decision was adopted in December 2015 and took effect in February 
2016. 
138 Information found on free english translation of the Press Release, see <http://www.olg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20190604_PM_booking/index.php>, [26-07-2019]. Since 
the decision of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court is not yet available, it is not possible to see whether the 
approach taken by the German court was different from the ones taken by the FCO, or even by the other 
countries that reached similar outcomes.      
139 An example of recent literature is A. Boik & K. Corts, ‘The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation 
Clauses on Competition and Entry’, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 59, No.1, 2016, pp.105-134.  
140 See, for instance, N. Sahuguet, J. Steenbergen, T. Verge & A. Walckiers, ‘Vertical Restraints: Towards 
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The E-commerce Sector Inquiry indicates the position of the Commission: parity 
clauses, both narrow and wide ones are not hard-core restrictions and therefore are block 
exempted.  
“In the absence of a hard-core restriction under Article 4 of the VBER, 
parity clauses in vertical agreements are covered by the VBER if the 
parties' market shares do not exceed 30 %. Should market shares exceed 30 
% an individual assessment of parity clauses will be required.”141 
These perceived differences in the interpretation and application of the EU law across 
jurisdictions create challenges for business and may even prevent firms from expanding 
within the internal market. Since the economic literature regarding the effects of MFNs is 
also very limited, it is also very difficult to authorities relying on a specific criterion for the 
assessment of these clauses. The result is a shortage of guidance on how assessment is to be 
conducted in relation to the new vertical models of distribution and practices that have been 
emerging online, such as agency arrangements, online RPM, parity clauses, restrictions on 
inclusion in price comparison tools and marketplace restrictions.  
4.5.2. Challenge #2: Different Procedural and Institutional Realities among 
the EU Member States 
The second identified challenge is related to different levels of enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU, more specifically anti-competitive vertical agreements, among the EU Member 
States. It  is expected that  different Member States (i.e., different NCAs, courts, tribunals) 
will  vary  in  the  speed,  competence,  and  effectiveness of  the  manner  in  which  they  
apply  competition law, since regimes respond to differing sets of pressures.142 This Section 
argues, therefore, that for different reasons, not all the authorities developed adequate 
enforcement procedures over the time to guarantee ex-post control of vertical agreements. It 
pretends to present some aspects – without being exhaustive – of this institutional discussion 
that jeopardize the optimal antitrust enforcement of vertical restraints in Europe.  
Before entering into the institutional discussion, it would be best to highlight that 
comparing enforcement activities of vertical agreements among the Member States is a very 
difficult task. Several Commission’s publications and statistics show only the general number 
 
141 European Commission, 2017, supra note 116, paragraph 621. 
142 Wilks, 2005, supra note 70, p. 441. 
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of cases held by NCAs or by the Commission over time. They also show information about 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, but again without a clear definition of which cases refer 
to cartels, or which cases refer to vertical restraints or other anti-competitive agreements. 
Figure 4.1 shows some of the information available at the Commission’s website. It shows 
precisely that, since the 2004 Reform, the NCAs have decided on average 47 cases under 
Article 101 TFEU.  
Figure 4.1 – Cases in which an envisaged decision under Article 101 TFEU has been 
submitted by NCAs (2005-2018) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. Data from European Commission Statistics.  
In addition to this information, the Commission also published the number of cases held by 
the different countries, when applying Article 101 and 102 TFEU (Figure 4.2). It is worth 
highlighting that since Regulation 1/2003 entered into force, the countries that carried out the 
highest number of investigations and/or envisaged decisions, are the countries with long-
standing traditions in competition law – such as France, Germany and Italy. Actually, the 
three countries together represent 32% of all new investigations and almost 40% of all 
envisaged decisions. Even though this information is not exclusively related to the 
enforcement of vertical restraints, it is possible to expect that this proportion also applies for 
the verticals. Even though there are a number of factors that affect the volume of cases and 
enforcement decisions, such as the budget of each country, or the time invested in complex 
cases, Figure 4.2 demonstrates that there is still room for more effective enforcement in some 
of the Member States.  
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Figure 4.2 – New antitrust cases and envisaged decisions under Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
by country143 (May 2004 to Dec/2018) 
Source: Compiled by the author. Data from European Commission Statistics.  
Indeed, in order to find more detailed information specifically about the level of enforcement 
of vertical agreements among the different Member States, an extensive analysis of the 
Annual Reports from 2004 until 2018 from all NCAs was carried out.144 The main purpose 
of this analysis was identifying the amount of cases in which vertical agreements were 
assessed by each authority, mostly at the administrative level.  From this analysis, there are 
some findings: 
• The Annual Reports indicate that, in the past 5 years, some NCAs have also launched 
their own guidelines, notices and studies to support the assessment of vertical 
agreements. For instance, in 2014, the Federal Competition Authority in Austria 
(AFCA) produced an official opinion regarding resale price-fixing called “Standpoint 
on Resale Price Maintenance”, that also orientates society regarding the possible 
scenarios in which these price restrictions can negatively affect competition. In 2016, 
 
143 Investigations of which the European Competition Network has been informed. 
144 The analysis of Annual Reports was limited to the countries that indeed publish their Annual Report online, 
and that had information in English, Portuguese, French, Italian or Spanish. The Annual Reports of all NCAs 
are available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/annual_reports.html> [02/03/2019].  
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with the same purpose, the British Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) issued 
the study “Vertical restraints: new evidence from a business survey”. Also in 2016, 
the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) in the Netherlands, published the 
document “ACM’s strategy and enforcement priorities with regard to vertical 
agreements”. Although the Dutch authority did not actively enforce too many cases 
of vertical agreements in the past years, the ACM recognizes the need for a careful 
look at these practices. In 2017, the Germany authority (Bundeskartellamt) launched 
a note on resale price-fixing in the food sector, called “Guidance note on the 
prohibition of vertical price-fixing in the brick-and-mortar food retail sector”. 
• Several countries hardly ever explicitly discuss the enforcement of vertical restraints 
in their Annual Reports, including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland and 
Netherlands.145 It means that they do not indicate any case in which the authority 
started an investigation or reported a decision. 
• Other countries have very incomplete and not systematic information about their 
enforcement of vertical agreements. For example, in their Annual Reports, Austria 
and Germany discuss the same investigation over different years (e.g. the resale price-
fixing in the food market in Germany or Austria),146 and France reports in its Annual 
Reports only few high-profile cases.147 These facts gives the reader the impression 
that only a few cases are being assessed by the authority, which may not be the reality. 
• Very few countries present in their Annual Reports complete information of all 
vertical cases including the ones subjected to judicial review (e.g. Poland). 
The fact that there is incomplete and unparalleled information among the Annual Report of 
the national authorities, also makes it difficult to create a fair picture of the level of 
enforcement regarding vertical agreements and the problems associated to it. If we do not 
know where the problem is in the first place, it becomes harder to suggest policy that 
 
145 Even though the Dutch Authority (ACM) did not present any information regarding specific cases of vertical 
agreements, in the 2016 Annual Report, the Authority indicated that the topic will be more carefully analysed 
considering the new cases that have been popping up in the EU level.  
146 The 2015 Annual Report from the Bundeskartellamt indicated fines of 50, 8 million euros. According to the 
2017 and 2016 Annual Reports, the Bundeskartellamt imposed fines amounting to 260.5 million euros on 27 
companies for having engaged in price-fixing agreements between retailers and manufacturers in the food 
sector. 
147 For instance, while the French Annual Reports of 2017 and 2018 do not indicate any enforcement regarding 
vertical agreements, information provided by the legal platform “Getting the Deal Through: Vertical 
Agreements”, indicated that in the same period, the French Authority ruled 9 decisions which relate to vertical 
agreements. For more information, access:https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/41/vertical-agreements 
[20/04/2019]   
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guarantees better levels of enforcement. Despite these methodological limitations, Table 4.1 
summarizes the findings. Because of the incomparable type of information provided among 
the different EU Member States, Table 4.1 simply indicates with the sign “X” when new 
cases and/or new decisions related to the enforcement of vertical agreements were mentioned 
in the documents, and with the sign “-” when no enforcement activity oriented to vertical 
agreements was mentioned in the same documents.148  
Table 4.1 – Enforcement of vertical agreements across the EU Member States, according to 
NCAs’ Annual Reports (2004-2018)  
 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Austria - X - - - - X - X X - - X -  
Belgium            - - - - 
Bulgaria        - X X - -    
Croatia                
Cyprus - - - - - X - - - - - -    
Czech Republic - - X X X X - - - X X X X X  
Denmark - - -             
Estonia      - - - - - - - - -  
Finland        -     - -  
France - X X - - - - - X - - - - -  
Germany          X X X X X  
Greece - X X - X X X - - X - - X X  
Hungary - X X - X X X - - X - - X X  
Ireland - - - - - - - X X - - - - -  
Italy - X - X - X X - X - X X -   
Latvia               - 
Lithuania X X X X - - X X - - X - - - - 
Luxemburg                
Malta                
Netherlands          - - - - -  
Poland        X X X X X X X  
Portugal X - X - X - - - X X - X X X  
Romania X - - X X X X X X       
Slovakia - - - - - X X X - - X - X X  
Slovenia                
Spain                
 
148 In addition, the grey cells were indicated when there was no published Annual Report in that year. It is 
important to reinforce that  the sign “-” does not necessarily mean that there was no case within each national 
law, but that the agency did not indicate it in its Annual Report.  
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 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Sweden          - - X X   
UK          - - - X X - 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
In this context, an important point to be made in this subsection is that the different level of 
enforcement might be explained by historical perspectives, and different experiences related 
to market economies and therefore also to competition law. By the time Regulation 1/2003 
entered into force, some EU Member States (mainly the ones from Central and Eastern 
European countries) had just left the socialist regime and were having to establish a market 
economy with trade liberalization and privatisation within a short period of time.  
There are indeed several differences that distinguish the CEE NCAs from the Western 
NCAs. Actually, the CEE NCAs have been created in a very distinct institutional set-up 
compared to the Western Europe NCAs. As a result of the Soviet influence and the ideology 
of state planning and intervention, Central and Eastern Europe's economies presented a high 
degree of market concentration, low technological development and only marginal growth 
of consumer markets.149 Moreover, the state bureaucracy had limited knowledge of the 
functioning of the market economy and favoured direct control and regulation of economic 
activities. 
As a result, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet system and the creation of a 
market system in those countries, the CEE NCAs had a huge task to support and enhance the 
emerging competition regimes. The NCAs had to cope with the reality that they needed to 
shape markets following the rules of free enterprise, market competition and efficiency. In 
this scenario, the NCAs played a significant advocacy role across all government ministries 
to guarantee that government regulation and decision-making would not fragilize the 
dynamics of the market economy.150 This historic perspective gives us some grounds to think 
about the reasons why some of the NCAs might not take the enforcement of vertical restraints 
as a priority, and it also puts into question whether government agencies and courts, at the 
national level, may not have the ability to judge and make decisions about complex market 
situations. 
With the 2004 Reform of competition policies in Europe, some Member States faced 
the implementation of  completely new competition laws and also the creation of a 
 
149 Riley, 2003b, supra note 74, p. 661. 
150 Riley, 2003b, supra note 74, p. 661. 
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competition culture. Other Member States had to completely modify the legislations to the 
new EU reality. With the Regulation 1/2003 in place, not only was the change in legislation 
a reality among the EU Member States, but also the direct involvement of national courts or 
tribunals in the application of Article 101 TFEU. In this new context, judges (and not expert 
officials) ended up being the ones to solve antitrust issues. One of the ECN Reports of 10 
years of Regulation 1/2003 demonstrated that less than 10 Member States had a specialised 
judiciary that handled competition cases, among them Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland Spain, and the UK.151 Most of these selected countries turn out to be the ones 
with long standing traditions in antitrust cases and the ones with the greater levels of antitrust 
enforcement (see Table 4.2). This means that the other 21 Member States still counted on 
civil courts that might have no knowledge whatsoever to deal with complex competition 
cases, such as vertical restraints that require a specific expertise to assess and balance the 
efficiencies and the potential anti-competitive effects of business practices.  
Taking these different historical perspectives into consideration, another point of 
controversy that also contributes to the different levels of enforcement (of vertical restraints) 
in Europe was the lack of guidance from the Commission’s side on how to enforce anti-
competitive practices. As briefly described above, in the context of the modernization of 
antitrust policies, Regulation 1/2003 set legal obligations on the Member States to enforce 
Article 101 TFEU (Article 3).152 Over the years, the Commission has not clarified the 
institutional elements to be observed by the Member States other than the obligations to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU uniformly.  
The Commission’s report of 10 years of implementation of Regulation 1/2003153 
acknowledges that the EU law tended to leave to Member States a large degree of flexibility 
(“procedure autonomy”)154 in the design of their competition enforcement regimes.155 
Therefore, even though the same rules are applied to all NCAs, their institutional set-ups vary 
significantly. The Commission also reported that the divergences among the Member States' 
enforcement systems refer to important aspects to guarantee ex-post control via public 
 
151 European Competition Network, Results of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States (MS) national 
competition laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003, 2013. 
152 K. Cseres, ‘The impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the new member states’, Competition Law Review, Vol. 6, 
No. 2, 2010b, pp. 145-182. 
153 European Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, 2014. 
154 Expression used by D. Geradin, A. Layne-Farrar & N. Petit, EU competition law and economics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 327. 
155 See also W. Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’, Journal of European Competition 
Law and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2013, pp. 293–301. 
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enforcement. Among these aspects, it highlighted the ability of NCAs to set adequate 
sanctions, including criminal ones, to impose structural remedies, and to set enforcement 
priorities.156 Given these different procedural and institutional realities, this section raises the 
question whether this decentralized enforcement system, where national authorities operate 
under different procedural rules, could endanger the effective enforcement of EU public and 
private law.157  
Moreover, Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003158 generally foresees that Member States 
should appoint the competition agencies responsible for applying EU competition rules in 
such a manner as to comply with the provisions of the Regulation.159 Since this Article was 
obviously intended to ensure the efficient implementation of EU competition rules in each 
Member State, it again refrained from imposing any specific requirements concerning the 
institutional setup of the NCAs. Souza Ferro, for instance, explains that this principle of 
effectiveness brought by Article 35 did not facilitate the exercise of the rights granted by 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as the fundamental rights associated with their 
enforcement. The author describes that, in some cases, national authorities might be 
influenced by lobbying groups, and/or other political or economic pressure groups, and this 
situation could frustrate the full efficient application of the EU law.160 For instance, Brook 
and Cseres demonstrated that the decentralized enforcement system provided room for the 
national authorities to promote their own specific domestic interests.161 This is not necessarily 
a problem, but it might justify the focus of certain competition authorities on high-profile 
cartel cases, rather than on complex vertical agreements cases.  
 
156 K. Cseres, ‘Multi-Jurisdictional Competition Law Enforcement: The Interface between European 
Competition Law and the Competition Laws of the New Member States’, European Competition Journal, Vol. 
3, No. 2, 2007, p. 466.  
157 Although this Chapter does not focus on the challenges of private enforcement of EU competition law, this 
analysis cannot be forgotten. See for instance, C. Cauffman & N.J. Philipsen, ‘Who does what in competition 
law: harmonizing the rules on damages for infringements of the EU competition rules’, in B. Akkermans, J. 
Hage, N. Kornet & J Smits (Eds), Who does what in European private law?, Ius Commune Europaeum No. 
137, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, pp. 245-287.  
158 Art 35(1) of Regulation 1/2003: “The Member States shall designate the competition authority or authorities 
responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions of this 
regulation are effectively complied with”. 
159 European Commission, 2017, supra note 153, paragraph 9. 
160 M. S. Ferro, ‘Institutional design of National Competition Authorities: EU Requirements’, Competition Law 
Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, p. 120.  
161 O. Brook & K. Cseres, ‘Member States’ Interest in the Enforcement of EU Competition Law: A Case Study 
of Article 101 TFEU’, in M. Varju (Ed), Between Compliance and Particularism: Member State Interests and 
European Union Law, Cham, Springer Publishing, 2019.  
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Indeed, political factors can justify inconsistent decisions on vertical restraints among 
the Member States, or even the enacting of national law that somehow circumvents Article 
101 TFEU. For instance, Van den Bergh discusses that in certain industries, the pressure of 
lobbying groups influenced national legislation to make resale price-fixing a legal practice, 
even though it is not clear whether these practices enhance economic welfare. In this case, 
the author explains that when prices of certain industries are regulated by law, Article 101 
TFEU is no longer applied.162 An important example of that is the market for books. Several 
countries around the world have adopted legislation fixing the retail prices for book, even 
though the economic theory and even empirical evidences fail to provide welfare-oriented 
justification for such practices.163 
If we go back to the argument that several NCAs have encountered difficulties in 
establishing a proper institutional background to tackle vertical restraints, one can say that 
this point is reinforced by the recent efforts of the Commission to publish new Directives in 
the topic. The ex-post policy evaluation of Regulation 1/2003 indeed recognised several ways 
in which the NCAs can enhance a more effective enforcement. Having a closer look to the 
policy tools and actions that directly affect the enforcement of vertical restraints, the 
Commission highlights (i) the general lack of instruments to enforce competition law; (ii) the 
lack of powers to effectively set fines; and (iii) the lack of safeguards which guarantee the 
independence of national authorities with regard to the enforcement of EU competition 
rules.164  
The Commission recently took an important step by publishing the Directive (EU) 
2019/1 “to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market”.165 In more detail, the 
Directive aims at ensuring a minimum common toolkit to foster effective enforcement 
powers for the authorities, such as the rights: (i) to act independently when enforcing EU 
competition law, without being influenced by public or private entities (Article 4); (ii) to have 
sufficient necessary financial resources and staff to be able to lead the substantive cases 
 
162 Van den Bergh, 2016, supra note 108. 
163 Van den Bergh, 2016, supra note 108, p. 183. 
164 These items are further described in: European Commission, Impact assessment on enhancing competition 
in the EU for the benefit of businesses and consumers – Reinforcement of the application of EU competition 
law by national competition authorities, 2017. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/im qpact 
_assessment_summary_en.pdf [30/01/2019]. 
165 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market. 
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(Article 5); (iii) to have power to collect evidence, even in complex cases (Article 6); (iv) to 
impose adequate sanctions to deter anti-competitive practices in accordance with EU 
competition policies and (e) to have adequate leniency programmes, that discourage 
undertakings from engaging in illegal cartels (Article 20).166 Although not all these 
enforcement powers are directly related to the enforcement of vertical restraints, they confirm 
the relevance of the institutional challenge that has been faced by the Commission. 
4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Chapter analysed the evolution of EU competition law in relation to vertical restraints, 
as well as its current challenges. Historically, Regulation 1/2003 replaced the centralized ex-
ante notification system of vertical agreements with a decentralized ex-post control of these 
business practices. The Chapter shows some alternative literature that suggests that behind 
the “decentralization”, the Commission has not lost its central position in the development 
and implementation of European competition policies, since it kept (and even expanded) 
most of its investigatory and law-making powers.  
Despite the political economy discussions and the suggested alternative readings, this 
piece of work shows that there are still very important lessons to be drawn from the European 
experience and the 2004 Reform. These lessons are mainly related to the instruments that are 
still used by the NCAs to guarantee the enforcement of vertical restraints, in the ex-post 
control scenario. Among the sections three of these instruments, called “pillars” were picked 
out: (i) the existence of a consolidated antitrust jurisprudence, a VBER and guidelines to 
support firms and law enforcers in self-assessing the economic effects of vertical agreements; 
(ii) the creation of a network among authorities that permitted some coordination, the sharing 
of experiences and a more effective allocation of competences among the NCAs and the 
Commission; and (iii) the intensification of ex-post control instruments.  
The Chapter also recognized that over the years, even with the presence of the three 
enforcement pillars, there are still open questions to be considered when thinking about 
optimal enforcement of vertical restraints in the EU context. Therefore, two challenges were 
identified. The first challenge refers to the controversies about the application of Regulations 
and soft law instruments to cases involving the digital economy. The two chosen case 
 
166 For further analysis of the Directive 2019/1, see M. S. Ferro, Institutional Design of National Competition 
Authorities: EU Requirements, The Competition Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 109-137.  
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analyses (selective distribution and price parity arrangements), illustrate that the authorities 
of countries such as in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are facing important 
controversies and are presenting different interpretations of Article 101 TFEU and of the 
content of the VBER. The new realities of a more globalized, technology- driven and 
digitalized competitive environment may suggest the need for a clearer framework for 
assessing and balancing the anti- and pro-competitive effects of such restrictive practices. 
The second challenge is related to the different levels of enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU among the Members States. This Chapter argued that not all the national authorities 
developed adequate enforcement procedures over time. The analysis suggests that the 
institutional disparities remain a challenge to be overcome by the Commission in the coming 
years.  
From what has been discussed, one can note that the challenges faced by several EU 
countries – even with the support of the Commission - are also faced by several developing 
countries around the world. The difficulties of establishing a proper competition authority, 
with sufficient resources to enforce all antitrust topics (including the complex cases of 
vertical restraints), with specialized courts, among other items, are not a problem encountered 
only in the European reality. For this reason, the understanding of the EU experience and its 
challenges are valuable for this comparative PhD research.  
This Chapter started by indicating that both Brazil and Europe passed through a 
similar change in policy applicable to vertical restraints: from an ex-ante notification system 
of agreements to an ex-post control of restrictive practices, although with some crucial 
differences. In the EU the change from an ex-ante notification system to an ex-post 
monitoring regime happened after forty years of notification system of agreements, and it 
was accompanied by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines to help 
business people self-assessing the potential anti-competitive effects of their contracts. In 
Brazil, Resolution No. 17/2016 excluded vertical agreements from the notification system, 
leaving the enforcement of vertical restraints in Brazil solely dependent on ex-post control. 
It means that, unlike in Europe, the Brazilian authority did not publish any guidelines to better 
inform companies and/or took specific measures to strengthening the ex-post control.  
 Considering the relevance of the institutional set-up to policy making and 
enforcement, the next step of this research is to identify the enforcement costs for each legal 
system. The comparative analysis of information, incentive and administrative costs will 
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allow a deeper understanding about the design and policy implication among countries which 
















5. ENFORCEMENT COSTS OF VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY OPTIONS FOR VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS   
This chapter aims to provide a normative analysis of antitrust policies applicable to vertical 
agreements. For this analysis, the antitrust enforcement cost framework and a comparative 
approach to the experiences from Brazil and the European Union (EU) are considered. 
Previous Chapters showed that the regulation of vertical agreements can be a challenging 
exercise to antitrust agencies around the world since such agreements have mixed 
consequences in the marketplace. It also investigated the legal framework and context of the 
Brazilian and the European experiences in trying to regulate these commercial practices. 
Even though both experiences favoured the ex-post control of vertical restraints over the ex-
ante notification system – the EU through Council Regulation 1/2003, and Brazil via CADE’s 
Resolution 17/2016 – some differences were identified, which will be elaborated upon in the 
next sections.  
When discussing the international trends in antitrust policies concerning vertical 
agreements, regulators have several policy options to choose from. Regulators can choose 
among a notification system for vertical agreements, pure ex-post enforcement of restrictive 
practices or mixed policies, for instance, legal exemption regimes. In their decisions, 
regulators should take into consideration several aspects, such as the costs of enforcement 
under each policy option, the existing capabilities and resources, as well as the institutional 
aspects of the country. For example, jurisdictions with limited experience of enforcing 
competition law and with less qualified staff (in respect to assessing restrictive agreements) 
146 
 
might opt to choose (or to begin with) a notification system of agreements and prohibiting a 
narrow range of vertical restraints.1  
Regulators should also carefully assess the behaviour of firms under different 
enforcement regimes. Companies, on the one hand, have better legal certainty when they 
notify their agreements and receive the ‘green flag’ from the authority. On the other hand, 
they might engage in more anti-competitive agreements in the ex-post enforcement system 
if the chances of being caught by the law enforcers and the fines are too low.  
In contrast with other antitrust illegal practices that are more easily characterized, 
such as cartels, an adequate antitrust assessment of vertical agreements requires deep 
knowledge of specialized economic concepts that might not be well established among 
businessmen, or even lawyers, judges, or other public officials. Experience and knowledge 
of how to handle complex antitrust cases (especially on the side of antitrust authorities) tend 
to be crucial pillars to be considered when the regulator is making a decision about the 
adequate policy to enforce the anti-competitive vertical agreements. Within this framework, 
the following research question is proposed: Does a change in antitrust policies from ex-ante 
to ex-post control of vertical agreements always enhance the efficiency of the enforcement 
of competition law? What are the direct and indirect enforcement costs in a notification 
system of vertical agreements and in an ex-post monitoring system? Which elements affect 
those different costs? What are the lessons to be learned from the Brazilian and the European 
experiences in regulating vertical agreements? 
In the attempt to find an answer to the proposed research questions and to expand on 
the existing literature, this Chapter is organized into nine Sections, including this introduction 
and the concluding remarks. Section 5.2 presents a relevant literature review. Section 5.3 
introduces a general theoretical background about the economic analysis of antitrust 
enforcement systems. The main goal is to prepare the reader for the proposed normative 
analysis. In sequence, the Chapter looks at three main types of costs faced by the antitrust 
agency when enforcing vertical agreements. Section 5.4 focuses on the information costs 
involved in the assessment of vertical agreements. As information costs, we consider the 
costs of gathering relevant information for an antitrust assessment and the costs of assessing 
the complex effects of vertical agreements. Section 5.5 describes incentive costs, which are 
costs related to the legal uncertainty of parties in a given framework. These costs are 
 
1 Kovacic develops similar argumentation in a more general context, not applied to vertical agreements. See W. 
Kovacic, ‘Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The case of 
Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement’, Chicago Kent Law Review, Vol. 77, 2001, pp. 265-306. 
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measured by analysing the level of fines of different jurisdictions, the probability of error, 
the role of private enforcement, and the general trust in institutions. Section 5.6 describes the 
administrative costs of enforcement practices. To illustrate the cost analysis, comparative 
elements from Brazil and the EU that have been previously discussed in this PhD thesis are 
presented. Following the cost analysis, Section 5.7 presents a normative discussion of 
efficient policies of vertical agreements taking into consideration different enforcement costs 
scenarios. Finally, Section 5.8 presents policy prepositions for Europe and Brazil and the last 
section indicates concluding remarks. 
5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior attention has been given in the literature about the economic analysis of competition 
policies applicable to restrictive agreements, mainly in the European context, when 
Regulation 1/2003 was being formulated.2  
Verena Hahn, for instance, by using a game theory framework, discusses the choice 
between notification of agreements or ex-post control which relies on the “pre-commitment” 
of the competition authority to an enforcement probability.3 In other words, the author claims 
that if companies cannot know for sure the probability of detection when deciding to engage 
in anti-competitive agreements (e.g. when the authority faces considerable discretion in its 
decisions), the notification system is preferred; however, when the pre-commitment is 
possible (e.g. when the authority announces an enforcement probability), then the ex-post 
control is preferred, since companies will tend not to sign agreements with restrictive clauses. 
Damien Neven emphasizes that the notification system and the ex-post monitoring 
are not necessarily substitutes. He argues that if an agency (in his paper, the Commission) 
decides upon ending a notification system of agreements and leaving the ex-post monitoring 
system unchanged, this change in policy may encourage the implementation of unlawful 
agreements.4  According to the author, when the ex-ante system is removed, it is expected 
 
2 Regulation 1/2003 entered into force in 2004, and subsitutes the old centralized ex-ante authorization system 
of agreements (including vertical ones) to a decentralized ex-post control. For more details, see Section 4.3 of 
Chapter 4. 
3 V. Hahn, ‘Antitrust Enforcement: Abuse Control or Notification?’, European Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, 2000, pp. 69-91. 
4 D. Neven, ‘Removing the Notification of Agreements: Some consequences of ex-post monitoring’, in A. 
Bogdandy, P. Mavroidis & Y. Meny (Eds), European Integration and International Cooperation: Studies in 
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that the ex-post system is “re-calibrated and strengthened”,5  by for instance, having a better 
screening of investigated cases, increasing the probability of enforcement of restrictive 
agreements, and re-evaluating the amount of fines.  
In a similar way, Pedro Pita Barros proposes a model that looks at how firms react in 
the context of ex-ante notification and ex-post monitoring of agreements.6 He shows that 
even in the case of an overall decrease of enforcement of restrictive agreements, two possible 
effects could be observed. On the one hand, in the absence of ex-ante notification, firms may 
start engaging in more anti-competitive agreements, since they will hardly ever be 
prosecuted. On the other hand, firms may also engage in less restrictive agreements, since 
they may be less likely to take risks. This is also the case because the costs of being 
prosecuted and fined under an ex-post monitoring regime tend to be more expressive than 
the costs related to the disapproval of the authority in the scope of a notification system.  
Barros concludes that, in Europe, this last effect was more likely to be observed. 
According to the author, agreements that are restrictive to start with (such as cartels, that 
probably would not be notified in the first place) may get worse in the ex-post monitoring, 
whereas agreements that have mixed consequences may become even less restrictive. This 
happens because of the different adjustment costs (of contracts) that business people 
experience in the scope of ex-post system. To reach these conclusions, the author considers 
that the EU enforcement capabilities are evenly spread among the different Member States, 
which may not always be the case. 
Finally, Frédéric Loss et al. investigate the optimal antitrust policy for restrictive 
agreements based on the competition authority’s accuracy of judgment.7 The authors look 
not only to the ex-ante versus ex-post efficiency trade-off, but also to mixed policies such as 
block exemptions regimes and black-lists. They conclude that the policy change from a 
notification system to an ex-post control regime is relevant only if the quality of judgement 
of the competition authority is sufficiently high. This happens because, according to the 
authors, when the accuracy and quality of the assessment is high enough, it is possible to 
deter anti-competitive agreements by simply applying adequate fines in the ex-post regime. 
 
International Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2002. 
5 Neven, 2002, p. 351. 
6 P. Barros, ‘Looking behind the curtain: effects from modernization of European Union Competition Policy’, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 47, No.4, 2003, pp. 613-624. 
7 F. Loss, E. Malavolti-Grimal, T. Verge & F. Berges-Sennou, ‘European Competition Policy Modernization: 
From Notifications to Legal Exception’, European Economic Review, Vol. 52, No.1, 2008, pp. 77-98.  
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However, if the quality of antitrust assessments of restrictive agreements is low, the 
notification system can thus be more effective than a legal exception or ex-post regime in 
preventing anti-competitive agreements from being signed. The authors conclude that ex-
ante notification systems are the optimal policy when there is a high probability of errors, for 
instance, in the case of young competition authorities that have less experience in applying 
adequate antitrust assessments.  According to them, an authority should only move away 
from a notification system and impose an ex-post control when the decisions reach more 
accurate levels.  The paper from these authors is the one that most closely relates to the 
analysis of this Chapter. 
This existing literature, however, has some limitations. Firstly, the contributions 
mainly refer to the context of modernization of the European Competition rules, not 
expanding the analysis to other jurisdictions. Secondly, restrictive agreements are considered 
as the unique anti-competitive problem, without paying too much attention to the differences 
among vertical agreements, cartels, and so on.  Thirdly, none of the authors systematically 
identified the different costs related to the enforcement of restrictive agreements which 
directly affect the policy options. It is also important to point out that the above-discussed 
theoretical contributions have not been updated to cope with the fundamental changes in the 
dynamics of contemporary markets. Therefore, the goal of this Chapter is to re-introduce the 
discussion about the enforcement of vertical agreements from a comparative perspective in 
order to see what can be learned from it. 
5.3. MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Shavell’s contribution on law enforcement describes three main dimensions that help 
characterizing the enforcement of the law.8 Firstly, there is the “timing of legal intervention”, 
which can happen either before (preventive-based measure) or after (act-based or harm-
based) the act happens. In more detail, the ex-ante/ex-post parameters mainly depend on the 
combination of some variables, such as the design of the sanctions together with the 
probability of its application, the ability of law enforcers (also in terms of resources) in 
prosecuting illegal practices, and the quantity of information held by law enforcers and by 
the parties in respect to a specific misconduct. At this respect, Shavell says: 
 
8 S. Shavell, ‘The Optimal structure of Law Enforcement’, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1993, 
pp. 255-287, p. 257. 
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“The knowledge that individuals have about the dangerousness of their acts 
is also germane to answering the question about the optimal stage of legal 
intervention. The more information that individuals have about the 
dangerousness of their acts, the more appealing will be later intervention. 
[…] Nevertheless, individuals who do not recognize the dangerousness of 
an act might be unaware that committing the act could result in an act-based 
sanction or a harm-based-sanction – so that prevention would be required 
to control their behaviour.”9 
Secondly, another dimension of enforcement of the law is the “form of sanctions”, which can 
be monetary or non-monetary (such as imprisonment), depending on the severity of the 
infringement.10 
Finally, the third dimension explained by Shavell is the “ role of private and public 
agents” in the enforcement of the law. A so called private-oriented enforcement system, 
occurs when private parties provide the most relevant information regarding the case. Public 
enforcement, in its turn, stands when public agents have or are capable of having more 
information about the given situation. These three dimensions can also be studied in the 
context of competition enforcement, especially, within the framework of policies applicable 
to vertical agreements as it is shown in the following subsections.  
5.3.1. Timing of Legal Intervention  
The optimal choice between ex-ante and ex-post policies, in the traditional theory of Law 
and Economics, is also discussed by Kaplow’s approach towards the trade-off “rules versus 
standards”.11 The author describes both a rule and a standard as legal commands, and 
emphasizes that “the only distinction between rule and standards is the extent to which efforts 
to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”.12 According to his 
theory, a legal norm might be precise in the sense that it is an outline for action by a judge 
and civil servants or might be imprecise when it simply indicates the direction in which the 
law requires decisions to be made. These precise norms (rules) allow simple and mechanical 
 
9 Shavell, 1993, p. 265. 
10 For this topic, see also G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1968, pp. 169-217. 
11 L. Kaplow, ‘Rules versus Standards: an economic analysis’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1992, pp. 
557-629. 
12 Kaplow, 1992, p. 560. 
151 
 
decisions, while vague norms (standards) require complex and policy-oriented decisions.  
Considering the systematic approaches adopted by Shavell and Kaplow, and applying 
it to the peculiarities of antitrust law and enforcement of vertical agreements, some remarks 
can be added. First, it is questioned in this PhD research whether an ex-ante notification 
system of vertical agreements (precise rules; preventive oriented policy) is a more efficient 
policy than an ex-post monitoring (vague norms; act/harm-oriented policy) and in which 
conditions. Within an ex-ante notification regime, firms are required to notify to antitrust 
agencies the agreements that they are intending to sign (meaning, the practices they are 
contemplating) before they put them into practice. The ex-post control of vertical restraints, 
in contrast, attempts to reach an optimal level of deterrence by sanctioning parties after the 
harm is caused by a certain agreement. Ex-post control of restrictive agreements is induced 
by general antitrust legal criteria that can sometimes be unclear and require complicated 
interpretation. As explained in the previous Chapter, both in Brazil and in the EU the ex-post 
enforcement of vertical agreement was favoured by the Authorities, but with certain 
differences. In the EU, for instance, the current legal framework applicable to vertical 
agreements is based on both precise norms (e.g. Article 101 TFEU) that describe the general 
rule applicable to restrictive agreements, and vague norms or standards, which correspond to 
the soft-law instruments, such as the existing guidelines on the application of Article 101 
TFEU, that was based on previous jurisprudence of the authority.  
5.3.2. Form of Sanction 
As for the ‘form of sanctions’, antitrust agencies around the world tend to use monetary 
sanctions or other behavioural restrictions (such as termination of contract) for condemned 
cases of restrictive agreements. Usually, in terms of antitrust policies, imprisonment is an 
option applied often for hard-core cartels and just in a few countries, such as in the US.  
The form of sanction can directly affect the incentive of parties to engage or not in 
restrictive agreements. If the sanction over anti-competitive vertical agreements is very 
severe (massive monetary fines, or even imprisonment), it may discourage companies from 
engaging in these commercial practices. Under a notification system of agreements, the form 
of sanction chosen by the antitrust  authority can actually determine whether companies will 
indeed comply with the law or not (meaning, whether they will notify or not the agreements). 
In the EU level, antitrust sanctions are mostly monetary, and only a few Member States still 
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consider imprisonment as an option for antitrust sanctions.  In Brazil, for instance, even 
though the law foresees imprisonment for some antitrust illegalities, in practice, this sanction 
has never been used.     
5.3.3. The Role of Public and Private Agents 
Regarding Shavell’s third dimension of antitrust enforcement, the “role of private and public 
agents”, one can say that like many other areas of the law, competition enforcement practices 
also frequently rely on a mix of public and private enforcement mechanisms.  
In the case of public enforcement, the law enforcers, by means of their joint activities, 
can determine the probability of detection as well as the severity of penalties to produce the 
correct incentives to deter violations.13 Arlen Duke14 describe two forms of public antitrust 
enforcement models: the prosecutorial model, under which the antitrust agency undertakes 
the investigatory and enforcement functions and must prove its case by bringing a complaint 
before a generalist court or specialist adjudicative body; and the administrative model, in 
which the investigative and adjudicatory powers are entrusted  to one authority or group of 
agencies.15 The administrative model can be seen in most of the antitrust agencies around the 
world, and it is also the model chosen by Brazil and by the EU (as well as by most NCAs). 
The literature on competition law and economics points out various advantages of 
public enforcement. Public authorities are sometimes more qualified to acquire and analyse 
relevant information, particularly when vast amounts of information are involved.16 Also, 
public enforcement regimes provide public agencies with a wider range of detection and 
means of investigation, as well as alternative sanctioning possibilities, which may provide an 
optimal level of deterrence. Finally, public servants are, in theory, appointed to pursue social 
goals dictated by public policy, rather than private objectives.17 A system of private 
 
13 W. Schwartz, ‘An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement’, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 
68, 1980, p. 1083. 
14 A. Duke, ‘Public enforcement’, in J. Duns, A. Duke, & B. Sweeney (Eds), Comparative Competition Law, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 271. 
15 Although a party found by the enforcement agency to have breached the law will almost always have a right 
to challenge the agencies’ decision in the courts. 
16 See R. Van den Bergh, ‘Should Consumer Protection Law be Publicly Enforced? an Economic Perspective 
on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the Consumer Protection Laws of the Member States’, 
in W. van Boom and M. Loos (Eds.), Collective enforcement of Consumer Law, Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2007. 




enforcement, in its turn, involves actions of private parties in civil courts that claim 
compensation for personal losses. That is to say, private enforcement, within the scope of 
competition law, also contributes to achieve complementary deterrence and corrective 
justice.18  
If competition law is efficiently applied, then the literature also suggests that public 
enforcement can be preferred to private enforcement. Wouter Wils, for instance, justifies the 
superiority of antitrust public enforcement through three main arguments.19  In the first place, 
the author argues that public law enforcers have more effective powers of investigation and 
sanction. Secondly, because private enforcement is motivated by private profit, it naturally 
deviates from the overall public interest that gives grounds to competition law. Lastly, private 
enforcement can be very expensive for parties, as many additional resources are needed to 
be able to correctly allocate the damages. In the same sense, Hannah Buxbaum points out 
that the expansive use of private lawsuits, especially in the United States, triggers the 
development of competition law in a “somewhat inefficient and piecemeal fashion”, as the 
majority of the issues brought before courts merely reflect the choices of individual plaintiffs 
and not a coherent enforcement strategy of public agencies.20  
Public and private enforcement are expensive procedures, yet each model has its own 
advantages. The question of how best to combine public and private enforcement to 
guarantee optimal welfare outcomes, invariably arises due to the strengthening of private 
rights.21 Also, the choice in favour of public or private enforcement, or most likely in favour 
of some mixed policy, is very much associated with the analysis of the goals of competition 
law in a certain jurisdiction, or even in broader terms, to the goals of the country itself. The 
goal of competition policies can vary considerably from country to country. As examples of 
goals, one can highlight the promotion of total welfare, consumer welfare and/or market 
integration. For instance, if the tools to apply competition law are not sufficient, and/or if the 
goal of another competition national law is pursuing corrective justice through compensation, 
then private enforcement may be preferred.22  
In their policy-making process, antitrust agents must consider both the welfare effects 
 
18 Van den Bergh, 2007, supra note 16. 
19 W. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’, World Competition, Vol. 26, 
No. 3, 2003, pp. 472-488. 
20 H. Buxbaum, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of optimal deterrence and 
social costs’, in J. Basedow (Ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, International Competition Law 
Series, Zuidpoolsingel, Wolters Kluwer, 2007, p. 48.  
21 Wils, 2003, supra note 19. 
22 Wils, 2003, supra note 19. 
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of anti-competitive practices, and the enforcement costs related to it. In practice, the 
competition agency chooses the optimal dimensions of antitrust enforcement by wisely 
allocating its resources. In certain circumstances, an ex-ante notification of vertical 
agreements may be preferred to an ex-post monitoring policy or even public enforcement 
may be preferred to a more private oriented policy so as to reduce the enforcement costs and 
the abuse of economic power.23 
5.3.4. Considerations on Enforcement Costs 
Competition authorities around the world are often subject to two main constraints, the first 
one being limited resources and the second one information asymmetries.24 Both constraints 
are somehow related, since it would be too costly to control every firm or market, and also 
because markets are rarely transparent. This information problem reduces the efficiency and 
directly influences the level of enforcement of certain antitrust policies.  
When thinking about policies applicable to vertical agreements, if a given antitrust 
authority chooses to allocate greater resources to the notification control, the probability of 
detecting anti-competitive agreements increases. The authority, consequently, gathers more 
information about the markets and on how to correctly assess the potential anti-competitive 
effects in those situations. However, this option could be too costly, and the authority 
eventually must face the trade-off of having a more extensive number of investigations or of 
having more effective results in fewer cases. In the case of ex-post monitoring of antitrust 
practices, a smaller number of interventions happens, and these interventions leave more 
markets without monitoring.25 
One approach that underlies the choice of antitrust enforcement policy is oriented 
 
23 More recent contributions to the literature of antitrust enforcement analyse the effects of private enforcement 
on public enforcement, for instance, in cartel cases, where the question arises whether the possibility of damage 
claims discouraging companies to sign leniency agreements in the first place. However, since most of these 
contributions are mainly oriented to cartel cases, they fall outside the scope of this PhD research. See, T. Reuter, 
‘Private antitrust enforcement and the role of harmed parties in public enforcement’, European Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 41, 2016, pp.479-507; and W. Wils, ‘Private enforcement of EU Antitrust Law and its 
relationship with Public Enforcement: Past, Present and Future’, World Competition, Vol.40, No.1, 2017, pp. 
3-46. 
24 S. Souam, ‘Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines’, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 19, No.1, 2001, p. 2. 
25 Souam, 2001, p. 2.  
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toward welfare maximization by seeking to minimize enforcement costs.26 In general terms, 
costs can be defined as “any item that makes someone worse-off, or reduces a person’s well-
being”.27 Costs can often be categorized according to different parameters. Costs can be 
monetary or non-monetary, they can be one-off costs and/or recurring costs; they can be 
described as economic or social costs, or even as indirect costs when related to the 
inefficiencies, regulatory uncertainty, distrust in institutions, and so on.28 
This PhD research takes as main cost parameters the ones defined by Roger Van den 
Bergh.29 The author discusses that the economic analysis of the switch from an ex-ante 
authorization system of contracts to an ex-post monitoring system involves the assessment 
of two main types of enforcement costs: the information costs and the incentive costs. To this 
analysis can be added the assessment of administrative costs. The next Sections aim at 
exploring and expanding this classification by identifying the elements that compose these 
three enforcement costs. 
5.4. INFORMATION COSTS  
Generally speaking, when it comes to antitrust cases, the term information refers to “the 
knowledge about the occurrence of anti-competitive actions, evidence to support the case, 
and the technique required to assess whether business practices are anti-competitive or not”.30 
In an ideal world, all market players and law enforcers have full information about market 
conditions, and the existence of restrictive practices, and they can all fully understand the 
existing legal rules. This means that both authorities and firms can easily recognize whether 
a restrictive agreement is an infringement to competition law. However, this scenario is 
unlikely to happen. In practice, firms often have the detailed information about their business 
practices (i.e. the content of the contracts) and law enforcers can face high costs in obtaining 
this relevant information.31 
 
26 Wright researched welfare maximization by seeking the minimization of the sum enforcement costs. See, J. 
Wright, ‘Evidence-Based Antitrust Enforcement in the Technology Sector’, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (March) 
2013. 
27 CEPS, Assessing the costs and benefits of regulation: Study for the European Commission, 2013, p. 22. 
28 CEPS, 2013, p. 22.  
29 R. Van der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, p. 430. 
30 A. Gonzales & A. Micco, ‘Private Versus Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile’, Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2014, p. 699. 
31 M. Pirrung, ‘EU Enlargement towards Cartel Paradise? An Economic Analysis of the Reform of European 
Competition Law’, Erasmus Law and Economics Review, Vol. 1, 2004, p. 89. 
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As anticipated before, one fundamental problem of formulating competition policies 
is related to the lack of information regarding market dynamics, price conditions, relevant 
data on firms’ cost curves, market shares, and most importantly, lack of information about 
the legality of business practices, which means the existence of coordination activities. 
Information costs can take different forms in the context of antitrust policies. When analysing 
the economic effects of vertical agreements, information costs refer to the costs of having 
access to enough information on the content of those agreements as well as on their potential 
anti-competitive effects on the market dynamics. For this PhD research, these information 
costs are divided into two different types: (a) costs of gathering market information and (b) 
costs of assessing the competitive effects (efficiencies and potential harms). 
5.4.1. Cost of Gathering Market Information  
There are several questions that law enforcers and firms encounter when assessing a vertical 
agreement, such as: How is the competition dynamic in the upstream and downstream 
markets? Who are the main market players? Do these players have market power? What are 
the barriers to entry in the upstream and downstream markets? What are the potential 
efficiencies and anti-competitive effects of these agreements? 
The literature recognizes that companies, as market players, tend to be better qualified 
to give answers to these questions, since they can more easily detect the anti-competitive 
contracts that affect their daily activities.32 An antitrust authority, by default, supervises all 
economic sectors, and therefore, is not always able to match the firm's ability to identify the 
most restrictive contracts. The authorities frequently use government statistical records to get 
information about the markets, or use complaints of other market players to identify anti-
competitive behaviour.33 However, gathering public data and information provided by third-
parties is often very difficult and costly, and the results are not always accurate enough to 
guarantee the assessment of market dynamics.   
When discussing policies to vertical agreements, one can say that the ex-ante 
 
32 See, for instance, Hahn, 2000, supra note 3 and Pirrung, 2004, supra note 31.   
33 Neven et. al., for instance, explored in their research the fact that ‘complaint procedure’ is a very useful and 
relevant form to provide the authority (in their research, the European Commission) with relevant information 
about markets. According to them, in the 1990s, 55% of infringement decisions were related to cases of 
restrictive agreements that started with a complaint procedure. See D. Neven, P. Papandropoulos & P. Seabright, 
Trawling for Minnows: European Competition Policy and Agreements between firms, London, Center for 
Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), 1998, p. 130. 
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notification system creates lower costs of gathering market information than the ex-post 
control regime. This happens because, under a notification system of agreements, firms 
should voluntarily reveal the dynamics of their markets and the possible existence of a 
vertical restraint and the authorities have access to the information that would probably be 
very costly or even impossible to obtain under an ex-post regime. Moreover, under the ex-
post monitoring regime, firms must self-assess the effects of their restrictive practices and, 
therefore, they collect a higher amount of information about the market dynamics. As stated 
in previous paragraphs, third-party information regarding market dynamics might also be 
difficult and costly to obtain and, therefore, the firm’s information costs for gathering market 
information tend also to be higher under an ex-post regime.  
This was indeed a concern expressed by some scholars over the years. Wernhard 
Moschel, in one of his speeches, talked about the risks faced by Europe when Regulation 
1/2003 was being discussed: 
“For competition policy, such a change is extremely risky. A system of 
directly applicable exceptions is clearly inferior to a prior notification 
system, again for a number of reasons: The cartel offices do not receive any 
information; It leads to a complete lack of transparency for interested third 
parties, competitors, subcontractors, and customers, including consumers; 
Self-assessment by the undertakings and their respective attorneys cannot 
guarantee the public interest in the protection of competition. There are 
three reasons for this. First, undertakings often lack the necessary data 
concerning the market. It is simply asking too much to ask them to apply 
Article 81(3) EC. Potential sinners are invited to exonerate themselves. 
This can hardly be described as a happy arrangement […].”34  
The passage above suggests that a notification system may be a preferred policy whenever 
the companies have difficulties in gathering market information and when the competition 
agency has restricted data on the real impacts of certain types of contracts with vertical 
agreements.35 This could be the case, for instance, of less experienced competition agencies, 
since companies and their lawyers may be unwilling to provide a public authority with 
accurate information, as a matter of distrust. For instance, Kovacic exemplifies that where 
the institutionalization of public law enforcement is fragile, antitrust officials may be 
 
34 Speech transcribed from W. Moschel, ‘Change of Policy in European Competition Law?’, Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2000, p. 496. 
35 Van den Bergh, 2017, supra note 29, p. 433-435. 
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threatened by business people that do not want to cooperate with the authority when 
providing market information.36  
 
This lack of information of the competition authority might cause errors in the decision-
making process. For instance, the lack of information can persuade an authority to set an 
infringement decision with regard to a resale price-fixing case that is related to a pro-
competitive agreement, or, the lack of information can encourage the authority to dismiss a 
case of price-fixing that actually creates harm to the market place in the form of market 
foreclosure. An important judgment of a resale price-fixing case in Brazil, the SKF case, 
allow us to explore this problem.37 Although CADE’s Commissioners, in their majority, 
voted to consider the vertical restraint illegal, the two minority votes (from Commissioner 
Olavo Chinaglia and Commissioner César Mattos) argued that, in the case files, there were 
insufficient information of the market conditions. Therefore, this fact made it difficult to infer 
that the conduct was indeed anti-competitive. In the words of Commissioner Olavo 
Chinaglia:  
“It is clear the various gaps observed in the case file in order to prepare a 
conclusive judgment on the illegality of the investigated conduct can be 
formed. It is striking, for example, the lack of information to allow me in 
better analysing the market structure and rationale of the sectors affected 
by the conduct, in particular the vertical relationships between 
manufacturers and distributors. It is impossible to confirm, from the 
evidences, how is the competitive dynamic in the distribution markets for 
SKF-manufactured products, and it is impossible to infer whether or not 
the distribution strategies in the affected markets include exclusivity 
relationships, exclusive territory provision to the distributors, whether the 
company is worried about the quality of customer service etc.”38 
If that is really the case, if there were not enough evidences of the market conditions to 
conclude that the SKF’s agreements were illegal, then the consequences to society of the 
potential error in the decision may have been very detrimental. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects in cases of vertical agreements turn out to be 
 
36 Kovacic, 2001, supra note 1, p. 308. 
37 For more details of the case, see Section 3.4.1. 
38 Free translation from Olavo Chinaglia’s Vote on Case SKF vs. Procon-SP, Case No. 08012.001271/2001-
447, from 31 August 2011, case file p. 932. 
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crucial to avoid errors in competition authorities’ decisions. The discussion concerning the 
consequences of antitrust errors will be explored in Section 5.5.  
5.4.2. Cost of Assessing the Effects of Vertical Agreements 
Information costs can also be discussed in terms of the lack of knowledge related to the 
assessment of pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements. These costs are 
perceived not only by the law enforcers but by businessmen and their legal advisors. In 
practice, companies often engage in certain commercial agreements, as distribution 
agreements with subtle restrictive clauses, drafted by lawyers, without being fully conscious 
of the potential negative outcomes of them in the markets.  
A precise antitrust evaluation of vertical agreements, most of the time, involves the 
study of complex economic concepts, which can be done by highly-educated people that have 
specific knowledge on antitrust rules and economic concepts. Chapter 2 discussed the 
complex nature of vertical agreements. It showed, for instance, that certain vertical restraints 
can be justified by efficiency arguments, as they can solve the double mark-up problem, 
prevent free-riding and reduce transaction costs. At the same time, these vertical restraints 
can facilitate collusion, reduce intra and inter-brand competition and foreclose markets.39 The 
Chapter showed that the balance of these effects is not an easy job and requires specific 
knowledge regarding antitrust and market analysis. These difficulties are also due to the fact 
that each vertical restraint (such as resale price-fixing, geo-blocking clauses, selective 
distribution system) requires a specific economic analysis.40  For example, resale price-fixing 
and geo-blocking restrictions may combat free-riding, which is a pro-competitive effect. 
Resale price-fixing and geo-blocking clauses may also facilitate collusion and forecloses 
markets, which are anti-competitive effects. However, resale price-fixing may also combat 
double marginalization problems, while territorial protection may increase those problems. 
Besides, it has been stated that balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical 
agreements also has limitations. First, incomplete information held by the parties harms the 
antitrust analysis. Second, the inter-relations between producers and distributors over a 
specific time period and the resulting outcomes are not always the same (not even fully 
predictable). Actually, the effects of these inter-relations are sometimes contradictory. 
 
39 For more discussion, see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Chapter 2. 
40 Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate these diverse effects.  
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Moreover, the economic assessment of vertical agreements is largely dependent on the study 
of the features of specific markets (such as market concentrations, rivalry, entry conditions, 
buying power) that add complexity to the analysis as a whole. The inter-temporal impacts of 
vertical agreements deny important information about the potential outcomes of certain 
practices, leading to a scenario of legal and economic uncertainty.  
Therefore, information costs tend to be lower in societies that have a long-standing 
tradition in competition law (with the authority and firms more trained to assess vertical 
agreements) and where the culture of competition and access to information is more present. 
On the contrary, information costs are higher in countries that have less experience in solving 
high complex cases, that have limited access to information regarding antitrust assessments, 
or just have an “anaemic competition culture”.41 Daniel Sokol, for instance, affirms that in a 
case where the competition authority is young (or with limited experience in assessing 
complex cases), human capital might be under-developed: 
“With few professors and practitioners devoted to the area, it is difficult for 
agencies to recruit staff specifically trained in competition law and 
economics. The well-staffed agency, full of competition specialists is less 
likely to create errors of misguided prosecution or errors of non-
prosecution of anti-competitive practices.”42 
Actually, several factors can contribute to create (or increase) the competition culture in a 
given jurisdiction, such as rethinking the university curriculum, increasing the role of 
competition advocacy and the role of the media, and if necessary, reforming institutions.43 
For instance, antitrust human capacity is primarily developed at the university level. This 
means that law schools and economic schools have an essential role in providing more 
teaching in this area to respond to the increasing demand for education in competition 
policies. Universities should adapt their courses to bring a general understanding of economic 
analysis of Competition Law (in a separate course or in the scope of other disciplines, such 
as in Contract Law), so that more people could be trained to solve highly complex cases, such 
as vertical restraints, but not limited to them.44 Because the study of Law and Economics, 
 
41 Expression used by Pena, in J. Pena, ‘Promoting Competition Policies from Private Sector in Latin America’, 
in, E. Fox & D. Sokol, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 469. 
42 D. Sokol, ‘The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition Policy’, in, E. Fox & D. 
Sokol, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 13. 
43 P. A. Queiroz, Direito Antitruste: Os fundamentos da promoção da concorrência, São Paulo, Editora 
Singular, 2018, p. 302. 
44 Most of the cases of abuse of dominant position, and other cases of horizontal agreements (different from 
hard-core cartels) also require an effect-based analysis and therefore tend to require very complex assessments. 
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mainly applicable to antitrust, provides a critical toolset for understanding the rationale of 
law based on the apprehension of how incentives shape human behaviour, the spread of this 
discipline may have a profound impact on society’s behaviour, including business practices 
related to contract and commercial law. 
As an example, Sokol discusses the lack of exposure to both Law and Economics 
courses and courses on Competition Law in Latin America.45 In his research, he shows that 
from 27 selected countries, 13 of them have no course oriented to these disciplines. If there 
is no specific training in this regard, how would businessmen, lawyers or public authorities 
have knowledge on the legality of vertical agreements and their antitrust effects on markets? 
Even knowing that, since 2009, a lot has changed in Latin American countries in terms of 
antitrust knowledge and new antitrust practices, but the gap between the need of antitrust 
knowledge and the sources of information training is still very big. The author also stresses 
that the transfer of knowledge is a difficult process, since the transplant of experience from 
a more to a less experienced country is highly dependent of the capability of the latter to 
adapt foreign ideas and knowledge to their own reality.46  
According to the empirical research carried out in Brazil on the status of the formal 
studies in Competition Law, less than 5% of the Law Schools offer disciplines related to 
Competition Law or Economic Law, with less than 2% offered as mandatory disciplines.47 
The research also shows that antitrust is still an underestimated discipline in the country. 
Pedro Aurélio de Queiroz indicates that some factors explain these low figures. The author 
states that the Guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Education in Brazil regarding rules on 
higher education (CNE Resolution CNE No. 9/2004) do not mention any disciplines related 
to Competition Law or Economic Law as a pedagogic area.48 It should also be considered 
that, in Brazil, the National Bar Exam does not include Competition or Economic Law among 
the topics of examination. The absence of an antitrust discipline in this National Exam is 
certainly a factor that affects how the Law Schools in the country handle the topic.49 This 
happens because the quality of the Law Schools in the country is mostly measured by the 
percentage of students that are approved in this National Exam, prepared by the Brazilian 
 
45Sokol, 2009, supra note 42, p. 22-23. 
46 Sokol, 2009, supra note 42, p. 15. 
47 L. Carvalho, ‘O ensino da defesa e da promoção da concorrência nos cursos de graduação em Direito no 
Brasil’, Revista de Direito Empresarial, (July) 2008, pp. 167-235. 
48 P. A. Queiroz, Direito Antitruste: Os fundamentos da promoção da concorrência, São Paulo, Editora 
Singular, 2018, p. 302. 
49 This point is reiforced by Forgioni in P. A. Forgioni, ‘O que esperar do antitruste brasileiro no século XXI?, 
Revista Jurídica Luso-Brasileira, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, p. 1737-1738. 
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Bar Association (in Portuguese, “Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil”). The reality in the 
country is that the traditional disciplines adopted by both the Ministry of Education and the 
Bar Association turn out to impose barriers to the inclusion of new subjects and more 
interdisciplinary topics. As the importance of antitrust disciplines seems to have been 
underestimated in the country, it is natural to expect that judges, public prosecutors, and 
lawyers also have less access to this specific education.  
As a matter of fact, nowadays, CADE has 385 employees, of which 137 are non-
administrative staff working on competition enforcement, including 40% lawyers, 25% 
economists, and the last 28% graduated in other areas.50 With regard to CADE 
Commissioners, they used to  traditionally be lawyers or economists because the Law sets 
out in its Article 6 that such decision-making positions should be filled by lawyers or 
economists. However, recent appointments have not necessarily respected this procedural 
requirement. The current President, Alexandre Barreto de Souza, as an example, has studied 
management and public administration.51 
The reality encountered in Brazil regarding education in Competition Law discipline 
is also reflected in several EU Member States. Indeed, taking into account the recent 
development of antitrust education in Portugal, Luís Morais explains that the Law Schools 
in the country started to slowly incorporate Competition Law disciplines in their curriculum 
after the ‘1999 Bologna Process’,52 which was an agreement among EU Member States about 
the higher education quality standards to make it more compatible and comparable.53 
However, according to Morais, it was the decentralization of the EU competition law that 
ultimately encouraged law faculties to create Competition Law disciplines in the country.54 
In the case of Portugal, just like many other EU Member States, the institutional change 
enhanced by Regulation 1/2003 promoted changes in the national curriculum of Law studies. 
The Portuguese example demonstrates that, without an anticipatory process of institutional 
reform, it is very difficult to develop antitrust knowledge or the culture of competition in a 
given country. The next sections discuss in more detail the institutional factors that affect the 
 
50 CADE, Annual Report 2018, p. 41. 
51 Alexandre Barreto de Souza has a mandate from 22/06/2017 until 21/06/2021. His background can be traced 
at: http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/presidencia 
[15/04/2019].  
52 See more information about the Bologna Process at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-
184_en.htm [22/05/2019]. 
53 L. D. S. Morais, Direito da Concorrência: Perspectivas do seu ensino, São Paulo, Editora Almedina, 2009, 
p. 155-169. 
54 Morais, 2009, p. 172-182. 
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path of antitrust enforcement. 
Also regarding the spread of antitrust culture in the European context, Kovacic 
highlights the role of specific educational programs that helped the implementation of 
antitrust law and policies in transition economies.55 He argues that it was common to see 
public agents involved in market reforms after they have been studying or working in 
Western universities or who have been widely engaged in training programmes aimed at 
addressing the fundamental economic and legal underpinnings of competition policy. At this 
respect, Kovacic concludes that: 
“Over time, the pool of indigenous experts may expand as university 
programs in business, economics, law, and public administration 
reformulate their curricula to teach courses relevant to developing a market 
economy. Transition economy agencies often find that professionals who 
have become expert in antitrust economics or law become extremely 
attractive to private sector employers.” 56 
What stands out in the above paragraph is the role of qualifications among law enforcers and 
legal advisors also for some European Member States that for several years did not even have 
a market economy as reference. 
The information costs’ analysis is associated not only to the spread of antitrust studies 
but also to the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence and the attempts of a competition authority 
in providing information to society. Regarding the Brazilian framework, over the years, 
CADE, especially after Resolution No. 17/2016, has not put much effort, either via their 
decision-making process or via soft-law instruments, into defining objective parameters for 
the economic assessment of vertical agreements.57 Moreover, CADE has relied heavily on 
settlements. The downside of settlement agreements is also the slow development of antitrust 
jurisprudence in Brazil towards the assessment of vertical agreements, since there is no 
effect-based assessment and/or decision published by CADE and the legal cases are not 
reviewed by national courts.58  
 
55 Kovacic, 2001, supra note 1, p. 306. 
56 Kovacic, 2001, supra note 1, p. 306. 
57 It is worth indicate that, in the past years, CADE has published some Guidelines that focuses exclusevly on 
cartel and merger policies, such as the “Guidelines on Competition Compliance Programs”, “Guidelines on 
CADE´s Antitrust Leniency Program”, “Guidelines Cease and Desist Agreement for cartel cases” and 
“Guidelines for the Analysis of Previous Consummation of Merger Transactions”. The content of these 
guidelines can be found at: <http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/publications/guidelines> [27-07-2019]. 
58 For more information regarding the Brazilian legal framework, see Chapter 3. 
164 
 
The scenario is somehow diverse in Europe. The European Commission over the 
years has worked on providing NCAs and businesses with information on how to prepare an 
assessment of vertical practices, lowering the level of information costs in EU jurisdictions. 
It should be stressed that two main pillars have contributed to the access of information with 
the EU. These pillars are: (i) the consolidated antitrust jurisprudence, together with the 
updates of Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) and Guidelines of application of 
Article 101 TFEU; and (ii) the European Competition Network (ECN). Indeed, these pillars 
facilitated the transaction from an ex-ante control of agreements to an ex-post policy and, 
simultaneously, had a positive effect on the evolution of the information costs.59  
The decisions and notices established by the Commission, in addition to the role of 
the Court of Justice in sometimes upholding or annulling decisions, were fundamental to the 
better understanding of the competition rules (including the complex assessment of Article 
101 TFEU) and the goals of the Community. After almost 40 years of enforcement of 
Resolution 17/1962, the rules on vertical agreements became more predictable to 
undertakings. In other words, several decades of notification system contributed to a good 
knowledge and acquaintance on how to assess the potential anti-competitive effects of 
vertical agreements taking into consideration the particularities of the Community, the entire 
legal system and its policy priorities. Indeed, the VBER and its Guidelines became 
fundamental tools to business people to self-assess their contractual relations, and to national 
authorities when investigating anti-competitive practices. 
Actually, as highlighted in Chapter 4, several NCAs, in the past years, have also 
launched their own guidelines, notices and studies to support the assessment of vertical 
agreements. For instance, in 2014, the Federal Competition Authority in Austria (AFCA) 
produced an official opinion regarding resale price-fixing entitled “Standpoint on Resale 
Price Maintenance” that also aims to guide society in relation to the possible scenarios where 
these price restrictions can negatively affect competition. In 2016, with the same purpose, 
the British Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) issued the study “Vertical restraints: 
new evidence from a business survey”. Also, in 2016, the Authority for Consumers and 
Markets (ACM) in the Netherlands, published the document “ACM’s strategy and 
enforcement priorities with regard to vertical agreements”. Although the Dutch authority has 
not actively enforced many cases of vertical agreements in the past years, the ACM 
recognizes the need for a deep and careful look at these practices. In 2017, the German 
 
59 For more information, see Section 4.4 of Chapter 4.  
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authority (Bundeskartellamt) launched a note on resale price-fixing in the food sector entitled 
“Guidance note on the prohibition of vertical price-fixing in the brick-and-mortar food retail 
sector”. This guideline was published after the Bundeskartellamt imposed fines amounting 
to 260.5 million euros on 27 companies for having engaged in price-fixing agreements 
between retailers and manufacturers in the food sector.60  
Regarding the ECN, this network was created as a forum for regular contacts, 
consultation and discussion regarding the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This 
network was created to help national authorities to enhance cooperation in a context that 
privileged the coherence, consistency and uniform application of the competition rules, given 
the diverse experiences among the NCAs in applying competition law. Considering the 
complexity of assessing antitrust cases, the ECN showed up as an important pillar to the 
national authorities. The idea of having the support of the Commission and of more 
experienced competition authorities, mainly for the new Member States with no tradition 
whatsoever in implementing competition rules, certainly also reduces the information costs 
discussed so far. 
Taking into account the comparison of the experiences in Brazil and the EU, some 
questions emerge: How to overcome this informational deficit related to antitrust assessment 
and the lack of competition culture among business people and law enforcers? Can these 
costs be simply overcome by additional education in Competition Law and Economics? 
These are surely issues that need to be addressed by a number of jurisdictions that still lack 
enough competition culture.  
5.5. INCENTIVE COSTS  
The so-called incentive costs and information costs are usually interconnected, since the 
boundaries among are them not completely clear. Nevertheless, in this Chapter, the incentive 
costs will be treated as the costs that influence the incentives of companies to engage in 
welfare-enhancing agreements or to stop participating in welfare-reducing agreements. 
Again, there are several methodologies that can classify these costs in the most different 
forms. Based on a Law and Economics’ theoretical approach, it is considered that the 
incentives of companies to engage in anti-competitive agreements are determined essentially 
 
60 More information about the case can be found in the 2016 and 2017 Annual Reports of the German 
Competition Authority, the Bundeskartellamt. 
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by following factors (1) the level of fines imposed by antitrust agencies and courts,  (2) the 
antitrust errors in assessing vertical agreements,  (3) the role of private enforcement, and (4) 
the general trust in institutions. The following subsections will analyse in detail these factors. 
5.5.1. Fines 
The Law and Economics’ theory of crime and punishment asserts that offenders eventually 
stop committing crimes (or reduce the amount of crimes), as a result of the increasing severity 
of the enforcement.61 The level of enforcement is therefore measured by means of the size of 
fines and the probability of detection. Even though the original literature is on criminal law, 
the rationale can also be usefully applicable in the context of antitrust policies. Therefore, we 
consider that firms will engage in fewer restrictive agreements according to a greater 
probability of having antitrust authorities prosecuting their company and of higher levels of 
fines applicable to these practices. William Landes shows that effective antitrust fines must 
be equal to the damage caused to other market players by the offender, given a certain 
probability of apprehension.62 However, as we know from previous discussions, the harm in 
the case of vertical agreements can be very difficult (when not impossible) to compute, since 
together with the anti-competitive outcomes there are always economic efficiencies to be 
balanced in this calculation. 
The optimal amount of fines applicable to restrictive vertical agreements will vary 
depending on whether the country has an ex-ante notification system of agreements or if it 
favours an ex-post control of these practices. Under an ex-ante notification system of 
agreements, the amount of fines imposed by the antitrust authority – in both cases of no-filing 
and/or existence of anti-competitive clauses – can actually determine whether companies will 
indeed comply or not with the law (meaning, whether they will notify the agreements or take 
the risk of being discovered). For now, let’s assume that a certain country is changing its 
policy from a notification system to an ex-post enforcement regime. In a context where the 
ex-post enforcement stays unchanged, the ending of the notification system may lead to an 
increase in anti-competitive practices if the sanctions are low, or to a decrease in anti-
competitive practices if the sanctions are high. In other words, if ex-post enforcement efforts 
 
61 See for instance, Becker, 1968, supra note 10; G. Stigler, ‘The optimal enforcement of law’, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 1970, pp. 526-536; and G. Becker & G. Stigler, ‘Law enforcement, 
malfeasance and compensation of enforcers’, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1974, pp. 1-18.  
62 W. M. Landes, ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 
2, 1983, pp. 652-678. 
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remain constant, an increase in fines would result in a decrease in the proportion of restrictive 
agreements, while an increase in fines would result in a “reduction of moral inhibition against 
engaging in anti-competitive behaviour”.63 As a consequence, the number of anti-competitive 
vertical agreements would increase. Some studies have demonstrated that the move to an ex-
post control of restrictive agreements is not optimal if the fines remain unchanged.64 
Actually, a change in the policy of vertical agreements from an ex-ante to ex-post 
monitoring, as happened in Brazil and in the EU, affects firms' decision-making with regard 
to the choice of agreements they will opt to sign. According to Neven, “as the system of ex-
ante monitoring is removed, the system of ex-post monitoring should be re-calibrated and 
strengthened” by, for instance, a better screening of investigated cases, the increase of the 
probability of enforcement of restrictive agreements, and the re-evaluating of the amount of 
fines.65 Business people are usually discouraged by the risk of sanctions they would incur if 
they implement more anti-competitive clauses to their vertical agreement. However, if fines 
are minimal, they would prefer to take the risk and sign unlawful agreements.66 
If we look carefully to the European experience, the strengthening of ex-post 
enforcement in the case of termination of ex-ante notification of agreements was indeed one 
concern brought by the Commission in its policy evaluation document, the White Paper on 
Modernization of the EU Treaty (hereinafter “White Paper).67 In the first years of application 
of Regulation 1/2003, there were no changes in respect to the magnitude of fines for 
undertakings that engage into anti-competitive agreements. However, in 2006, new 
Guidelines with specific methodologies to set fines for antitrust infringements were adopted 
by the European Commission.68 These Guidelines increased the deterrent effect of fines by 
determining, for instance, (i) that fines may be based on up to 30% of the company’s annual 
sales to which the infringement relates, multiplied by the duration, in years, of the 
infringement; (ii) that an “entry fee” may be applicable regardless of the length of the 
infringement; (iii) that fines for undertakings that continue to repeat the infringement may 
 
63 K. Elzinga & W. Breit, The antitrust penalties: a study in law and economics, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1976, p. 129. 
64 See, for instance, G. Federico & P. Manzini, ‘A Law and Economics Approach to the new European Antitrust 
Enforcing Rules’, Erasmus Law and Economics Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004, pp. 143-164. See also, Hahn, 
2000, supra note 3. 
65 Neven, 2002, supra note 5, p. 351. 
66 Neven, 2002, supra note 5, p. 361. 
67 European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty, 1999. 
68 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, 2006. 
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increase up to 100%, and so on.  
These changes mean that, in respect to the application of fines at the EU level, the 
movement from an ex-ante to an ex-post monitoring of agreements was indeed accompanied 
by an increase in fines and the rules related to it in order to deter antitrust violations. At the 
national levels, however, the maximum allowed fine (of national laws) and the parameters 
for calculating the fine can differ significantly. Considering the same type of company and 
infringement, the differences in fines among Member States can be up to 25 times between 
the highest and the smallest fine.69 It means that the level of deterrence among these countries 
also differs. In Europe, only a few NCAs have their own Guidelines with specific methods 
to set fines, for instance, France and the UK.70 
In Brazil, the policy evaluation documents that anticipated Resolution No. 17/2016 
did not show any concern about strengthening ex-post enforcement with the end of the 
notification system of vertical agreements. According to Article 37 of Brazilian Competition 
Law, fines for antitrust violation range from 0.1 to 20% of the company's gross revenues in 
the year prior to the beginning of the investigations, in the field of the business activity in 
which the violation occurred. The method for setting fines within this range, though, is not 
always clear, since the terms “gross revenues”, or “the year prior to the beginning of the 
investigation” and “field of the business” can be rather subjective. Even though the Brazilian 
Competition Law anticipates in Article 45 some parameters for the calculation of fines, 
including the “seriousness of the violation” and the “advantage obtained by the violator”, 71 
there are no clear Guidelines oriented to develop objective methods to set fines. As a 
consequence, the interpretation of combined Articles 37 and 45 of the antitrust law has caused 
divergencies in the national jurisprudence.  
Gabriel Moreira Pinto conducted some empirical research about the different 
 
69 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be 
more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 2017, p. 20. 
70 See, Autorité de la cuncurrence (France), Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of 
Financial Penalties, 2011; Competition and Markets Authority (UK), CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate 
amount of penalty, 2018. It is worth noting that Germany, for instance, has a guideline with methods to set fines 
specific to cartel infringements. See also, Bundeskartellamt, Guidelines for the setting of fines in Cartel 
Administrative Proceedings, 2013.   
71 Article 45, Law No. 11.259/2011: “Art. 45. In the application of the penalties set forth in this Law, the 
following shall be taken into consideration: I - the seriousness of the violation; II - the good faith of the 
transgressor; III - the advantage obtained or envisaged by the violator; IV – whether the violation was 
consummated or not; - 17/34 - V - the degree of injury or threatened injury to free competition, the national 
economy, consumers, or third parties; VI - the negative economic effects produced in the market; VII - the 
economic status of the transgressor; and VIII – any recurrence.” 
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methodologies to decide fines in the Brazilian case law. He found out that, from 2004 to 
2010, in most infringement decisions, CADE failed in clearly defining its method to calculate 
fines and in explaining the weight of the parameters established by Article 45.72 More 
recently, João Paulo de Resende also carried out an analysis showing that, in a period of six 
months, CADE applied more than 18 different methodologies to the calculation of fines in 
cartel cases.73 The author explains, for instance, that as “gross revenue” CADE has 
considered the profit of the company (as in the Milk Cartel),74 the expected margin (as in the 
ForEx Cartel),75 the value of bid-contract (as in the “CarWash” investigation),76 among other 
examples. The same inaccuracy has also been observed in the use of other economic and 
legal parameters.  
In the cases of vertical restraints, CADE has not stipulated any fine higher than 2% 
of the company's gross revenues. From the cases explored in Chapter 3, CADE imposed fines 
in the SKF case of resale price-fixing of 1% of the company's gross revenues in 2013,77 and 
2% in the Iguatemi shopping mall cases.78 In none of the cases was there an explicit 
explanation regarding the parameters taken by the authority. After the end of the notification 
system of vertical agreements in 2016, the level of sanctions remained unchanged in the 
country. 
Furthermore, unlike the EU, any anti-competitive conduct (including vertical 
restrictions) in Brazil is also considered a crime, subjected to imprisonment of up to five 
years, under the Economic Criminal Law (Law No. 8.137/1990) and the Public Procurement 
Law (Law No. 8.666/1993). However, no business people have ever gone to prison as a 
consequence of anti-competitive misconduct. The very few cases of criminal prosecution in 
Brasil are cartel cases that are directly linked to corruption scandals.79 The “CarWash” 
operation is an example of that. Considered the biggest corruption scandal in history, the 
operation involved huge money-laundering schemes and fraud in public bids, which are in 
 
72 G. Moreira Pinto, ‘A dosimetria das multas impostas em resposta às infrações contra a ordem econômica’, 
Prêmio SEAE 2010 sobre Defesa da Concorrência, 2010. 
73 J. P. Resende, ‘Ainda falta um guia de dosimetria de pena’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do 
antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018, p. 1077. 
74 Case No. 08012.010744/2008-71. 
75 Case No. 08700.004633/2015-04. 
76 Case No. 08700.003226/2017-33. 
77 SKF vs. Procon-SP, Case No. 08012.001271/2001-447. 
78 Ambev 2, Case No. 08012.001626/2008-71; CADE vs. Condomínio do Shopping Center Iguatemi/SP, Case 
No. 08012.006636/97-43. 
79 C. A. J. Schimidt, ‘Crime e Castigo: Cartel no Brasil, algumas reflexões’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, 
Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018, p. 1186. 
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the scope of the antitrust authority.80  
The last point that should be highlighted with respect to antitrust sanctions is that 
simply raising the amount of fines as a way of strengthening the ex-post enforcement is not 
an optimal solution, since other variables play an important role in antitrust enforcement. 
Therefore, the next Subsections will take a closer look into other institutional factors that 
affect the detection level: antitrust errors, private enforcement and institutional set-up.  
5.5.2. Antitrust Errors  
In general terms, experience in antitrust policy-making can be characterized as a situation in 
which agency and/or courts have analysed a large amount of cases regarding a specific topic 
over the years and have learned from the outcomes of failures and successes in judgments 
and evaluations. The repetition of cases in both administrative and judicial levels over time, 
not only creates an important source of knowledge for law enforcers, but also permits the 
undertakings to have higher legal certainty on what is expected from them. If, for instance, a 
competition agency is new (or became recently effective) and just a few, if any, complex 
cases were assessed by the authority, the authority itself is more prone to errors. Besides, the 
companies will not have legal certainty on what type of business practices are illegal or not, 
and in which conditions. Subsection 5.3.2 emphasised the lack of experience as a source of 
information costs, since both law enforcers and undertakings, in these situations, have less 
access to information that comes from antitrust precedents. This Subsection will stress 
experience as a factor that directly influences antitrust errors from both antitrust authorities 
and courts, and therefore affects the incentives of companies to engage in restrictive 
agreements.  
Insights from the Social Learning Theory help explain how the lack of experience 
and/or consolidated jurisprudence creates enforcement costs.81 This theory explains that all 
learning phenomena result from both direct experiences and from the observation of other 
people’s behaviour. Albert Bandura argues that new patterns of behaviour can be acquired 
by observing the behaviour of others, without having to build up these patterns gradually by 
tedious trial and error.82 Moreover, the author also explains that people are repeatedly 
confronted with decisions that can lead to successful or unsuccessful outcomes. Because of 
 
80 J. Watts, ‘Operation Car Wash: Is this the biggest corruption scandal in history?’, The Guardian, 1 June 2017. 
81 See, for instance, A. Bandura, Social Learning Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1977. 
82 Bandura, 1977, p. 5. 
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that, over the time, successful responses to certain types of behaviour are then encouraged 
while inefficient ones are discarded over time.  
Regarding the antitrust policies, this learning process means that if a certain 
jurisdiction has experience regarding assessing complex cases of vertical agreements, at both 
administrative and the judicial level, firms observe what has been done in the past and 
therefore they can take extra precautions to avoid anti-competitive practices. Therefore, firms 
can learn from past experience or even from observing other firms’ and the competition 
authority’s actions. At the same time, the competition authority is also involved in a learning 
process that is vulnerable to errors that can affect the evolution of the dynamics of 
competition in the markets. As explained in Chapter 2, antitrust assessments of vertical 
agreements can be complex because they involve a challenging balance of pro- and anti-
competitive outcomes, and this complexity may generate errors that can be harmful to 
competition. As described by Alan Devlin and Michael Jacobs:  
“More than any other area of civil law, antitrust is error prone. Its basic 
analytical methodology is hopelessly imprecise. The economic terms at the 
heart of many of its important doctrinal questions—terms such as “cost,” 
“market,” “monopoly power,” and “entry barrier”—are either vague, 
contestable, or both. In many cases, the answer to the question of interest—
whether certain conduct is harmful to consumers— can depend upon first 
identifying and then comparing current or past harms and benefits with 
those likely, but not certain, to arise in the future. This comparison involves 
measuring the relative size of a known set of facts, on the one hand, and an 
uncertain but theoretically predictable future outcome, on the other.” 83 
Indeed, as the paragraph suggests, the errors that reflect the quality of decisions of antitrust 
authorities and courts can be classified as errors Type I and II. In statistics terms, on the one 
hand, a Type I error is described as the wrong rejection of a true null hypothesis.84 It is also 
regarded as a "false positive". Regarding antitrust cases, a Type I error is a misjudgement in 
which law enforcers condemn a firm’s behaviour which was not anti-competitive. Such errors 
may raise the desirable level of competitive intensity, increasing the degree of uncertainty, 
or lowering the decision-making threshold for enforcement. Type I errors reflect an over-
enforcement or over-regulation.85 Type I errors pressure companies to take precautionary 
 
83 A. Devlin & M. Jacobs, ‘Antitrust Error’, William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 52, No.1, 2010, p. 86-87. 
84 P. A. Morettin & W. O. Bussab, Estatística Básica, 5th Ed., São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 2003.  
85 Devlin & Jacobs, 2010, p. 86-87.  
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actions when they face the threat of being wrongly accused of anti-competitive behaviour. 
Consequently, businesses are less likely to participate in pro-competitive business 
transactions, such as vertical agreements that bring economic efficiencies to markets. An 
error Type I can decrease total welfare in markets since they limit the availability of products 
and services to consumers. 
A Type II error, on the other hand, is described as the wrong rejection of a false null 
hypothesis.86 It is also regarded as a "false negative". Considering competition law cases, a 
Type II error is a misjudgement in which law enforcers fail to condemn a conduct that is anti-
competitive, meaning that such errors take place when anti-competitive practices or conducts 
are not punished. Type II errors reflect under-enforcement or under-regulation. Because of 
the scenario of under-enforcement caused by error Type II, firms may engage in more anti-
competitive business practices, such as vertical restraints that foreclose markets. Errors Type 
II can hence also decrease total welfare in markets since they, indirectly, also restrict the 
amount and variety of products and services that are available to consumers. Indeed, in any 
case, errors of Type I and II can create social costs and enormous disincentives to companies, 
in addition to provoking adverse effects on the welfare of consumers and distortions of the 
level of economic activity.87 According to Michael Block and J. Gregory Sidak, antitrust 
errors introduce costs to society that cannot be easily eliminated by law enforcers, not even 
through compensation or imposition of high penalties.88  
Let’s take as example an Agreement A, a welfare-enhancing vertical agreement 
between a beverage producer and a wholesale distributor that creates efficiencies in the form 
of cost savings that are transferred to consumers as lower prices; and an Agreement B, a 
welfare-reducing distribution agreement with a retail price-fixing clause, in which the fixed-
price was higher than competitive standards. A Type I error would mean that the antitrust 
agency blocks the welfare enhancing Agreement A or prosecutes the beverage companies 
treating them as if they were colluding instead of cooperating. In contrast, an error of Type 
II shapes the scenario in which the antitrust agency approves without restriction a welfare-
reducing agreement as Agreement B or in the case of inertia of the agency in prosecuting the 
beverage companies involved in restrictive practices. It is worth noting the reaction of courts, 
antitrust agencies, and academics with regard to the antitrust error which has a bias towards 
 
86 Morettin & Bussab, 2003. 
87 M. Block & J. Sidak, ‘The cost of antitrust deterrence: Why not hang a price fixer now and then?’, The 
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 5, 1980, pp. 1131-1138. 
88 Block & Sidak, 1980. 
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“false negatives”, meaning that they tend to more easily admit the misjudgement related to 
an anti-competitive conduct, rather than to a pro-competitive one.89 This happens because 
the pro-competitive behaviour that is erroneously condemned turns out to result in a 
permanent loss for the market. In our example, the efficiencies of Agreement A would never 
be passed on to the consumers, which would in theory cause less harm than the negative 
effects of a wrongly permitted anti-competitive conduct.90 
The relevant issue at stake is that changes from an ex-ante policy to an ex-post 
monitoring of vertical agreements alter the probability of errors Type I and Type II, affecting 
the features of the agreements that are signed by firms. More frequent errors by antitrust 
agencies or courts in a certain jurisdiction, make businessmen less motivated to engage in 
welfare-enhancing contracts. According to Wils, “errors or the risk of errors in the imposition 
of sanctions could lead to lawful and economically desirable conduct being deterred”.91  
The end of a notification system of vertical agreements changes the sorts of business 
practices that undertakings implement. If the antitrust agency or a court in a given country 
does not have experience in handling complex assessments of vertical agreements, the 
probability of Type II errors increases, and firms may be encouraged to engage in anti-
competitive practices. However, if antitrust agencies and/or courts are overlooking vertical 
agreements, even the efficiency-enhancing ones, and the probability of Type I errors is high, 
this scenario could discourage better competitive practices. In this case, the amount of errors 
of Type I and Type II increases, while the available information for parties is less complete, 
and the law enforcer is less familiar with the actual application of substantial rules based on 
economic concepts.  
In effect, a notification system of vertical agreements may reduce the above-
mentioned error costs related to restrictive business practices, mainly if the quality of the 
assessment made by legal representatives at the moment of the notification is high. Therefore, 
the deterrent effect can be greater under a notification system of agreements, especially in 
the case when business people cannot be sure of the outcomes of the antitrust investigations, 
or cannot predict the probability of being condemned.92 In this context, antitrust error costs 
 
89 A reference paper in this respect is F. Easterbrook, ‘The Limits of Antitrust’, Texas Law Review, No. 63, 
No.1, 1984, pp. 1-40.  
90 For more details regarding this discussion, see: Devlin and Jacobs, 2010, supra note 83; and F. McChesney, 
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91 Wils, 2003, supra note 21, p. 9. 
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can be calibrated or adjusted considering the probability of detection or fines, or, more 
generally, depending on the intensity of the ex-post enforcement. A reduction of error costs 
can thus be associated with a better screening of the cases to be investigated by the antitrust 
authority.93 
In practice, law enforcers cannot avoid some of the antitrust error costs of 
enforcement, simply because there are uncertainties, the access to information is not perfect, 
the learning process is affected by institutional features and because generally judges are not 
particularly good at handling complex economic arguments.94  
Looking at both European and Brazilian experiences, some lessons can be highlighted 
in relation to the learning process. In Europe, forty years of experience with the notification 
system of agreements gave to the European Commission better knowledge and experience to 
assess the impact of agreements on economic welfare. When the notification regime was 
installed in 1962, the Commission or the Member States had no experience in assessing 
agreements, and the likelihood of committing errors was high, therefore the notification 
system of vertical agreements was an adequate policy. However, the accumulated experience 
over the years (particularly by the Commission) in handling complex economic analyses of 
vertical agreements, somehow justified the change towards an ex post control monitoring 
regime in 2003. As explained in Chapter 4, Regulation 1/2003 also decentralized antitrust 
enforcement in Europe, which mean that, since then, NCAs as well as national courts are also 
subjected to the error costs. As demonstrated so far in this PhD research, the level of 
enforcement and the experience among Member States can considerably differ, due to, 
among others, different historical and institutional realities.  In this scenario, the probability 
of antitrust errors also varies.  
In Brazil, the existing antitrust jurisprudence is very limited, and the economic 
assessment of limited cases is not always adequate. Also, the outcome of some important 
vertical cases indicated diverse perspectives on substantive topics among the CADE’s 
Commissioners. With regard to resale price-fixing, until 2013, CADE had condemned no 
company for this antitrust practice. Most of the cases were dismissed because of the lack of 
market power of economic agents, lack of evidence, and/or lack of monitoring mechanisms 
and punishment for the dealer that did not follow the fixed resale prices. The jurisprudence 
 
93 See analysis of Neven, 2002, supra note 5. 
94 Easterbrook, 1984, supra note 89, p. 39. 
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until 2013 supported companies to carry out these business practices without apparent risks.95 
Since 2013, some divergent opinions among CADE’s Commissioners started to be 
formulated in respect of the competitive outcomes of this practice. Moreover, resale price-
fixing turned out be considered as an anti-competitive practice in the judgment of the SKF 
case.96 According to the company, no distributor was ever penalized for not following SKF’s 
fixed mark-ups, being free to set its own prices. The company also argued that the fixed 
mark-up was a request from the distributors themselves as a way of avoiding the free-riding 
problem as part of the "price war" in the downstream market. CADE, however, defined that 
the vertical price-fixing established by the auto parts manufacturer SKF was considered 
illegal since defendants were not able to prove efficiencies. Besides, the case was considered 
illegal despite the fact that the distributors did not follow the fixed resale prices.  
Since the SKF decision, companies are facing more legal uncertainty in respect of 
certain types of vertical contracts.97 Firms must now be able to prove that the positive effects 
generated by vertical price-fixing will be passed on to consumers, altering the dynamics of 
the ex-post enforcement of vertical restraints. If the burden of proof regarding the absence of 
adverse effects on competition relies on  the company, it is very likely that it will be 
condemned by the authority, even though it can bring efficiencies to the markets.98 This 
change of interpretation about the legal rules concerning resale price-fixing in Brazil may 
probably be subject to more  error costs, once contracts can be considered illegal despite 
enhancing efficiencies in specific markets.  
With regard to the practice of geo-blocking, CADE’s jurisprudence is rather limited 
and outdated (from the early 2000s).99 The most relevant cases are the ones involving 
exclusive territory clauses imposed by the Shopping Mall Iguatemi, in the city of São 
Paulo.100 In this case, Iguatemi prohibited shop owners of luxury brands from opening other 
stores in malls that directly competed with Iguatemi, and/or defining that the same shop 
owners could not have other shops within a certain radius of its mall (“radius clause”). Even 
though the authority recognized some economic efficiency of the clauses, such as the 
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protection against free-riders, the result was the condemnation of the shopping mall, since 
the measures taken by the clauses were generating foreclosure and they were overall 
disproportionate. The effect-based analysis conducted by CADE over the year has been 
subjected to errors due to the adoption of a more qualitative approach and subjective 
reasoning, instead of a structured and objective economic assessment which includes the use 
of quantitative methods. 
Additionally, as exposed in Chapter 3, in the past years, CADE has greatly depended 
on settlements. Settlements can actually generate diverse effects when it comes to error costs. 
On the one hand, settlements may decrease error costs, since firms sign the agreement with 
the authority and terminate the anti-competitive practice. The authority, in this case, reduces 
the administrative costs of carrying out the whole investigation, and the termination of the 
practice increases economic welfare. On the other hand, settlements may increase error costs, 
since companies might decide to sign the settlements and terminate the pro-competitive 
agreements just in order not to bear the costs of litigation. Accordingly, the excessive use of 
settlements might also increase error costs.   
In short, the lack of guidelines on the assessment of vertical agreements, the lack of 
judicial review, added to the lack of experience in assessing complex cases increase the risks 
of misinterpretation of both the law enforcers and the business community, intensifying the 
risk of errors Types I and II in Brazil.  
It should be noted that the recent globalization of antitrust laws and enforcement 
practices, can help less experienced jurisdictions to avoid committing errors. Considering the 
international landscape, national competition agencies design their policies based on similar 
grounds, for instance, the promotion of market efficiency. This does not mean that antitrust 
rules must be the same in all jurisdictions, or even that the enforcement of competition law 
in different countries is free of tensions.101 In this respect, Ezrachi explains that: 
“Competition law is not immune to these dynamic society-driven 
processes. […] it is inherently susceptive to a wide range of national 
variants. Although guided by economic analysis, one may identify distinct 
social, economic and political foundations which foster diversity. Different 
levels of economic development, market realities, government and 
enforcement structure all dictate differentiation in the composition of 
 
101 A. Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, (April) 2017, pp. 49–75. 
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national competition provisions and their implementation”. 102 
Indeed, in the attempt to apply international jurisprudence, the domestic economic reality 
and the goals of competition enforcement are only some of the many forces which often 
introduce tensions and inconsistencies. In the case of the EU, the market integration goal had 
a great role to play in defining the outcome of vertical restraints cases. However, the problems 
associated with market integration are not observed in many other jurisdictions such as 
Brazil. Therefore, by applying international decisions (designed and based on their specific 
goals) to national realities, many less experienced countries in competition policies are 
subjected to even greater error costs of enforcement.  
A last point to be noted in respect of errors in the decision-making process, is the 
complexity of digital economies. The competition implications of vertical restraints in digital 
markets are inherently more complex because of multiple interactions, network externalities 
and vertical relationships between the market-place platforms and consumers. Chapter 2 
argued that this scenario potentially implies a more elaborated antitrust analysis with multiple 
foreclosure effects, and therefore, higher changes of antitrust error. The European 
Commission has been working on solving and clarifying the applicable rules when it comes 
to vertical agreements in online markets, but many questions remain unanswered.  
For instance, new cases of selective distribution and platform bans, contradict old 
jurisprudence in the topic, increasing the legal uncertainty of business people that intend to 
celebrate such contracts. The Coty case is an example of that situation. Towards the end of 
2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided that no antitrust violation had been 
verified in the selective distribution case against the luxury cosmetics company Coty, which 
banned authorized distributors from selling Coty’s products in online platforms such as 
Amazon or E-bay.103 This outcome was different from the well-known jurisprudence in the 
topic, the Pierre Fabri precedent from early 2010s, in which, the European Court of Justice 
ruled that a prohibition on internet sales in the framework of selective distribution systems 
represents an infringement of competition by Article 101(1) TFEU.104  
 
102 A. Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, (April) 2017, pp. 49–75. 
103 Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case No. C-230/16, decision Luxembourg Court of 
Justice of the European Union on 6 December 2017. 
104 Pierre Fabre vs L’Autorité de la concurrence, Case No. 439/09. 
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In Brazil, the few vertical cases involving digital markets ended up with settlement 
decisions, which, again, did not make a positive contribution to the development of the 
jurisprudence in the country.     
5.5.3. The Role of the Judiciary and Private Enforcement 
Vertical agreements can be detrimental to the overall economy, since they can drive 
competitors out of the market, and consumers can end up paying high prices for a product or 
service. These losses can therefore be compensated under the rules of tort law. If a country 
does not have an ex-ante notification system of vertical agreements and public enforcement 
is not able to achieve effective enforcement, private actions can play an important role in 
national enforcement practices.  
If a country has a notification system of agreements, the “green flag” of the authority 
in respect of signing the agreement, also protects the companies against future litigation. 
However, if the companies do not have confirmation from the antitrust authorities with 
respect to the legality of the agreements, they are not only subjected to possible prosecution 
by the authority itself but are also not covered against private litigations. This uncertainty in 
respect of private actions generates costs to parties. In countries where private actions are 
very common, companies may have less incentive to engage in anti-competitive agreements, 
and the opposite is also true. If private actions are not a reality in a given jurisdiction, 
companies may engage in more restrictive agreements, since the probability of being sued is 
low. In some jurisdictions, private antitrust actions are more welcome than others. For 
instance, in the United States, in average 90% of the antitrust cases come from private 
litigation,105 but this is not a reality in many jurisdictions for several reasons.  
It is worth highlighting that the structure of the judiciary system directly impacts the 
incentive to initiate private actions. Furthermore, a system of private ex-post control of anti-
competitive agreements requires supporting rules that enable an adequate assessment by the 
judiciary, and these flanking rules are not always existent in common law jurisdictions as 
they are in most European countries or even in Brazil.106 In the scope of private enforcement, 
both in Europe and in Brazil, civil law procedures require that the plaintiffs present, in the 
case files, the relevant information to support their case. However, they often have difficulties 
 
105 See Wils, 2003, supra note 21. 
106 Moschel, 2000, supra note 34, p. 498. 
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in gathering the complex information and evidence to prove the anti-competitive 
infringement. This is different from the public enforcement systems. In the administrative 
model followed by both jurisdictions, the competition authority has greater investigative 
powers and has the right to collect evidence with or without the firm’s consent (for instance, 
in the form of dawn raids).107 
In a country with under-developed or dysfunctional courts, it does not make too much 
sense to give incentives to private rights as a way of enforcing the anti-competitive vertical 
agreements. Expanding on this idea, Donncadh Woods et al. also point to some other 
obstacles regarding antitrust private actions.108 The first obstacles highlighted by the author 
is that parties might not always have adequate incentives to start a claim before the courts, 
mainly because judiciary costs can be very high. Second, proving the infringement of 
welfare-reducing vertical agreements can also be challenging for claimants. Third, the 
calculation of the real loss related to the existence of a restrictive agreement in the 
marketplace is very costly and difficult to assess, as there is not enough expertise to identify 
the losses. Fourth, and most important of all, companies (e.g. distributors) might decide not 
to enter into a private action in order to keep good commercial relations (e.g. with their 
suppliers). Finally, some agencies and courts are known for moving slowly, both because of 
the significant number of pending cases, and also because of several legal tools that allow 
parties to the case to unduly delay the process.  
Looking at what has happened in the EU, the Directive 2014/104/EU entered into 
force after 10 years of having the ex-post control of agreements, removing procedural 
obstacles to private actions under EU law. 109 The Directive is applicable to every individual 
or collective antitrust damage action, which include cases of compensation for damages 
originated by restrictive agreements. Thus, important changes were brought by the Directive, 
such as:  (i) parties have now easier access to required evidence; (ii) the final infringement 
decision of an NCA also constitutes full evidence before the national courts; (iii) victims 
have at least 5 years to bring damages claims before courts, after the moment the victim finds 
out about the damages caused by an antitrust infringement; (iv) victims are also entitled to 
full compensation for the harm, including the right to the receipt of interest regarding the 
 
107 Pirrung, 2004, supra note 31, p. 97. It should be noted that the investigative power of antitrust agencies is 
often focused in cartel cases, but less common in the vertical cases. 
108 D. Woods, A. Sinclair & D. Ashton,  ‘Private enforcement of Community competition law: modernization 
and the road ahead’, Competition Policy Newsletter, Vol. 2, (Summer) 2004, p. 33. 
109 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance. 
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period of time since the harm occurred until the payment of full compensation. Despite the 
limitations of this Directive, the changes brought by it, to a certain extent, lowered the level 
of uncertainty of private actions and helped to increase the credibility of the judicial system.  
The outcomes of the European experience fostered further discussions in Brazil 
regarding the clarification of rules of private antitrust claims.110 CADE’s recent Resolution 
No. 21 from 12 September 2018, aimed at clarifying the documents produced by the 
administrative proceedings, such as leniency documents, that can be used in courts when 
starting a private action. There has also emerged an initiative from the Senate, Project Law 
No. 283/2016, aiming at facilitating and encouraging private actions with regard to anti-
competitive conduct.  One of the main prepositions of this Project Law is to increase the time 
period regarding the right to start an action from three to five years after CADE’s decision. 
CADE has been directly involved in this legislative process that is still to be approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies.  
Despite the relevance of these legislative attempts, there are two important 
considerations with regard to the Brazilian case. Firstly, these rules are mostly applicable to 
cartel cases, and there is a very low perception from society that it can also be applicable to 
other anti-competitive practices such as restrictive vertical agreements. Secondly, the 
efficient use of private enforcement for vertical agreements requires the use of the economic 
analysis of law by judges and members of the judiciary that Brazil has not necessarily 
developed so far.  
The discussion regarding the role of Judiciary Power in antitrust cases, is, of course, 
not limited to private actions, but also to the judicial review of CADE’s administrative 
decisions. In Brazil, CADE’s decisions are subject to judicial review. Until the mid-2000s, 
CADE's decisions were not so effective, since most of them were suspended by the judiciary. 
From 1994, when the old Brazilian Competition Law entered into force, until 2005, only 18% 
of CADE’s infringement decisions were essentially confirmed by courts.111 In the years of 
2002 to 2004, for instance, less than 4% of the fines imposed by the Brazilian Authority were 
actually paid by parties. This scenario started to slowly change after 2008, when the agency's 
success rate in court disputes started to increase.112 In a study conducted by the Brazilian 
Society of Public Law (in Portuguese ‘Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público’, or just 
 
110 The European Directive 2014/104/EU was indeed quoted several times by CADE in the Technical Note that 
followed the Public Consultation 5/2016.  
111 CADE, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 2013, p. 132. 
112 In 2008, there were 343 new cases for judicial review; in 2009, 150 new cases; in 2010, 62 new cases; and 
in 2011, 58. CADE, 2013, p. 131. 
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SBDP) in 2011, it was pointed out that almost 50% of CADE’s decisions on administrative 
proceedings regarding anti-competitive conduct were confirmed by national courts.113 Other 
data presented by CADE in 2013 indicates that about 80% of CADE's decisions are now 
upheld by the judiciary.114 
5.5.4. The General Trust in Institutions 
The general trust in institutions appears to be relevant when discussing antitrust enforcement 
costs. In this respect, developing economies such as Brazil, are particularly vulnerable. Also 
in the EU, there are some less developed countries that face similar institutional challenges, 
such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovakia.115 The public and private enforcement of competition law in less developed 
countries should be characterized in the context of insufficient economic development, 
incipient competition regimes, lack of competition culture, economic fragility, and most 
importantly for the current discussion, the institutional weakness.116  
The costs raised by the distrust of institutions are particularly important in the context 
of ex-post control of vertical agreements, but not limited to it. Under an ex-post monitoring 
regime, undertakings may have more incentives to engage in anti-competitive practices, 
because of the low probability of detection. The likelihood of being caught is also strongly 
related to the administrative and judicial structure of the given jurisdiction, as well as all the 
other bodies that are related to it.  
From the institutional perspective, it would first be useful to mention the general 
conceptualization of institutions brought by Douglas North: 
“Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions. They 
are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulation), 
informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed 
 
113  Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público (SBDP), Revisão Judicial das Decisões do Conselho Administrativo 
de Defesa Econômica (CADE): Pesquisa empírica e aplicada sobre os casos julgados pelos Tribunais 
Regionais Federais (TRFs), Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Belo 
Horizonte, Editora Fórum, 2010.  
114 CADE, 2013, p. 136. 
115 For more information about the development of EU regions, see European Union (2017), Eurostat Regional 
Yearbook, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/8222062/KS-HA-17-001-EN-N.pdf, 
[26/05/2019]  
116 Pena, supra note 41, p. 480. 
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codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. 
Organizations are the players: group of individuals bound by a common 
purpose to achieve objectives. They include political bodies (political 
parties, the senate, the regulatory agency); economic bodies (firms, trade 
unions, family farms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic 
associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational 
training centres).”117 
In general terms, North and other scholars associated to the "New Institutional Economics" 
have examined how institutional quality affects public policy.118 As an example of 
institutional quality, one can highlight, (i) voice and accountability (citizen participation in 
the selection of governments); (ii) political stability; (iii) government effectiveness 
(capability to produce and implement good policies); (iv) regulatory quality (incidence of 
market-friendly policies); (v) rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption.119 In the context of 
antitrust law, countries with mature institutions, greater capabilities and resources, have 
greater prospects of using efficiently ambitious competition policies.120 
In a comparative historical analysis of institutions, one of the main ideas is that the 
choices made at the time of the institutions’ formation and the resulting political decisions 
have a constraining effect on their future development due to the inertial tendency of 
institutions that block or hinder subsequent changes.121 The concept of ‘path dependence’ is 
precisely offered as the analytical tool to understand the importance of temporal sequences 
and the development of social events and processes over time. According to the path 
dependence theory, once a specific trajectory has been adopted, it would take a great deal of 
effort or even an external shock to change the direction and course of institutions at later 
times.122 This means that the current structure and functioning of any institution can be 
understood only partially if the analysis is not integrated in a historical perspective. Despite 
the attempts of some competition agencies, there will always be some difficulties to 
guarantee a competitive environment. The challenges of cultural components are most of the 
 
117 D. North, ‘The new institutional economics and Third World development’, in J. Harris, J. Hunter & C. 
Lewis (Eds), Economics and Third World Development, Oxon, Routledge, 1995, p. 23.  
118 Regarding the work of North, see for instance, D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; D. North, ‘Economic Performance through 
Time’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, 1994, pp. 359-368.  
119 List prepared by World Bank in the following working paper: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobaton, 
‘Governance Matters’, World Bank Policy Research Working paper, No. 2196, 1999.   
120 Kovacic, 2001, supra note 1. 
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times difficult to overcome, because they are historically and politically rooted.  
Institutional stability is one of the factors to be considered when promoting 
competition policy, and this comprises both ex-ante preventive educational measures, and 
ex-post enforcement control. The antitrust authority is therefore responsible for promoting 
appropriate institutional arrangements for its purposes defined by law.123  
For this PhD research, I consider that a competition law itself is not sufficient to 
guarantee optimal levels of enforcement, since the institutional environment can jeopardize 
the efforts of the authorities. In Europe, for instance, the Commission, in cooperation with 
the ECN, has difficulties in transplanting the competition culture and institutional set-up to 
guarantee optimal competition policy across the different EU Member States. The Report 
entitled “Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003” concluded that NCAs have to be empowered to 
co-enforce competition rules in Europe, in order to make a positive contribution to the 
strengthening of EU antitrust enforcement.124 Yet, the same report suggested that several 
NCAs still have room for improvement, among other, by finding adequate enforcement tools 
to deter anti-competitive violations. These concerns were again raised by the impact 
assessments documents of Directive 1/2019 that aims “to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market”.125 
In Brazil, CADE also faces difficulties when it comes to building effective 
enforcement mechanisms that at the same time deter anti-competitive effects and encourage 
a competition culture among businesspeople. Looking back at the Brazilian experience, 
antitrust law was born as a way to protect the “popular economy”, and after the 1988 
Constitution and Law No. 8.884/1994, took the position of creating a competitive market. 
Actually, the old Competition Law from 1994 was created in the context of privatization of 
state-owned companies. In Brazil, a top-down model of competition policy was 
configured.126 In a top-down model, there is the transposition of norms (in this case, of 
competition law), without a correlative socio-political movement, which ends up having a 
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small effect on society. The legal reforms of countries that have a top-down approach may 
be insufficient to create a competition culture. These countries may need more serious 
institutional reforms against abuses of economic power, which involves also movements 
against private interests that interfere in a more efficient law and decision making.127  
All these institutional issues are directly linked to the main discussion of this Chapter 
on the optimal design of competition policies applicable to vertical agreements. When 
choosing between an ex-ante notification system of agreements, an ex-post control system or 
something in between, the regulator (mostly antitrust agencies) should avoid overweighting 
the directive administrative costs of having to analyse notifications, but also look at several 
other factors related to the development of antitrust knowledge and institutional set-up 
analysed in this Chapter. These factors are usually underestimated by policy makers although 
they play a big role in the definition of incentives to parties on whether to engage or not in 
anti-competitive practices. 
5.6. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS  
Administrative costs can be defined direct costs borne by the law enforcers and firms to 
comply with the applicable regulation. Administrative costs are usually the ones that are 
easier to consider when it comes to estimating enforcement costs. For this purpose, I will 
divide the administrative costs in two different components, the fixed administrative costs 
and the variable administrative costs. From Microeconomic theory, fixed costs are the ones 
that do not depend on the amount of quantity produced, and variable costs are the ones that 
change with the variation of output.128 However, since we are not talking about production 
costs, but enforcement costs, I will consider fixed administrative costs the ones that basically 
do not vary with the passage of time, degree of experience of public agents and the antitrust 
experts, or the level of maturity of the institutional set up. The variable administrative costs, 
on its turn, are the ones that vary with the degree of experience that public agents and antitrust 
experts acquire over time, and with the level of maturity of the institutional set-up. The next 
 
127 It is worth noting that Brazil, since 2014 has been passing to the biggest political crises of the country due 
to a series of corruption scandals. Among the politicians involved in these scandals are two former Presidents, 
Lula da Silva (who is currently in prison), and Dilma Rousseff that was impeached and removed from its office 
in 2016.  
128 For the analysis of different measures of costs, see G. Mankiw & M. P. Taylor, Microeconomics, 4th ed., 
Hampshire, Cengage Learning, 2017, p. 116-122. 
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paragraphs will explain these two components in detail.  
The fixed administrative costs are simply the cost of maintaining the antitrust 
agencies, prosecutors and courts, from the infrastructure to the human resources. The cost of 
staff is often the biggest cost of an antitrust agency. When thinking about the costs borne by 
private parties, they are usually related to the cost of lawyers and experts, and fees of antitrust 
agencies.  
In the context of the enforcement of vertical agreements, a notification system can be 
costly both to the undertakings and to the antitrust authorities. The undertakings, under a 
notification system of agreements, bear the costs of the notification fees and the costs of 
hiring lawyers. The firms also might bear the costs of renegotiations, for instance, if the 
authority gives a signal of a potential anti-competitive concern, and, in extreme cases, the 
costs of redrafting the whole contract and vertical clauses. Under a notification system of 
vertical agreements there are also the costs linked to the disclosure of information between 
the parties of the agreement, that can be quite high in cases where the authority decides to 
reject the operation. The antitrust authorities themselves, under an ex-ante notification 
system, have to consider the costs of their staff to proceed with the analysis of filling forms, 
and most importantly, they bear the risk of analysing a huge number of contracts, including 
the ones that present no antitrust risk whatsoever to the markets. 
Under the ex-post regime of agreements, the costs for antitrust authorities drop 
drastically, since they will only randomly assess the most severe agreements. However, for 
the parties, it is not always clear which legal framework reduces the administrative costs. 
This is the case because, even under the ex-post control regime, parties still have to hire 
lawyers to help the self-assessment of their contracts, although they will not be 100% sure 
that their agreement is lawful. Apart from these legal costs, under the ex-post regime, firms 
are vulnerable to the risks of future litigation that can be much bigger than a simple 
notification fee. Antitrust litigations can take years to be solved if taking into account both 
administrative decisions and judicial reviews and therefore the costs to parties are very 
unpredictable. 
Administrative costs tend to be overstated in the law-making process, not only 
because they are easier to compute, but also because of the budget constraints of antitrust 
authorities. Antitrust regulators usually have a certain budget for hiring a limited number of 
staff and most of the time they choose to allocate the money in the assessment of more severe, 
or of a politically more interesting case.  
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The European Commission White Paper explicitly brought up the issue of the 
administrative burden of the notification of agreements, since the resources expended in those 
cases could be allocated to more severe cases such as cartel prosecutions. However, this 
administrative burden of the notification system, argued by the Commission, was criticized 
by some scholars who showed that it was overweighed. As presented in Chapter 4, Riley 
argued that the notification of vertical agreements was already an “irrelevant procedure with 
marginal impact on the enforcement of EU competition law” by the time Regulation 1/2003 
entered into force and, therefore, there were almost no costs to the Commission to abandon 
this policy.129 Indeed, even though in the late 1960s the Commission was handling more than 
30.000 notifications a year, this amount was substantially reduced by the introduction of 
comfort letters, block exemptions (mainly the 1999 Block Exemption Regulation), and 
notices. For instance, only 71 agreements were notified in 2003, before the new Regulation 
entered into force.130 It means that with the adoption of complementary rules to the 
notification system, the administrative burden of the authority also goes down.  
However, even though administrative costs may have been overstated by the 
Commission in the White Paper, the lack of resources of some EU Member States is a reality 
that has been calling the attention of the European authority in the past years. The Policy 
evaluation document that anticipated Directive 1/2019 shows that several EU Member States 
have insufficient resources and a significantly lower level of enforcement decisions.131 The 
document compared countries with similar GDP, showing that national authorities with 
limited resources also face excessively lower levels of antitrust decisions compared to the 
NCAs with a higher level of resources in the same time period.132  
Similar analysis could be formulated concerning the Brazilian experience. From 
January 2015 to November 2016, a period when Brazil faced clear rules of notification of 
both vertical and horizontal agreements,133 only 35 associative agreements among 
horizontals and verticals were assessed by the authority, corresponding to less than 5% of 
 
129 A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! Part One: 
Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003a, p. 604. 
130 According to the XXXIII Report on Competition Policy 2003, 216 agreements were notified in 1998, followed 
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131 European Commission, 2017, supra note 125. 
132 European Commission, 2017, supra note 125, p. 28. The European Commission does not reveal in this policy 
evaluation document to which Member State each data belongs, but it shows that NCAs which have more 
limited resources (e.g. Country 1 and 2) present less enforcement decisions (14 and 13 decisions respectively) 
compared to the NCAs with a higher level of resources (e.g. Countries 3 and 4: 28 and 48 decisions respectively) 
in the same time period. 
133 Period when CADE Resolution No. 10/2014 was into force.  
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cases analysed by the authority in the same period. One could say that the notification system 
of vertical agreements in Brazil, did not necessarily overload CADE’s staff. However, budget 
constraint is currently a problem faced by the authority, since the hiring of 200 additional 
staff foreseen by the Competition Law No. 12.529/2011 has not materialised due to wider 
government budget cuts. According to an OECD report, the Brazilian antitrust authority is 
known as one of “the most understaffed competition enforcement regimes in the world”.134 
Antitrust authorities tend to overstate the administrative burden of a notification 
system of vertical agreements because they are simply not interested in such cases. 
Authorities are usually interested in enforcing more high-profile cases that would increase 
their reputation, such as international price-fixing cartels, and, consequently, this private 
interest pulls the law-making in the direction of choosing a less costly policy option for 
vertical agreements. The downside of having private interests behind the regulatory process 
is that optimal welfare outcomes cannot always be achieved. 
Finally, the variable administrative costs of enforcement can change depending on 
the degree of experience of antitrust authorities and their institutional maturity.  As a result, 
it is wrong to assume that all the authorities bear similar costs when it comes to assessing 
vertical agreements, under ex-ante or ex-post control of such commercial practices. Indeed, 
the greater the experience of a particular antitrust agency, the better qualified its staff is, and 
less time and resources are spent in the assessment of each vertical agreements’ case. 
Consequently, the costs for the authority (or for the legal representatives of firms) are lower. 
This component of the administrative costs is very relevant for the next step of this research 
that refers to the building of the Antitrust Cost Curve related to the enforcement of vertical 
agreements. 
5.7. THE ANTITRUST COST CURVE 
5.7.1. Building the Cost Curve 
This Chapter started by highlighting the work of Hahn,135 Neven,136 Barros,137 and Loss et 
 
134 OECD, Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil, 2019, p. 10. 
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al.138, who all somehow identified the importance of experience and institutional set-up to 
define an optimal policy for restrictive agreements. Briefly speaking, according to these 
authors, notification policies of agreements are preferred by the less experienced law 
enforcers when assessing anti-competitive conduct and when their perception of 
undertakings with regard to the probability of getting caught is low. This existing literature, 
as described before, has some limitations, since it is shaped in the EU context of 
modernization of competition rules, and did not focus on the different policies required for 
vertical agreements and for other restrictive practices. Moreover, the theoretical literature has 
not been further developed in recent years.  
Below, the discussion is re-introduced by the formulation of illustrative curves in the 
context of a qualitative and normative analysis. This attempt will consider that the total cost 
of enforcement of vertical agreements are equal to C, which embodies the sum of C1 
(information cost), C2 (incentive cost) and C3 (administrative cost).  
For this qualitative analysis, it is considered firstly that enforcement costs are 
associated to the evolution of incentive and information costs that are a function of α, which 
measures the antitrust experience acquired over time with regard to the economic assessment 
of complex vertical agreement cases (Figure 1). Experience, in this case, is not measured by 
‘time’, but rather, assessment of cases. It is worth noting that using ‘time’ as a variable of the 
cost curves has several limitations. Historical and socio-political reasons can affect the course 
of time it takes for a certain jurisdiction to achieve a good experience. As highlighted along 
this PhD research, the influence of different groups of agents (e.g. industry and their lobby 
groups, politicians, lawyers) in the law and decision-making process can delay the due 
development of the legal rules, directly affecting the relevance of the time dimension.   
Secondly, enforcement cost is related to the evolution of incentive and information 
costs that are also a function of β, which measures the quality and maturity of the institutional 
set-up (Figure 2). The institutional set-up is related to all institutional features/elements that 
affect the institutional maturity and quality mentioned in Section 5.4.4, mainly the 
capabilities of law enforcers to guarantee optimal levels of enforcement. The choice of these 
measures is related to the level of antitrust experience and the quality and maturity of the 
institutional set-up is in accordance with the cost analysis conducted in the previous Sections. 
Indeed, these two variables turned out to be at the centre of our discussions related both to 
information and incentive costs and, therefore, they are adequate for our purpose. 
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Thirdly, for this analysis, it is possible to interpret that the administrative costs can 
also be a function of α and β, and therefore they are not constant in time. As explained in 
Section 5.6.2, the more experienced is the law enforcer, the quicker (and therefore the less 
costly) will be the decision-making process.  
When it comes to information and incentive costs, the Table below indicates which 
costs are directly influenced by α and β.  The symbol ‘++’ indicates the situation where the 
costs are highly influenced by variables α and β, the symbol ‘+’ indicates the situation where 
the costs are slightly influenced by variables α and β, and the symbol ‘-’ refers to a situation 
where the costs are not influenced by any of the variables.  
Table 5.1 – Enforcement costs: degree of influence of antitrust experience and the 
institutional set-up 
Enforcement costs α β 
Information costs 
Costs of gathering information ++ + 
Costs of assessing the competitive effects ++ + 
Incentive costs 
Fines - ++ 
Antitrust Error ++ ++ 
Structure of Judiciary + ++ 
Distrust in Institutions + ++ 
Note: α refers to antitrust experience and β refers to institutional set-up. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Table 5.1 shows that information costs – composed by the costs of gathering market 
information and the costs of assessing the economic effects of vertical agreements (both 
efficiencies and anti-competitive effects) – are highly influenced by the antitrust degree of 
experience. This is the case because the more mature and experienced is the competition 
agency, the greater are the chances of having knowledgeable staff to conduct the assessments 
of vertical agreements. Information costs are also slightly influenced by the level of the 
institutional set-up variable, since, for instance, the gathering of market information might 
also depend on how stable and trustworthy the competition authority is in the eyes of business 
people.  
Considering the incentive costs in Table 5.1, they are all highly influenced by the 
level of institutional set-up. For example, the incentive costs of not having an optimal fine 
scheme (and/or optimal methods of applying fines) are highly dependent on the level of 
maturity of the authority. The comparative analysis showed that some European countries 
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with long-standing tradition in Competition Law, such as the UK, France and Germany have 
specific guidelines when it comes to this topic. Having clear rules concerning this topic, 
decreases the enforcement costs. Antitrust error costs are also highly influenced by the degree 
of experience of the law enforcers. The more experienced and more mature is the authority, 
the smaller are the errors in the decision-making process.  
Relying on both Law and Economics and the Social Learning Theories, the following 
figures are proposed. 
Figure 5.1 – Evolution of information and incentive costs in assessing vertical agreements: 
the influence of antitrust experience 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
In Figure 5.1, the cost curves (C1 and C2) are non-linear downward sloping curves. The first 
property that should be highlighted is related to the negative slope of the curves. In both 
incentive and information costs curves there is a negative relation between the variables, i.e. 
the bigger the experience of law enforcers in conducting full economic assessment in vertical 
cases, the smaller are the enforcement costs related to it. The second important property is 
their convex shape, meaning that the slope of the curves decreases at a decreasing rate. In 
practical terms, if an antitrust authority has no experience whatsoever in assessing complex 
vertical agreement cases (α = 0), the perceived value of the first assessment (to both business 
people and law enforcers) will be bigger than the perceived value of the second assessment, 
and so on. By the time the authorities have assessed multiple cases, the value of a marginal 
decision over the topic becomes minimal. It is worth noting that the elasticity of the different 








given jurisdiction´s learning from the new cases.  
There is some other information that can be extracted from Figure 5.1. Even though 
the incentive costs (C2) and information cost (C1) curves have a similar shape, C2 is usually 
higher than C1, and this can be explained by the fact that incentive costs are highly dependent 
on the same institutional factors that influence the curve of information costs, such as 
effective antitrust prosecution, fast and specialized judiciary, elements that are slightly 
captured by α (Table 5.1). Lastly, although the perceived value of the antitrust experience 
might increase over time, the levels of incentive and information costs will never be zero, 
since the ongoing changing conditions related to market performance, emergence of new 
markets (e.g. digital markets), and new types of contractual clauses may enhance the 
consideration of  low but positive enforcement costs. In other words, there will always be 
uncertain factors that may affect this variable.  
A similar analysis can be drawn taking into account the enforcement cost curves 
where total costs are a function of the quality of the institutional set-ups. 
Figure 5.2 – Evolution of information and incentive costs in assessing vertical agreements: 
the influence of the quality and maturity of the institutional set-up 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
The same as in Figure 5.1, in Figure 5.2, C1 and C2 are also non-linear downward sloping 
curves. In more detail, there is a negative relation between incentive and information costs, 
and the institutional set-up variable. In other words, the greater the levels of institutional 









up. The information and incentive costs curves are convex. If a jurisdiction has no antitrust 
law, no rules for vertical agreements, no specialized court, no accountability and so on (that 
is to say, if β = 0), the perceived value for society of the first institutional change - for 
instance, the creation of an antitrust agency and competition law - will be bigger than the 
perceived value of the following institutional changes, that may create secondary rules, 
guidelines, rules for private enforcements, and so on. In this case, C1 is higher than C2, since 
institutional factors by themselves do not capture all the costs associated with information 
and knowledge. Lastly, despite the maturity and trustworthy nature of the institutions, the 
enforcement costs for both curves will never be zero, since there will always be uncertain 
factors that may affect this variable, such as private interests of groups of agents that are 
constantly putting pressure on the law decision making process. 
In sequence, Figure 5.3 presents the enforcement costs of vertical agreements in a 
simplified cost curve I, equal to C1+ C2, that is a function of Φ, a variable that captures both 
antitrust experience and the maturity and quality of the institutional set-up. In Figure 3, the 
administrative cost curve is represented by curve C3. The C3 curve is downward sloping, 
since it is influenced by both information and incentive costs. However, it is flatter than the 
curve I, since the administrative costs also have a fixed component that does not depend on 
that function Φ, and therefore keeps the curve C3 less steep.   
Figure 5.3 – Evolution of antitrust enforcement costs in assessing vertical agreements 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
As we will demonstrate in the next Subsection, the proposed curves, together with the 
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comparative Law and Economic analysis, give us the basis for a normative analysis.   
5.7.2. The Three-Stage Policy Framework Applicable to Vertical 
Agreements 
This PhD research has highlighted some antitrust policy options applied to vertical 
agreements, such as: ex-ante notification of agreements, mixed policies (such as block-
exemption regimes), and ex-post control of restrictive agreements by public and private 
enforcement. It also emphasized that information and incentive costs are lower under the 
notification system than under block exemption regimes or ex-post monitoring, since parties, 
in the moment of the notification, are obliged to share with the authority the content of each 
agreement and information about the market. However, administrative costs are higher in a 
notification system, since not only do the companies have to bear the procedure costs and 
cost of lawyers to do the notification, but also the antitrust agency has to guarantee enough 
staff to assess these notifications.  
 Table 5.2: Enforcement costs under ex-ante and ex-post control systems 
Enforcement costs Ex-ante 
notification 
Ex-post control 
Information costs + ++ 
Incentive costs + ++ 
Administrative costs ++ + 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Taking into consideration the policy framework and the enforcement cost curves of assessing 
vertical agreements, it is possible to identify preferable policies for each phase of the cost 
curves. It is worth noting that, for this PhD research, the approach that underlies the choice 
of antitrust enforcement policy is oriented toward welfare maximization by seeking to 
minimize enforcement costs.  
Generally speaking, to minimize the costs of enforcement in a given jurisdiction, a 
notification system of vertical agreements will be an optimal policy when information and 
incentive costs are higher than the administrative costs of the ex-ante system of notification. 
However, the favouring of an ex-post monitoring system of restrictive agreements will be 
preferred in the moment when information and incentive costs are lower than the 
administrative costs of the notification. Lastly, mixed policies for vertical agreements will be 
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preferred policies in the moment when the cost curve I becomes less inelastic, but the level 
of enforcement costs (information and incentive) are still higher than the administrative cost 
curve. See illustration below. 
Figure 5.4 – The three-stage policy framework applicable to vertical agreements  
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
According to the proposed framework, during the First Stage of curve I, public enforcement 
and a pure ex-ante notification of vertical agreements should be the most adequate policies 
to be encouraged. This is the case because the notification system of agreements has an 
important educational function and should be respected by the agencies. Moreover, the 
notification system should be presented as an ambitious competition policy in order to foster 
full advocacy and law enforcement. In this stage of implementation of an antitrust law, it is 
more efficient and overall less costly to adopt the obligation towards notification.  
As soon as some institutional basis is set up, and the law enforcers have some level 
of experience in assessing complex vertical agreement cases, the Second Stage can be 
characterized and, therefore, mixed policy options should be introduced in the jurisdiction. 
As example of mixed policies one can identify: block exemptions regimes (as the ones 
introduced by the European Union) in which the antitrust authority defines which types of 
agreements are presumed to be legal, and under which circumstances; and/or black-listed 
regimes, in which the authority defines the types of vertical agreements that are presumed to 
Enforcement 
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be illegal. The other example of a mixed policy would be the implementation of a simplified 
consultation procedure, so that companies could obtain additional clarification from the 
authorities regarding their commercial practices. All the above examples of mixed policies 
guarantee some degree of legal certainty to companies, and at the same time reduce the 
enforcement costs associated to it, including error costs of future litigations. 
It is worth noting that, within the scope of the proposed curve (Figure 5.4), the point 
of the curve that separates the First and the Second Stage is a blurry one, i.e., it can be more 
to the right or to the left of the curve depending on each case. This occurs because each 
jurisdiction reacts differently over the time in terms of capturing antitrust experience and 
improving the quality of its institutional set-up. In Figure 5.4, the different reactions can also 
be expressed by different slopes of the I curve. For instance, one can consider a country A 
where a sole resale price-fixing assessment is enough to create clear rules on how the country 
balances the pro and anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements. In this case, since the 
slope of the I curve is bigger (the I curve is more inelastic), the period related to Stage 1 is a 
very short one. In other countries, however, the repetition of the assessment of several cases 
may be necessary to acquire greater knowledge on the topic. In these cases, the I curve tends 
to be flatter and the period in which Stage 1 is optimal becomes longer. In short, the point of 
the curve that shows the passage from Stage 1 to Stage 2 moves to the right. 
When a jurisdiction achieves the Third (and last) Stage, individuals and law enforcers 
are most probably better informed about the types of business practices that restrict 
competition. Moreover, law enforcers are more efficient in enforcing the law since 
institutions are also more trustworthy. In this last stage, the adoption of a sole ex-post 
monitoring system of vertical agreements and of preferences to private litigation must be 
encouraged. 
There are some extra considerations to be made in regard to the illustrative curves. 
First, objective parameters of time that define for how long each jurisdiction should keep the 
same policies in each stage are very hard to formulate. Again, each jurisdiction has different 
institutional backgrounds and cultural values that directly influence the pace of policy 
implementation oriented to vertical agreements. Secondly, and most importantly, from Law 
and Economics’ theory, various combinations of policies and sanctions can establish similar 
levels of enforcement.139  This means that the change from the first to the second stage should 
 
139 See, for instance, P. Polisky & S. Shavell, ‘The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of 
fines’, American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 5, 1979, pp. 880-891. 
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be carried out together with the publication of guidelines that directly inform business people 
and law enforcers about the types of vertical agreements that are considered restrictive in a 
given jurisdiction. Moreover, the change from the second to the third stage (or even from the 
first to the third stage in the cases of countries that do not consider mixed policies) should be 
carried out with the strengthening of ex-post control mechanisms. This change means the 
redefinition of fines, the increase of investigative powers, and the clarification of rules about 
private actions, but is not limited to them.  
5.7.3. Limitation of the Framework: Political Economy distortions 
It must be acknowledged that the proposed three stage policy framework has limitations, 
since it does not represent every possible situation of changes in law regarding vertical 
agreements. This Section presents one of these alternative scenarios. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, regulation can be motivated and explained by public 
interest arguments, meaning that the law and policy decision makers operate to ensure the 
promotion of economic efficiency. However, in certain contexts, the law and decision-
making processes may not be guided by what is optimal for society, or they may not achieve 
the public interest goals. These scenarios certainly do not promote economic efficiency.  
Regarding the lack of the predominance of public interest, public choice theorists 
highlight the powerful influence of special-interest groups over the whole law- and decision- 
making process. In the antitrust field, not different from economic regulation in general, the 
agencies, the judges, the antitrust bureaucrats140 and their legal representatives are relevant 
stakeholders involved in the process of making either a new law or changes to existing laws. 
Private interests of the different groups of agents can directly affect the law-making process 
and the adequate assessment of the changes in antitrust regulation regarding rules for 
restrictive vertical agreements. Private interests may affect the balance among the total 
enforcement costs’ components and anticipate or even delay the evolution from Stage 1 to 
Stage 2 and Stage 3 in the curve.  
The evolution between the three Stages may not be linear. For instance, in the 
assessment of the law, some authorities might exaggerate the role of administrative costs 
when deciding on whether to impose an ex-ante notification system of agreements or an ex-
 
140 Expression used by Tollison in R. Tollison, “Public Choice and Antitrust”, Cato Journal, Vol. 4, (Winter) 
1985, p. 905. 
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post monitoring one. This may happen since the enforcement of vertical agreements creates 
substantial costs to the competition authority and does not proportionally increase its 
reputation as a law enforcer. By overestimating the value of administrative costs, the 
authority might decide to implement a unique ex-post enforcement scheme in an earlier Stage 
of implementation of antitrust law. If this occurs earlier than in the so-called “Stage 3”, the 
efficiency of law enforcement will not be maximized.  
The public choice perspective, that is to say the thesis that government authorities, 
businesses, and legal representatives attempt to influence the law or decision-making process 
in order to pursue benefits for themselves, may lead one to conclude that both the Brazilian 
and the European legal changes favoured, in a premature way, the adoption of an ex-post 
control of vertical agreements. The reasons for the inefficient outcome may be related to the 
influence of private interests in the regulatory process. Regarding the Brazilian experience, 
Chapter 3 found that the self-interest of both CADE, and competition lawyers may explain 
the enactment of Resolution No. 17/2016. Neither did CADE include in its policy assessment 
document any reference to the goals of competition law in the country, nor did it give clear 
reasoning explaining the choice of this specific regulation. Hence, one may hypothesise that 
the exclusion of vertical agreements from the Brazilian notification system was influenced 
by the private interests of relevant agents.  
The same holds true in the EU case. Chapter 4 presented some literature that explains 
the context in which the 2004 Reform of EU Competition Law happened, as well as the 
potential winners and losers of the premature change in policy. The analysis of the European 
experience opens up a debate about the Commission’s main argument regarding the huge 
administrative costs of adopting the notifications of agreements. In reality, according to 
Riley, the notification was already an “irrelevant procedure with marginal impact on the 
enforcement of EU competition law” and the reductions in administrative costs associated to 
changes in its policy to the Commission were actually minimal.141 Law firms providing 
antitrust advocacy to the undertakings also profited from the decentralized ex-post control of 
Regulation 1/2003.142  This happened because, following the 2004 Reform, companies 
should privately self-assess their agreements (to minimize antitrust risks and to know better 
how to deal with competitors) and ex-post litigations were also encouraged.143 
 
141 A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! Part One: 
Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003a, p. 604. 
142 A. Wigger, ‘Revising the European Competition Reform: The toll of Private Self-Enforcement’, Working 
Papers Political Science of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, No. 07, 2004. 
143 Wigger, 2004, supra note 142, at 14-15. 
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In sum, the relevance of private interests cannot be neglected in any normative 
analysis involving competition law, especially in the cases of less developed EU countries 
and in the cases of developing countries such as Brazil, or even in the cases of countries with 
lower experience in applying competition law. It is worth noting that developing countries 
that do not clearly present the goals of their competition laws are more subjected to the 
influence of private interests in their regulatory process. 
5.8. POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR EUROPE AND BRAZIL 
This Chapter proposes a normative analysis of policies oriented to vertical agreements. The 
main research question was formulated at the beginning of the Chapter: Does a policy change 
from an ex-ante notification system to an ex-post monitoring of vertical agreements always 
enhance the efficiency of the enforcement of competition law? The answer to this question 
is negative and the Comparative Law and Economics analysis of the EU and Brazil 
experiences supports this important conclusion.  
From what has been previously discussed, antitrust regulators should consider three 
main costs to be minimized in their law-making process: information costs, incentive costs 
and administrative costs. Information and incentive costs are mostly related to the antitrust 
experience of law enforcers with regard to the assessment of complex vertical agreement 
cases, and to the maturity and quality of the institutional set-up in each jurisdiction that can 
be shaped by several factors including institutional quality and the capability of law enforcers 
to guarantee optimal levels of enforcement. Meanwhile, the administrative costs are the 
monetary costs faced by the law enforcers and firms to comply with the applicable regulation. 
Regarding the public authorities, the administrative costs are the costs of maintaining the 
antitrust agencies, prosecutors and courts, from the physical infrastructure to the human 
resources. In order to guarantee an optimal level of antitrust enforcement, all three costs 
should be considered by antitrust authorities in its law-making process. However, this has 
not always been the case.  
Based on Law and Economics’ enforcement theories and drawing on the comparative 
analysis of the experiences of the EU and Brazil, this Chapter formulated illustrative 
enforcement cost curves to develop a qualitative and normative analysis. A three-stage policy 
framework applicable to vertical agreements was proposed, in which, depending on its 
antitrust experience and institutional set-up, the jurisdiction should choose among a 
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notification of agreements by public authorities (Stage 1), a mixed policy option such as 
block exemption regimes (Stage 2) or an ex-post control by both public and private agents 
(Stage 3). The normative analysis also suggests that various combinations of policies and 
sanctions can establish similar levels of enforcement. For instance, the change from Stage 1 
to Stage 2, or from Stage 1 (or 2) to Stage 3, may also be accompanied by complementary 
policies, such as the publication of guidelines, the increase in fines, the clarification of 
procedural rules for private actions, and the creation of specialized courts, among others.  
The Chapter concludes that both the Brazilian and the European experiences 
favoured, in a premature way, the adoption of ex-post control of vertical agreements. Because 
of that, complementary policies should be implemented in both jurisdictions in order to 
enhance optimal levels of enforcement of restrictive vertical agreements, and therefore, to 
move towards optimal levels of social welfare.  
In the European Union, by the time Regulation 1/2003 entered into force ending the 
notification system of vertical agreements, several Member States did not even have a 
competition agency, which means that their α and β values were close to zero.144 According 
to the proposed policy framework, a notification system of vertical agreements is preferred 
when a country has no experience in applying competition law and also when the institutional 
set-up is limited. One can argue that the ECN would help filling the experience gap by 
transplanting the experience of the European Commission and the maturity of NCAs (such 
as Germany and France). However, this argument has several limitations since the top-down 
approach proposed by the European Commission has not easily permitted the full spread of 
competition culture across different Member States.145 These points lead us to the conclusion 
that the implementation of ex-post control was precipitated in particular European countries.  
There are, of course, lessons to be learned from the EU experience to other 
jurisdictions, as well as points of improvement to be taken into consideration by European 
authorities. In respect to the lessons to be learned, there are several positive aspects of the 
EU 2004 Reform that are aligned to the proposed normative analysis. One lesson is that the 
adoption of an ex-post control of vertical agreements has happened in stages for most of the 
Member States (mainly the founder Member States). Other lessons are related to the fact that 
the European authority, that under the ex-post regime, published guidelines to the self-
 
144 It is worth noting that when a competition law is inexistent in a certain country, meaning, when α 
(experience) and β (institutional set-up) are close to zero, this does not mean that there is no welfare loss in this 
jurisdiction.  
145 This fact supports one of the reasoning that underlies Directive 2019/1/EU. 
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assessment of vertical agreements and also took several measures to enhance antitrust 
enforcement, such as increasing enforcement powers of the Commission and Member States, 
increasing fines, implementing new rules for private actions, that indeed decrease the 
information and incentive costs to a level that is equal to or less than the potential 
administrative costs of bearing a notification system.  
Regarding the points of improvement of the overall enforcement of anti-competitive 
vertical agreements in Europe, this PhD research highlights important measures to be taken 
both at the EU level, mostly by the European Commission, and at the Member States level, 
i.e. by National Competition Authorities. At the EU level, the Commission should first 
conclude the revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation to be entered into force in 
2022 in an effective way. The Commission must add to the revised Regulation further legal 
requirements and clarifications concerning new forms of contractual relations and abuses that 
are arising in the context of digital markets and the new roles of e-commerce platforms. For 
instance, the Commission could indicate what is the legal framework that covers the cases of 
Most-Favoured Nation clause provisions, and how to assess the potential effects of wide and 
narrow MFN clauses. The new legal provisions should guarantee better information to the 
self-assessment of vertical agreements, and most importantly guarantee a higher level of 
consistency in the application of the legal rules across Member States. 
A second important point to be made when it comes to policies at EU level, is that 
the Commission should add efforts to efficiently monitor the implementation of the Directive 
2019/1/EU, which has as its objective the empowerment of competition authorities by better 
designing their institutional set-up. This implies that the Commission bears now not only the 
responsibility to enact the legal rules, but also to guarantee that there are enough enforcement 
mechanisms to apply those rules across the Member States. In order to achieve the goals of 
this policy, it is necessary to ensure full awareness of the different levels of enforcement 
across Member States. Lastly, about the European Competition Network, the optimal 
exchange of experiences among EU Member States could be accomplished via the creation 
of an official ECN vertical agreement working group. Naturally, the expected cooperation 
within this particular group guarantees better consistency in the application of EU 
competition policies relevant to vertical agreements.   
At the national level, there are three main points that should be highlighted. The first 
one, also within the scope of the Directive 2019/1/EU, is that the authorities should efficiently 
allocate their resources to build an adequate institutional set-up, both at the administrative 
and judicial level. This implies having minimal investigatory tools (including technological 
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instruments) and higher decision-making powers, which also depend on hiring highly 
qualified staff to carry out the complex assessments required by Article 101 TFEU. In this 
regard, the second point should be highlighted, which is the need for more training of national 
law enforcers in the economic analysis of antitrust cases across all Member States. Moreover, 
these educational programmes should be further developed both at the administrative and 
judicial level.146 The last point to be noted is the need for better organization and cataloguing 
of internal data and case files of National Competition Authorities, in order to help 
identifying potential antitrust actions that require better enforcement focus. It has been shown 
in this PhD research that, nowadays, there is still almost no public and categorized 
information on the enforcement of vertical agreements among the different Member States. 
And this is also the case because their Annual Reports fail to give a full picture of the on-
going investigations. It is worth recalling that the focus of this research is looking at the big 
picture of potential drawbacks of EU enforcement systems, and not to the particular needs of 
each National Authority. 
On the Brazilian perspective, the country could have also profited from a longer 
period of notification system of vertical agreements. Firstly, the country did not acquire 
enough experience in assessing complex vertical agreement cases. Apart from that, the 
country lacks efficient educational programmes in competition law, it has also judicial bodies 
that are not open to interdisciplinary approaches, and the law and decision-making processes 
are characterized by high levels of corruption and political influences. However, since the 
Brazilian law applicable to vertical agreements has change twice in the past five years, being 
the last change made in 2016 to favour ex-post control of these practices, it will probably not 
be revised in the near future. Therefore, other complementary policies should be carefully 
considered in the country in order to improve enforcement levels and minimize enforcement 
costs.  
Given the analysis about the main threats for an effective antitrust enforcement 
concerning vertical agreements developed in this Chapter, here are some suggested policy 
proposals that can directly reduce information, incentive, and administrative costs in Brazil. 
Assessment of the first threat: Lack of consolidated antitrust jurisprudence with 
regard to vertical agreements and the excessive use of settlements in Brazil. 
 
146 It is important to acknoledge that the European Commission has invested in some projects related to the 
training of national judges in EU Competition Law. However, these projects need should be extended, and they 
should make sure that law enforcers indeed attend these courses. For more information about these training 
programmes, see: <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/training> [20-08-2019]. 
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Competition policy in Brazil would benefit from specific Guidelines on vertical 
agreements, indicating how business people and the antitrust authority could improve the 
economic assessment of these commercial practices. Soft-law instruments, such as 
guidelines, have been widely used by antitrust agencies around the world, including other 
regulatory bodies, since they improve the institutional environment throughout activities that 
enhance social learning.  Guidelines help companies and their legal advisors to interpret the 
rules, especially in the case of complex matters involving interdisciplinary knowledge. The 
creation of Guidelines about vertical agreements would even help CADE’s Commissioners 
to better explore the available information in each case and make more uniform decisions on 
vertical cases, ensuring greater legal certainty. Considering the scope of the content, the 
Guidelines should describe the concept of the main vertical agreements (e.g. resale price-
fixing, geo-blocking, selective distribution) as well as the economic criteria to analyse their 
potential effects in the markets.  In this attempt, the Brazilian guidelines could adapt the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, prepared by the European Commission, by taking into 
consideration the goals of competition policy in the country. Finally, with the growth of 
vertical contracts in the context of e-commerce, it would be very important that the guidelines 
also include explanations about how to perform an optimal economic assessment of contracts 
in the context of digital economies. 
It is worth noting that the Brazilian competition policy applicable to vertical 
agreements could also be improved by the use of legal exemptions in specific markets. 
Antitrust literature in Brazil explain that there is room to interpret about the viability of legal 
exemptions in the country, since the current legislation does not explicitly foresee/or prohibit 
such practice.147   
Assessment of the second threat: CADE´s institutional design and lack of specialized 
staff  
Nowadays, CADE’s internal units and departments are primarily specialized in 
mergers and cartel cases, leaving the vertical cases handled by merger units. This practice 
puts into question the priorities of CADE’s investigations. CADE should add to its 
institutional priorities the enforcement of other forms of anti-competitive conducts than 
cartels, which also have deleterious effects on markets.  As a policy recommendation, the 
assessment of vertical restraints cases should be held in specialized units, with a team of 
 
147 See discussion in C. Salomão Filho, Direito Concorrencial: as estruturas, 3rd Ed., São Paulo, Editora 
Malheiros, 2007; and P. A. Forgioni, Direito Concorrencial e Restrições Verticais, São Paulo, Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2007, p. 128.   
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lawyers and economists who are highly skilled in making the economic analysis of the dual-
side effects of vertical agreements. The opening of a specialized unit (or specialized 
enforcement teams), and the hiring and/or relocating, for example, of highly educated staff, 
would increase the quality and efficiency of CADE’s investigations. This specialization 
would also enhance the consistency of the administrative decisions. As CADE’s resources 
tend to be very limited, the specialized unit could also handle other unilateral conduct apart 
from vertical cases, which usually also require very complex economic assessments. 
Regarding the European best practices, for instance, the European Commission clearly 
distinguishes the units that deal with mergers, from the ones that deal with cartels, complex 
antitrust cases, policy evaluation and state-aid cases. In the case of the European 
Commission, these units are even further divided according to the sectors of the economy. 
However, it is considered that, in Brazil, the simple creation of a specialized unit for vertical 
agreements would already be a great progress in the improvement of the institutional design 
of antitrust policies. 
Assessment of the third threat: Lack of clarity regarding antitrust sanctions and the 
methodology to set fines. 
When CADE opted to change the policy of vertical agreements to an ex-post 
enforcement system, the sanctions for antitrust violation remained unchanged. In order to 
ensure that an ex-post enforcement system of agreements gives the right incentives to 
companies, i.e. incentives to sign pro-competitive vertical agreements instead of restrictive 
ones, the increase in antitrust fines is a policy decision to be considered by the Brazilian 
Authority. Today, in the Brazilian reality, companies have incentives to actually design 
restrictive contract clauses, since CADE’s ex-post enforcement has been rare, the fines are 
minimal and rarely enforceable by the courts. Indeed, CADE should not only consider 
increasing the level of fines for cases of vertical restraints, but also create clear methodologies 
for setting the fines and enforcing them. Looking at the European experience, it is worth 
recalling that several countries in Europe with more antitrust experience, such as Germany, 
the UK and France, have nowadays specific guidelines that clarify the methods used in setting 
antitrust sanctions and fines. This can certainly be used as an inspiration for improving the 
antitrust tools and practices in Brazil. 
Assessment of the fourth threat: Non-existence of specialized antitrust courts, and 
unclear rules for proposing private actions.  
This item involves the role of the Brazilian judicial system in enforcing antitrust 
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policy, both regarding the judicial review of CADE’s administrative decisions and the 
assessment of antitrust damage claims. The Brazilian judiciary is not fully prepared to 
perform a merit analysis in antitrust matters, and it ends up focusing most of its decisions on 
formal errors of the administrative processes, rather than on the full analysis of the case. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the creation of specialized courts be considered, with 
judges that are trained to conduct an economic analysis of the legal cases, which would also 
bring more efficiency to the due processes. It is important to point out that there is no legal 
impediment to create specialized courts for antitrust matters in the country, since Brazil has 
a history of creating specialized courts in diverse topics, such as military crimes, corruption, 
financial crimes, environmental cases, and so on. In a comparative Law and Economics 
perspective, the experience of the European Union shows that the good performance of 
antitrust authorities is also better perceived due to the existence of specialized courts. In 
accordance with this recommendation, the Brazilian judges should have additional training 
of the economic analysis of law in antitrust cases (including courses of basic Law and 
Economics’ concepts and methods, Microeconomics, Antitrust Economics, among others), 
since the improvement of the institutional environment should be articulated with  building 
new educational perspectives.  
Assessment of the fifth threat: Lack of transparency, influence of private interests in 
the law-making process and risk of regulatory capture. 
Although CADE accomplished Public Consultations prior to the publication of its 
legal Resolutions, several other practices need to be developed and implemented to improve 
the transparency of the law-making process. In this sense, CADE must adopt the best 
practices regarding transparency and impact assessment of its regulations, which includes, 
among others, (i) the introduction of a roadmap (summary of the topic) and feedback periods 
that anticipate the public consultations; (ii) the extension of deadlines for public 
consultations, (iii) the spread of the use of social media and communication strategies in 
Brazil to encourage the participation of potential stakeholders in the law-making process, (iv) 
the publication of a detailed Technical Note with justifications for the proposed changes in 
law-making, including, for instance, a Cost Benefit Analysis methodology of the new rule. 
Regarding the lessons from Europe, the reviewing process of the rules applied to vertical 
agreements was followed by an extensive impact assessment analysis. The impact assessment 
for the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (to enter into force in 2022) started already 




Another relevant recommendation for the Brazilian antitrust policy would be the 
introduction of a more transparent system for the appointment and nomination of CADE´s 
Commissioners and President, for instance, by allowing the interested candidates to directly 
apply for a transparent selection process of these positions based on qualification and skills. 
This topic is of particular importance in the historical moment that Brazil is passing through, 
since the country has been in the spotlight because of issues of corruption and political 
influence in most of its Ministries, Secretariats and Agencies.   
Assessment of the Sixth Threat: Lack of social knowledge on antitrust matters. 
This last recommendation is a rather general, but still a very important one. Although 
CADE has the legal responsibility to explore the knowledge on competition law within 
universities, research groups, companies, associations, consultancies, law firms (with or 
without competition expertise), and among other stakeholders, the outcomes have been 
limited.  An example of an initiative to be taken by the authority is the promotion of 
institutional actions across the various States in Brazil, such as the organization of forums, 
programmes, and other events to favour the spread of awareness of antitrust conduct.  
Moreover, CADE's compliance Guidelines do not focus on the precautions to be 
taken by business people to avoid restrictive vertical agreements. The existing compliance 
Guidelines are rather focused on the prevention of sharing information among firms in the 
context of cartel and pre-merger scenarios. Therefore, an amendment to the current 
compliance Guideline, adding concerns oriented to vertical agreements, could be an 
alternative policy to tackle the issue.  Also, within the scope of new educational strategies 
and practices, one last point that deserves attention is the need to reformulate the curriculum 
of economics and law schools to ensure that students have the option to study antitrust-related 
disciplines throughout the entire national territory (as separate or together with other related 
disciplines). 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the previous recommendations should be considered in a holistic 
public policy perspective to guarantee the optimal enforcement of an antitrust policy. In other 
words, there should be an integrated effort to improve the institutional design, the learning 





















This research has reviewed the enforcement of the Brazilian and the EU antitrust policies 
oriented to vertical agreements from an institutional perspective. It has considered both the 
evolution of the legal framework and the application of the existing policies in practice. The 
thesis highlighted the main challenges of the current approaches taken by the competition 
authorities in these jurisdictions and formulated specific proposals for improvements. 
Because Brazilian competition rules were originally inspired by the European legal 
framework, this PhD research also resumes discussions regarding comparative law and the 
efficiency of transplanting laws and good practices.  
The main research question of this PhD research is “How should an antitrust policy 
be designed to efficiently deter anti-competitive vertical agreements and encourage pro-
competitive ones?”. To answer this, other sub-questions were proposed along the Chapters. 
The following sections will recall the main questions and answers that were discussed along 
the thesis. 
When it comes to the analysis of vertical agreements, we highlighted that the effects 
of these practices are limited and less problematic when compared to the effects of horizontal 
agreements. Hence, the policy options of the former type of restrictions should be carefully 
assessed. The complexity of vertical agreements also requires the conceptualization by the 
competition authorities of what is harmful to society, in order to guarantee that restrictions 
to competition do not take place. And whether a country will choose a lighter or stricter 
approach towards vertical agreements will depend on what are the goals of competition 
policy, i.e., what policy makers believe their competition policy should aim at protecting. 
6.1. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS  
Chapter 2 of this thesis proposed the following group of economic-oriented questions: In 
which conditions should vertical agreements be considered efficiency enhancing? How can 
vertical agreements lead to anti-competitive outcomes?  
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It was argued that vertical agreements have different effects in the marketplace. On 
the one hand, these commercial practices can bring economic efficiencies to markets, 
increasing the total welfare. On the other hand, they can generate negative outcomes, be 
harmful to consumers and producers, reducing the total welfare of the specific market. 
Chapter 2 explored three main efficiency arguments: the double mark-up problem, the 
preventing of free-riding in both upstream and downstream markets, and the reduction of 
transaction costs of the firms that are in a vertical structure. In addition, the Chapter indicated 
three main anti-competitive effects: the increase of collusive practices, the reduction of intra 
and inter-brand competition, and the foreclosure of markets.    
The complex nature of vertical agreements makes it difficult for law and decision-
makers to assess the welfare outcomes of such practices. This PhD research showed that a 
vertical restraint can constitute a solution to a market failure, and at the same time encourage 
anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, different forms of vertical restraints have diverse 
outcomes in the markets, and therefore requires case-by-case assessments. For example, 
resale price-fixing and geo-blocking restrictions may combat free-riding, which is a pro-
competitive effect. Resale price-fixing and geo-blocking clauses may also facilitate collusion 
and forecloses markets, which are anti-competitive effects. However, resale price-fixing may 
combat double marginalization problems, while territorial protection may increase those 
problems. 
Chapter 2 also showed that what is called “regulatory dilemma” may be reinforced in 
the context of digital economies, e-commerce transactions, and marketplace platforms. New 
forms of vertical restraints are being observed in online markets, which raise concerns on 
their potential anti-competitive effects. This is because the assessment of the competition 
implications of vertical restraints in digital markets seems inherently more complex on behalf 
of multiple interactions, network externalities and vertical relationships between the market-
place platforms and consumers. This scenario potentially implies a more careful antitrust 
analysis with multiple foreclosure effects.  
In sequence, Chapters 3 and 4 aim at answering the following legal-oriented 
questions: What are the possible legal treatments for vertical agreements? What are the 
promises and drawbacks of the legal treatment chosen by Brazil and by the EU? To what 
extent has the evolution of the Brazilian and European regulation been conditioned by the 
interests of private relevant actors? 
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Brazil and Europe passed through a similar change in antitrust policy applicable to 
vertical agreements: from an ex-ante notification system of agreements to an ex-post control 
of restrictive practices, although with some crucial differences. In the EU, the change from 
an ex-ante to an ex-post control happened after forty years of a notification system of 
agreements, and it was accompanied by other complementary policies, such as the enactment 
of the Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines for helping firms self-assess the potential 
anti-competitive effects of their contracts. In Brazil, the Resolution No. 17/2016 removed the 
vertical relationship threshold for notification, leaving the enforcement of anti-competitive 
vertical agreements in Brazil solely dependent on ex-post control. In contrast with Europe, 
the Brazilian authority did not publish any guidelines to better inform business people, nor 
did it take any specific measures to strengthen the ex-post control.  
With regard to the Brazilian context, it is undeniable that competition policies in 
Brazil have evolved considerably in the last decades. Brazil is one example of an emerging 
economy that has put efforts in implementing a competition policy, and, as a result, it “has 
consolidated its position among the main antitrust jurisdictions around the world”.1 When it 
comes to Brazil´s experience in regulating vertical agreements, Chapter 3 argued that the 
established legal framework that excluded vertical agreements from the notification system 
and favoured the ex-post control, presents several limitations. The PhD research has 
demonstrated that these limitations can represent threats for the optimal enforcement of 
competition law. Among the identified threats, it is highlighted: (i) the lack of consolidated 
antitrust jurisprudence with regard to vertical agreements and excessive use of settlements in 
Brazil; (ii) CADE´s institutional design and lack of specialized staff; (iii) the lack of clarity 
regarding antitrust sanctions and the methodology to set fines; (iv) the non-existence of 
specialized antitrust courts, and unclear rules for proposing private actions; (v) the lack of 
transparency and the influence of private interests in the law-making process; and (vi) the 
lack of social knowledge on antitrust matters. 
These items are related, in general terms, to the unstable learning process of the 
enforcer and business community with regard to the assessment of vertical restraints. This 
situation leads to great legal uncertainty, and to the prevalence of private-interest motives in 
the law-making process. Both problems lead to sub-optimal regulations and lower levels of 
antitrust enforcement. 
 
1 OECD, Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil, 2019, p. 15. 
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In more detail, when analysing case law under CADE´s ex-post enforcement, the 
antitrust jurisprudence is not consolidated enough to guarantee legal certainty to parties when 
assessing their vertical agreements. For instance, Chapter 3 highlighted that for resale price-
fixing cases, there is no clear rule or clear jurisprudence regarding the topic. Besides, in these 
cases, CADE’s Tribunal is also not completely sure on whether to define such practice as a 
per se illegality.  
In the scope of Chapter 3, it also showed that one of the goals of competition policies 
in Brazil is to protect competition and prevent markets from being harmed by agents with a 
high degree of economic power, by preserving an environment where companies have 
effective incentives to compete, innovate and attend to consumers’ demands. The use of the 
presumption of illegality in resale price-fixing cases does not necessarily respect these goals, 
because resale price-fixing can bring economic efficiencies to markets. These economic 
efficiencies can help creating a level playing field among competitors that is intrinsically 
expressed in the constitutional principles, and therefore they should not be ignored by the 
Brazilian Authority in the analysis of any vertical cases, even when it involves price 
restrictions.  
Moreover, CADE relies heavily on settlements. The downsides of settlement 
agreements are the reduction of legal certainty in the marketplace and the slow development 
of the jurisprudence in Brazil towards the economic assessment of vertical agreements. With 
settlements, there is no effect-based assessment and/or decision published by CADE and 
legal cases are not reviewed by the national courts.  
CADE not only fails in defining objective parameters for assessing vertical 
agreements (including the definition of whether some practices are per se illegal or not), but 
also does not have enough staff to do such work (the Authority has only 5 people to assess 
all the antitrust cases other than cartels and mergers). This means that CADE has favoured 
ex-post enforcement with a lack of skilled staff to do so. Actually, nowadays, the lack of trust 
in CADE’s precedents has become a real problem to business people.  
Another important topic of Chapter 3 was the identification of the self-interest of 
relevant actors as a possible explanation to the enactment of Resolution No. 17/2016. As 
CADE did not include in its policy assessment document any reference to the goals of the 
country, nor gave a clear reasoning to the choice of this specific regulation, one could 
hypothesise that the exclusion of vertical agreements from the notification system has been 
based on the private interests of relevant agents. Moreover, Schuartz´s theory of 
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"deconstitutionalization" of the Brazilian competition rules is somehow confirmed. This is 
because the application of the rule of reason in vertical cases seems to be neglected and the 
law-making process and the implementation of competition law have not been observing the 
constitutional principles of the country. 
In other words, the choice for the exclusion of vertical agreements from the 
notification system, was not properly justified by the CADE in its policy assessments. First, 
the goals and constitutional principles of the country were not considered by the authority. 
Second, the aptitude of business people in self assessing their contracts and the capability of 
the antitrust authority to deter restrictive anti-competitive agreements were not completely 
reflected. 
With regard to the European context, Chapter 4 shows that historically, Regulation 
1/2003 replaced the centralized ex-ante notification system of vertical agreements to a 
decentralized ex-post control of these business practices. It presented some alternative 
literature that suggests that behind the “decentralization”, the Commission did not lose its 
central role in the enforcement of competition law in Europe, since it kept (and even 
expanded) most of its investigatory and law-making powers. Despite the political economy 
discussions and the suggested alternative readings, this thesis shows that there are still very 
important lessons to be drawn from the European experience and the 2004 Reform.  
These lessons are mainly related to the instruments that are used by the NCAs to 
guarantee the enforcement of vertical restraints, in the ex-post control scenario. Within the 
sections there are three of these instruments, that can be called “pillars”: (i) the existence of 
a consolidated antitrust jurisprudence, of a Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and of 
specific Guidelines; (ii) the creation of a network among authorities that permitted some 
coordination, sharing of experiences and better competence allocation among the Member 
States and the Commission; and (iii) the intensification of ex-post control instruments. 
Chapter 4 also highlighted that over the years, even with the presence of the three 
enforcement pillars, there are still open questions to be considered when thinking about 
optimal enforcement of vertical restraints in the EU context. Two challenges were identified. 
The first challenge refers to the controversies about the application of Regulations and soft 
law instruments to cases involving the digital economy. The two chosen case analyses 
(selective distribution and price parity arrangements), illustrate that countries such as 
Germany, France, and the UK are facing important controversies and are presenting different 
interpretations of Article 101 TFEU and of the content of the VBER. The new realities of a 
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more globalized, technology- driven and digitalized competitive environment may suggest 
the need for a clearer framework for assessing and balancing anti and pro-competitive effects 
of such restrictive practices. The second challenge is related to the different levels of 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU among the Members States. This Chapter argued that not 
all the national authorities developed adequate enforcement procedures over time. The 
analysis suggests that the institutional disparities remains a point of concern to be overcome 
by the Commission in the coming years.  
From what has been discussed, one can note that the challenges faced by several EU 
countries – even with the support of the Commission - are also faced by several developing 
countries around the world. The difficulties of establishing a proper competition authority, 
with sufficient resources to enforce all antitrust topics (including the complex cases of 
vertical restraints), with specialized courts, among other items, are not a problem encountered 
only in the European reality. For this reason, the understanding of the EU experience and its 
challenges are valuable for this comparative PhD research. 
Finally, Chapter 5 discussed the answers to the Law and Economics’ group of sub-
questions that enhances the normative analysis: Does a change in antitrust policies from ex-
ante to ex-post control of vertical agreements always enhance the efficiency of the 
enforcement of competition law? What are the direct and indirect enforcement costs in a 
notification system of vertical agreements and in an ex-post monitoring system? Which 
elements affect those different costs? 
From the analysis, we concluded that not always the change from an ex-ante to an ex-
post control of vertical agreements is capable of enhancing the efficiency of law enforcement. 
The Comparative Law and Economics analysis of the EU and Brazil experiences support this 
important conclusion. Actually, the choice of an optimal antitrust enforcement policy 
applicable to vertical agreement should seek to minimize enforcement costs. And the 
assessment of these enforcement costs by policy makers shall consider three dimension of 
costs: information costs, incentive costs and administrative costs.  
Information and incentive costs are mostly related to the lack of antitrust experience 
of law enforcers with regard to the assessment of complex vertical agreement cases, and to 
the lack of maturity and quality of the institutional set-up in each jurisdiction that can be 
shaped by several factors. Information costs will often be high in jurisdictions where there is 
limited case law regarding vertical agreements, no specific guidelines regarding the topic, 
and non-specialized nor highly qualified staff. Incentive costs, in its turn, is influenced by 
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several institutional factors. They can be defined as the costs that influence the incentives of 
companies to engage in welfare-enhancing agreements or to stop participating in welfare-
reducing agreements. Incentive costs are often large in jurisdictions where there is generally 
a low level of antitrust deterrence, no clear rules regarding setting fines, a high incidence of 
antitrust errors in the decision-making process, apart from a non-active judiciary and general 
distrust in institutions. Meanwhile, the administrative costs are the direct costs faced by the 
law enforcers and firms to comply with the applicable regulation. Chapter 5 also showed that 
administrative costs tend to be overstated in the law-making process, not only because they 
are easier to compute, but also because of the budget constraints of antitrust authorities.  
Based on the costs analysis, on the EU and Brazilian experiences, and on Law and 
Economics’ enforcement theories, Chapter 5 formulated illustrative enforcement cost curves 
to answer the main research question of this PhD thesis, “How should an antitrust policy be 
designed to efficiently deter anti-competitive vertical agreements and encourage pro-
competitive ones?”.   
The antitrust policy should observe the three-stage policy framework applicable to 
vertical agreements in order to guarantee that the three enforcement costs are minimized: 
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Figure 6.1 – The three-stage policy framework applicable to vertical agreements 
 
Note: Φ, a variable that captures both antitrust experience (α), and the maturity and quality of the 
institutional set-up (β) 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
According to the novel framework, there is no unique design of antitrust policy that is capable 
of deterring anti-competitive vertical agreements and encourage pro-competitive ones in 
every jurisdiction. In reality, the country should opt among a notification of agreements by 
public authorities (Stage 1), a mixed policy option such as block exemption regimes (Stage 
2) or an ex-post control by both public and private agents (Stage 3), depending on its antitrust 
experience and institutional set-up. The normative analysis also suggests that various 
combinations of policies and sanctions can establish similar levels of enforcement. For 
instance, the change from Stage 1 to Stage 2, or from Stage 1 (or 2) to Stage 3, may also be 
accompanied by complementary policies, such as the publication of guidelines, the increase 
in fines, the clarification of procedural rules for private actions and, the creation of 
specialized courts, among others.  
One limitation of the proposed three-stage policy framework is that private interests 
Enforcement 
costs of vertical 
agreements
Φ= F (α; β)
C3 = Administrative Costs
I = Information + Incentive costs
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of different groups of agents, including the antitrust regulators, can directly affect the 
analysis. This may happen because private interests affect the balance among the total 
enforcement costs’ components. For instance, in the assessment of the law, some authorities 
might exaggerate the role of administrative costs when deciding on whether to impose an ex-
ante notification system of agreements or an ex-post monitoring one. This may happen since 
the enforcement of vertical agreements creates substantial costs to the competition authority 
and does not proportionally increase its reputation as a law enforcer. 
Looking to the proposed Stages of implementation of policies oriented to vertical 
agreements, the PhD thesis concludes that both the Brazilian experience and the European 
one (in respect of the new Member States) were premature in favouring the ex-post control 
of vertical agreements. Because of that, complementary policies should be implemented in 
these jurisdictions in order to guarantee optimal levels of enforcement of restrictive vertical 
agreements, therefore, optimal levels of welfare. 
6.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATION  
Along the Chapters of this PhD research, I discussed that, in Brazil, law enforcement still has 
some challenges in ensuring that anti-competitive vertical agreements are effectively 
enforced in the country. Therefore, I proposed six policy recommendation to the country. 
First, competition policy in Brazil would benefit from specific Guidelines on vertical 
agreements, indicating how business people and the antitrust authority could improve the 
economic assessment of these commercial practices. Guidelines help companies and their 
legal advisors to interpret the rules, especially in the case of complex matters involving 
interdisciplinary knowledge. The creation of Guidelines about vertical agreements would 
even help CADE’s Commissioners to better explore the available information in each case 
and make more uniform decisions on vertical cases, ensuring greater legal certainty. 
Considering the scope of the content, the Guidelines should describe the concept of the main 
vertical agreements (e.g. resale price-fixing, geo-blocking, selective distribution) as well as 
the economic analysis criteria to analyse their potential competitive effects and potential 
economic efficiencies. The Guidelines should also not exclude clarifications concerning new 
forms of vertical contractual relations and abuses that are arising in the context of digital 
markets and e-commerce platforms. 
When it comes to strengthening ex post enforcement in the country, CADE, in the 
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second place, should add to its institutional priorities the enforcement of other forms of anti-
competitive conduct rather than cartels, which also have deleterious effects on markets.  As 
a policy recommendation, the assessment of vertical restraints cases should be held in 
specialized units, with a team of lawyers and economists who are highly skilled in making 
the economic analysis of the dual-sided effects of vertical agreements. The opening of a 
specialized unit (or specialized enforcement teams), and the hiring and/or relocating, for 
example, of highly educated staff, would increase the quality and efficiency of CADE’s 
investigations. Third, CADE should also increase the pattern of antitrust fines for cases 
related to vertical restraints and create clear methodologies for setting the fines and enforcing 
them. Unfortunately, the current Brazilian ex-post enforcement of vertical restraints (rare 
administrative and judicial enforcement, minimal fines) may generate the wrong incentives 
for companies that tend to be more willing to design restrictive contract clauses.  
Sequentially, as a fourth item of recommendation, I suggested the creation of 
specialized courts, with judges that are trained to conduct an economic analysis of the legal 
cases, which would also bring more efficiency to the due processes. In fifth place, in order to 
develop and implement improvements in the transparency of the law-making process, CADE 
must adopt best practices regarding transparency and impact assessment of its regulations. I 
highlight hereby some of these best practices (i) the introduction of a roadmap (summary of 
the topic) and feedback periods that anticipate the public consultations; (ii) the extension of 
deadlines for public consultations, (iii) the spread of the use of social media and 
communication strategies in Brazil to encourage the participation of potential stakeholders 
in the law-making process, (iv) the publication of a detailed technical report. Apart from 
these items, there should be also the introduction of a more transparent system for the 
appointment and nomination of CADE´s Commissioners and President, for instance, by 
allowing interested candidates to directly apply for a transparent selection process of these 
positions based on qualifications and skills. 
Finally, CADE should promote institutional actions across the various States in 
Brazil, such as the organization of forums, programmes, and other events to favour the spread 
of awareness of antitrust conduct. This recommendation aims at exploring the knowledge on 
competition law within universities, research groups, companies, associations, consultancies, 
law firms (with or without competition expertise), and among other stakeholders. 
When it comes to the policy recommendations to the European Union, these are 
aimed at the EU level (European Commission) and at the national level (National 
Competition Authorities). At the EU level, the Commission should first conclude the revision 
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of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation to be entered into force in 2020 in an effective 
way. The Commission must add to the revised Regulation further legal requirements and 
clarifications concerning new forms of contractual relations and abuses that are arising in the 
context of digital markets and the new roles of e-commerce platforms. For instance, the 
Commission could indicate what is the legal framework that covers the cases of Most-
Favoured Nation clause provisions, and how to assess the potential effects of wide and 
narrow MFN clauses. Even though the economic literature regarding the effects of MFNs is 
still very limited, which makes it difficult to authorities relying on a specific criterion for the 
assessment of these clauses, the new legal provisions should guarantee better information to 
the self-assessment of vertical agreements, and most importantly guarantee a higher level of 
consistency in the application of the legal rules across Member States. 
A second important point to be made when it comes to policies at EU level, is that 
the Commission should add efforts to efficiently monitor the implementation of the Directive 
2019/1/EU, which has as its objective the empowerment of competition authorities by better 
designing their institutional set-up. This implies that the Commission bears now not only the 
responsibility to enact the legal rules, but also to guarantee that there are enough enforcement 
mechanisms to apply those rules across the Member States. In order to achieve the goals of 
this policy, it is necessary to be fully aware of the different levels of enforcement across 
Member States. Lastly, about the European Competition Network, the optimal exchange of 
experiences among EU Member States could be accomplished via the creation of an official 
ECN vertical agreement working group. Naturally, the expected cooperation within this 
particular group guarantees better consistency in the application of EU competition policies 
relevant to vertical agreements.   
At the national level, there are three main points that I would like to highlight. The 
first one, also within the scope of the Directive 2019/1/EU, is that the authorities should 
efficiently allocate their resources to build an adequate institutional set-up, both at the 
administrative and judicial level. This implies having minimal investigatory tools (including 
technological instruments) and higher decision-making powers, which also depend on hiring 
highly qualified staff to carry out the complex assessments required by Article 101 TFEU. In 
this regard, I would like to highlight the second point which is the need for more training of 
law enforcement officers in the economic analysis of antitrust cases. Moreover, these 
educational programmes in each Member State should be developed both at the 
administrative and judicial level. The last point to be noted is the need for better organization 
and cataloguing of internal data and case files of National Competition Authorities, in order 
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to help identifying potential antitrust actions that require better enforcement focus. I have 
shown in this PhD research that, nowadays, there are still almost no public and categorized 
information on the enforcement of vertical agreements among the different Member States. 
And this is also the case because their Annual Reports fail to give a full picture of the on-
going investigations. It is worth recalling that the focus of this research is looking at the big 
picture of potential drawbacks of EU enforcement systems, and not at the particular needs of 
each National Authority. 
It is worth noting that the description of many of the above-discussed threats to an 
effective enforcement in Brazil can also be understood as threats to the competition 
authorities of the EU Member States, mainly to those with less experience in implementing 
and enforcing competition laws (such as the ones from the new Member States). Therefore, 
some of the public policies recognized as suggestions for enhancing the Brazilian policy 
framework, also serve as recommendations, to some extent, to certain European competition 
authorities. 
Clearly, Brazil is the focus of this PhD research. This does not imply, however, that 
the findings are not useful for other countries’ competition policies. At the worldwide level, 
there are still significant barriers to the enforcement of competition law in many countries, 
and a lack of focus on the enforcement of more complex conduct such as of vertical restraints. 
I would like to stress that countries with more recent competition policies, like China, India, 
Mexico, and Russia are facing even greater threats to law enforcement across their 
territories.2 The territorial dimension of these countries, just like in Brazil, makes it hard for 
national authorities with limited budgets to control exclusionary practices, primarily those 
implemented in the most remote regions of the countries. 
Finally, considering that competition policies in Brazil have always been inspired by 
the EU policies, the main findings of this PhD imply a general warning of policy failures 
raised by transplanting of competition rules.  
 
2 See, for instance, recent contributions in N. Philipsen, S. E. Weishaar & G. Xu, Market Integration: The EU 
Experience and Implications for Regulatory Reform in China, Heidelberg, Springer, 2016; in F. Jenny & Y. 
Katsoulacos, Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing countries: Legal and Economic 
aspects, Basel, Springer, 2016; in P. Burnier da Silveira, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: Recent 
Developments, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer International, 2017.  
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6.3. FUTURE RESEARCH  
The topic of regulation of vertical agreements is a complex one. While this PhD research 
aims to offer a more comprehensive theoretical and institutional framework for determining 
the optimal policies of vertical agreements through a comparative study between Brazil and 
the EU, there are relevant questions that build on my thesis.  
Regarding the European Law and Economics research, further analysis of antitrust 
enforcement actions of specific Member States could be encouraged. Mainly because of 
language barriers, and a lack of access of relevant data and case files in English, this research 
did not focus on the specificities of the case law of national authorities. However, I 
understand that a more extensive analysis of national jurisprudence will add inputs to the 
normative framework proposed so far. The same suggestion applies for other developing 
countries with recent implementation of competition policies, such as India, Mexico, Russia 
and China. The assessment of their case law and legal framework would certainly enrich and 
give new perspectives to this study.  
Other research questions can be derived from this PhD. It is well-known that the 
harmonization of legal rules imposed by European Commission with Regulation 1/2003 has 
provoked different impacts on the enforcement of competition rules across the Member 
States. In this sense, further research could discuss the “price” of this harmonization process 
or its welfare consequences within all European Member States, either with or without long-
standing tradition in applying competition rules. 
Finally, considering the discussion about competition in digital markets, further 
research is needed to capture the economic effects of new forms of vertical agreements. Hub-
and-spoke conspiracies, price-algorithms restrictions, and vertical restraints on e-commerce 
platforms, are only a few of the anti-competitive practices that are currently a challenge to 
policy makers. Therefore, more normative analysis on how technological innovations affect 







Abreu, F. & Honda, J., ‘Associative agreements under the Brazilian Antitrust Law’, in C. 
Zarzur, L. Katona & M. Villela, Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, São Paulo, Editora 
Singular, 2015. 
Amorim, F., Fixação de preços de revenda no Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da 
Concorrência: análise do direito sancionador antitruste à luz do princípio da segurança 
jurídica, 2017 (Master thesis filed at University of São Paulo, São Paulo). 
Angelozzi, G., História do Direito no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Freitas Bastos Editora, 2009. 
Atiyah, P., The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford, Oxford, 1979. 
Azevedo, P. F., ‘Contratos de Exclusividade em Shopping Centers’, in E. Pereira, E. 
Lagroteria & J. P. Lea, Concorrência e Regulação: Estudos e Pareceres Econômicos, 1st ed., 
São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2004, pp. 163-186 
Azevedo, P. F., ‘Restrições verticais e Defesa da Concorrência: A experiência Brasileira’, 
Textos para Discussão FGV-EESP, No. 264, 2010. 
Bagnoli, V., Direito Econômico e Concorrencial, 7th ed., São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 
2017. 
Barcellos, R., O Contrato de Shopping Center e os Contratos Atípicos Interempresariais, 
São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 2009. 
Bandura, A., Social Learning Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1977. 
Barros, P., ‘Looking behind the curtain: effects from modernization of European Union 
Competition Policy’, European Economic Review, Vol. 47, No.4, 2003, pp. 613-624.
  
Becker, G., ‘Crime and Punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 76, No. 2, 1968, pp. 169-217. 
Becker, G. & Stigler, G., ‘Law enforcement, malfeasance and compensation of enforcers’, 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1974, pp. 1-18. 
Becker, G., ‘A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence’, 
Quarterly Journal of EconomicsVol. 98, No. 3, 1983, pp. 371–400. 
Bishop, S. & Walker, M., Economics of E.C. Competition Law: concepts, application and 
measurement, 3rd ed., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2010. 
Block, M. & Sidak, J., ‘The cost of antitrust deterrence: Why not hang a price fixer now and 
then?’, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 5, 1980, pp. 1131-1138. 
222 
 
Boik, A, & Corts, K., ‘The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition 
and Entry’, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 59, No.1, 2016, pp.105-134.  
Bork, R., ‘The rule of reason and the per se concept: price-fixing and market division’, Yale 
Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 5, 1965, pp. 775-847. 
Bork, R., The Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself, New York, Basic Books, 1978. 
Brook, O. & Cseres, K., ‘Member States’ Interest in the Enforcement of EU Competition 
Law: A Case Study of Article 101 TFEU’, in M. Varju (Ed), Between Compliance and 
Particularism: Member State Interests and European Union Law, Cham, Springer 
Publishing, 2019. 
Brown, J. R. & Goolsbee, A., ‘Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence 
from the Life Insurance Industry’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3, 2002, pp. 
481–507. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y. & Smith, M., ‘Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: 
Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers’, Management 
Science, Vol. 49, No. 11, 2003, pp. 1580–1596. 
Budzinski, O., ‘Towards an international governance of transborder mergers? Competition 
networks and institutions between centralism and decentralism’, NYU Journal of Internation 
Law and Politics, Vol.36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-52 
Buccirossi, P., ‘Vertical Restraints on e-commerce and selective distribution’, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2015, pp. 747-773.  
Budzinski, O. & Christiansen, A., ‘Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy 
System as an Interest-Driven Process’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005, pp. 
313-337. 
Budzinski, O., ‘An economic perspective on the jurisdictional reform of the European merger 
control system’, European Competition Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006, pp. 119-40. 
Budzinski, O., The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in 
International Competition Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. 
Burnier da Silveira, P., Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: Recent Developments, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer International, 2017 
Buxbaum, H., ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of optimal 
deterrence and social costs’, in J. Basedow (Ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Law, International Competition Law Series, Zuidpoolsingel, Wolters Kluwer, 2007. 
CADE, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 2013. 
CADE, Annual Report 2018. 
223 
 
Campilongo, C. & Pfeiffer, R., Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 
2018. 
Cardenal, M. B. S., ‘Vertical Restraints on E-Commerce in the Context of the Single Digital 
Market Initiative of the European Commission’, Stanford-Vienna European Union Law 
Working Paper, No. 23, 2017. 
 
Carvalho, L., ‘O ensino da defesa e da promoção da concorrência nos cursos de graduação 
em Direito no Brasil’, Revista de Direito Empresarial, (July) 2008, pp. 167-235. 
Cauffman, C. & Philipsen, N.J., ‘Who does what in competition law: harmonizing the rules 
on for damages for infringements of the EU competition rules’, in B. Akkermans, J. Hage, 
N. Kornet & J Smits (Eds), Who does what in European private law?, Ius Commune 
Europaeum No. 137, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, pp. 245-287. 
Cengiz, F., ‘Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition 
Network’, European Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, pp. 660-677. 
CEPS, Assessing the costs and benefits of regulation: Study for the European Commission, 
2013. 
Chiritoiu, B. M., ‘Convergence within the European Competition Network: Legislative 
Harmonization and Enforcement Priorities’, in A. Almășan & P. Whelan (Eds), The 
Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: Substantive and Procedural Challenges, 
Springer International Publisher, 2017. 
Coase, R., ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, Vol. 4, (November) 1937, pp. 386-405. 
Colino, S., Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: A comparative Study of the EU and 
US Regimes, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010.  
Collins, H., The Law of Contract, 2nd ed., London, Butterworths, 1993. 
Colomo, P.I., The Shaping of EU Competition Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2018. 
Comanor, W. & Kirkwood, J., ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy’, 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 3, 1985, pp. 9-16. 
Comanor, W., ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust 
Policy’, Harvard Law Review, Vol.  98, No. 5, 1985, pp. 983-1002. 
Cristofaro, P., ‘A categorização dos ilícitos concorrenciais e o direito concorrencial 
brasileiro’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, 
Editora Singular, 2018. 
Cross, F., ‘The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution’, Emory Law 
Journal, Vol. 45, 1996, pp. 523-527. 
224 
 
Cseres, K., ‘Multi-Jurisdictional Competition Law Enforcement: The Interface between 
European Competition Law and the Competition Laws of the New Member States’, 
European Competition Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp. 465-502.  
Cseres, K., ‘Comparing laws in the enforcement of EU and national competition laws’, 
European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp.7-44. 
Cseres, K., ‘The impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the new member states’, Competition Law 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010b, pp. 145-182. 
de la Mano, M. & Jones, A., ‘Vertical Agreements Under EU Competition Law: Proposals 
for Pushing Article 101 Analysis, and the Modernization Process, to a Logical Conclusion’, 
King's College London Law School Research Paper, No. 23, 2017. 
Devlin, A. & Jacobs, M., ‘Antitrust Error’, William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 52, No.1, 
2010, pp. 75-132. 
Dobson, P., ‘Vertical Restraints Policy Reform in the European Union and United Kingdom’, 
Loughborough University Business School Research Series, No. 2, 2005. 
Duke, A., ‘Public enforcement’, in J. Duns, A. Duke, & B. Sweeney (Eds), Comparative 
Competition Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 
Duns, J., Duke, A., & Sweeney, B., (Eds), Comparative Competition Law, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 
Easterbrook, F., ‘The Limits of Antitrust’, Texas Law Review, No. 63, No.1, 1984, pp. 1-40. 
Ebb, L., ‘The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization Of National Law 
And Treaty Law In The Common Market’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 
115, No. 6, 1967, pp 855-889.    
Elzinga, K. & Breit, W., The antitrust penalties: a study in law and economics, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1976. 
European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 1997. 
European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the EC Treaty , 1999. 
European Commission, Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of 
Competition Authorities, 2004. 
European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 
23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, 2006. 
European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010. 
European Competition Network, Results of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States 
(MS) national competition laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003, 2013. 
225 
 
European Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, 2014. 
European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, 2015.  
European Commission, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, 2017. 
European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, 2017. 
European Commission, ‘EU competition rules and marketplace bans: Where do we stand 
after the Coty judgment?’, Occasional discussion papers by the Competition Directorate–
General of the European Commission, 2018. 
Ezrachi, A. & Stucke, M., Virtual Competition: the promise and perils of the algorithm-
driven economy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2016. 
Ezrachi, A., ‘Sponge’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, (April) 2017, pp. 49–
75. 
Federico, G. & Manzini, P., ‘A Law and Economics Approach to the new European Antitrust 
Enforcing Rules’, Erasmus Law and Economics Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004, pp. 143-164. 
Ferro, M. S., ‘Institutional design of National Competition Authorities: EU Requirements’, 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, pp. 109-137. 
Fingleton, J., ‘The distribution and attribution of cases among the members of the network: 
the perspective of the Commission/ NCAs’, in C. Ehlermann & I. Atanasuy (Eds.), 
Constructing the EU Network of Competition Authorities, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005. 
Forester, I., ‘Modernization: an extension of the powers of the Commission?, in D. Geradin 
(Ed), Modernization and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC Competition Law, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004. 
Forgioni, P. A., Contratos de distribuição, São Paulo, Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2005. 
Forgioni, P. A., Direito Concorrencial e Restrições Verticais, São Paulo, Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2007. 
Forgioni, P. A., ‘O que esperar do antitruste brasileiro no século XXI?, Revista Jurídica Luso-
Brasileira, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, pp. 1713-1742, 
Forgioni, P. A., Os fundamentos do antitruste, 9th ed., São Paulo, Editora Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2016. 
Forgioni, P. A., Contratos Empresariais: Teoria Geral e Aplicação, 4ª ed., São Paulo, 
Revista dos Tribunais, 2019. 
226 
 
Frazão, A., Direito da Concorrência: pressupostos e perspectivas. São Paulo, Editora 
Saraiva, 2017. 
Georgieva, Z., ‘Competition soft law in French and German courts: A challenge for online 
sales bans only?’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, 
2017, pp. 175–193. 
Geradin, D. & Pereira Neto, C. M., Restrições verticais adotadas por empresas dominantes: 
uma análise do Direito Concorrencial no Brasil e na União Europeia, Edição Bilingue, São 
Paulo, Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2013. 
Geradin, D., Layne-Farrar, A., & Petit, N., EU competition law and economics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Gerard, D., ‘The effects-based approach under Article 101 TFEU and its paradoxes: 
modernization at war itself?’, J. Bourgeois & D. Waelbroeck (Eds), Ten Years of Effects-
Based Approach in EU Competition Law Enforcement, Brussels, Bruylant, 2012. 
Gerber, D., ‘Modernizing Competition Law: a developmental perspective’, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 4, 2001, pp. 122-130. 
Grau, E. R., A Ordem Econômica na Constituição de 1988, 15th Ed., São Paulo, Malheiros 
Editores, 2012. 
Grau, E. & Forgioni, P. A., ‘Restrição à concorrência, autorização legal e seus limites, Lei 
8.884, de 1994, e Lei 6.279/1979 (“Lei Ferrari”)’, Revista do IBRAC,Vol. 6, 1999, pp. 5-27.   
Gomes, A. C. & Camargo e Gomes, M. E. A, ‘Ouvidoria do CADE: contribuições para o 
equilíbrio entre autonomia e accountability, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do 
antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
Gonçalves, P. A., Fixação e Sugestão de Preços de Revenda em Contrato de Distribuição, 
2nd ed., São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2016. 
Gonzales, A. & Micco, A., ‘Private Versus Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from 
Chile’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2014, pp. 691-709. 
Hahn, V., ‘Antitrust Enforcement: Abuse Control or Notification?’, European Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2000, pp. 69-91. 
Hawk, B., ‘System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law’, Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 32, No.4, 1995, pp.937-989. 
Hortaçsu, A., Martínez-Jerez, F. & Douglas, J., ‘The Geography of Trade in Online 
Transactions: Evidence from eBay and Mercadolibre’, American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp. 53–74. 
Hovenkamp, H., Principles of Antitrust, St. Paul, West Academic Publishing, 2017. 
227 
 
Jenny, F. & Katsoulacos, Y., Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing 
countries: Legal and Economic aspects, Basel, Springer, 2016. 
Jones, A. & Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Jullien, B. & Rey, P., ‘Resale price maintenance and collusion’, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2007, pp. 983-1001. 
Kaplow, L., ‘Rules versus Standards: an economic analysis’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, 1992, pp. 557-629. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Zoido-Lobaton, P., ‘Governance Matters’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working paper, No. 2196, 1999.   
Kerber, W. & Vezzoso, S., ‘EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation: An 
Analysis from an Evolutionary Perspective’, paper presented at 10th International Joseph A. 
Schumpeter Society Conference (ISS), Milan, 9-12 June 2004. 
Kingstone, S., ‘A “new division of responsibilities” in the proposed regulation to modernize 
the rules implementing Article 81 and 82 EC? A warning call’, European Competition Law 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 8, 2001, pp. 340-348. 
Klein, B., Crawford, R. & Alchian, A., ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process’, The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1978, 
pp. 297-326. 
Klein, B., ‘The Apple E-books Case: when is a vertical contract a hub in a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy?’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2017, pp. 423–474. 
Kochan, D., ‘The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability through Public Participation 
Public Participation’, Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 601-622. 
Kovacic, W., ‘Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition 
Economies: The case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement’, Chicago Kent Law 
Review, Vol. 77, 2001, pp. 265-306. 
Kovacic, W., ‘Rating the Competition Agencies: what constitutes good performance?’, Geo. 
Mason. L. Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, pp. 903-926. 
Kovacic, W., Hollman, H. & Grant, P., ‘How does your competition agency measure up?’, 
European Competition Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, pp. 25-45. 
Krattenmaker, T. & Salop, S., ‘Anticompetitive exclusion: Raising Rivals’Costs to Achieve 
Power Over Price’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 2, 1986, pp. 209-293. 
Landes, W. M., ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’, University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1983, pp. 652-678. 
228 
 
Lao, M., ‘Resale Price Mantenance: The Internet Phenomenon and “Free Rider” Issues’, 
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 55,  No. 2, 2010, pp. 473-512. 
Lever, J., ‘The German Monopolies Commission’s report of the problems consequent upon 
the reform of the European cartel procedures’, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 23, 
No. 7, 2002, pp. 321-325. 
Lieber, E. & Syverson, C., ‘Online Vs. Offline Competition’, in M. Peitz & K. Waldfogel J 
(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Logelain, P. Competition Law: Self-assessment of contracts – Interaction of Eu Competition 
Law with Contract Law and Tort Law, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011. 
Long, W., Schramm, R. & Tollison, R., ‘The economic determinants of antitrust activity’, in 
F. Mc Chesney & W. F. Schughart II, The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public 
choice perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
Loss, F., Malavolti-Grimal, E., Verge, T. & Berges-Sennou, F., ‘European Competition 
Policy Modernization: From Notifications to Legal Exception’, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 52, No.1, 2008, pp. 77-98. 
Mankiw, G. & Taylor, M. P., Microeconomics, 4th ed., Hampshire, Cengage Learning, 2017. 
Mankiw, G., Principles of Microeconomics, 8th ed., Boston, Cengage Learning, 2018. 
Marvel, H. & McCafferty, S., ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification’ RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1984, pp. 346-359. 
Marvel, H., ‘How Fair Is Fair Trade?’, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 3, 1985, pp. 
23-35. 
Mathewson, F. & Winter, R., ‘The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance’, 
Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 13, No. 1/2, 1998, pp. 57-84. 
Mattos, C., ‘Um pouco da História da Lei 12.529/11’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, 
Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
Mattos, P., ‘Regulação econômica e social e participação pública no Brasil’, IX Congreso 
Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, 
Madrid, Spain, 2004. 
Mc Chesney, F. & Schughart II, W. F., The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public 
choice perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
Mc Chesney, F., ‘Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and In the Field 
of Competition Law’, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 52, 2003, pp. 1401-1412. 
Menard, C., ‘On clusters, hybrids, and other strange forms: the case of the French poultry 




Menard, C., ‘The Economics of Hybrid Organizations’, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, No. 3, 2004, pp. 345-376. 
Morais, L. D. S.,  Direito da Concorrência: Perspectivas do seu ensino, São Paulo, Editora 
Almedina, 2009, p. 155-169. 
Moreira Pinto, G., ‘A dosimetria das multas impostas em resposta às infrações contra a ordem 
econômica’, Prêmio SEAE 2010 sobre Defesa da Concorrência, 2010. 
Morettin, P. A. & Bussab, W. O., Estatística Básica, 5th Ed., São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 
2003. 
Moschel, W., ‘Change of Policy in European Competition Law?’, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2000, pp. 495-499. 
Motta, M., Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
Neven, D., Papandropoulos, P. & Seabright, P., Trawling for Minnows: European 
Competition Policy and Agreements between firms, London, Center for Economic and Policy 
Research (CEPR), 1998. 
Neven, D., ‘Removing the Notification of Agreements: Some consequences of ex-post 
monitoring’, in A. Bogdandy, P. Mavroidis & Y. Meny (Eds), European Integration and 
International Cooperation: Studies in International Economic Law in Honour of Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
Ng, W., The Political Economy of Competition Law in China, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2018. 
Nicolaides, P., ‘Development of a system for decentralised enforcement of EC competition 
policy’, Intereconomics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002, pp. 41-51. 
Niels, G., Jenkins, H. & Kavanagh, J., Economics for Competition Lawyers, 2nd ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 247 
North, D., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
North, D., ‘Economic Performance through Time’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 
3, 1994, pp. 359-368.  
North, D., ‘The new institutional economics and Third World development’, in J. Harris, J. 
Hunter & C. Lewis (Eds), Economics and Third World Development, Oxon, Routledge, 1995. 
OECD, Vertical Restraints for online sales, 2013. 
OECD, Relationship between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement: Brazil, 2015. 
230 
 
OECD, The competition analysis of vertical restraints in multi-sided markets – Note by 
Cafarra and Kuhn, 2017. 
OECD, Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil, 2019. 
Ogus, A., ‘The economic basis of legal culture: networks and monopolization’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2002, pp. 419–443. 
Ogus, A., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford, Hart publisher, 2004. 
Patel, K. K. & Schweitzer, H., (Eds.), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Peltzman, S., ‘Toward a more general theory of regulation’, Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, 1976, pp. 211–240. 
Pena, J., ‘Promoting Competition Policies from Private Sector in Latin America’, in, E. Fox 
& D. Sokol, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009. 
Pérez, S. & Scheur, S., ‘The evolution of the law on Article 85 and 86 EEC: Ordoliberalism 
and its Keynesian challenge’, in  K. K. Patel & H. Schweitzer (Eds.), The Historical 
Foundations of EU Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Pfeiffer, R. A. C., Defesa da concorrência e bem-estar do consumidor, 2010 (PhD thesis 
filed at University of São Paulo, São Paulo). 
Philipsen, N., Weishaar, S. E. & Xu, G., Market Integration: The EU Experience and 
Implications for Regulatory Reform in China, Heidelberg, Springer, 2016. 
Pindyck, R. & Rubinfeld, D., Microeconomics, 7th ed., Essex, Pearson Hall, 2009. 
Pirrung, M., ‘EU Enlargement towards Cartel Paradise? An Economic Analysis of the 
Reform of European Competition Law’, Erasmus Law and Economics Review, Vol. 1, 2004, 
pp. 77-109. 
Polisky, P. & Shavell, S., ‘The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of 
fines’, American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 5, 1979, pp. 880-891. 
Porter, M. E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, 
New York, Free Press, 1980. 
Posner, R., ‘Theories of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1974, pp. 335–358. 
Posner, R., ‘The social costs of monopoly and regulation’, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 83, No. 4, 1975, pp. 807–827. 
Posner, R., ‘The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1977, pp. 1-20. 
Posner, R., Antitrust Law, 2nd ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
231 
 
Posner, R., ‘Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy’, University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 72, 2005, pp. 229-241. 
Possas, M. & Pondé, P. ‘A análise de eficiência em práticas restritivas verticais: custos de 
transação e cláusulas de raio no mercado de shopping center’, in C. Campilongo & R. 
Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018, pp. 1012-1056. 
Queiroz, P. A., Direito Antitruste: Os fundamentos da promoção da concorrência, São Paulo, 
Editora Singular, 2018. 
Resende, J. P., ‘Ainda falta um guia de dosimetria de pena’, in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, 
Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
Reuter,T., ‘Private antitrust enforcement and the role of harmed parties in public 
enforcement’, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41, 2016, pp.479-507. 
Rey, P. & Stiglitz, J., ‘The role of Exclusive Territories in Producer’s Competition’, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, 1995, pp. 431-451. 
Rey, P. & Caballero-Sanz, F., ‘The Policy Implication of the Economic Analysis of Vertical 
Restraints’, European Commission Economic Paper, No. 119, 1996. 
Riley, A., ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! 
Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden’, European Competition Law Review, 
Vol. 11, 2003a, pp. 604-615. 
Riley, A., ‘EC Antitrust Modernization: The Commission Does Very Nicely – Thank you! 
Part Two: Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralization under Regulation’, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 12, 2003b, pp. 657-672. 
Rodriguez, A. & Menon, A., The limits of competition policy: The shortcommings of antitrust 
in developing and reforming countries. Biggleswade, Kluwer Law International, 2010. 
Sahuguet, N., Steenbergen, J., Verge, T., & Walckiers, A., ‘Vertical Restraints: Towards 
Guidance to Iron Out Perceived Enforcement Discrepancies Across Europe?’, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2016, pp. 274-279. 
Salomão Filho, C., Direito Concorrencial: as condutas, 1a. Ed., São Paulo, Editora 
Malheiros, 2007. 
Salomão Filho, C., Direito Concorrencial: as estruturas, 3rd Ed., São Paulo, Editora 
Malheiros, 2007. 
Salomão Filho, C., ´Evolução ou Involução do direito antitruste?´ in C. Campilongo & R. 
Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
Sampaio Ferraz, M. M., ‘Fixação de preço de revenda no e-commerce: uma análise à luz da 




Santacruz, R., ‘Exclusividade e competição no mercado de shopping centers’, in C. Mattos 
(org.), A revolução do antitruste no Brasil 2, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2008. 
Scherer, F. M., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed., Chicago, 
Rand McNally, 1980. 
Schimidt, C. A. J.,  ‘Crime e Castigo: Cartel no Brasil, algumas reflexões’, in C. Campilongo 
& R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora Singular, 2018. 
Schreuders, W., ‘Welcome in Brussels on the Rhine: A positive perspective on the EU’, in 
M. Faure, W. Schreuders & L. Visscher, Don’t Take it Seriously: Essays in Law and 
Economics in honours of Roger Van den Bergh, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018. 
Schuartz, L. F., ‘A desconstitucionalização do direito de defesa da concorrência’, Revista do 
IBRAC, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, pp. 325-351. 
Schughart II, W. F., ‘Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy’, in F. Mc Chesney & W. F. 
Schughart II, The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public choice perspective, 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
Schwartz, W., ‘An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement’, Georgetown Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, 1980, pp. 1075-1102. 
Shavell, S., ‘The Optimal structure of Law Enforcement’, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 
36, No. 1, 1993, pp. 255-287. 
Simonsen, R., História Econômica do Brasil, São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957. 
Smits, R., ‘The European competition network: selected aspects’, Legal Issues of European 
Integration, Vol 32, No. 6, 2005, pp. 175-92. 
Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público (SBDP), Revisão Judicial das Decisões do Conselho 
Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE): Pesquisa empírica e aplicada sobre os casos 
julgados pelos Tribunais Regionais Federais (TRFs), Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e 
Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Belo Horizonte, Editora Fórum, 2010. 
Sokol, D., ‘The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition Policy’, in, 
E. Fox & D. Sokol, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2009. 
Souam, S., ‘Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines’, International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19, No.1, 2001, pp. 1-26. 
Souter, W., Coherence in EU Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Spengler, J., ‘Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
58, No. 4, 1950, pp. 347-352.  
Stigler, G., ‘The optimal enforcement of law’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 
1970, pp. 526-536 
233 
 
Stigler, G., ‘The theory of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1971, pp. 3-21. 
Stiglitz, J, ‘Principal and agent’, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 3, 
1987, pp. 966–71. 
Sulivan, L.A., Antitrust, Minessota, West Publishing, 1976.  
Swaak, C. R., European Community Law and the Automobile Industry, Deventer, Wolters 
Kluwer, 1999 
Telser, L., ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade’, The Journal of Law & Economics, 
Vol. 3, (October) 1960, pp. 86-105. 
Todorov, F., & Torres Filho, M., ‘History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930-2010’, The 
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2012, pp. 207-257. 
Tollison, R., “Public Choice and Antitrust”, Cato Journal, Vol. 4, (Winter) 1985, pp. 905-
916. 
Van den Bergh, R., ‘Towards Efficient Self-Regulation in Markets for Professional 
Services’, in C. D. Ehlermann & A. Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004. 
Van den Bergh, R. & Camesasca, P., European Competition Law and Economics: a 
Comparative Perspective, 2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006. 
Van den Bergh, R., ‘Should Consumer Protection Law be Publicly Enforced? an Economic 
Perspective on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the Consumer Protection 
Laws of the Member States’, in W. van Boom and M. Loos (Eds.), Collective enforcement 
of Consumer Law, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007. 
Van den Bergh, R., ‘Vertical Restraints: The European Part of the Policy Failure’, The 
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2016, pp. 167-185. 
Van den Bergh, R., Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2017. 
Vaz, I., Direito Econômico da Concorrência, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Forense, 1993. 
Venit, J. ‘Brave new world: the modernization and decentralization of enforcement under 
article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2003, pp. 
545-80. 
Verissimo, M. P., ‘A “regra da razão” e o controle de condutas anticompetitivas pelo CADE’, 
in C. Campilongo & R. Pfeiffer, Evolução do antitruste no Brasil, São Paulo, Editora 
Singular, 2018. 
Watts, J., ‘Operation Car Wash: Is this the biggest corruption scandal in history?’, The 
Guardian, 1 June 2017. 
234 
 
Werden, G., ‘Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2011, pp. 87-111 
Wigger, A., ‘Revising the European Competition Reform: The toll of Private Self-
Enforcement’, Working Papers Political Science of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, No. 07, 
2004. 
Wijckmans, F & Tuytschaever, F., Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law (3rd ed.), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Wilks, S., ‘Agency Escape: Descentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in 
the Mofernization of Competition Law?’, Governance:  An Institutional Journal of Policy, 
Administration and Institutions, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2005, pp. 431-452. 
Williamson, O., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York, 
Free Press, 1975. 
Williamson, O., ‘Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transaction Cost Approach’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 4, 1979, 
pp. 953-993. 
Williamson, O., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press, 1985. 
Williamson, O., ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1991, pp. 269-296. 
Williamson, O., The Mechanisms of Governance, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Wils, W., ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’, World 
Competition, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2003, pp. 472-488. 
Wils, W., ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’, Journal of European 
Competition Law and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2013, pp. 293–301. 
Wils, W., ‘Private enforcement of EU Antitrust Law and its relationship with Public 
Enforcement: Past, Present and Future’, World Competition, Vol.40, No.1, 2017, pp. 3-46. 
Woods, D., Sinclair, A. & Ashton, D., ‘Private enforcement of Community competition law: 
modernization and the road ahead’, Competition Policy Newsletter, Vol. 2, (Summer) 2004, 
pp. 31-37. 
Wright, J., ‘Evidence-Based Antitrust Enforcement in the Technology Sector’, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle,  (March) 2013. 
Zarzur, C., Katona, L. & Villela, M., Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, São Paulo, 






Vertical agreements represent a broad variety of supply and distribution contracts involving 
diverse market players, such as suppliers of diverse production inputs, manufacturers, 
distributors and retailers. The study of vertical agreements was always a complex subject and 
constitutes a lively dispute for antitrust enforcement. Vertical agreements can be considered 
pro-competitive since they can solve double mark-up problems, prevent free-riding in both 
upstream and downstream markets, and reduce transaction costs of the firms that are in a 
vertical structure. However, these commercial contracts can also bring anti-competitive 
effects to markets, as they may increase collusive practices, reduce intra and inter-brand 
competition, and foreclose markets. The assessment of the welfare outcomes of such 
practices depends on the context in which they are implemented.  
This PhD thesis intends to propose an efficient antitrust policy framework applicable 
to vertical agreements. When it comes to the analysis of vertical agreements, we highlight 
that the effects of these practices are limited and less problematic when compared to the 
effects of horizontal agreements, as cartels. The complexity of the nature of vertical 
agreements brings a challenge to policy makers, and it also requires the conceptualization by 
the competition authorities of what is harmful to society, in order to guarantee that restrictions 
to competition do not take place. Whether a country will choose a lighter or stricter approach 
towards vertical agreements will depend on what are the goals of competition policy, i.e., 
what policy makers believe their competition policy should aim at protecting. 
The research focuses on a comparative analysis of the current vertical agreement’s 
legal framework in Brazil and the EU. By comparing the challenges of antitrust enforcement 
in two jurisdictions, this thesis opens new perspectives to analyse the evolution of both the 
rules and the institutional set-up of antitrust authorities concerning the complex assessment 
of vertical agreements. It is worth noting that the European Union antitrust regime has always 
influenced the Brazilian one.  
When it comes to policy applicable to vertical agreements, Brazil and Europe passed 
through a similar change: from an ex-ante notification system of agreements to an ex-post 
control of restrictive practices, although with some crucial differences.  
In the EU, the change from an ex-ante to an ex-post control of anticompetitive 
agreements was established by Regulation 1/2003, and it happened after forty years of a 
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notification system of agreements. This policy was accompanied by other complementary 
ones, such as the enactment of the Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines for helping 
firms self-assess the potential anti-competitive effects of their contracts, the strengthen of ex-
post enforcement and the creation of the European Competition Network. These 
complementary policies aimed at, among others, diminishing the legal uncertainties 
associated with the end of notification system.  
In Brazil, Resolution No. 17/2016 removed the vertical relationship threshold for 
notification, leaving the enforcement of anti-competitive vertical agreements in Brazil solely 
dependent on ex-post control. In contrast with Europe, the Brazilian authority (CADE) did 
not publish any guidelines to better inform business people, nor did it take any specific 
measures to strengthen the ex-post control. When it comes to Brazil´s experience in 
regulating vertical agreements, this PhD thesis argues that the established legal framework 
that favoured the ex-post control presents several limitations and threats for the optimal 
enforcement of competition law. Among the identified threats, it is highlighted: (i) the lack 
of consolidated antitrust jurisprudence with regard to vertical agreements and excessive use 
of settlements in Brazil; (ii) CADE´s institutional design and lack of specialized staff; (iii) 
the lack of clarity regarding antitrust sanctions and the methodology to set fines; (iv) the non-
existence of specialized antitrust courts, and unclear rules regarding private actions; (v) the 
lack of transparency and the influence of private interests in the law-making process; and (vi) 
the lack of social knowledge on antitrust matters. 
Even though the PhD takes the European experience as an important framework to 
take lessons from, the EU still faces some challenges when it comes to optimal enforcement 
of anticompetitive vertical agreements. The first challenge refers to the controversies among 
Member States about the application of EU Regulations and soft law instruments to cases 
involving the digital economy, such as selective distribution involving e-commerce, or price 
parity clauses (Most favoured nation clauses). The new realities of a more globalized, 
technology-driven and digitalized competitive environment may suggest the need for a 
clearer framework for assessing and balancing anti and pro-competitive effects of such 
restrictive practices. It should be acknowledged that the next years will be dynamic in the 
discussion of online and offline vertical agreements in Europe, since more enforcement 
action is expected regarding sales restrictions and digital conducts. Moreover, the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation is now under review, and the Geo-Blocking Regulation No. 
302/2018 is also applicable. 
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The second enforcement challenge in Europe is related to the different levels of 
enforcement of EU competition rules among the Members States. Not all the national 
authorities developed adequate enforcement procedures over time, and the institutional 
disparities among Member States remains a point of concern to be overcome by the 
Commission and the National Authorities in the coming years. The next years will be 
dynamic in the discussion of online and offline vertical agreements, since more enforcement 
action is expected regarding sales restrictions and digital conducts. Moreover, the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation is now under review,3 and the Geo-Blocking Regulation No. 
302/2018 is also applicable 
The PhD thesis discusses that the choice of an optimal antitrust enforcement policy 
applicable to vertical agreement should seek to minimize enforcement costs. And the 
assessment of these enforcement costs by policy makers shall consider three dimensions of 
costs: information costs, incentive costs and administrative costs. For this thesis, information 
and incentive costs are indirect costs mostly related to the lack of antitrust experience of law 
enforcers with regard to the assessment of complex vertical agreement cases, and to the lack 
of maturity and quality of the institutional set-up in each jurisdiction. And, administrative 
costs are the direct costs faced by the law enforcers and firms to comply with the applicable 
regulation. Because they are easier to compute, and because agencies are often facing budget 
constraints, administrative costs tend to be overstated in the law-making process. 
Taking this framework, this PhD thesis concludes that not always the change from an 
ex-ante to an ex-post control of vertical agreements is capable of enhancing the efficiency of 
law enforcement.  
 Most importantly, it is concluded that there is no unique design of antitrust policy 
that is capable of deterring anti-competitive vertical agreements and encourage pro-
competitive ones in every jurisdiction. In reality, the country may opt among (i) a notification 
of agreements by public authorities, (ii) a mixed policy option such as block exemption 
regimes, or (iii) an ex-post control by both public and private agents, depending on its 
antitrust experience and institutional set-up. The normative analysis also suggests that 
various combinations of policies and sanctions can establish similar levels of enforcement. 
For instance, Brazil could achieve greater levels of enforcement if the ex-post control of 
agreements is accompanied by complementary policies, such as the publication of guidelines, 
 




the increase in fines, the clarification of procedural rules for private actions and, the creation 
of specialized courts, among others.  
Considering that competition policies in Brazil have always been inspired by the EU 
policies, the main findings of this PhD imply a general warning of policy failures raised by 















Verticale overeenkomsten vallen uiteen in een breed scala aan leverings- en 
distributiecontracten waarbij verschillende marktspelers betrokken zijn, zoals leveranciers 
van uiteenlopende productiemiddelen, fabrikanten, distributeurs en detailhandelaren. Vaak 
zijn verticale overeenkomsten complex en over de wijze waarop het mededingingsrecht op 
deze overeenkomsten van toepassing is wordt bijna onafgebroken gediscussieerd. In 
sommige opzichten hebben verticale overeenkomsten positieve effecten in de zin dat zij 
concurrentie bevorderen. Deze effecten treden vooral op wanneer zij een double markup-
probleem kunnen oplossen, free-riding in zowel stroomopwaartse als stroomafwaartse 
markten kunnen tegengaan en de transactiekosten van de bedrijven in een verticale structuur 
kunnen verlagen. Tegelijkertijd kunnen deze commerciële contracten ook 
concurrentiebeperkende effecten hebben, doordat zij heimelijke prijsafspraken versterken, 
de intra- en intermerk-concurrentie kunnen reduceren en markten kunnen afsluiten. De 
beoordeling van verticale overeenkomsten en de welvaartseffecten van dergelijke praktijken 
is afhankelijk van de context waarin ze worden toegepast. 
Dit proefschrift beoogt een efficiënt mededingingsrechtelijk beleidskader te 
ontwikkelen dat toepasbaar is op verticale overeenkomsten. In de analyse van verticale 
overeenkomsten, benadrukt dit onderzoek dat de effecten van verticale overeenkomsten 
beperkt en minder problematisch zijn in vergelijking tot de effecten van horizontale 
overeenkomsten, zoals kartels. De aard van verticale overeenkomsten en de complexiteit die 
daarmee gepaard gaat, levert verschillende uitdagingen op voor mededingingsautoriteiten en 
vereist in het bijzonder dat zij zich een goed beeld vormen van de wijze waarop verticale 
overeenkomsten schadelijke effecten voor de samenleving tot gevolg kunnen hebben. Alleen 
op die manier kan worden gegarandeerd dat er geen welvaart verminderende 
concurrentiebeperking plaatsvindt. Daarbij zal uiteindelijk ook gelden dat het antwoord op 
de vraag of een land voor een lichtere of strengere aanpak van verticale overeenkomsten 
kiest, afhangt van de doelstellingen die dat land ten aanzien van het mededingingsbeleid 
koestert, dat wil zeggen in hoeverre beleidsmakers vinden dat het mededingingsbeleid gericht 
moet zijn op bescherming. 
 Het onderzoek was gericht op een vergelijkende analyse van het juridische kader 
zoals dat op verticale overeenkomsten in Brazilië en de EU van toepassing is. Door de 
240 
 
uitdagingen op dit terrein in twee jurisdicties te vergelijken, opent dit proefschrift nieuwe 
mogelijkheden om de evolutie van zowel de regels als het institutionele kader rondom 
verticale overeenkomsten te analyseren. De constatering dat Brazilië en Europa soortgelijke 
beleidswijzigingen hebben doorgevoerd met betrekking tot verticale overeenkomsten 
vormde het vertrekpunt voor het onderzoek. Brazilië heeft zich bij het ontwerp van 
mededingingsregimes zich altijd sterk laten inspireren door de EU. In beide jurisdicties werd 
een systeem voor voorafgaande kennisgeving of ex-ante toezicht van verticale 
overeenkomsten vervangen door een stelsel van ex-post controle. Ondanks de 
overeenkomsten tussen beide stelsels bestaan er ook nog altijd cruciale verschillen tussen 
Brazilië en de EU. 
De overgang van een ex-ante naar een ex-post controle van concurrentiebeperkende 
verticale overeenkomsten werd binnen de EU bereikt door Verordening 1/2003/EG. Dit 
gebeurde nadat de EU veertig jaar een systeem had gekend van ex ante toezicht. De nieuwe 
verordening ging gepaard met aanpalend beleid en maatregelen over onder andere: 
groepsvrijstellingen en richtsnoeren om bedrijven te helpen bij het maken van een 
eigenstandige analyse van de potentiële concurrentiebeperkende effecten van de 
overeenkomsten, de versterking van de ex-post handhaving en de oprichting van de Europese 
Concurrentie Netwerk. Dit aanvullende beleid was onder meer gericht op het verminderen 
van de rechtsonzekerheid die zou kunnen ontstaan door het beëindigen van het systeem van 
kennisgeving. 
In Brazilië kwam door resolutie nr. 17/2016 een einde aan de verplichting tot 
kennisgeving van verticale overeenkomsten. Als gevolg van deze resolutie werd de 
handhaving van het mededingingsrecht ten aanzien van verticale overeenkomsten in het 
vervolg volledig ex post vormgegeven. In tegenstelling tot haar Europese tegenhanger heeft 
de Braziliaanse mededingingsautoriteit (CADE) geen richtlijnen gepubliceerd om bedrijven 
te informeren over deze wijziging, noch heeft zij specifieke maatregelen genomen om de ex 
post handhaving te versterken. Ten aanzien van deze beleidswijziging in de Braziliaanse 
context betoogt dit proefschrift dan ook dat het nieuwe wettelijk kader heeft geleid tot 
verschillende beperkingen en bedreigingen voor de optimale handhaving van het 
mededingingsrecht. De volgende (geïdentificeerde) bedreigingen moeten daarbij in het 
bijzonder worden genoemd: (i) het ontbreken van geconsolideerde antitrust-jurisprudentie 
met betrekking tot verticale overeenkomsten en overmatig gebruik van schikkingen; (ii) het 
institutionele ontwerp van CADE en het gebrek aan gespecialiseerde medewerkers ; (iii) het 
gebrek aan duidelijkheid over mededingingssancties en de wijze waarop boetes worden 
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vastgesteld; (iv) het ontbreken van rechtbanken die gespecialiseerd zijn in 
mededingingsvraagstukken en onduidelijke regels over de mogelijkheid om civielrechtelijke 
vorderingen in te stellen; (v) de invloed van particuliere belangen op het wetgevingsproces 
en het gebrek aan transparantie daarover; en (vi) het gebrek aan gespecialiseerde kennis over 
mededingingsvraagstukken. 
Hoewel dit onderzoek de Europese ervaring als een belangrijk referentiepunt 
beschouwt van waaruit lessen getrokken kunnen worden voor Brazilië, is daarmee niet 
gezegd dat de EU geen uitdagingen meer kent. Ook de EU staat nog steeds voor uitdagingen 
als het gaat om de optimale handhaving van het mededingingsrecht ten aanzien van verticale 
overeenkomsten. Dat geldt ten eerste voor de toepassing van verordeningen en soft law-
instrumenten op onderwerpen die betrekking hebben op de digitale economie. De nieuwe 
realiteit van een meer geglobaliseerde, technologie gedreven en gedigitaliseerde 
concurrentieverhoudingen leidt tot een behoefte aan een duidelijker kader voor de 
beoordeling van concurrentiebeperkende en concurrentiebevorderende effecten van verticale 
overeenkomsten. Ten tweede zijn ook de verschillende niveaus van handhaving van de EU-
mededingingsregels tussen de lidstaten een uitdaging. Niet alle nationale autoriteiten hebben 
in de loop van de tijd adequate handhavingsprocedures ontwikkeld en de institutionele 
verschillen tussen de lidstaten blijven een punt van zorg. 
Dit proefschrift neemt tot uitgangspunt dat bij de keuze voor het mededingingsbeleid 
dat van toepassing is op verticale overeenkomsten moet worden geprobeerd de 
handhavingskosten van dat beleid te minimaliseren. Bij de beoordeling van de 
handhavingskosten moet rekening worden gehouden met drie typen kosten: 
informatiekosten, economische prikkelkosten en administratieve kosten. Voor dit 
proefschrift zijn informatie- en prikkelkosten gedefinieerd als indirecte kosten die 
voornamelijk verband houden met het gebrek aan ervaring van toezichthouders met 
complexe verticale overeenkomsten. Daarnaast worden deze kosten veroorzaakt door een 
gebrek aan volwassenheid en een gebrekkige kwaliteit van de institutionele structuur. 
Administratieve kosten zijn de directe kosten waarmee toezichthouders en bedrijven worden 
geconfronteerd wanneer zij aan de toepasselijke regelgeving proberen te voldoen. Omdat 
administratieve kosten eenvoudig te berekenen zijn, maar ook omdat 
mededingingsautoriteiten te maken hebben met budgettaire beperkingen, worden 
administratieve kosten vaak overschat in het wetgevingsproces. Vanuit dit uitgangspunt 
concludeert dit proefschrift dat de efficiëntie van de handhaving niet altijd verbetert door de 
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ex-ante controle van verticale overeenkomsten te vervangen door ex-post toezicht op 
verticale overeenkomsten.  
In het verlengde van het voorgaande is het van belang op te merken dat er geen 
antitrustbeleid bestaat dat eenduidig in staat is concurrentiebeperkende verticale 
overeenkomsten af te schrikken en concurrentie bevorderende overeenkomsten aan te 
moedigen. In werkelijkheid kunnen landen kiezen tussen (i) een kennisgeving van 
overeenkomsten door overheidsinstanties, (ii) een gemengde beleidsoptie zoals 
groepsvrijstellingsregelingen, of (iii) controle achteraf door zowel openbare als particuliere 
instanties, afhankelijk van de mededingingservaring en institutionele vormgeving. De 
normatieve analyse suggereert ook dat verschillende combinaties van beleid en sancties 
vergelijkbare of hogere handhavingsniveaus kunnen bewerkstelligen. Brazilië zou 
bijvoorbeeld een hoger handhavingsniveau kunnen bereiken als de ex post controle van 
verticale overeenkomsten gepaard zou gaan met complementair beleid, zoals de publicatie 
van richtlijnen, de verhoging van boetes, de verduidelijking van procedureregels voor 
civielrechtelijke vorderingen en de oprichting van gespecialiseerde rechtbanken. 
Het mededingingsbeleid in Brazilië is vaak geïnspireerd op het EU-beleid en de EU-
regelgeving. De belangrijkste bevinding van dit onderzoek komt dan ook neer op een 
algemene waarschuwing voor de transplantatie van mededingingsregels, omdat dit zou 
kunnen leiden tot beleidsfalen. 
 
 
